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Abstract
This work puts into close relationship the approach of Analytical Sociology, characterised 
by a search for explanatory social mechanisms, and the tools of Complexity Science, 
particularly useful for studying social systems characterised by non-linearity and out of 
equilibrium dynamics.
It starts by presenting arguments for analytical social research, touching on 
epistemological, theoretical and methodological issues. After having introduced and 
debated the analytical approach to social theory, it describes a kind of bounded rationality 
that seems to be consistent with both the methodological individualism implied by the 
approach and the need for final explanations of social phenomena. The focus then passes 
onto the choice of an appropriate tool for the analysis of social systems: Agent Based 
Simulations.
In the second half of the work this framework is applied to a social dilemma, voluntary 
public good provision. The critical point about the provision of public good is coimected to 
the general social dilemma of cooperation: individuals would improve their wealth by 
making a full contribution to the public good in the case of cooperation with others, but 
free riding can be widespread and have a strong impact on the system dynamics.
Thus the work, having introduced some not very common tools, concentrates on attempts 
to analyse and simulate the behaviour of subjects in economic experiments about the 
voluntary provision of public goods, pointing out that the mechanism in such dilemma is 
mainly the result of conditional cooperation. A case study of a rural community in Italy 
helps to validate the results and to direct attention to some other key issues, such as the 
structure of the interactions between the comimmity members.
The work ends by presenting a mechanism-based theoiy of voluntary public good 
provision that helps in understanding the boundaries of validity of social explanation and 
in extending it.
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Introduction
The present work analyses the approaches of Analytical Sociology and Complexity 
Science for studying social systems in detail.
The analytical approach to social tlieory is characterised by searching for explanatory 
social mechanisms, by using formal models and theories, and by being peivaded by 
methodological individualism. The approach refers to the works of sociologists such as 
Merton, Coleman, Elster, Boudon, Heldstrom and so forth. Tools coming from Complexity 
Science can be used to study social systems characterised by non-linearity and by 
dynamics out of equilibrium. Their application to social sciences dates back to the works, 
among the first and most influential ones, of Schelling and Axelrod.
The work presents methodological issues and the study of a social dilemma. Concerning 
the first half of it (that is to say the first part of the two into which it is divided), the aim is 
to define a framework for analytical social research, touching on epistemological, 
theoretical and methodological issues.
In the second half of the work (i.e., the last part) the framework previously defined is 
applied to a social dilemma, namely the problem of voluntary public good provision.
Public goods are not appropriable goods, the contrary of private goods. More precisely 
they are characterised by being non rival and non excludable. Public goods can be 
consumed by one person without subtracting consuming opportunities available to others 
like in the example of clean air. Public goods, once provided, are available to anybody, as 
in the example of sti'eet lighting.
In widespread empirical situations the provision of public goods is insufficient if not 
supported by institutional mechanisms which, by coordinating, monitoring, controlling, 
punishing individuals and modifying incentives, can raise the level of such goods 
provision. The problem is comiected to the general social dilemma of cooperation: 
individuals would better their wealth with a full contribution to the public good in the case 
of cooperation with others, but free riding behaviour can be widespread and have a strong 
impact on the system dynamics.
In particular, the work is organised as follows. The two parts into wliich the work is 
organised are divided into two sub-parts containing several chapters. The first sub-part 
deals with epistemological, theoretical and methodological issues: chapter 1 introduces and 
debates the analytical approach to social theory, pointing out differences with other 
approaches by presenting the kind of explanation searched for, that is to say social 
mechanisms, presenting examples of social mechanisms and introducing a kind of bounded 
rationality that seems to be consistent with both the methodological individualism implied 
by the approach and the need for final explanations of social phenomena. Chapter 2 starts 
from those points and explores the possibility of finding a versatile tool for Analytical 
Sociology. The tool is identified in Agent Based Models, which are presented and 
discussed by refening to one of the most widespread methodological approaches for their 
usage in the social sciences. By presenting the already existent approach, some problematic 
issues are raised and debated, pointing out the need to abandon such an approach and to 
coherently follow only the epistemological and methodological guidelines drawn by 
Analytical Sociology. The chapter ends with an explanation of how Agent Based Models 
are reported in this work and introduces a methodological peculiarity of Agent Based 
Models, called “indirect explanation”, which copes with the problem of the understanding 
of models outcomes.
Part Ib considers open methodological issues in using Agent Based Models following the 
analytical approach to social theory. Chapter 3 debates the relationship between models 
and empirical data by calling for an integration of modelling activities and the collection of 
empirical data. The chapter introduces the activities of micro specification and calibration, 
as well as macro validation: they aie all shown to be necessary for purpose of modelling 
and researching social systems. In addition, a typology of Agent Based Models is 
introduced, with the aim of helping to establish a ffuitfi.il relationship with techniques for 
empirically fomid models, and in accordance some good practices found in the literatme 
are reported. Chapter 4 deals with another problematic issue concerning the usage of Agent 
Based Models in the social sciences -  that of methodologically adapting social network 
analysis tools for the indirect explanation implied by these kind of models. Such a point is 
illustrated by presenting an abstract model where the care in using such tools for 
explaining systemic features is demonstrated to be necessary.
Part Ila of the work concerns the introduction of tools that are used in the following sub­
part. While it is plausible to assume that common practices for surveying social systems 
belong to the toolkit of any social scientist, the usage of experiments as a means to collect 
useful empirical data is not so common, nor is the usage of an optimisation heiuistic called 
Genetic Programming for inferring individuals’ behavioui". For these reasons, chapter 5, 
after having briefly debated the usage of surveys in the applied research presented in the 
following chapters, introduces experiments as a tool for empirical data collection. Chapter 
6, on the contrary, introduces Genetic Programming, a mathematical heuristic developed in 
the field of Artificial Intelligence. This will be exploited in the following chapters as a 
means to induce the behaviom* of subjects involved in experiments, starting from the 
collected data about their actions. The chapter then intioduces all related technicalities, 
making it easier to comprehend its working mechanisms and to evaluate the assumptions 
made when it has been subsequently applied to a given case.
Part Ilb presents the analysis of the social dilemma of interest, that is to say the voluntary 
provision of public goods.
Chapter 7 starts by introducing an experiment on public good provision made in the 
nineties by Andreoni. This experiment is considered as the empirical foundation for 
making “abstract” Agent Based Models of public good provision. After presenting the 
experiment, and its design and results, the inferring process of subjects’ behavioural rules 
is described. The rules of behavioui* which have been foimd are then analysed by 
evaluating the cognitive weight of their structure and comparing it to experimental 
treatments.
The chapter proceeds by classifying the inferred mles of behaviour according to a 
classification in tliree “idealised” kinds of behaviour: selfishness; imconditional 
cooperation; and conditional cooperation or reciprocation.
Chapter 8 focuses on verifying the analyses previously made on human behaviom* in the 
social dilemma context and on understanding the social mechanism underlying the 
phenomenon. To do so, many Agent Based Models implementing the rules of behavioui' 
mentioned before are presented.
Firstly, the “basic” models are presented and simulated: micro founding models, where 
outcomes obtained are identical to empirical ones. Then a long process for both evaluating 
the model robustness and finding clues about the social mechanism at work in public good 
provision starts. It is undertaken by testing the possibility of having different group 
allocations, different group sizes and different retiun rates for the considered goods. The 
main results are the effectiveness of the followed methodological procedure and the
discovery of several clues in explaining the dynamics of public good provision as strongly 
influenced by the presence of reciprocating behaviom in involved subjects.
The chapter then proceeds to verify that reciprocating behavioui' can be considered a key 
element in the explanatory mechanism by replicating the models run previously based 
upon inferred rules of behaviour, with new ones where behaviour is modelled according to 
tliree idealised kinds cited previously.
Starting from the conclusions of the two earlier chapters, chapter 9 introduces an empirical 
case where public good provision plays a key role in overcoming several challenges which 
the case is facing. Firstly, the phenomenon of a new kind of localised production system in 
riu'al communities is presented by explaining its historical evolution, its features, the 
diffusion in the world and the results obtained by several cases. Secondly an empirical case 
is chosen and presented. It is a case located in Italy and it is particularly important because 
it is one of the oldest examples of the new kind of productive organisation. By explaining 
the present structure on which the case is organised, several competitive challenges are 
presented: they stress the robustness of the internal structure and challenge one of the 
“supposed-to-be” key mechanisms for its success, i.e. its monitoring and control 
mechanisms that ensure cooperation. Thus, agent based models are presented to investigate 
if such an institutional mechanism for cooperation-enforcing is needed, aiming to shed 
light on possible future scenarios where such an institution will not be present. The result is 
the understanding that a monitoring mechanism capable of detecting deceiving partners in 
a short space of time is absolutely necessary; fbi'ther theoretical conclusions are also 
suggested. In fact, the model points out the importance of information flows for 
cooperation, and the structure of interaction particularly emerges as a key element in 
explaining social mechanisms of public good provision.
Chapter 10 concludes the work, presenting an attempt to define a mechanisms-based 
theory of voluntary public good provision.
The chapter starts by describing how a mechanisms-based theory could be derived: a 
mechanisms-based theory is defined as a theoretical construct where, using logic and 
deductive arguments derived fiom formal theoretical models, the limits of validity of the 
social mechanism that has been found previously and that explains voluntary provision of 
public goods. The proceduie to find the boundaries of validity and to better comprehend 
the explanatory mechanism at work in several different theoretical settings which take 
form as different system configurations is described in the following sections of the 
chapter. The mechanisms-based theory, in conclusion, will be capable of showing when 
and why the explanatoi-y mechanism works in different situations, for instance when 
individuals interact in small and large groups, according to small-world and scale-free 
networks, and so forth.
Before proceeding to the acknowledgments and ending the introduction, it is important to 
add that chapter 3 is the outcome of a joint work with Flaminio Squazzoni, which is online, 
published by Boero and Squazzoni (2005). Similarly, the model presented in chapter 4 has 
been developed with the help of Francesca Cavallaro, and has been reported in Italian by 
Boero and Cavallaro (2005). Some results presented in section 7.2, moreover, have been 
presented in an unpublished thesis for the “Dottorato di Ricerca in Bconomia Politica” at 
the University of Pavia (Italy) in 2004.
Particularly kind thanks should go to the supervisor of my PhD programme, Professor 
Nigel Gilbert. Other people who have strongly helped in the development of the research 
work, have been professors Pietro Terna, Massimo Egidi and Giancarlo Provasi, and my 
colleagues and friends Flaminio Squazzoni, Marco Castellani, Gianluigi Ferraris, Matteo 
Morini, Michele Sonnessa, and Francesca Cavallaro.
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Many thanks are also due to the universities and institutions where the research process has 
taken place, that is to say the universities of Suirey, Torino, Pavia and the Santa Fe 
Institute, as well as to participants of several conferences, seminars and workshops where 
parts of this work have been presented, such as SwarmFest in 2002 (Seattle), 2004 (Ann 
Arbor) and 2005 (Torino), the 5**' workshop on Experimental Economics 2002 (Siena), the 
EPOS (Epistemological Perspectives on Simulation) Conference 2004 (Koblenz) and the 
seminar at the Dipartimento di Studi Sociali in Brescia (2006).
A final acknowledgment is due to the people who made possible the research process of 
the empirical case reported in chapter 9. They are the staff of Slowfood (Bra, Italy) and of 
MIAC (Mercato allTngrosso Agroalimentare di Cuneo, Italy), Sergio Capaldo and the 
producers who have been inteiwiewed or who have responded to my postal questiomiaire.
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The Methodology o f Analytical Sociology:
The Analytical Approach to Social Theory and Its 
Modelling Consequences
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Chapter 1 
The Analytical Approach to Social Theory
The research approach referred to in this work is that of Analytical Sociology. The 
definition of the approach is based on the work of many sociologists, including Merton, 
Coleman, Elster, Boudon, Hedstrom and Schelling. Such an approach has found a 
systematic representation in Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998a) and in Barbera (2004), and 
these are the main texts suggested to the interested reader.
The approach starts by defining a particular form of explanation, the social mechanism that 
is “the” explanation in the social sciences because it is the kind of causal statement that can 
explain social phenomena.
The first section of this chapter, therefore, is devoted to the introduction of social 
mechanisms and to the other features which characterise the analytical approach.
Section 2 focuses on the differences with other research approaches such as the ones based 
on statistical relationships between variables and on covering laws. Section 3 introduces 
two different categorisations of social mechanisms, first pointed out by Elster and 
Coleman.
Section 4 presents many examples of social mechanisms, starting from classical authors to 
defining chains of mechanisms and introducing families of them. Some examples taken 
from Economics are introduced, aiming to show how economists often exploit the 
explanatory power of mechanisms, even if their approach is often quite far from the one 
here presented.
Section 5 deals with the possibility of “summarising” knowledge obtained in studied social 
mechanisms to build social theories. Starting fiom the idea that social mechanisms should 
avoid black boxes, it is shown how, fiom mechanisms, it is possible to build “middle- 
range” theories as introduced by Merton, and the reason is the possibility to abstract and 
generalise, with the help of some examples, families of mechanisms which are found in 
several different cases of contemporaiy social reality.
Finally section 6 introduces the themes of methodological individualism and of bounded 
rationality. The need for a “weak” version of methodological individualism is shown, as 
well as the one for final explanations. Thereafter the need for explaining human actions is 
demonstrated to be an element in supporting the need for a theory of rational choice and 
the possible choices are debated by refening to the considered epistemological fr amework. 
In conclusion a boimded rationality approach, called the “adaptive toolbox”, is presented as 
composed of fast and frugal heuristics, characterised by being ecologically rational.
1.1 Analytical Sociology and Social Causal Mechanisms
Analytical sociology is used as an approach towards social research that aims to exploit the 
explanatory power of social mechanisms in making sociological research. In the 
introductory essay of Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998a), the authors point out that “the main 
message of this book is that the advancement of social theory calls for an analytical 
approach that systematically seeks to explain observed associations between events”.
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considering that “much of modern social theory has a tendency ... to label, relabel, and to 
describe rather than explain” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998b, pp. 1).
Explanation, in analytical sociology, comes only in one form, that is to say, in terms of 
social mechanisms. Other explanations are not possible, because of the subject of study 
(societies) or because they are not true explanations but rather descriptions.
Therefore, two fundamental concepts rely on the basis of such an approach. The first one is 
the so called “social mechanisms”. The second one is their explanatory power.
1.1.1 Defining Social Mechanisms
Definitions of social mechanisms^ are many, and it is possible to proceed identifying a 
comprehensive one by finding its core elements in available definitions, which furthermore 
testify to the evolution of the concept in social research. The first definition worth being 
cited is that of Merton, who introduced middle-range theorising as the middle way between 
general social theories and descriptions, adding that middle-range theories are made of 
“mechanisms”. Thus the goal of sociology would be to understand mechanisms and their 
conditions, to discover which mechanisms are working in the considered phenomenon and 
to evaluate under which conditions they work and why they are there. Mechanisms in his 
words are “social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of the 
social structure” (Merton 1949, pp. 43-44).
In this definition some elements are still missing. An important one is how the social 
process relates to the social structure. An intuition on such an issue comes fiom 
Stinchcombe (1991, pp. 367), who pointed out that mechanisms work between “entities at 
different levels”, for instance between individuals and groups.
From a different point of view, mechanisms have been defined via their explanatory 
power. For example, Harré (1970) noted that a mechanism needs to have a key role in 
explaining a social phenomenon, while Elster (1998) reports the evolution of his 
interpretation of mechanisms, saying, for instance that in Elster (1983) he conceived 
mechanisms as antonyms of black boxes, in connection with a reductionist strategy in 
social science, while in more recent works he was referring to mechanisms as antonyms of 
(scientific) laws.
More recently, Boudon srmimarises mechanisms characteristics and purposes by explicitly 
referring to their explanatory power:
explaining a social phenomenon means identifying its cause(s). In most cases, 
the explanation takes the form of a more or less complicated set of causal 
statements. The relations between the elements of the set can be more or less 
complex... the set is what is we usually call a “social mechanism” (SM). An
’ The word ‘mechanism’ is often interpreted as synonymous o f ‘mechanical process’, “ a complex moving of 
parts possessing a constant structure which uniquely determine its operations, so that it will always respond 
in the same manner to a given external influence, repeat under the same external conditions the same 
movements, and which is capable of only limited number of operations” (Hayek 1952, pp. 122). But as it has 
been pointed out by Hayek (1952, pp. 122-123) for neural cognitive mechanisms in human beings, there are 
also mechanisms capable to (purposely or not) adapt other mechanisms’ operations to produce different 
results in the same external conditions. As well as in that case, social mechanisms define social systems 
where the internal structure can be modified as well as the range of operation can be extended depending 
upon experience. Thus social mechanisms do not directly imply a mechanicistic and static vision of social 
systems which can even show features like self-organisation, self-adaptation and purposive behaviour.
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SM is, in other words, the well articulated set of causes responsible for a 
given social phenomenon. (Boudon 1998, pp. 172)
Summarising the definitions just cited, two elements appear to be indispensable for 
defining social mechanisms. The first is the fact that they put in relation different levels of 
a social structure. These different levels will be, from now on, called the micro and the 
macro levels, but it is even possible to consider more than two levels. A very simple 
example of these two levels referring to a prototypical social phenomenon, is the one 
considering individuals as micro and societies as macro. Micro and macro are not, 
obviously, absolute dimensions, but they are defined and needed by mechanisms: a 
mechanism needs to consider a set of social phenomena, and a set of elements which are 
on a lower level. Mechanisms, thus, are relations, social processes which consider these 
two objects, and which call for many issues, from methodological individualism to the 
conception of how societies should be studied, fiom rational behaviour in individuals to the 
possibility of building social theories. Such points will be discussed later.
The second element is that mechanisms are explanations. They differ fiom other kinds of 
scientific explanations, and they are believed to have more explanatory power than others, 
for instance than laws, in the social sciences.
Combining the two elements, Hernes (1998) states that social mechanisms consider two 
sets of abstract elements, actors and their “staging”, and they are useful because they allow 
for understanding of their systemic effects. To say it in his words, “a social mechanism is a 
device for combining actors with a given set of characteristics (‘casting’) with a particular 
structure (‘staging’) in order to infer what outcomes will result (‘plotting’)” (Hernes 1998, 
pp. 95). Van Den Berg (1998, pp. 205) concludes that “if we accept that for analytical 
purposes it is useful to distinguish between macro-structural and micro-individual levels, 
then the explanatory task of any sociological theory consists of either providing an 
explanatory mechanism accounting for how structuie is converted by individuals into 
social action, or how such social actions aggregate to constitute social structures, or both”.
The distinction between micro and macro is thus not just a trivial separation between 
individuals and the aggregation. As well as the possibility of considering institutions and 
other kinds of actors as micro entities, the analytical approach is neither just the outcome 
of a methodological individualism that reduces social phenomena to individual actions 
(with both intentional and unintentional consequences) nor to social structures, and neither 
ignores the relevancy of actors nor of structures, but considers both, if necessary for 
understanding the social phenomenon of interest.
The micro-macro separation is thus dependent on the phenomenon of interest and on the 
elements of analysis, but it is led by the fact that some mechanisms needed to explain the 
phenomenon work between two conceptual different levels of elements, and one of these 
two is greater than the other in the sense that it contains the other. For instance, if the 
phenomenon of interest is a particulai* dynamic happening in a society, the macro level 
could be that social group, with all its characteristics, dynamics, rules, and so forth, while 
the elements aiding the description of the macro level could be the elements of the micro 
level, that is to say individuals and their relationships: the cause of the social phenomenon 
is the mechanisms that work inside the micro level and between the micro and the macro 
levels.
In other words, the distinction here considered between the micro and the macro is 
characterised by the following features:
• it is a relative, non-absolute, separation depending on the social phenomenon on 
focus and on the research process carried on by the scholar studying it;
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• it considers a micro level made by elements (from individuals to nations) who act 
and interact;
• it considers a macro level which represent the system made by the micro elements: 
it is worthless the discussion about the ontological status of the macro because 
micro elements can give birth to any kind of system (from families and companies 
to the state and international organisations) and the only requirement is that the 
features of interest of such a system must be obsei'vable (i.e., some featui'es of the 
macro must be measurable);
• the micro and the macro are separate for analytical purposes, but for the same 
reason they are put in relationship for explaining social phenomena: explanatory 
social mechanisms in fact often point out the effects of the macro on the micro and 
how the micro generates the macro.
As pointed out, the micro-macro concept is strictly dependent on the explanation of the 
phenomenon of interest. In this sense, the definition of mechanism is just depending on its 
explanatory power, and the fact of working on two different aggregation levels is just a 
implied characteristic. It is in fact implied hy considering social phenomena as the 
outcomes between different levels of action.
Social causal mechanisms are thus explanations of social phenomena, which, by describing 
the interdependencies and interactions inside and between two or more level of analysis in 
which each social system can be divided, show the causes of social system dynamics and 
features.
This definition syntheses the meaning of social causal mechanisms as interpreted by 
scholars belonging to the analytical approach to social theory. But such an approach is not 
only made by using mechanisms-based explanations because the adoption of such a kind of 
explanation implies some important methodological consequences.
As could have been particularly noted when discussing micro-macro social processes as 
causes for social phenomena, the analytical approach focuses on dynamics and processes, 
and the exploitation of mechanisms-based explanations is by itself a testimony of the 
attention to causal processes and to social systems characterised by, realistically, not being 
static.
1.1.2 The Need for Formal Models
The third fundamental element for the analytical approach, besides mechanisms-based 
explanations and the focus on dynamics, is the aim to use formal models and theories 
(Barbera 2004). There are two reasons for such an aim.
The first motivation for aiming to use formal models and theories of mechanism-based 
explanations is that they imply and verify the usage of rigid rules for transferring scientific 
knowledge and to verify that. Formal models and theories are “first-class” science, because 
while generally falsifiable, verifiable and understandable, they require coherence and they 
help to point out assumptions, hypotheses and thesis. Other kinds of scientific explanation 
such as verbal descriptions lacks of these features: they are only a verbal accoimt of the 
observation of a social phenomenon, interpreted by the obseiwer without the possibility to 
frilly state the exploited theoretical premises and the logical considerations made on the 
phenomenon. Such considerations, aiming to show the causal relationships determining the 
phenomenon are not, obviously, false by definition but are expressed in a way that is not 
easy to be falsified and verified in terms of coherence and empirical grounds.
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The second reason for choosing formal models is the possibility to abstract and generalise 
knowledge, without the aim of universality which is typical of laws. As noted in Boudon 
(1984), if we have a formal model as y  = ax + b, we could not apply it to any case if we 
caimot specify a and b. While description, as said, does not use this kind of formalism and 
thus does not allow eventual generalisation or the application of the developed knowledge 
to other empirical cases easy, covering laws, by definition, tend to assert that if y  is the 
kind of social phenomena to explain, the model is true for every instance of y  and for any 
value considered in a and b .^
Models, moreover, are not complete from the point of view of description, because they 
select in the complexity of reality the elements needed to explain, while the “specification” 
of their elements can serve two purposes.
The elements can be specified to make the model explain an empirical case. Or they can be 
specified by using abstract conditions which are however valid in the sense that make 
possible the understanding of many empirical cases which belong to a family of 
phenomena where many elements, as well as the causal explanations, are shared.
Formal models and theories are thus a way to avoid the disadvantages of both descriptions 
and covering laws when considering mechanism-based explanations and such a point will 
be further discussed in the following section.
1.2 Differences with Other Approaches
The analytical approach differs from other research approaches to social science because of 
many issues, but mainly because of the kind of explanation.
In fact the analytical approach differs fiom those using descriptions for understanding, and 
uses formal models to show that some social mechanisms are the cause of tlie phenomenon 
of interest, and the mechanisms-based explanation is what differentiates it from the ones 
based on covering laws and on statistical variables.
1.2.1 Statistical Approaches
Mechanisms are systematic sets of statements that explain how some inputs generate an 
output, that is to say that they explain the reasons for a systematic relationship observed 
between two entities. Mechanisms thus do more than just establish systematic covariation 
between variables or events (Elster 1989).
Statistical associations between variables have become one of the main methods of 
explanation in the social sciences. Coleman (1986) called such an approach, also known as 
“causal-modelling”, an “individualistic behaviourism” because there the individual 
behaviom- is determined by many individual and enviromnental variables, and the research 
work is to statistically estimate such influences. In this approach, “statistical association 
between variables has largely replaced meaningful coimection between events” (Coleman 
1986, pp. 1327) but such a practice of analysis is the opposite of mechanism-based 
explanation, where actors are responsible for determining social processes, and not 
vaiiables.
 ^The possibility to generalise the knowledge developed following the approach presented here and avoiding 
the pitfalls o f covering laws will be discussed below. An example will be presented too, in the last chapter.
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A similar point against causal modelling has been made by Boudon (1979, pp. 51): it 
summarises some useful information, but it does not explain it. “Understanding a statistical 
structure means in many cases building a generating theory or model”, and thus the 
“variables” approach should be refused as an approach to explain social phenomena, but 
should be exploited as a description approach, capable of pointing out relevant empirical 
phenomena to be explained by mechanisms.
1.2.2 Covering Laws
The causal explanatory power of mechanisms differs also from the classic covering-law 
model (Hempel 1942). According to that approach, explanations of events depend upon the 
fact that they imply a general law. A satisfactory explanation is, in that case, the 
identification of a general covering-law and of the conditions that make the law reproduce 
events such as in the specific case. Covering-laws can be deterministic or probabilistic, and 
in social sciences, according to Hempel (1942), more often refers to the latter kind of laws, 
the probabilistic ones.
Probabilistic laws in the social sciences are often made by statistical associations between 
variables. They thus do not explain why associations are in being, but they can be used as 
good predictors. Probabilistic laws in social sciences are thus made of black boxes, and the 
approach based on causal mechanisms aims to explain social phenomena, not only to 
describe and predict them, by distinguishing also “genuine causality and coincidental 
association” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998b, pp. 9). In other words, while black boxes 
explanations ignore the structine connecting the two considered events (i.e., the explanans 
and the explanandum) which are linked by non-random, systematic relationship; it focuses 
on the relationship, for instance by “discovering” the regression coefficient between the 
two events. On the contiary, the mechanism based explanation is interested in explaining 
and therefore in finding the causes for the systematic relationship which is, from the point 
of view of analytical sociologists, not an explanation but a description of a phenomenon^.
Laws obviously can be black boxes (i.e., it is not clear how they work), and in this case, 
even if they are reliable because they are capable of accurate predictions and descriptions, 
they are less useful than laws that describe how things happen. In social sciences laws are 
generally not transparent and thus they are black boxes. They are generally not capable of 
enough accuracy in describing and predicting, and those are the reasons of the 
unsatisfaction towards such an approach. But as Elster (1998, pp. 49) pointed out, when 
lawlike explanations fail, we must not “fall back on naiTative and description”, and we 
should refer to causal mechanisms.
A fui'ther point in supporting mechanisms against laws is in Elster (1998, pp. 69). As said, 
in social sciences laws are probabilistic and rely upon some statistical correlations. 
Causation and correlation have two very different meanings, and such a point is clear when 
compaiing a correlation explanation with a mechanism based one. For instance, imagine of 
having found a mechanism-based explanation which takes into consideration two distinct 
and opposite mechanisms: they aie tiiggered by the same conditions and they modify the 
outcome in opposite ways. While a statistical correlation could not help in discovering 
such issues and would lead to very inaccurate descriptions and predictions, the knowledge
 ^ Black boxes can thus be defined as descriptions of numerical relationships between the phenomenon of 
interest and some of the elements that are possible causes. The aim of black boxes is to be capable to 
numerically forecast the phenomenon by variation on its elements. In black boxes the attention is not on the 
identification of causes and explanations. Black boxes are thus made by a formal model of the phenomenon 
of interest, but such a model is not at all a causal explanation of the phenomenon itself.
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of the presence of opposite mechanisms can lead the scholar to understand how and when a 
mechanism prevails. To summarise, besides guaranteeing the possibility to understand the 
causal processes avoiding black boxes, the mechanisms-based approach can help in 
sepaiating casual and causal correlations, and the former are very common when more 
mechanisms are at work together and not all in the same direction.
In conclusion, it is worth adding, as suggested by Hernes (1998, pp. 74), the intrinsic 
differences between natural laws and social mechanisms. Covering laws, deterministic or 
probabilistic, can work in natural sciences, where they claim general validity by 
imiversality; also they can be falsified and refiised by a single counter example (that is to 
say by finding a case in which they do not work). Social mechanisms, on the contrary, 
claim limited applicability, even if general and abstract. They are not “theories to be 
confirmed or disconfirmed in general, but only confirmed or disconfirmed in specific 
applications” (Coleman 1964, pp. 516). They are “sometime-tiue theories”, and their fit 
can be evaluated by comparing their general implications with empirical facts: theories are 
better when explained by more facts, but it is not necessary to take into account all facts 
because of the risk of losing generality.
The last point is, as suggested, strictly connected to the complexity of social sciences, for 
which the covering law approach cannot be applied. This point will be discussed further 
later when the possibility of making social theories based on mechanism-based 
explanations is debated.
1.3 Typologies o f M echanisms
The social causal mechanisms as defined before can be building blocks of social theories, 
and they explain social phenomena by building mechanism chains capable of explaining 
fully their causes. To better understand mechanisms heterogeneity and the complexity of 
mechanisms chains, some typologies can be reported.
1.3.1 ‘A’ and ‘B’ Mechanisms
The first typology is the one proposed by Elster (1998, pp. 46) in the case of multiple 
mechanisms. We find mechanisms of type A when a set of conditions can trigger different 
several combinations of mechanism. In other words, “they arise when the indeterminacy 
concerns which (if any) of several causal chains will be triggered” (Elster 1998, pp. 46). 
Obviously with mechanisms of type A, after having identified them, it is worth focusing on 
the triggering conditions which determine the chain to be triggered.
The second type of mechanisms in Elster’s scheme is that of type B: “they arise when we 
can predict the triggering of two causal chains that affect an independent variable in 
opposite directions, leaving the net effect indeterminate” (Elster 1998, pp. 46). As 
mentioned in the previous section, mechanisms of type B make the difficulty of using 
coiTelations as explanations perfectly clear, and it is worth adding that they can come not 
only in pairs but also many together, affecting the independent variable in different 
directions and intensities: however, with type B mechanisms the net effect is not trivial.
For examples of mechanisms of type A and B, see section 1.4.2.
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1.3.2 The Macro-micro-macro Model
A second classification of mechanisms worth reporting is the one proposed by Hedstrom 
and Swedberg (1998b, pp. 21 ft) and based on the “famous” Coleman boat.
The Coleman boat has been introduced by Coleman (1986) as a model to represent 
influences of collective social action, and is also known as the “macro-micro-macro 
model”.
As in figure 1.1, which reports the proposed typology, Coleman’s fiamework considers 
micro and macro levels, and their reciprocal influences. If such influences are represented 
as social causal mechanisms, mechanisms will be as in the figure.
Macro Level:
Situational 
Mechanisms 
(Type 1)
Transformational 
Mechanisms 
(Type 3)
Micro Level: Action-Formation 
Mechanisms 
(Type 2)
Figure 1.1
The typology of social mechanisms proposed by Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998b) on the 
basis of the macro-micro-macro model of Coleman (1986).
As figure 1.1 clearly points out, the difference between mechanisms depends on the 
direction of the comiection between macro and micro levels.
Mechanisms of the first type, called “situational mechanisms”, are the ones where the 
macro level influences the micro elements. Many belief-formation and preference- 
fbrmation models have at their core the presence of mechanisms which linlc the social 
structure or other macro-social characteristics to the beliefs, desires, opportunities or 
behaviour of some actors. Situational mechanisms are those that define the specific social 
situation to which each actor is exposed and in which he will act. If the social system 
affects the actor (for instance, as said, by modifying his desires and behaviom), that will be 
the result of a situational social mechanism.
“Action-formation mechanisms” are entirely located at the micro level: they are 
mechanisms which modify actor behaviour depending on the presence of specific 
combinations of desires, beliefs and opportunities. They can be considered as 
psychological mechanisms in the sense that they modify actors’ behaviour not because of 
interaction and interdependence with the macro level or because of direct interaction with 
other actors at the micro level (that kind of mechanisms will be the third one, to be soon 
introduced). Action-formation social mechanisms depend upon the cognitive capability of 
human individuals to modify their behaviour both to adapt it to personal beliefs, etc. and 
to update the latters (i.e., personal beliefs, desires, etc..) depending on relationships of 
interdependence with other individuals. In other words, sometimes actors modify their 
behaviour not after the interaction with other individuals or with an aggregate, but before. 
Among the social capabilities of humans, there is in fact the capability to internalise the 
interdependence with other individuals or groups, and thus to anticipate the interaction.
The third type of mechanisms is the ones called “tiansfbrmational” because they define the 
macro outcomes. They are generally made by interactions of individuals at the micro level.
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In conclusion, while it is not clear if typologies are effective and useful in bettering the 
understanding of social phenomena with causal mechanism explanations, it has been worth 
reporting them here because they have been usefiil in introducing the relevant role of 
cognitive capabilities in humans decisions and actions, as well as the presence of many 
kinds of “relationships” or links between agents. We have at least been able to identify a 
strong and relevant difference in interactions and interdependences. Such issues will be 
detailed later as key elements in taking methodological choices.
1.4 Examples of M echanisms
From a historical point of view, Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998b: pp. 5, 6) correctly point 
out that an explicit use of the term “mechanism” in social sciences emerged just after 
World War II and, in particular, m the works of Merton in the late sixties.
1.4.1 Classic Sociology
But even before this, in classic sociology, some mechanism-based explanations emerged in 
explaining social phenomena. The best known example is the Weberian Protestant Ethic, 
where a cultural issue, at one moment in time, affects people’s behaviour, giving rise to 
unintended strong changes in economic activities. Other examples of mechanism-based 
explanations can be found in the works of Simmel and Duikheim: Sinimel explained the 
terthis gaudens as a causal mechanism based upon others’ actions; Durkheim analysed 
how the individual and the group affect the suicide rate.
A mechanism-based approach seems also in line with many lessons of Elias: as in the 
example of the French quadrille (Elias 1939a, pp. 19), where the “We-I balance” is put in 
focus as the complex aggregate dance is necessary to miderstand the movement of a single 
dancer that can not be understood if seen alone, while dancers are those who make the 
dance, and thus their behaviom* is needed to understand the aggregate outcome of the 
dance.
1.4.2 Concatenations of Mechanisms
Taking a look at other mechanism examples, it is worth stressing some further issues. 
Mechanisms do not generally come alone, but social phenomena are explained by 
concatenations (i.e., chains) of several mechanisms. That is always true, also because even 
mechanisms can be disaggregated in components. An example of tliat is reported in 
Gambetta (1998, pp. 104): despite the strong attitudes and policies against smoking in New 
York, walking along the city roads it is possible to obsei-ve many smokers and the streets 
covered in cigarettes stubs. The outcome is not unsurprising considering the following 
plausible mechanism: if smoking is not allowed in office buildings and private houses, the 
number of smokers on the streets will increase. But such a mechanism is not just one 
because it assimies many others. As the author notes it means that somehow “the social 
norm against smoking will be effectively enforced”, that “at least some smokers will not 
give up their addiction but persist in smoking even at the cost of doing it outdoors” and 
finally it means that throwing stubs away in the streets will be chosen among other 
possible behaviour, like putting them in garbage cans or in one’s pocket, etc...
21
Going back to a work of one of the pioneers of mechanism-based explanation, Elster 
(1998) has presented many examples of mechanisms, classifying them according to the 
typology previously presented.
For instance, considering type A mechanisms, he reported (Elster 1998, pp. 52 ft)
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), in which different beliefs, 
values and mental representations of others’ behaviour or expectations are in contrast 
because of inconsistencies with each other. Dissonance reduction (or avoidance) is a 
common process where some dissonant cognitions are modified or removed, and 
sometimes others are added. Such a process is generally intended to be imconscious, and 
can take many forms and mechanisms. Considering as an example the case in which 
“dissonance is generated by the presence of a desire that X be the case and a belief or 
suspicion that X is not the case”, there are at least five mechanisms to reduce the 
dissonance:
1. it is possible to try to modify the world so that X will be the case;
2. it is possible to accept the world as it is, accepting it to be different fiom personal 
desires;
3. beliefs can be modified, expecting X to be the case (i.e., “wishful thirrldng”);
4. desires can be transformed in less important thoughts, ceasing to desire that X will 
be the case;
5. desires can be modified, desiring X to be not the case (i.e., “sour grapes”, or 
adaptive preference formation).
While other scholars such as Kuran (1998, pp. 148) argued the existence of two types of 
dissonance, expressive and moral, it is a phenomenon that is acknowledged as social, in the 
sense that any kind of cognitive dissonance derives from social interactions and 
interdependences.
Dissonance reduction mechanisms are often relevant in explaining many social 
phenomena, and many examples of their explanatory power can be found in Kuran (1995), 
but here it is important to note the kind of mechanism, which can be considered at first 
glance a psychological one but wliich is intrinsically determined by the social dimension 
because it affects the personal set of desires and beliefs, and to stress the fact that under the 
words “cognitive dissonance reduction” several mechanisms are categorised, but they are 
very different.
Dissonance reduction is an example of a family of mechanisms: there is one common 
element, the attempt to reduce an inconsistency in cognitions, but there are many, possibly 
infinite, instances of the family, all different. Families of mechanisms are imporfant for |
knowledge shareability and for theory building, as will be discussed below. |
Another example of a type A mechanisms is the case of mechanisms on which Tocqueville |
based his analysis of American democracy. To use Elster’s words (1998, pp. 54), they are: j
• the spillover effect that is “if a person follows certain patterns of behaviour P in one |
sphere of his life, X, he will also follow P in sphere Y”; i
• the compensation effect is that “if he does not follow P in X, he will do so in Y”; j
• the crowding-out effect is that “if he does follow P in X, he will not do so in Y”. |
Many examples can be drawn fiom people and politics: it is clear how, because time is 
bormded, the increasing participation in one sphere of activities is at the expense of others 
(crowding-out effect), while if people participate in decision making and problem solving 
activities at work, they will also be more willing to accomplish similar tasks in the political
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sphere (spillover effect). However, if people cannot have access to democratic behaviom' at 
work, they will tiy to regain their space of fieedom in other spheres, such as in politics 
(compensation effect).
Passing to type B mechanisms, the examples reported by Elster are the coexistence of 
contrast and endowment effects and the one of desires and opportunities.
The first case is related to past events and their memory. In fact, after a past experience, 
there is always an endowment effect, that is the fact that a memory of a good experience is 
a good memory, and is the opposite for a bad experience, and the contrast effect, that 
makes a bad memory help in tolerating the present evaluated as “mediocre” while a good 
memory makes it impossible to accept. The same events trigger opposite psychological 
mechanisms, which can be found as core ones in many social and economic processes, 
making it necessary to study deeply the conditions determining the net effect.
The second case recalls the “Tocqueville’s effect” (Elster 1998, pp. 58) in explaining 
revolutions. When conditions improve, it is not clear if discontent decreases because, on 
one side there is, for instance, the improving of economic welfare, but on the other side 
such an improvement can raise aspirations or make the satisfaction of other needs more 
important.
1.4.3 Mechanisms in Economics
Another similar example of type B mechanisms that can easily be added to this non- 
exhaustive list is the case, well known in economics, of coexistence of income and 
substitution effects.
In a framework composed by a consumer spending his endowment on two goods (X and 
Y), a decrease in the price of good X causes a substitution effect, that is to say the fact that 
the endowment will allow for the buying of more X goods. But there is also an income 
effect: the consumer puichasing power has increased by lowering X price, and thus the 
consumer could also buy more Y by keeping the level of bought X as before or by 
increasing it just a little. What will be the net effect on X consimiption, with static 
preferences and respecting budget constraints? The answer depends on conditions. For 
instance, economists have studied the conditions to have a negative net effect, that is to say 
a decrease in X price generates a diminution in its consmnption. It is the case in which the 
income effect over-compensates the substitution effect, and the goods for wliich that 
happens should respect thiee necessary conditions (i.e., the good must be an inferior good, 
there must be a lack of similar substitutes, and the good must weigh a lot in the consumer’s 
total expenditure) and they are called “Giffen goods”.
In concluding this short and quick introduction of a few examples of social mechanisms, 
we can underline two major points with which it is possible to move on fui’ther.
The first point is that mechanisms can be categorised, and they can be understood even in 
general terms. As in the cases of families of mechanisms which have been reported, as well 
as in many others (just as a frirther reference, see Hedstrom 1998 for an introduction to 
mechanisms of rational imitation), mechanisms can be concatenated and co-exist for 
explaining empirical phenomena, but some of them share the same function or working 
elements, and thus they can be generalised as mechanisms that can be found in many social 
processes.
The second point concerns the last example introduced, taken from Economics literatuie. It 
is a common opinion among analytical sociologists that economists use explanatory social 
mechanisms (see Cowen 1998). Here the objections are several. As a first element to refuse 
such a position there is the aim of not considering social relations as determinants of
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economic activities. Such an aim has been applied every day since the methodological 
positions of John Stuart Mill about the only relevancy of economic relationships to 
understand economic phenomena (and the definition of Economics as the “separated” 
science that talces in consideration only economic facts), and thus economists do not 
consider social mechanisms because often avoid considering the existence of concepts like 
society, social ties, and so on. Moreover their conception of aggregation is limited to the 
concept of groups in a few rare cases of analysis (for instance the one of public good 
provision, presented in the last chapters): such an miwillingness to consider more realistic 
and complicated forms of sociality should not be envied. A second element is the fact that 
economists use mechanisms, as coiTcctly noted by sociologists, but not for explaining the 
causes of economic phenomena. This point will be fuilher analysed in the last section of 
the chapter, when discussing rational choice theory, but for now it is important to stress 
how even if economic models underlie mechanisms at any level (from national 
accountancy relations to micro foimded models, from game theory to consumer and 
production theory), they do not have explanatory power but they are chosen depending on 
their fitness to make the system mathematically tractable. The intention of economists is in 
fact the one of finding covering laws, and to build them starting from tractable 
mechanisms. A simple example of such an aim is the theory of general equilibriimi as well 
as the economist’s attitude towards mechanisms that is represented by the famous “as-if ’ 
methodology introduced by Friedman (1953) which is an epistemological justification on 
the usage of black boxes in economics (for a fui’ther discussion of such an issue, see the 
last section of this chapter). In the case of economists, thus, mechanisms allow for the 
building of a covering law, and the as-if principle in fact states that assumptions on 
behaviour and other model elements (i.e., mechanisms) do not have to be realistic because 
that is not the goal of economic science. In conclusion, economists use umealistic and non- 
causal mechanisms to find covering laws, and that is quite a different approach from the 
agenda of analytical sociology.
The discussion about explanations developed in mainstream Economics gives the 
opportunity to point out the differences between processes and mechanisms and between 
the latter and laws.
The term mechanism is preferred because a process generally identifies a series of changes 
that natuially occm following some pre-defined steps with the aim of obtaining a particular 
result. Social changes do not always happen in this way and thus the term “mechanism” is 
a more general one that is capable of including processes but also systemic outcomes that 
are imintended and due to the interaction of micro elements changing their behaviom* 
through time.
In a similar* way, the term “law” usually refers to something intrinsically static, aiming at a 
broad validity (i.e., an explanation static over time and space). As has been discussed 
tlrr oughout this chapter, the kind of social explanation that is proposed here is characterised 
by being developed in specific cases and by being extended to more general phenomena 
only if it is feasible: that is to say that the explanation is not rmiversal by definition but it 
can be in the case in which it works for all the empirical cases that can be considered.
1.5 From M echanisms to Theories
 ^The last chapter of this work will show an example of the process of extension o f an explanation developed 
in a specific case, underlining the scientific relevancy of such a process.
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As seen, among the many definitions of mechanisms, the comiection between micro and 
macro levels plays a key role. Stinchcombe (1991, pp. 367) contextualised mechanisms 
with theories: “mechanisms in a theory are defined ... as bits of theory about entities at a 
different level (e.g., individuals) than main entities being theorized about (e.g., groups), 
which serve to make the higher-level theory more supple, more accmate, or more general”.
1.5.1 Finding Mechanisms by Theoretical Hypotheses
Such a point requires further clarification. It is often difficult to directly identify and 
observe explanatory social mechanism in empirical settings and, as said, mechanisms are 
analytically relevant as explanations of social phenomena. As in the well known examples 
of electrons and other small physical particles which have been firstly theorised and then 
observed, a research process searching for explanatory mechanisms ftequently follows a 
similar path.
Mechanisms are often, at the begimiing of the reseai'ch process, just unobseived and 
theoretical constructs. In that phase they provide hypothetical links between observed 
events. Then, the research process obviously goes on, and the hypothesised mechanism is 
subject to empirical tests to understand if, among the infinite possible analytical constructs 
that can be hypothesised, the chosen one is capable of explaining the final causes of the 
phenomenon.
Such a research path underlines many important issues of analytical sociology. Using 
mechanism-based explanation means using formal models with which the hypothesised 
mechanisms are expressed and verified, and thus the analytical approach to sociology 
implies the usefulness and the necessity of theoretical analysis. Reality is in fact abstracted, 
and even if a continuous reference to empirical reality is made, just some supposed-to-be 
relevant elements of the real world are considered because it is impossible to consider the 
whole complexity of the real world. Such a research strategy is obviously criticised by 
scholars considering verbal descriptions as the only means to understand social processes, 
it is also criticised by scholars advocating the need for general theories made by covering 
laws: the middle position of mechanism-based models between descriptions and covering 
laws seems to them to be too specific and too detailed to allow the comprehension of social 
dynamics,
1.5.2 Mechanisms and Black Boxes
Moreover the important issues of the relationship between models and empirical reality are 
touched. In a research agenda that searches for explanations and that avoids any kind of 
black boxes^ and descriptions, the relationship with empirical data should be very close, 
and in fact the continuous validation of models and of their mechanisms with obseived 
data is the only way to avoid the trap of black boxes and to improve explanations.
 ^ In common language the term “black box” identifies a device contained in a single unit with a specific 
purpose, well known, and with an internal structure and working mechanisms which is generally unknown. 
Here the term “black box” refers to any model, logical construct, or more generally any system supposed to 
contain scientific knowledge, that is capable o f generating an output given an input. The output that is 
generated (or derived, or induced, etc...) by the black box is useful for scientific purposes if close to 
observed empirical patterns obtained giving the same input. To be extremely synthetic, the main advantages 
of a “good” black box can be identified as its predictive capability and its mimicking capability of reality, 
while its main disadvantage is the impossibility or the difficulty to understand why the output is generated, 
that is to say the difficulty to “open” the black box.
25
The importance of such validation processes of mechanisms with observed data is well 
stressed in literature. A particularly effective example has been made by Hernes (1998, pp. 
76 ff). A 1990 survey made in Norway showed the intriguing statistical result that women 
are more often than men stung by wasps. The author hypothesised a set of possible causal 
mechanisms, from different attitude of women towards pain to different gender based 
activities which lead women to spend more time outdoors, from a cliche-based explanation 
of women’s hysterical behaviom* attracting wasps to the “weakness” of women towards the 
usage of perfumes and other cosmetics generating a scent capable of attracting the insects. 
All of these explanations are possible and have a similar degree of plausibility, in fact they 
do not state hypotheses that a priori have been scientifically denied and they refer to 
ai'guments well rooted in common knowledge (perhaps wrong Imowledge, but 
widespread). Considering also that an infinite set of other possible mechanism-based 
explanations can be hypothesised to explain the phenomenon of interest, how can we find 
the causal explanation of such a problem?
Hernes showed how theoretical analysis, via logical verification and comparison with other 
similar phenomena found in literature, can help in eliminating some candidate explanations 
and to modify and improve some others, but it is clear how the comparison with real data 
and perhaps the collection of new data about the.problem can shed light upon the 
mechanism involved in generating the result (or, better, upon the coexistence of several 
mechanisms generating the result).
The research process based on explanatory mechanisms is thus characterised by a passage 
ft'om theory (i.e., from hypotheses suggested by theories) to empirical reality (i.e., to 
mechanisms which are causes of phenomena). But the agenda of analytical sociology 
considers also the passage back from empirically validated mechanisms to theory.
Mechanisms based explanations can in fact be good ingredients for good social theories. 
Always remembering the assumptions on which the analytical approach is based, that is to 
say the presence of causal mechanisms involving different levels of social structure as 
determinants of social dynamics, it is possible to use the so defined mechanisms to build 
up theories.
1.5.3 Mechanisms-based Theories
As Schelling (1998, pp. 32) pointed out, “a social mechanism may comprise many 
theories” for the reason just seen that is connected to the research path in discovering 
explanations, but “a theory may comprise many social mechanisms”.
How can mechanisms be organised and generalised to form theories? A starting point is the 
concept of a family of mechanisms which has been already introduced.
Families of mechanisms are “mechanisms that produce similar results, and enjoy 
similarities but also differences” (Schelling 1998, pp. 38). Some fuither examples can be 
useful to understand them and their role in theory building.
An example of family of mechanisms very well known and cited by Schelling (1998) and 
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998b) is the one that dates back to the work of Merton (1949) 
and is called the “self-fulfilling prophecy”. Many mechanisms can be found in many 
empirical cases (from coffee shortages to insolvent banks) which resemble the general 
case, i.e. that “an initially false definition of a situation evokes behaviour that eventually 
makes the false conception come true” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998b, pp. 18).
A second example is represented by “network diffusion” mechanisms, which date back to 
the work of Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1957 and 1966). The diffusion of new products, 
habits, values, etc... is strictly influenced by the social network structme and by the fact
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that individuals are more open to adopt innovations if other neighboming individuals have 
already done so, making clear the true value of the innovation. Even in this family of 
mechanisms, many similar but different mechanisms have been found capable of 
explaining the diffusion of imiovations, from new drugs to entrepreneuiship.
A third and final example of families of mechanisms is the Granovetter’s thr eshold theory 
of collective behaviour* (Granovetter 1978). “Threshold based behaviour” is when the 
decision of an individual to join a group for a collective action or to behave in a particular 
manner is dependent on the number* of other* individuals who have already joined the group 
or* started to behave in that way. Individual heterogeneity of tliresholds, as well as the 
different structure of the problem, gives rise to many different thr eshold based mechanisms 
that can explain many empirical phenomena, fr om choice of restaurants to minority games.
It is evident how families of mechanisms are usefiil analytical and theoretical constructs: as 
models or theories of social dynamics they can be used effectively in finding causes of 
empirical social phenomena. Meanwhile the research process and scientific evolution will 
go on to define their* details, discovering the conditions when some mechanisms of a given 
family are more probable to be foimd and why.
Moreover, as a fur*ther example of how mechanism-based explanations of social 
phenomena can be generalised and can be elements of social theories, consider the three 
families just introduced. They can be generalised in a miique larger family of belief- 
formation mechanisms. In each sub-farnily and in each of their members there is a 
mechanism in which the number of individuals who adopted a behaviour represents a 
signal on the evaluation that should be given to that choice, and thus they influence other 
actions by modifying personal beliefs.
Social theory is then richer because we know that belief formation is often a social process, 
and we know at least tlnee sub-families of mechanisms which define the interdependence 
between the diffusion in the social aggregate and personal beliefs. Such a set of families 
and mechanisms can be used as a good theory for social formation of beliefs. Moreover 
such a theory is a starting point to understand new empirical cases, and it needs to be 
further investigated to understand the condition for the different sub-families to emerge 
and to be preferable, their evolution, the limits of their applicability, and so forth.
In conclusion the analytical approach to social research does not just call for final and 
causal explanations, but also testifies in many ways the utility of theorising in the social 
sciences. The attempt to find the concatenation of causal mechanisms that determine the 
social phenomenon means the identification of the actors and of their social structure, of 
the basic mechanisms and of their concatenation, as well as of their triggering conditions: 
such a knowledge seems to go in the direction of the specific, full of detail, and far from 
generalisation. But, when already found and accepted mechanisms are considered, it is 
evident how empirically found mechanisms have many similarities and thus the 
generalisation process is possible and useful.
In the last chapter an attempt to build a mechanisms-based theory will be presented: the 
considerations reported here will be developed and expanded upon there to be fully 
coherent along with the rest of the epistemological and methodological approach.
1.6 Methodological Individualism and Final Explanations
The program of methodological individualism in the social sciences can be synthesised as 
the acceptance of the concept that each social phenomenon can be explained as the result 
of individuals and their behaviour.
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Social mechanisms as explanations of social phenomena are, as already shown, a kind of 
explanation which is coherent with methodological individualism because it implies the 
presence of interacting and interdependent actors who, by their behaviour, determine social 
aggregates, which, at their time, influence individuals, and so forth.
In fact in social sciences the finest grain in analysis can be reached by considering the 
smallest unit of causes, the causal agent at the base of the system, which here is 
represented by actions of individuals.
1.6.1 ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ Methodological Individualism
It can be useful to distinguish between strong and weak versions of methodological 
individualism when considering the analytical approach to social science, as suggested in 
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998b, pp. 12).
The strong version of the program accepts only rigorous bottom-up explanations; the weak 
version accepts the presence of unexplained or exogenous social phenomena in 
explanations. This latter interpretation of the program seems to be the one most suitable for 
explaining human societies; while perhaps the first can be used for explaining animal 
societies.
Human societies are in fact characterised by the capability to transfer and inherit 
knowledge and cultural issues, surviving its members’ life spans (see Cilliers 1998). This 
is the reason why so many institutions, norms, rules, etc are present in our societies, and 
the process that caused such interesting social phenomena is a very long and complicated 
one, of which the institutions we can observe today are just the last expression.
Our social world seems too difficult to be explained if, investigating it scientifically, we 
should consider each element as an endogenous one.
Thus, while “the weak version of methodological individualism agrees with the strong 
version in assuming that all social institutions in principle can be explained by only the 
intended and unintended consequences of individuals’ actions”, but “faced with a world 
consisting of causal histories of nearly infinite length, in practice we can only hope to 
provide information on their most recent history” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998b, pp. 12). 
The Analytical Sociology approach thus embraces a weak version of methodological 
individualism, using principles of realism and relevancy at the basis of the needed process 
of taking assumptions for mechanisms mgredients that do not directly refer to individuals’ 
actions, and thus considering influences coming from macro outcomes “previously” 
generated (from a historical point of view).
By accepting such an approach other issues are automatically set: for instance it derives the 
claim that each institution is a social outcome, and is thus generated by a social process 
involving individuals, even if sometimes it is worth considering it as it is and as it works, 
for focussing attention on other causal mechanisms. In other words, the presence of norms, 
institutions, habits, and so on in mechanism-based explanations can be allowed without 
explaining their origin and evolution when the thne scale of their dynamics is far slower 
than the one of the social dynamics on which the research process is focused.
1.6.2 Final Explanations
Besides institutions, norms, etc. many other cases can be presented by elements 
participating in social mechanisms but which are not explained. To flirther clarify this 
point, it is worth re-considering the characteristics of the explanation the analytical 
approach of social sciences is looking for.
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As is self-evident, in a complicated field such as social research, explanations are always 
incomplete: just thinldng about a specific group dynamics, even if an explanation can be 
found for this phenomenon, many other questions can be raised, such as why the 
individuals are participating in the group, and so forth, infinitely.
Considering that for the sake of practicity, scientific research must go on by following an 
additive path that allows for the re-use of knowledge already developed, and by exploiting 
a selective strategy that in the complicated reality selects “modular” systems, which are in 
reality open and nested, but that are considered closed for analytical puiposes, the issue is 
about how different degrees of incompleteness can be evaluated, and that a research 
strategy can be followed to select both the degree of details and the elements to be 
considered explaining social phenomena.
Among the practitioners of the analytical approach to social research the main author who 
has dealt with this problem is Boudon (1998, pp. 172 ff), even if the point plays a key role 
for all authors because of the search for causes that characterise the approach.
The starting point of the author is that an explanatory social mechanism is, as already cited, 
“the well-articulated set of causes responsible for a given social phenomenon”. But some 
explanations do not appear to be “final”. The example suggested is the sentence “a legal 
limitation of rents provokes a degradation of housing”. Such an explanation is not final 
because some pieces of the mechanism are missing, and it is not clear how the cause 
generates the effect. If we suppose that “the owners, who have the exclusive capacity of 
repairing the houses, are not incited to do so when this cost exceeds the benefit that they 
draw from renting their houses”, we will get a final answer, wliich does not immediately 
call for other questions. The reason for such a social mechanism to be final is the fact that 
it describes the behaviour of actors. In Boudon’s words the fact of being a final explanation 
is due to “the character of being individual decisions” and that “implies that the 
explanation of the social mechanism in question has been analysed in terms of the 
methodological individualism paradigm”.
Nevertheless, explanations of social mechanisms not following methodological 
individualism exist and are useful because they lead to the right questions needed to 
understand the final explanation. But even if “social mechanisms and methodological 
individualism imply each other only to the extent to which final theories are aimed” 
(Boudon 1998, pp 173), having an explanation based on the methodological individualism 
paradigm does not imply that such an explanation is final.
In fact methodological individualism does not guarantee the absence of black boxes. For 
instance, when explaining a social phenomenon, it is not acceptable to state just that 
individuals behave in a maimer because they have been socialised to do so. Even if the 
individuals’ behaviour is the cause of the social phenomenon, and even if it is quite 
important to understand that the phenomenon is the consequence of individuals’ behaviour, 
too many other unanswered questions are still present.
The final explanation must thus not consider black boxes, to paraphrase Boudon’s 
conclusions, and that means that individual behaviom* has to be explained.
This final point opens the problematic box of individual rationality, but before proceeding 
it is worth smnmarising what has been pointed out following Boudon. Social mechanisms 
to which the analytical approach to social research aims are explanations of the causes of 
social phenomena, and they are final explanations because tliey do not comprehend black 
boxes. They refer to individual choices and behaviour, explaining the reasons behind them, 
in terms of influences and interdependences at both the micro and the macro levels. The 
fact that individuals’ choices have reasons, influences, interdependences, etc. means that 
they are “rational choices”, i.e. they are grounded on some reasons.
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1.7 Integrating Analytical Sociology: Ecological Rationality
The focus of analytical sociologists is thus aimed at finding social causal mechanisms 
based upon individual actions - actions that are to be explained in terms of reasons, leading 
individuals to a specific behaviour.
While some scholars (such as Coleman and Manzo -  see for instance Maiizo 2006) seem to 
have embraced the perfect and unbounded model of rationality exploited also by 
economists, my position is that such a solution is equal to a black box.
The evolution of cognitive sciences has in fact pointed out the many relevant boundaries to 
human capabilities in cognition and computation, issues that make the perfect rationality 
model umealistic and thus a black box that could be eventually accepted according to the 
“as i f ’ principle for describing human behaviour. But if the focus is also on explaining the 
reasons for such a behaviour, as in the case of analytical sociology, the “as if” principle, 
that is to say just another example of a black box, should be refused. We must focus on 
finding more plausible and explanatory powerful models of rationality, such as the one that 
will be introduced below, as a necessary integration of the analytical sociology approach.
1.7.1 Bounded Rationality
Boudon showed how the two postulates (that is to say the methodological individualism 
paradigm and the rational choice model) are important and how the fact of referring to a 
rational choice model does not directly imply the embracement of any particular kind of 
model. (Boudon, 1998). In fact as well known, many approaches for modelling rational 
behaviour have been proposed and used in the social sciences.
While a complete review of those several approaches is not worth including here, it is 
useful to evaluate two facts. The first is that most approaches are based on utility functions, 
while the second is that, everyday, more acceptance and interest is given to alternative 
models which can be called “cognitivist”.
The presence of a utility function is the mean by which almost all approaches in 
Economics are based (in fact it is not needed just by the mainstream one considering pure 
rationality and homo oeconomicus, but also by heterodox approaches such as the Simonian 
one based upon satisficing) and it has also gained acceptance in other social sciences and 
even among practitioners of the analytical approach (Coleman 1990, pp 674 ff), despite the 
fact that it assumes “heroic” human capabilities (Goodie et al. 1999, pp. 347).
The point here is that the utility function is a theoretical construct made for analytical 
purposes but empty of empirical salience. In fact, while it is a needed mean to compute 
many formal models of individuals’ behaviour, there is no evidence that individuals have 
this kind of function in their minds, leading all their actions. While some elements 
considered in some theories of rational choice such as beliefs and desires have been 
identified and measured by psychologists, the utility function has no empirical salience, 
despite its central theoretical role.
That is the reason for asserting that a rational choice model based on utility flmctions is not 
coherent with the analytical approach in social sciences. To say it differently and referring 
to the discipline that has mostly exploited utility functions, in searching for explanatory 
social mechanisms utility flmctions and, more generally, all the theoretical constructs 
without empirical salience, should be avoided because they are black boxes not allowing 
for explanation.
Moreover, it is worth noting the justification of such a kind of black boxes: they are not 
only unrealistic descriptions of human behaviour without explanatory power, but their
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impracticality is needed by the search of covering laws in mainstream Economics. In fact 
the already mentioned as-if methodology has been introduced to justify their usage: 
accepting these black boxes in our case means to give up explaining, in particular when 
focusing on describing the individual behaviour that is needed to explain the socio­
economic phenomenon. But, from the point of view of many approaches to rational choice, 
umealistic assumptions on human behaviour* are the only means to develop the kind of 
explanation which is looked for there, that is to say covering laws.
Following the analytical approach means to refuse such black boxes not just because of the 
search for final explanations, but also because it is not clear how good descriptions can be 
generated without explaining and imderstanding a complex phenomenon such as human 
choice. A completely similar argument can be made for other assumptions of the 
approaches we are referring too: the maximisation of the utility function that, constrained 
or not, comes with utility functions in such modelling approaches, is further imrealistic, 
and the reasons are illustrated in the following section.
To srmi up the presented points, the rational choice approaches widespread in social 
sciences cannot be accepted if following the analytical approach in social research because 
they inser*t in explanations descriptions of human action which have a false explanatory 
power, such as in the example of homo oeconomicus, an agent maximising Iris personal 
utility function by even discoimting back future probabilistic gains.
1.7.2 The ‘Adaptive Toolbox’
Which kind of “choice model” can be used in our* approach? Firstly we can accept the 
adjective “rational” in the sense of Boudon (1998, pp. 173) where rational behaviour* 
means a behaviour “described as on strong reasons”, that is to say, scientifically speaking, 
not just embedded in theory but also with empirical salience and explained in terms of 
causal relationships. Secondly we must consider* the presence of bounded rationality, that is 
to say the presence of evident boundaries to the capabilities of the human brain, refusing 
for* instance imrealistic paradigms such as homo oeconomicus. Thirdly, we must consider* 
the situation being considered. In fact there ar*e no clues about the possibility of having a 
model of human choice that works in each situation, and for the state of Imowledge in 
cognitive sciences it is better to narrow the possible spectrmn of human choices to the 
situation we are interested in.
To testify to these last methodological arguments, a particular* model of choice can be 
presented: it is the one exploited and debated in the last chapters of the present work, and it 
is wor1h starting by presenting it.
The framework, here considered to model individual rationality, is the one called the 
“adaptive toolbox” (for a complete reference see the homonymous book, Gigerenzer and 
Selten 2001a, for a review of cases of its application see Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
The fr amework has been developed inside the research field of bounded rationality, started 
by Simon in the mid-1950s, with the aim of “inserting more psychology into rationality, 
and vice versa” (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001b, pp. 1).
The adaptive toolbox is not a unified theory of rationality, but a metaphoric framework that 
accomplishes some goals worth listing:
• it provides an understanding about why and when the simple heuristics in the 
adaptive toolbox work,
• it extends the notion of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions,
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• it extends the notion of bounded rationality to include social norms, imitation, and 
other cultural tools (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001b, pp. 1).
The adaptive toolbox is a framework which is characterised by being conceived as a 
metaphoric toolbox at the disposal of human behaviom*. The elements composing the 
toolbox are heuristics^.
The fact of considering hemistics instead of miiversally valid and generic behavioural rules 
calls for further clarification. Following Gigerenzer and Selten (2001b, pp. 7), it is worth 
noting that, firstly, contrary to what conventional wisdom suggests, the presence of 
limitations of knowledge and computational capability does not imply a disadvantage (an 
example of this is the empirical evidence about the informative power in decision making 
caused by limitations in knowledge, see as examples the cases reported in Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer 1999, and Borges et al. 1999), mainly because simple heuristics chosen by 
hmnans are effective in a specific environment to which they have been adapted. The 
complexity of the enviromnent is one of the reasons for making simplicity an added value 
capable to enable “fast, frugal and accurate decisions”.
In fact, “a hemistic can exploit a regularity in the enviromnent”, and thus reduce 
enviromnental complexity. Moreover bomided rationality hemistics are not universal 
strategies but domain-specific and, because they are “middle-ranged”, they work 
effectively in classes of situations, despite their lack of general purposes.
1.7.3 Fast and Frugal Heuristics
The adaptive toolbox is made of fast and frugal hemistics, many of them, composing a set 
of tools capable of being effective in several situations, and it is not a miique tool valid in 
all situations.
Why are hemistics in the adaptive toolbox qualified as “fast and frugal”? It is because of 
the fact of considering boimded rationality. Knowledge and computation limitations in fact 
make the optimisation process of unbounded rationality impossible, and such limitations 
are not just constraints to this latter. They are in fact limitations that can not be conceived 
as constraints to the behaviomal model of optimisation. Put differently, it is not possible to 
model human behaviom* by using constrained optimisation because the limits present in the 
human mind, in tenns oif computational capability and time limitation, deny the very 
possibility of optimisation, no matter the number of constraints.
Furthennore, the adaptive toolbox is a modelling framework with empirical salience (for a 
review of proofs see Gigerenzer et al. 1999) and structmed by using a topology of rules 
which have been found in many case-studies. Rules in fact can belong to three categories. 
There are “simple search rules”, which accomplish information retrieval in the 
environment by an iterative step-by-step procedme. There are “simple stopping rules” 
which stop the search procedure depending on reaching an aspiration level.
Finally there are “simple decision rules”, which exploit the acquired limited amount of 
information to take the decision (in the last two chapters, these kinds of rules will play a 
key role in explaining the social phenomenon of interest -  for a detailed explanation of the 
thr ee categories of rules see Gigerenzer 2001, pp. 43 ff.).
’ Heuristic here means a rule to solve problems and defining human behaviour, following the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition: “a heuristic process or method for attempting the solution o f a problem; a rule or item 
of information used in such a process”.
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The adaptive toolbox is a framework capable of modelling interesting processes such as 
learning and adaptation. The means by which such goals are accomplished is mainly 
constituted by the adaptation of aspiration levels, but such a process is obviously 
considered with a different time scale in respect of decision making. In fact, adaptation 
occurs when iterate decisions generate modifications of aspiration levels.
1.7.4 Ecological Rationality
As a final element in introducing the adaptive toolbox, it is worth discussing why and 
when it works. For such a pmpose the concept of “ecological rationality” must be 
introduced. Often definitions of rationality are “internal”, in the sense they are evaluated if 
the rule that determines the behaviom is consistent with other internal elements, such as 
beliefs i.e., Olympic rationality, as in Economics. Coleman (1990) is an example of such a 
kind of internal rationality: there is a maximising behaviom* based upon internal elements 
such as the personal utility fiinction and personal beliefs that shape expectations.
On the contrary, ecological rationality is not dependent on internal criteria. Citing 
Gigerenzer (2001, pp. 46) “the question of ecological rationality concerns the match 
between a strategy and an enviromnent”, and the match “concerns structural properties”. 
To understand the meaning of a hem'istic matching enviromnental structme it could be 
useful to consider the following extremely simple example. Imagine that the environment 
is characterised by the presence of many information sour ces, and that the possible courses 
of action are just two. Moreover, because of environmental structure, among the many 
information sources (all usable and relevant for decision making) one can provide a piece 
of information that makes the comse of action absolutely clear. In the event of such an 
information somce transmitting that pai*ticular piece of information, other information 
becomes useless. If a hemistic is capable of detecting that piece of information coming 
from that information source, and choosing the implied course of action, it will match that 
particular structm al property of the enviromnent.
Moreover, fast and frugal hemistics can be effective and ecologically rational for* another* 
reason, besides the matching of enviromnental structural properties. It is because of their* 
robustness, that is to say, because they “generalise well to new problems and 
enviromnents” (Gigerenzer 2001, pp. 47). hr other* words, fast and frugal heuristics can be 
effective because they are not “overfrtted”, meaning that because of their* very simple 
structure they do not occur* in overfrtting, a typical issue in models of behaviour which 
consider* many parameters and that are not capable of working if facing an environment 
different from the one used to estimate their parameters. As Gigerenzer (2001, pp. 48) 
noted, “the reasonableness of models of bounded rationality derives fr om their ecological 
rationality, not from coherence or an internal consistency of choices”.
Finally, it is worth noting that social enviromnents are peculiar* ones. For them it is worth 
adding the concept of social rationality, a special case of ecological rationality where the 
enviromnents are constituted by “other agents with which to interact” (Gigerenzer 2001, 
pp. 48). In social rationality fast and fr ugal heuristics are capable of following social goals 
in decision making aiming to create or* maintain social structmes and cooperation. 
Examples of goals considered by socially rational hemistics are “transparency (i.e., making 
decisions that are understandable and predictable by the group with which one associates), 
fair*ness (i.e., making decisions that do not violate the expectations between people of equal 
social standing), accomitability (i.e., making decisions that can be justified and defended)” 
(Gigerenzer* 2001, pp. 48), and so forth.
In conclusion, it is worth synthesising the considered framework of bounded rationality as 
characterised by some important features:
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it is empirically gi'oimded;
it considers peculiarities of human action in social contexts and the possibility of 
evolution of behaviour;
it respects human boundaries in knowledge and computation by considering fast 
and frugal heuristics which require a modest level of brain power, increasing the 
level of plausibility of the modelling framework;
rules of behaviour* are not universal but context-dependent, even if in many cases 
the same rule is applied in different contexts.
1.8 Conclusions on the Theoretical Framework
This chapter* has dealt with two interlaced topics: tire theoretical background of this work 
and its epistemological approach.
It has shown how adopting the analytical research approach means searching for* 
explanations of social phenomena in the form of social mechanisms, to use formal models, 
to avoid black boxes, to find final explanations according to a “weak” version of 
methodological individualism, and to adopt a rational choice model that must allow for* 
finding the reasons for* human behaviour*.
On this last issue (i.e., rationality), the approach of analytical sociology as presented in the 
many references cited in this chapter is not clear. Some scholars embrace the perfect 
rationality model, some criticise it without identifying an approach on their own.
The exploitation of a model of rationality that has been recently presented in cognitive 
sciences and that has a strong empirical salience, ecological rationality, is proposed.
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Chapter 2 
Agent Based Models as the Tool for Analytical Sociology
In the previous chapter the theoretical framework of this work has been introduced and 
debated.
At the core of it there is the explanation of social phenomena tlnough social mechanisms. 
But which are the tools available for formally studying social phenomena using 
explanatory mechanisms, remembering that following the analytical approach to social 
research requires the usage of formal models and theories? Among the available tools, 
which is the one that should be chosen considering the advantages and disadvantages 
implied by each possible choice? Is a methodological framework available to use the 
selected tool?
The present chapter aims to answer these questions, showing how the preferable choice in 
the case of modelling is the one of considering agent based models (ABMs) because of a 
principle of versatility, and how a new methodological approach to the tool is preferable.
In fact section 1 starts by showing that a first selection among possible tools should be 
made for the ones capable of modelling non-linear courses of actions. The selection then 
focuses on tools developed by scholars in the field of Complexity Science where systems 
with non-linear and out of equilibrium dynamics are studied. The many tools developed to 
accomplish such a purpose are briefly presented, and the one called Agent Based Models is 
chosen because it is the most flexible and versatile.
Section 2 deals with the intioduction of Agent Based Models. Their features are presented 
along with their main methodological approach. The usefrilness of presenting such an 
approach is due to the fact that it helps in pointing out the problematic issues in using those 
kinds of models for analytical social research. The widespread approach is presented and 
criticised, defining many new methodological guidelines and leaving some important 
topics to the chapters in the following part.
Section 3 briefly introduces a concept derived from other research fields where Agent 
Based Models have been extensively used: it is the need of “indirect explanation”, that 
means that results obtained by such models are not immediate, but rather, superficially, 
opaque. The search for explanatory causal mechanisms calls for a strategy capable of 
discovering interdependences and causes for system dynamics.
Finally, section 4 explains why the mentioned Agent Based Models are presented in such a 
way here in. In fact the presence of mathematical formalisms in presenting the models 
developed according to the analytical approach to social research is superfluous, while 
complete and simple descriptions of model components are preferable and the model 
programming code must always be made public.
2.1 Choosing Agent Based Models
Formally researching an empirical social phenomenon mainly means three activities. It 
means obseiwing the phenomenon, collecting data. Then it is necessaiy to select relevant 
issues in the target and to formally model it. Finally there is the phase in which the model 
is verified, validated, and its outcomes are studied.
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We now focus on the second phase and in particular on modelling issues, while the other 
phases will be debated in the following sections and chapters. The reason for starting from 
modelling is quite important.
The research process can be conceived in a step-by-step procedure as the one just depicted, 
but the steps needed are mutually influenced. Just as an obvious example, it is worth 
knowing the kind of data that will be useful in the modelling activity before staiJing to 
observe the phenomenon and collect its data.
And, among the phases that make the research process, modelling is the one that generally 
poses more boundaries than the others. To say it differently, while each phase is 
constrained by available tools and methodologies, and each phase poses boundaries to the 
others, modelling is the phase which poses the narrowest boundaries to the research 
process.
In our case, moreover, some theoretical boundaries exist ex ante and are the ones related to 
the theoretical framework in which the research is embedded (such boundaries are the 
characteristics of the social research approach introduced in the previous chapter -  it is 
worth adding that theoretical fr ameworks imply ex ante boundaries in all research works, 
not just in the present case).
2.1.1 Non-linearity of Social Processes and Complexity
After having motivated the focus on modelling, it is possible to start the discussion of 
available methods by making a simple distinction in modelling techniques*.
There are modelling teclmiques which deal with systems characterised by linear actions, 
and modelling teclmiques which also allow for the consideration of non-linear actions by 
individuals.
Linearity and non linearity of actions here refer to the possibility of describing human 
actions as lineai* functions tiansfbrming the input (the information set reaching the 
individual) into an output (the course of action chosen and followed by tire individual).
The first case, the one of linear actions of individuals is the one most widespread in the 
social sciences and particularly in Economics. The system so characterised, considering 
further assumptions on the individuals can be formally represented by mathematical 
language. The resulting model composed by systems of equations can be studied by 
understanding the dynamics towards equilibrium and by comparing static equilibria.
Many problematic issues have been raised in following such a modelling approach, as the 
problem of studying equilibria of systems that in reality never reach such a stable state, and 
many others. For the present work it is not worth reporting the huge debate about such 
issues, but two points can be referenced. The first one is the fact that the widespread usage 
of linear models with equilibria has been due to the lack of other tools. But that situation 
has changed in recent decades when the computation capability of personal computers has 
strongly increased. The second point is to give the intuition of some relevant points for the 
social scientist: it is possible to follow a scholar belonging to the analytical approach of 
social research, Coleman (1990), who chose to follow what he called the “linear system of 
action” for practical purposes but without avoiding noting its limits.
® It is worth adding that in the presented discussion about modelling techniques the focus is always on 
considering them for social systems, even if not re-underlined.
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Coleman (1990, pp. 681) in fact noted that his research work by means of formal models 
following linear actions was bounded to consider just one outcome, competitive 
equilibrium. Following his words, “the virtue of restricting attention to the competitive 
equilibrium lies in the fact that calculation of the space occupied by the core is not possible 
except for the simplest systems, but calculation of the competitive equilibrium for a system 
in which actors have utility functions”, as Cobb-Douglas functions (i.e., as Economist 
would say, a “well-shaped” utility flmction that makes the mathematical system tractable), 
“is quite simple”.
Coleman admitted that the only value in considering equilibria as an analytical tool was, in 
his case, the mathematical tractability. Moreover he suggested that some very impacting 
issues like the choice of the presence of well-shaped utility functions leading individual 
behaviour in models was only due to the same issue, that is to say mathematical 
tractability.
We have already debated that individual behaviom* modelled with utility function is 
incoherent with the adopted theoretical framework, but the point about considering linear 
systems of action can be summarised saying that the related modelling approach based on 
systems of linear equations, tractable and solvable by inspecting their* steady states and 
equilibria, implies several unr ealistic assumptions in the modelled social mechanism, and 
the reason for that is just mathematical tractability.
Passirrg to the case of non-linear course of actions, the argmnent is similar*. Why non-linear 
courses of actions have been so often ignored? Is it because of empirical reasons, that is to 
say because actions executed by hmnans are in reality linear? The answer* is no, hmnan 
actions are sometimes linear and sometimes not, but considering a system of non-linear* 
equations makes it not solvable with any mathematical technique but solvable with 
simulation, a technique that requires strong computing power*.
Therefore, to be consistent with the goals of the adopted research approach, first a choice 
must be made: it is preferable to exploit modelling tools that are capable to model both 
linear* and non-linear* courses of hmnan action, considering that for explaining social 
phenomena both could be relevant.
Such a choice implies the fact of refiising the standard mathematical models just 
mentioned, made of systems of only linear* equations and of analytical tools studying 
system equilibria (e.g., the simplex method), and to look in the category of formal tools for* 
studying “complex” systems, where generally both linear and non-linear actions can be 
modelled.
Complex systems are systems defined as, in general, characterised by the presence of non- 
linearity and by being far fiom equilibrimn. Nevertheless they are not chaotic systems, and 
they have several properties, like the possibility to generate outcomes difficult to forecast 
or* understand by just looking at elements of which they are composed.
In complex systems terminology, there is a micro level which is made of system 
components, and a macro level that is made of aggregate and systemic outcomes: a good 
and classic example is temperature of materials, a macro feature absent in the micro level 
of atoms. The research field coping with complex systems was developed inside Physics, 
and in particular in the fields of non linear and non equilibrium thermodynamics (see, as a 
reference to the historical evolution, Prigogine and Stengers 1984). The modelling 
frameworks there developed often rely, somehow, on simulation teclmiques: as said non- 
linearity means the absence of closed form analytic solutions, and thus simulation is the 
unique way to explore the solution space and to imderstand the systemic outcomes.
For studying complex systems several modelling techniques have been developed, mainly 
in the fields of Physics (e.g., statistical mechanics), Systems Theory (e.g., system
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dynamics) Artificial Intelligence (e.g., agent based models), and Computer Science in 
general (e.g., cellular automata). Moreover Complexity (i.e., the discipline that studies 
complex systems) has developed many conceptual and analytical tools, such as the 
concepts of “attractor”, “emergence”, “bifurcation”, etc...
For the scope of this work it is worth spending just a few words explaining “emergence”: 
in general, it is a term identifying the dynamic generation of macro outcomes in complex 
systems, but applied to social systems the term has been extended to also include the 
influences of the macro level on the micro one (i.e., the so called “second-order 
emergence”, Gilbert 2002). Moreover, the conceptual innovations coming from 
Complexity widespread in many different scientific fields, and also in the social sciences 
(for an example in Sociology see Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997, for a sceptical view in 
Economics see Foster 2004).
Because modelling tools developed for studying complex systems are capable of having 
both linear and non-linear elements and dynamics, it is worth searching among them^ for 
the tool to carry on social research following the analytical approach.
2.1.2 Modelling Fraineworlis for Complex Social Systems
The first modelling approach to be considered is “statistical mechanics”: it is a teclmique 
developed in Physics combining statistical tools with mechanics, which is the studying of 
particles subject to a force. The result is a teclmique that relates the micro level 
“behaviour” of individual atoms and molecules to the macro properties of the materials 
made by the atoms and molecules considered, helping in solving problems of 
thermodynamics.
Because of the presence of a micro level of atoms generating macro properties of 
materials, statistical mechanics models have been presented as metaphors of societies. 
Such an approach, in particular, has been widely used in financial studies, giving rise to a 
discipline called Econophysics, where atoms represent investors and “material” properties 
are market behaviours such as price dynamics (for an introductory and recent review of the 
state of art in Econophysics see Farmer, Shubik and Smith 2005).
But statistical mechanics has been used even in the field of sociology and social 
psychology (as examples see Latané and Nowak 1997, and Nowak et al. 2000), often 
combined to other tools for simulation purposes. Sometime statistical mechanics models 
appear as systems of differential or difference equations which represent the dynamic 
behaviour of atoms, and to solve such systems it is necessary to try many parameters 
values and see the result (i.e., simulation is needed because formal models to solve and 
study such systems are not available because of the non-linearity), and often the simulation 
technique chosen to accomplish such a task is the use of Montecarlo algoritlims (i.e., the 
use of non-deterministic algorithms which help in exploring the solution space of the 
system by means of random numbers). Moreover sometimes because standard statistical 
mechanics models do not allow for studying complicated structures of interaction, different 
simulation teclmiques are used, as for instance in the case of Nowak et al. 2000 where 
systems are simulated with cellular automata (see below) to insert a spatial dimension of 
interaction in the model.
 ^ For a complete introduction on most of the tools presented in the following section see Gilbert and 
Troitzsch (2005).
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Statistical mechanics, considered the approach in modelling explanatory social 
mechanisms, raises some problematic issues. Firstly a serious problem is the heterogeneity 
of individuals. As said in such models atoms or molecules are the metaphoric framework 
to represent individuals in social systems. They all behave in the same way, being 
differentiated just by parameters. To make an example, a model could represent a society 
by means of electrons, which all spm, even if they do it with different speed and direction.
Heterogeneity at the micro level in statistical mechanics models is strictly bounded, 
making it possible to just consider one kind of behaviour* per time, and modifying the 
intensity of it in each individual. In social system it is common to find a kind of 
heterogeneity in individuals that is characterised by vastly different behaviours, and this is 
a feature that is not possible to model with statistical mechanics.
Furthermore, statistical mechanics models are thought to represent atoms free to move in 
space according to their forces. Such a kind of interaction structure if applied to social 
systems as a metaphor is a fuither consti*ain. In fact it is not possible to consider different 
structures of interaction as the ones found in social systems, and the only solution is to 
recm* to other simulation and modelling approaches (see for instance Nowak et al. 2000).
A second kind of framework for modelling complex systems is “system dynamics”. The 
modelling teclmique (as references to the works of one of its main developers, see 
Forrester 1961 and 1968) has been applied to economic and industrial problems, to 
organisation and management issues, for urban and public policies, and so forth.
System dynamics exploits differential and difference equations to model influences among 
model components. Via the equations, even feedback loops among the components are 
modelled, so to create the systematic non-linearity that characterises complex systems.
In other words, while a “standard” dynamic model of differential and difference equations 
represent the future state of the system depending only on the present state and on 
exogenous parameters, system dynamics is a tool to simulate systems in which the 
differential equations representing dynamics of model components can be interdependent, 
determining one from each other and creating feedback loops.
Even system dynamics models are not suitable for our pmpose: their modelling approach is 
bomided to consider few model components, while our interest is in modelling social 
systems with many interacting individuals. Moreover, the modelling of interaction 
structme is quite limited and it is not possible to consider all kinds of it, such as 
geographical space, and the behaviom* of model components is bounded to the form of a 
differential or difference equation, often making the representation of hemistics expensive 
and they could be more easily modelled by algorithms. Finally, system dynamics models 
lack one of the key features needed for explanatory social mechanisms, the multi level 
structme. In fact model components are all on the same level influencmg each other, and a 
micro level is not present. Such a point is a problematic issue in the case of social systems, 
where the aggregation of individuals can become an autonomous entity by itself and where 
feedbacks are not only among individuals but also with aggregates. System dynamics can 
be useful for representing systems made of a few interacting simple components without 
aggregation, or to model interaction between systems modelled as wholes, but not 
effectively for many kinds of social phenomena.
Thirdly, models for “process simulation” can be considered (such models are also known 
as discrete event simulations, see Banks et al. 2000). They are models originally 
developed to simulate maiiufacturing processes and to better organise them, efficiently 
managing repositories and production activities.
The focus in on engineering, and the modelling activity aims to replicate the process of 
interest as a set of elements which can represent places or activities, with flows of people,
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materials or information passing through them. Each model component (except flows 
which are generated exogenously as an input and that then, inside the model and at the end 
of the process, represent the model outcomes) is modelled as a sort of separate function 
stopping, transforming and diverting flows.
Even such a modelling approach is clearly poor for social systems, which are not made of 
individuals executing just one and specialised function as a reaction to the flow of inputs 
received, but are capable, just as an example of the many activities humans are capable of 
doing, of finding information, of elaborating it, of taking a decision and of executing an 
action.
Even if with recent software tools for process simulation such a limit can be partially 
overcome by grouping activities in more complicated elements and thus hypothetically 
allowing for the modelling of individual behaviom*, again the modelling framework lacks 
of requirements about the aggregate level and particularly the interaction structure. In fact, 
the macro level is modelled by means of metaphoric system flows, while aggregation of 
internal attributes of model components (individuals) and other forms of aggregation are 
not allowed. Finally, although the possibility to build very precise, asymmetiic and 
intercomiected interaction structures, some common social interaction stiuctmes like the 
one of participating in meetings or the one of spatial neighbourhood can not be modelled 
easily.
The fourth modelling framework worth considering are “cellular* automata”. Following 
Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999, pp. 121) it is possible to say that cellular* automata are 
characterised by the following featm*es:
• there is a regular* grid (often of one or two dimensions) composed by homogeneous 
cells, each one identical to the others (cells, when building models of social 
phenomena, usually represent individuals);
• each cell has a state, which can be changed over* time (states can represent, if 
considering social systems, attitudes or* characteristics of individuals);
• time is discrete, advancing one step per* time;
• each cell, on each time step, modifies its internal state according to a rule that uses 
two sources of information, the internal state of the cell itself the previous time 
step, and the irrternal state of neighbouring cells (and such a rule represents 
individual behaviour).
Cellular* automata have been widely used to model social processes based orr local 
interaction, such as residential segregation (Schelling 1971) or the already mentioned 
example of Nowalc et al. (2000) where they are used to simulate the spreading of 
entreprerreurship between neighbouring geographical areas.
The constraints imposed by cellular automata are several. The first obvious one is the 
homogeneity in micro components behaviour. The second is the rigid str*ucture of 
interaction that allows interaction with only the closest neighbours in the spatial 
dimension. Thirdly, actions are limited as well as individuals characteristics. In general the 
state of cells is unique (i.e., it can represent several variations of only one featme of the 
individual), while action is boimded to modify such a state, for instance not allowing 
movements in the spatial dimension. Because of such limits, also cellular automata can not 
be chosen as the tool to be used.
As the fifth and final modelling framework to be excluded, it is possible to analyse the 
characteristics of a class of modelling tools that can be identified as “lear*ning and 
evolutionary models” (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999, pp. 195 ff).
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This class of modelling frameworks^® is characterised by taking inspiration from human 
physiology (e.g., artificial neural networks), genetic evolution (e.g., genetic algorithms and 
genetic programming) and social dynamics (e.g., classifier systems). All of the approaches 
have a feature in common: they are all capable of modelling learning arrd adaptation. 
Among the several disposable approaches, the two discussed are the ones “which are 
influential in social simulation” (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999, pp. 195), artificial neural 
networks and genetic algorithms. A further approach, genetic programming, will be the 
focus of chapter 6 and it will be used in chapter 7 as an inferential engine to elaborate 
collected experimental data and not as a modelling framework.
Artificial neural networks (for an introduction to the tool see Gurney 1997) are composed 
of several layers of elementary units, comiected to each other only at inter-level (that is to 
say that each miit is connected with all the units of close layers, but not with units 
belonging to the same layer). Each unit is, taking inspiration on a simple rrrodel of human 
brain, like a neuron, capable of doing an operation (generally modelled as a simple 
mathematical function) that transforms a numeric input into a numeric output. Functions in 
neurons are homogeneous and fixed, whilst weights, defining the strength with which linlcs 
between neurons trarrsmit outputs of the sender neur on as inputs of the receiving neuron, 
can vary according to a technique (the back-propagation of errors) that operates in the 
training phase of the network. Artificial neural networks should in fact be trained to learn 
to transform, as a whole, the inputs received in the right output.
Artificial neural networks can be used in modelling social systems to mimic learning 
processes in individuals, and if the data on which tire network is trained is enough, 
“complete”, the capability to replicate right decisions will be very high. Artificial neinal 
networks can also be used to model human behaviour* and cognition processes, even in 
social contexts as in Hutchins and Hazlehurst 1991 and 1995, but even the usage of such a 
tool raises several problems. Firstly, they can not model societies. Nem*al networks are not 
tools for modelling several individuals interacting and belonging to a social system, and 
thus explanatory social mechanisms can rrot be modelled with them. Secondly, focussing 
on their* only purpose which is the one of modelling learning in individuals, such an 
approach can not be used with our theoretical approach. In fact it does not follow the 
chosen approach to bounded rationality, and artificial neural networks are learning black 
boxes. In fact, although the capability to mimic decisions, it is not possible to study the 
internal structur e of trained networks to understand the reasons which lead to the right 
decision, making it impossible to use them even just as models of human minds, in 
conjunction with other tools capable of modeling social dynamics.
Genetic algorithms take inspiration from genetic evolution (for* an introduction see 
Mitchell 1996). They are constituted by a population, a set, of individuals facing an 
environment which is modelled as a fitness function that evaluates the fitness to survive for* 
each individual in next generation. A “reproduction” process creates new generations of 
individuals, using as parents the old generation individuals selected according to their* 
fitness, and “reproduced” according to some well-known evolutionary mechanisms such as 
genetic crossover* and mutation. Individuals are modelled as strings of numbers and they 
represent possible solutions to the problem of interest. The execution of genetic algoritlims 
lets “evolve” an effective solution to the given problem, exploring the solution space in a '
It is worth adding that a better definition of the class o f tools here referred to would be not as generic 
modelling frameworks but as nature inspired computational algorithms (see Rennard 2006): such algorithms 
can be used for modelling purposes, as described in the text, but that is just one of the many available usages 
for them.
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manner which is often more effective than random tries (the effectiveness of genetic 
algorithms as learning processes strictly depends upon the form of the solution space).
Even genetic algoritlims are not modelling frameworks usable for social mechanisms. In 
fact individual interaction and multi level interdependence are not allowed, and even in the 
most known case of usage of genetic algorithms in social sciences, the Axelrod’s (1997a) 
evolution of an optimal strategy for individual behaviour, the social system was modelled 
by other means, particularly by exploiting the game theoretical model of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, implemented with an Agent Based Model.
Modelling frameworks capable of representing individual learning can thus not be used for 
our purpose, but they can be used as mathematical heuristics (in this context heuristic 
means an algoritlnn capable of reaching a solution by trial and error methods, and thus 
different to algorithms such as the simplex method that, given certain conditions, reaches 
the solution directly) for optimisation problems (and that will be the usage made of genetic 
programming in chapter 7).
After having excluded all these possible candidates as modelling frameworks, it is now 
possible to introduce the only remaining solution which is the one adopted here.
Agent Based Models (ABMs) are a formal tool for scientific modelling, derived from the 
tradition in micro simulation (for an illustration of their historical development see Gilbert 
and Troitzsch 1999, pp. 158 ff).
They overlap with similar research agendas, in particular with the one of Multi Agent 
Systems (MAS) in Computer Science, which aims to develop autonomous software 
capable of interacting with other software and with human users.
They are constituted by autonomous software pieces that are called agents. Modelling 
social systems they usually represent individuals, but they can also represent institutions, 
organisations, and so forth. They allow multi level analysis, not bounding the niunber of 
levels (i.e., it is also possible to model more than two levels). Any kind of interaction 
structure can be modelled, and it can be static or dynamically generated and modified by 
agents.
They are quite an open framework: except for the presence of interacting agents, there are 
no other particular prescriptions characterising them. Thus, accepting the tool for our 
purpose, there are still many methodological problems left. The ones relevant for this work 
will all be discussed in the remaining part of this chapter and in the chapters of the 
following part. Here it is worth adding just a consideration about the softwaie toolkits that 
have been chosen and used throughout the present work.
Software tools for agent based modelling are several and it is not worth reviewing them, 
but also among them it is possible to use some criteria for preferring some to others. Such 
criteria are obviously dependent upon the theoretical framework and research interest. In 
our case, some software tools have been chosen because they are extremely general 
(Swann and Jas, for reference see respectively Minar et al. 1996 and Sonnessa 2004), 
whilst others have been avoided because they are too reliant upon metaphors. This last case 
is, for instance, the one on modelling tools derived from Starlogo: in those cases, despite 
the fact that they are tools for agent based modelling, they consider a modelling framework 
where agents are “tmtles” moving and interacting on a two dimensional space. Besides the 
impossibility to directly model complicated interaction stiuctures, such bomids are often an 
obstacle to model explailatoiy social mechanisms, and thus, considering that a main added 
values of agent based models is the versatility of the modelling framework, the most 
general and “metaphor-free” toolkits should be preferred.
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2.2 Methodological Approaches to Agent Based Modelling
Agent Based Models (ABMs) are the modelling tool chosen for following the analytical 
approach to social research inti'oduced in chapter 1. They have been used in several 
different contexts and that implies the need for introducing the methodological issues that 
the conjunction between oui* purpose and the modelling framework raise.
Before proceeding in the discussion of the main methodological issues of our interest that 
will be presented in chapter 3 and 4, it is worth citing ABMs accepted featmes and to 
introduce the most widespread approach to them because, born in different contexts and for 
different pmposes, they should be not followed and it is important to miderstand why.
In the remaining sections of this chapter two last relevant issues will be introduced, how 
results coming from ABMs can be interpreted and how ABMs will be reported and 
explained in this work: these last two issues, together with chapter 3 and 4, complete the 
description of the research approach which has been followed.
2.2.1 Some ABMs Features
ABMs are formal models based on two main elements, which constitute, all together, the 
so-called model “micro specification”. They are: i) a set of agents, with their own 
resources and autonomous behaviours, probably heterogeneous in their behaviour* and 
endowment; ii) an interaction structure, static or dynamic, independent or defined by 
agents’ behaviour.
Defining those two elements through a programming language constitutes the model. Its 
execution^ ^ allows the “macro results” of the formalisation process (i.e. of the model) 
being obtained.
It is important to underline that ABMs results ar e generally called the “macro” side of the 
model and the specification the “micro” one. Generally speaking, the model is not only 
built by its specification, but also by its results because they formally derive from the 
micro layer*. Moreover, the distinction between micro and macro cannot generally be 
rigorously defined, but it derives from the fact that ABMs are built bottom-up, i.e. 
obtaining an emerging macro (upper* level) result by the interaction of micro (lower* level) 
elements. Therefore the term micro specification and macro result mean, in the context of 
this work, the two levels characterising an ABM, and they do not refer to the considered 
tar*get of the modelling task, because that could be misleading. To make the point clearer, 
in reality we could call macro a micro unit of an ABM (for instance a firm or an 
institution) as well as we could call micro something that we can obtain as a macro result 
of an ABM (e.g. the consuming choice of a family).
As claimed, ABMs are useful to imderstand and model complex systems. The micro 
specification can in fact represent a social causal mechanism, while the possibility to 
compare the modelled mechanism with the real one together with the comparison between 
the real phenomenon and the macro result obtained in the model help the scholar 
addressing social issues (these points will be deeply discussed in chapter 3).
*’ The execution o f the model (which is formalised as a computer program) on a computer is necessary 
because there are no other possible formal ways to solve the model and obtain results. Moreover, the 
execution of the model on a PC is often called, since the tradition in the fields o f Computer Science and 
Artificial Intelligence, the simulation', the term is widespread in the literature but sometime misleading 
because it is generic. In fact, there are many kinds of simulations, like micro-simulation, process simulation, 
system dynamics, and so forth. Here, the term simulation will only be used for meaning the execution of an 
ABM.
43
*#
Although it is practically impossible to list all the ABMs features that are useful for 
modelling explanatory social mechanisms, following Arthur et al. (1997) six elements of 
the common social world that can be modelled with such a tool can be reported:
• dispersed interaction,
• lack of global control, 
cross hierarchical organisation, 
continuous adaptation, 
perpetual iimovation,
• dynamics out of equilibrium.
A final remark is due to a supposed-to-be feature: the multi-disciplinaiity. Following 
Epstein (1999), it is worth saying that ABMs aie not multi-disciplinary per se, but because 
of their flexibility and of the features just mentioned, it is easy to get over disciplinary 
bounds traditionally imposed. In other words, the relevant characteristic is the possibility 
of ABMs to consider many dimensions, aiding the development of a multi-disciplinary 
approach to social sciences.
2.2.2 Generativism
As said in the introduction to the present section, ABMs have been used following several 
different research approaches, and thus the methodology of them is not unique.
Nevertheless, there is a widespread methodology for ABMs (perhaps the most widespread 
and the oldest one introduced in social sciences, dating back to the works of Axelrod, 
1984, 1997a and 1997b) that has been developed and gained acceptance in the social 
sciences, and thus it is really worth explaining why such an approach is incoherent with the 
analytical approach to social research and the consequent need for a different 
methodology. The most widespread approach to ABMs in the social sciences is called 
“Generativism” and has mainly been developed by Axtell, Epstein and Axelrod in the 
second half of the nineties.
The Scientific Approach
The first point to cope with is the scientific approach. Does the usage of ABMs imply the 
need for a new scientific approach?
Supporters of Generativism generally think that the answer should be positive, setting 
themselves against Inductivism and Deductivism. In pailicular, Axelrod (1997b) asserts 
that ABMs should be somehow used to study reality in a different way from when 
inductive and deductive tools are used. ABMs, in his opinion, generate outcomes similar to 
deductive models (but starting from assmnptions inside the micro specification and not the 
ones of theory), and then it is possible to induct on them (but they are not empirical data, as 
in standard Inductivism) so to help the researcher in sustaining his intuitions.
Therefore, in Axelrod’s opinion, the usage of ABMs is sometliing new, slightly different 
from standard approaches to science.
But his position can be criticised. Firstly it limits the usage of ABMs to a particular one of 
identifying the research path as one characterised by induction on data generated by the 
ABM made upon the researcher’s hypotheses. Secondly it does not say where the 
assumptions in micro specification come fiom, if not from theory. Finally it does not cope
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with different kinds of data obtained as the outcome of an ABM. In fact, with ABMs it is 
possible to obtain at least two kinds of data, as a macro result. When a model full of details 
(that will be called “case-based model” in chapter 3) is prepared and tested, it is possible to 
get data capable of representing useful forecasts for the studied system. Whilst in other 
cases or when the model is made not for forecasting but for comprehending, the outcomes 
are useful to understand the cause/effect connections inside the model, possibly making 
clear some im-revealed aspects of the social mechanism of interest. These are the two 
kinds of “new knowledge” that can be obtained from data generated inside ABMs. But 
considering that this Imowledge has, in any case, to be compared with reality and other 
sources, obtained knowledge do not appear to be peculiar of ABMs but instead it appears 
to be the usual outcome obtained in any kind of formal modelling. Using formal models 
does not imply overcoming neither Inductivism (because of the data obtained) nor 
Deductivism (because of the assumptions taken).
A similar opinion based on the existence of a new scientific approach can be ascribed to 
another author, Epstein (1999, pp. 44), who, although he correctly shows that the usage of 
ABMs implies the usage of deduction, asserts that “given the differences between agent- 
based modelling and both inductive and deductive social science, a distinguishing term 
seems appropriate. The choice of ‘generative’ was inspired by Chomsky’s (Chomsky 
1965) early usage; Syntactic theory seeks minimal rule systems that are sufficient to 
generate the structme of interest, grammatical constiTictions among them. The generated 
structures of interest are, of course, social”.
The quotation is relevant for many reasons. Firstly it testifies the generativist claim for the 
need of a different scientific approach. Secondly it explains tlie origin of the name given to 
the methodological approach and it helps to focus the attention on the adjective “minimal”, 
referred to syntactical rules, that is quite relevant in the approach as better explained below 
when discussing modelling procedures.
In conclusion, on the generativist position, it is claimed that the usage of ABMs implies a 
sound novelty for scientific practice and methodology, but it does not seem that sound 
motivations for that have been showed, or, at least, no elements have been presented to 
state that a new scientific approach is required by ABMs because they can not be used by 
following common and well accepted scientific procedmes and approaches*^.
Nevertheless, what should be accepted as innovative is the kind of modelling allowed by 
ABMs. In fact, it is cited in several social research papers that the scientific process 
exploiting ABMs can be considered “as a ‘third way’ of carrying out social science, in 
addition to argumentation and formalisation” (Gilbert and Terna 2000) in the sense that it 
is obviously different from argumentation because it involves the usage of rigorous formal 
modelling, but also different from the “standard” way of formalisation in social sciences 
that is based on systems of linear equations.
Considering ABMs just as a new tool means having a richer toolset in which the new 
language available is complementary to the verbal one and the standard mathematical one 
(as suggested in Ostrom 1998, and Gilbert and Terna 2000).
Summarising the presented issues, ABMs are a tool making it possible to study complex 
systems while other modelling tools appear to be more suitable for studying systems with 
different characteristics, but sound reasons have not been presented to sustain that they 
belong to a completely different scientific approach, justifying the existence of something
The researcher exploiting ABMs in his scientific practice can thus still consider processes of induction, 
deduction and abduction (Peirce 1955).
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that we could call a “strong generative science”, outside the common good practices of 
contemporary scientific research. ABMs are just a tool, and several scientific approaches 
can exploit their advantages to improve their effectiveness and to follow their research 
agenda. Generativism is not the only scientific approach available for ABMs, and neither is 
the approach presented in this work; perhaps one of the most interesting features of ABMs 
is the tool flexibility itself that allows so many different approaches to coexist.
Models Classification
At the beginning of the short and recent history of ABMs in scientific research, the main 
concern was natuially about the opportunity to use the new tool for old, uni'esolved, 
problems. Although it is comprehensible that such an approach has been one of the first 
followed, it is also obvious that it is not the only one.
The kind of model categorisation proposed by generativists (i.e., scholars following 
Generativism) follows the idea that ABMs should be categorised according to the kind of 
difficulties met in studying the problem with other tools, and in particular with models of 
equations studied with standard analytic teclmiques to find closed form solutions. Axtell 
(2000) in fact suggests that ABMs should be divided in tlnee categories, depending on the 
fact that the studied problem is i) “partially solvable”, ii) “intractable” or iii) “unsolvable”.
The generativist typologies to categorise ABMs seem to constrain the tool flexibility, 
obliging to consider the focussed phenomenon firstly in another framework, and then, after 
the failure with other modelling fiameworks, with ABMs. Moreover they give the idea that 
ABMs are a marginal tool, only usefiil when everything else does not work.
Finally, the generativist approach to models categorisation practically leads to a modelling 
practice in which models thought for different modelling frameworks are translated into 
ABMs, with the side effect of introducing in the latters the no longer needed hypotheses 
and theoretical biases of the formers.
In the approach here presented such a categorisation is not useful; as said in the previous 
chapter, it is claimed that social systems are often complex systems and that ABMs can be 
used as one of the best tools available for studying complex social systems. The choice of 
ABMs denies the utility of studying such complex systems with tools more suitable for 
other kinds of systems.
Validation
Generativism also concerns validation of ABMs; at the core of it there is the concept of 
generative sufficiency. Generative sufficiency means that for a model it is sufficient to 
generate macro outcomes similar to the ones found in the empirical target for being 
considered a valid explanation of the phenomenon. In other words, generative sufficiency 
means that a model capable of mimicking a realistic macro behaviour is valid. This 
approach seems to be top-down for bottom-up models, and does not focus on the social 
mechanism happening in the micro specification.
Following my approach, verifying the validity of ABMs means to consider not only the 
realism of the emergent macro outcome, but also the empirical salience of the micro 
specification, so to achieve an explanation of the given social phenomenon, and avoid 
studying just one of the infinite mechanisms that can generate a similar phenomenon.
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Fuither considerations about the verification and validation of ABMs will be presented in 
chapter 3 which entirely deals with the relationship between the model and the empirical 
data* .^
Simplicity
Talking about the methodology in practice, the generativist one is based upon the 
simplicity principle and on some attempts to specify a research procedure.
For Axelrod (1997a), who introduced the army motto KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) in 
Generativism, model agents must be simple, and their complexities are not allowed. For 
him and for others (see, for instance, Shubik 1996 and Epstein 1999) simplicity is the 
leading principle whereby to choose the micro rules of agents behaviour** .^
But, as noted by Popper (1935), “simplicity” is not uniquely defined: simple is an adjective 
generally used as the antonym of many others (e.g. difficult, complicated, complex, etc..) 
with different meanings and, overall, it implies an underlying and essential subjective 
aesthetical evaluation. The concept of simplicity does not belong to logics or philosophy of 
science but to aesthetics and, pragmatics.
Besides the difficulty in defining and measming simplicity as intended by Generativism 
(in fact even if the antonym is complexity, it is not clear how generativists identify and 
measure this last featm*e of systems) it is worth remembering the bounded rationality 
approach here considered. The principles leading the modelling of agents behaviour are 
different and already debated: the simplicity principle is inconsistent with the one of 
ecological rationality explained before.
Moreover, it seems that the simplicity principle defined by generativists leads to 
behavioural rules which could make it almost impossible to understand some relevant 
issues such as second-order emergence, while that kind of “mechanism” is quite important 
in social systems where social processes such as identification and reflexivity can matter.
Explanation
The generativist position on how getting knowledge via ABMs exploits the concepts 
explained before in the quoted sentence of Epstein (the one citing Chomsky’s linguistic 
theory), the idea of Axelrod (1997b) that ABMs are um-ealistic models in their micro 
specification but capable of generating outcomes similar to real ones, the principle of 
simplicity explained before (Axelrod 1997a), and the sentence in Epstein (1999, pp. 43) 
which states that “ABMs provide computational demonstrations that a given 
microspecification is in fact sufficient to generate a macrostructure of interest”.
But, altogether, the generativists’ concepts define the already introduced principle of 
“generativist sufficiency”, for which it is not only true that the micro specification 
generates the macro outcome, but also that the micro specification, beyond explaining the 
macro outcome, also explains the target phenomenon. The generativist approach is very
Chapter 3 will analyse validation and verification procedures according to the proposed approach. The 
following sub section about “explanation” will further discuss generativist positions on validation: it is in fact 
obvious that methodological positions on validation strictly depend upon the kind of explanation the 
researcher is searching for.
In Epstein (1999) the KISS principle is supported by also saying that “even perfect knowledge of 
individual decision rules does not always allow us to predict macroscopic structure”, but that is due to the 
fact that agents’ behaviour is not the only element of an ABM micro specification and of a social mechanism.
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different from the one of Analytical Sociology, and the former does not consider the kind 
of explanation the latter is looking for, that is to say causal social mechanisms.
From the point of view of the analytical approach to social science, models developed 
according to Generativism are neither explanations nor useful to describe social 
phenomena, but they are black boxes capable of mimicking macro dynamics. The reasons 
for the different concepts about methodology lie upon the different kinds of explanation. 
Firstly, the generative sufficiency focuses on the capability to mimic some macro data, not 
on the social mechanism. Secondly, obliging agents’ behaviour to be simple excludes the 
possibility of having multi-level dynamics as second-order emergence. Thirdly the fact that 
a set of agents’ behaviour (and thus a particular micro specification) is capable of 
mimicking some real macro data is not sufficient to say that the micro specification 
considered is the right explanation of the real dynamics. In fact, as some authors (Axtell 
and Epstein 1994, pp. 30) recognised “many different sets of agent local rules might 
produce the same kind of global output ... the mapping from micro-rules to macro­
structures may be many-to-one” and Epstein (1999, pp. 43) says that when the researcher is 
capable of finding more possible solutions, then he should “determine which micro 
specification is the most tenable explanation empirically”. But the reference to the 
empirical target is checked when just two solutions with the same degrees of “generative 
power” and simplicity are available.
For these reasons it is better to preserve the generativist motto (Epstein 1999, pp. 43) “if 
you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain its emergence” as a criterion of necessity and not of 
sufficiency, when using ABMs following the Analytical Sociology approach. Every micro 
specification fomid capable of generating a realistic macro outcome is a candidate solution 
of the real social mechanism, but not all candidates are right and a reference to empirical 
data can not be avoided. The number of candidates is in fact infinite: as demonstrated by 
Bar-Yam (1997, pp. 118) for the case of Cellular Automata, there is no general solution to 
the problem of retro-inference (from macro to micro), because of the loss of information. 
The recovery of the loss of information on the micro specification and on the social 
mechanism are the aims for which ABMs are used in Analytical Sociology.
If the recovery of information both between the macro and the micro and inside each level 
is the most qualifying issue of the approach here presented, the generativist approach 
seems to be not the most appropriate one. Nevertheless, if following different research 
approaches, Generativism could be considered an important step forward. As an example 
of that, consider the research agenda developed in Economics inside the approach called 
“Zero Intelligence Economics” that dates back to the 50s and the work of Alchian (1950): 
there the focus is on demonstrating that perfect rationality is not needed to ensure 
equilibria and other featuies of markets, and such aims can be facilitated by exploiting 
ABMs in a generativist way (an example among the many possible is the work of Terna 
2000 which focuses on the lack of need of rational behaviom* in investors to allow the 
creation of bubbles in financial markets).
Research Procedures
Passing to the research procedme, the two most accepted generativist examples have been 
the ones of Melanie Mitchell reported in Casti (1997, pp. 179-180) and Axtell and Epstein 
(1994). The first one has been presented in a symposimn at the Santa Fe Institute and states 
(as it has been literally reported) the following research steps:
1. Simplify the real-world problem as much as possible, keeping only what
appears essential to answering the questions being asked.
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2. Write a program that simulates the individual agents of the system, their 
individual rules for action and interaction, along with whatever random elements 
appear to be needed.
3. Run the program many times with different seeds for the random-number 
generator, and collect data and statistics Rom various rmis.
4. Try to understand how the simple rules used by the individual agents give rise 
to the obseiwed, global behaviour of the system.
5. Change parameters in the system to identify souices of behaviour and to pin 
down the effects of different parameter settings.
6. Simplify the simulation even further, if possible, or add new elements that 
appear to be needed.
While the one in Axtell and Epstein (1994, pp. 29) suggests four steps, or levels, that a 
model should reach (in their very words):
LevelO: The model is a caricature of reality, as established tlirough the use of 
simple graphical devices (e.g., allowing visualization of agent motion);
Level 1: The model is in qualitative agreement with empirical macro-structures, 
as established by plotting, say, distributional properties of the agent population;
Level2: The model produces quantitative agreement with empirical macro­
structures, as established thi'ough on-board statistical estimation routines;
and finally LevelS: The model exhibits quantitative agreement with empirical 
micro-structure, as determined fi'om cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of 
the agent population.
These levels are progressive in the sense that satisfactory performance of a 
model at level N implies that it is also satisfactory at level N-1.
The first procedure can be just useful for very explorative and abstract models, as noted by 
the same Casti (1997) who reported it.
The second one seems to be more usefiil, even if the different levels are not compulsory in 
the sense that, for instance, it is possible to build a model of level 2 without passing 
tlu*ough preceding levels and that level 3 corresponds to a particular kind of ABM (it 
seems to be an empirically grounded model like the ones called “case-based models” in 
chapter 3), but that kind of modelling is not the only possible choice when analytically 
studying social mechanisms.
Summarising these last points, perhaps a miified procedure for building ABMs is neither 
commonly accepted nor desirable, and issues such as the inspiration, interests, habits, 
theoretical and methodological backgroimds, empirical data availability, and so forth 
should be the elements leading the resear cher tluoughout the research process, in particular 
if considering the possibility that several different theoretical and methodological 
approaches can co-exist in the scientific commimity of ABMs practitioners, as the 
presentation of Generativism in comparison with the adopted approach testifies.
To summarise the comparison between Generativism positions and the ones here adopted, 
table 2.1 reports some methodological features of the two approaches. In the first line the 
position about the presence of a new scientific approach is summarised. While 
Generativism supports such an idea, our approach considers ABMs just as a modelling 
tool. Typologies of ABMs in Generativism depend upon the problem foimd studying the 
same phenomenon with other tools, while here they depend by the relationship with the 
empirical target and the degree of abstraction, as will be discussed in chapter 3. Validation,
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the third row of the table, for generativists is just a matter of macro similarity to the 
empirical phenomenon, while for the proposed analytical approach the feature is more 
complex and it will be explained in detail in chapter 3. The fourth row of the table presents 
the kind of explanation searched in Generativism, in terms of micro specification. In fact 
the micro specification that is sufficient to generate the macro phenomenon is considered 
“the” explanation of the phenomenon. In our case the aim is to imderstand and to formalise 
social mechanisms, and to accomplish both goals the relationship with empirical data is 
crucial (see chapter 3 for details) and data generated by the model must be investigated 
with care and by means of an approach called “indirect explanation” that will be presented 
in the following section. Finally the table deals with the presence of guidelines for the 
research process with ABMs. In the case of Analytical Sociology there are not guidelines 
for step-by-step procedures, but just the theoretical and methodological guidelines 
presented in the first two par ts of the present work. In Generativism, some procedures have 
been proposed and they are centred on the simplicity principle.
Table 2.1
Methodological features of Generativism and of Analytical Sociology
Feature Generativism Analytical Sociology
Paradigm New scientific approach, different 
horn the standard one
Different kind of modelling 
framework, more suitable for social 
processes
Typologies ABMs as complementary to other 
tools; typologies deriving from 
problems encountered in studying the 
given phenomenon with other tools
ABMs as a tool to study complex 
social systems; typologies based on 
the different levels o f modelling 
abstraction (see chapter 3)
Validation Just at the macro level At every model level, and according 
to the typology (see chapter 3)
Explanation Macro representation and micro 
“generative sufficiency”
Social mechanisms: micro 
“generative necessity”, structural 
validity, and indirect explanation
Procedure Simplicity principle Freedom of choice
2.3 Indirect Explanation in Agent Based Models
The last methodological point worth being examined in this section is the process of 
understandmg the social mechanism with ABMs, and in particular how to understand 
dynamics and causal mechanisms inside the model.
Besides the relevant issues of model verification and validation which will be discussed in 
chapter 3, the literatme in the field of Artificial Life pointed out one ABMs peculiarity 
which is worth considering. ABMs in fact have been defined as “opaque mental 
experiments” (Di Paolo et al. 2000, pp. 1), that is to say “thought experiments in which the
50
consequences follow Rom the premises, but in a non-obvious manner which must be 
revealed through systematic enquiry”
Thus, the fact of identifying the relevant micro specification able to capture the social 
mechanism of interest does not automatically mean that the functioning of the mechanism 
is clear and evident. Furthermore, considering the fact that social systems are oRen 
characterised by concatenations of mechanisms and that more mechanisms can be at work 
in the same time, the understanding of model performance and the discovering of new 
knowledge (e.g., the implications of the co-existence of two specific causal mechanisms, 
triggering conditions, etc...) can be problematic.
It is possible to present the problem in a different way that could help in making the point 
clearer. Imagine using an ABMs to formally describe a system that generates a 
phenomenon that is characterised by a stable low level of the variable of interest, which, 
after some time, suddenly increases and stabilises on a higher value. There are two social 
mechanisms that, co-existing, seem to characterise the system. The model goals, via its 
solution with the simulation, firstly are to understand if the two mechanisms are relevant 
for the comprehension of the phenomenon and secondly to discover how the coexistence 
(or concatenation) of the two generates the phenomenon (i.e., to fully explain the 
phenomenon).
The first goal can be immediately reached: if the model generates dynamics of the variable 
of interest which can be evaluated consistent with the empirical data while considering one 
of the two mechanisms per time, separately, does not generate the dynamics of interest, it 
will be possible to say that it is highly probable that the two mechanisms are responsible 
for the phenomenon.
The second task, that is the explanation of how the phenomenon is dynamically generated, 
is not immediate. To understand that, it is necessary to make hypotheses and to test them, 
to consider other variables besides the ones of interest, and so on. In other words, to 
miderstand simulation results and to ftilly understand the modelled social mechanisms a 
different strategy in explanation (of simulation results) is needed. Such a strategy is called 
“indirect explanation” and its need is due to the fact that models of complex systems are 
complex too.
As Di Paolo et al. (2000, pp. 6) noted “the behaviom* of a simulation is not imderstandable 
by simple inspection, effort towards explaining the results of a simple simulation must be 
expended, since there is no guarantee that what goes on in it is going to be obvious”.
In conclusion the way of explaining results coming from ABMs is not just as in the case of 
other formal models where the obseiwation of generated data can be directly coimected to 
model features, but it is a more complicated process where the researcher, after having 
built, rim and validated the model, has to complete the map between the generated 
patternsand the micro specification elements.
The difference between the two approaches in understanding model results is graphically 
synthesised in figure 2.1 (Di Paolo et al. 2000, pp. 8). On the left part is depicted the 
understanding of model results in models such as systems of linear equations (direct 
explanation). The process is made by obseiwing the pattern resulting Rom the model (e.g..
Mental experimenting is just one of the possible usages of ABMs (Bedau 1998 and Bedau 1999) and it is 
similar to abstract models made upon the scholar’s knowledge (Kuhn 1977): it is a way either to strengthen 
the scholar’s knowledge or to test the knowledge put inside the model.
ABMs generally create many patterns together (on the contrary of models made by systems of equations) 
and they can be both quantitative and qualitative (e.g. organisational structures, etc..).
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an equilibrium state) and then relating it “directly” to the modelled system. On the right of 
the figure is depicted the case of understanding the many resulting patterns of ABMs. 
Many indicators can be traced to describe the system dynamics, and just by obsei*ving them 
it is not clear if they are independent and which elements of the model have been mainly 
responsible for generating them. By inspecting the model (and the modelled system 
indeed) and by a trial-and-error strategy it is possible to shed light on the model 
mechanisms, and patterns interdependences.
As an example of indirect explanation, consider a very simple case taken h om Economics. 
Imagine modelling a market with an ABM, considering heterogeneous consumers and 
producers, their properties, behaviour and interaction stmctuie. The output of the model 
(i.e., of the given specification of the model components) will be many, and considering 
the easiest case possible they will be the average price at which goods are exchanged and 
the distribution of exchange p r i c e s T h e  result will be, in the long run, that the market 
reaches an equilibrium where all goods are exchanged at the same (stable over time) price.
The explaining process with the ABM can not stop by obseiwing the resulting price 
equilibrium and the dynamic path leading to it (as it would have been by using and 
equation based model) but it calls for a further investigation that logically relates the 
dynamics of both patterns (i.e., the average price and prices distribution) and the model 
components (i.e., agents’ financial endowments, productive capability, behaviom, network 
of interaction, etc...). Such an investigation perhaps will require to run the model with 
different specifications of its components (e.g., if the indirect analysis is suggesting that the 
price setting behaviour of consumers is the main cause of system dynamics, we could try to 
modify it and to see if resulting systemic dynamics are different) or to take into 
consideration fmfher patterns (e.g., if the explanation we are thinking of seems to suggest 
that small producers are leading the market because they make more transactions of small 
lots of goods, we could analyse the attempts made by the biggest producer to sell his goods 
over time).
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Direct Explanation indirect Explanation
Figure 2.1
Explanatory opacity: direct and indirect explanation (Di Paolo et al. 2000).
Here only two “patterns” generated by the model are considered for the sake of simplicity, but as said in 
the text the model intrinsically generates many other data that the researcher can decide to ignore. A simple 
example is the fact that each seller and each producer of the model could be monitored over time, and thus it 
would be possible to consider as relevant resulting patterns, for each agent, the number of failed attempts to 
transact, the quantities exchanged, the offered price, the agreed one, etc...
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2,4 Communicating Agent Based Models
A final point in introducing ABMs as a tool for Analytical Sociology is the way ABMs 
should be communicated to the scientific community. The point is also useful to claiify the 
reasons for the way models are presented in the following chapters.
Because of verification and replication pmposes, model comprehension and increnientality 
of scientific research, the computer code by which model are formalised and simulated 
must be shared and made available to everyone.
But obviously that is not sufficient. Before presenting the simulation results and 
proceeding to show their validation with empirical references, a frill description of the 
model must be made.
Readers in fact camiot understand and evaluate model results if they do not know what is 
inside the model. In the case of ABMs that means to frilly describe how many agents are 
considered, how they are characterised (saying, eventually for each one, the personal 
features), and so on. In particular, agents’ behaviour and the structure of interaction must 
be presented because they are the two “leading forces” of the system dynamics.
Chapter 4, 7 and 8, which present ABMs, are structured following such guidelines and by 
showing, step-by-step, the reseaich process as constituted by asking and answering 
research questions.
Finally, it is worth noting that in the tradition of reporting standard formal models, a 
mathematical language is exploited to describe model featmes. The reasons for such 
choices are many, mainly because mathematics is the language with which models are 
built, and by presenting the equations with which models are made, it could be possible 
that the reader re-solves and verifies the system of equations (i.e., the model).
In the case of ABMs the formalisation process typical of the modelling activities takes 
place in a formal language different from mathematics: ABMs are in fact pieces of 
computer programming code.
Is it worth using mathematics? Is it better to just rigorously describe the model components 
in common language? Or, finally, is it better to report all the programming code which 
makes the model?
The reporting of computer code could be an effective way, but it encounters a practical 
problem. ABMs are in fact programmed in different programming languages and toolkits, 
requiring the knowledge of too many programming rules and it is not assumable that all 
readers know all technicalities. Moreover the code should be reported entirely and that 
would mean to ask the reader to analyse both relevant and non relevant model details.
A solution could be the adoption of a standard representing a meta-language, easy to 
understand and to share, even if different from the programming language really used for 
simulations. But today there is not such an accepted standard. And moreover, the space 
needed for reporting the whole model would often exceed publication standards. A 
candidate solution could be the usage of UML (Unified Modelling Language), but even if 
it has been available since some years ago, UML is not diffrised and it has been used in 
very few cases
UML is surely useful for “technical reports” concerning the model, but for publication and for 
communicating models, in particular when aiming at readers outside the community of ABMs practitioners, 
UML is often not sufficient and inefficient. It can be integrated with pseudo-code, graphical representations 
and so on, but it is difficult to consider it as a substitute for a good narrative description of the model.
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Mathematics is a choice that has been followed several times for presenting research works 
made with ABMs, and mathematics as known is the most widespread formal language of 
science.
Nevertheless, in the present work mathematics has not been used for presenting model 
features. To understand the reasons for such a choice, it is worth focussing on ABMs 
elements, agents and interaction structure.
In presenting an interaction structure, the mathematical language is poor, and often 
graphical representations are more effective, even than using descriptive language. For 
instance imagine the case of a social network or of a spatial dimension: a picture of it is 
easier to understand than any other possible means.
In presenting agents, the main task is to fully explain their behaviour'. This is the case in 
which mathematics has been widely used, by exploiting functions and parameters. But in 
our case it is possible that behaviour s have forms difficult to be mathematically described, 
such as in the case of algorithms based on nested if-then clauses.
It is thus preferable to use complete descriptions made by common words. An example can 
help in stressing such a point. Imagine modelling the dynamics of the increase of book 
selling by means of a word of mouth mechanism (this example takes inspiration fr om the 
one presented in Schelling 1998, pp. 34). Agents are situated in a network of relationships 
and thus each one has a set of neighbours that can be easily reached.
The behaviour of agents is as follows:
agents choose the book to buy today at random, but for the case in which, if more than half 
of their neighbours have bought yesterday one specific book and they have not already 
bought it, they today buy that book and not a randomly chosen one.
In less than tlu'ee lines and in less than 50 words, the description of agents’ behaviour 
based on common language is easily imderstandable and complete, excluding possibilities 
of misunderstandings and multiplicity of formal translations in programming languages.
In mathematics the description could be as foliows^^:
b'.=
PV0./-1 j
¥  with (l-/)* = 0
where i is a nmnber indicating an agent, i e /(l,iV), N  is the total number of agents, fis a 
time step, f e r (0 ,r ) , T is the time step at which simulation ends, b\ is the book bought by
agent i at time f, ( l - / )  is the set of neighbouring agent to agent /, (l-/)" is the set of 
neighbouring agents of agent i in the case that more than half of them have bought tire
same book, is the book bought by the just mentioned set at time (f-1), 0  is the
empty set. is the set of books cumulated by agent i in buying books during the
time steps before f, h'' is a book chosen at random, ¥  e 5(6, ,6^  ^), and finally 5(6, ,6^ ) is 
the set of all published books (and M is the total number of them).
The mathematical expression here presented can surely be shortened and improved. But it is the same for 
the description of agents behaviour in common language.
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The mathematical language is not so effective in explaining the behaviour: it is a useless 
complication, and it also calls for a description made by common language to understand 
the chosen symbols (in fact such a description is not needed for common logical symbols 
like =, 9^ , g , V , and so forth, but it is so for all relevant variables typical of the given 
problem).
For the reason just explained (i.e., the uselessness of its presence), mathematics will not be 
used to explain models in the following chapters, and full descriptions will be preferred, as 
well as graphical descriptions of interaction sti-uctures, such as in chapters 4 and 8.
2.5 Conclusions on Tools and Methods
This chapter has shown that it is worth avoiding bounding social mechanisms in the 
domain of linear systems, and thus modelling tools capable of considering non-linear and 
out of equilibrium dynamics should be preferred because of their versatility.
Among the tools capable of modelling such kinds of systemic features. Agent Based 
Models have been chosen, again because of reasons of versatility and flexibility.
Besides the presence of an established methodological approach to ABMs in social 
sciences, our analytical approach is incoherent with the modelling assumptions and 
guidelines which constitute the established approach, called Generativism.
Thus a new methodological approach has been outlined, leaving two important issues to 
the two following chapters, which will also explain in depth some of the issues here 
introduced, and stress the role of indirect explanation when using Agent Based Models.
Finally, this chapter has shown the reasons for presenting models with the help of verbal 
and graphic descriptions, avoiding mathematical language.
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Part Ib
The Methodology o f Analytical Sociology: 
Methodological Issues of Agent Based Models for 
Analytical Social Research
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Chapter 3 
Empirical Foundations of Agent Based Models
This chapter discusses the relationship between empirical data and ABMs, from a 
methodological point of view.
Why do social scientists using ABMs and following the analytical approach to social 
science need to take into accomit the use of empirical data more carefully? Which are the 
empirical data needed? By which strategies can empirical data be collected? Are all models 
of the same type? Does a difference in the modelling target matter for empirical calibration 
and validation strategies? These are the questions this chapter aims to deal with.
The starting point is the generalised belief that ABMs are just as highly abstract “thought 
experiments” conducted in artificial worlds, in which the purpose is to generate but not to 
test theoretical hypotheses in an empirical way (Prietula, Carley and Gasser 1998). ABMs 
are often tacitly viewed as a new branch of experimental sciences, where the computer is 
conceived as a laboratory through which it is possible to compensate for the unavoidable 
weakness of empirical and experimental laiowledge in social science. This belief often 
implies a self-referential theoretical usage of these models, that is to say, with a very loose 
reference to empirical basis.
Of course, such an attitude is not restricted to the case of social scientists. The weakness of 
the linlc between empirical reality, modelling and theory is not something new in social 
science (Merton 1949). In social science, theories always teem, theoretical debates are 
vivid, grand theories only emerge once in a while, sometimes to be left aside or to 
suddenly re-emerge. On the contrary, perhaps empirical tests of the theories completely 
lack, and the coherence of the theory with direct observable evidence does not often seem 
to be one of the main imperatives of social scientists (Moss and Edmonds 2004). 
Furthermore, the need of relating theories and empirical evidences tlu'ough formalised 
models is not perceived as a focal point in social science, but it is in our approach.
The recent literatm e on ABMs seems to be begimiing to recognise the importance of these 
issues. Let the debate on applied evolutionary economics, social simulation, and history- 
friendly models be an example of this (see the followings as examples of the debate: Pyka 
and Aluweiler 2004; Eliasson and Taymaz 2000; Breimer and Murmami 2003), to remain 
within the social science domain. In ecological sciences, biology and in social insects 
studies, the question of empirical validation of models has been under discussion for many 
years (for example, see Carlson et al. 2002, and Jackson, Holcombe and Ratnieks 2004).
In any case, within the computational social science community, most of the steps forward 
have been undertaken on the quest of internal verification of ABMs, model to model 
aligmnent or docking methods, replication, and so fortli (consider positions in 
Generativism about model validation as reported in the preceding chapter and, for the case 
of model docking see Edmonds and Hales 2003). Less attention has been devoted to the 
quest of empirical calibration and validation and to the empirical extension of models.
The situation briefly pictuied above implies that ABMs are often conceived as a kind of 
self-referential autonomous method of doing science, a new promise, something 
completely different, while little attention has been paid to the need of integrating ABMs 
(and simulation models generally speaking) and methods to infer data from empirical 
reality (i.e., methods to collect data particularly useful for modelling with ABMs), such as 
qualitative, quantitative, experimental and participatory methods (as it has been suggested
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before, such an approach to model validation is perfectly coherent with Generativism but it 
is not so with the analytical approach, and it is important to stress the reasons for that).
The first argument to be made and to be analysed more deeply is that if empirical 
knowledge is a fundamental component for obtaining sound and interesting theoretical 
models, as a consequence model makers should not use empirical data just as a loose and 
un-direct reference for modelling social phenomena. On the contrary, empirical knowledge 
needs to be appropriately embedded into modelling practices tluough specific strategies 
and methods.
The second argument is that of speaking about empirical validation of ABMs meaning to 
take into account problems of both model construction and model validation. The link 
between empirical data, model construction and validation needs to be thought of and 
executed as a circular process for which the overall goal is not merely to get a validation of 
simulation results, but to empirically test theoretical mechanisms behind the model. 
Empirical data are needed both to build sound micro specifications of the model and to 
validate macro results of simulations. Models should be both empirically calibrated and 
empirically validated. This is the reason why we often enlarge our analysis to the broader 
quest of the use of empirical data in ABMs, with respect to the naiTow quest of empirical 
validation.
It is obvious to note that social scientists often deal with missing, incomplete or 
inconsistent empirical data and, at the same time, that theory is the most important added 
value of the scientific process. But, the point here is that models are theoretical constructs 
that need to be embedded as much as possible in empirical analysis to have a real 
analytical value.
The third argument is that there are different types of empirical data a model maker would 
need, and different possible and multiple strategies to take them out of reality. The term 
‘‘strategies” is used because a unique method for empirically calibrating and validating 
ABMs does not exist, yet. In this regard, ABMs should be fruitfully integrated, thiough a 
sort of creative attitude, with other methods, such as qualitative, quantitative, experimental 
and participatory methods (and the present work follows this attitude and it is a testimony 
of the fruitfulness of it). There ai'e some first examples of such an attitude in ABMs 
literature and they will be described in the fomfh section. They should be used as “best 
practices” to improve our methodological knowledge about empirical validation.
The last argument is that featmes of the model target definitively matter. It is then possible 
to suggest a taxonomy according to which ABMs are differentiated into “case-based 
models”, “typifications” and “theoretical abstractions”. The difference is in the target of 
the model. This has a strong effect on empirical data finding strategies.
It is worth saying that the subject under debate here implies to seriously take broad 
epistemological issues into account: for example, the relation between theories, models and 
reality, the difference between description and explanation, deduction and induction, 
explanation and prediction and so forth (see also Troitzsch 2004). Here ABMs are 
considered as the formal tool for the analytical approach to social research, as explained in 
part I of the work. Thus, the reader who is interested in a broader perspective that goes 
beyond methodology should refer to the first two chapters and to chapter 1 in particular.
To sum up the structure of this chapter and the main arguments, section 1 focuses on 
empirical data and strategies to collect them. The topic is that empirical data refers to the 
specification-calibration of model components and to the validation of simulation results. 
The output of such a process is intended to test the explanatory theoretical mechanism 
behind the model.
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Section 2 depicts a taxonomy of models that can be useful to tackle both empirical data and 
theory generalisation. Models are differentiated in “case-based models” (the target is a 
specific empirical phenomenon with a circumscribed space-time nature and the model is an 
ad hoc construct), “typifications” (the target is a specific class of empirical phenomena that 
share some idealised properties), and “theoretical abstractions” (the target is a wide range 
general phenomena). Differences in the target imply different empirical challenges and 
different possible strategies of validation to be taken into account. These types are not 
discrete ones but belong to an ideal continuum. This allows for the reflection on the 
problems of how theoretical results of a model can be put under test and generalised.
Section 3 looks at the previous taxonomy on the ground of empirical data finding 
strategies. Which are the empirical data needed and the validation strategies available 
according to the specificity of the modelling target? Some “best practices” available in the 
field are presented.
3.1 Strategies for Model Calibration and Validation
Empirical validation distinguishes itself from other important modelling processes, which 
are more concerned with internal verification of the model.
The internal verification is usually intended to analyse the internal correctness of the 
computer implementation of the theoretical model (Manson 2003) and the model’s 
aligmnent or docking, which compares the same model translated on different platforms 
(Axelrod 1998). Internal verification focuses on the theory and its implementation as a 
computer programmed model.
On the contrary, according to a micro-macro analytical perspective, the usage of empirical 
data implies different methods for establishing fruitful relations between the model and the 
data. Empirical data can be used for two purposes: to specify and calibrate model 
components at micro level and to validate simulation results at macro level.
Specification and calibration of model components mean the usage of empirical data to 
choose and select the appropriate set of model components, as well as their respective 
values, and the appropriate level of details of micro foundations to be included into the 
model. Empirical validation of simulation means the usage of empirical data to test 
artificial data produced by the simulation, through intensive analysis and comparison with 
data on empirical reality.
To clarify the point, it is worth refening back to the concepts shown before about the 
methodological approach to ABMs called Generativism and introduced before: by shortly 
refeii'ing to its concepts it will be possible to synthesise and stress the reasons for our 
approach.
We can imagine an abstract example: suppose that a model maker should explain kr, a 
phenomenon or macro behaviour. The model maker aims to translate kr into an ABM M  
because is perceived as a complex social phenomenon that cannot be mrderstood either 
directly or with other kinds of models, etc... The model maker translates h' into a 
theoretical system T and then into an ABM M, assuming some premises, definitions and 
logical sentences, which are mostly influenced by empirical and theoretical knowledge 
already available (Werker and Brenner 2004). Let’s suppose that A, 5, C..., are all the 
possible model components, which ideally allow the model maker to translate T into the 
model M in an appropriate way. They are, for example, nmnber and type of agents, rules of 
behaviour, types of interaction structme, structures of information flow, and so on.
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Suppose that A l, A2, A3..., BI, B2, B3..., CI, C2, C3..., are ail the possible features of the 
model components. The model maker is ideally called to choose the right components and 
to select their right features to be included in the model, because they should potentially be 
considered a som ce of generation of the macro behaviom* kr.
To empirically specify the model components means to use empirical evidences to choose 
the appropriate model components, let’s suppose, for instance, To empirically
calibrate the model components, it means to use empirical evidences to select the features 
of the components, that is to say, for instance, A2+ C1+ D3+ N5.
Now, let’s suppose that from the empirically specified and calibrated model it follows ka 
as the simulation result. For empirical validation, we mean an intensive analysis and 
comparison between ka (the artificial data) and kr (the real macro behaviour). ITT2+ CI+ 
D3+ N5 come to generate ka and ka is closely comparable with kr (i.e., ka and h' have 
been found very similar by an intensive analysis based on statistical tools), it follows that 
A2+ Cl + D3+ N5 can be considered as a causal mechanism sufficient to generate Jq\
Three points call for our attention. They are about the possible black holes in available 
empirical data, the sequential order from specification-calibration to validation, and the 
condition for causal mechanisms to be considered as a valid theoretical statement.
As it is well laiown, getting empirical data for fiilly specifying and calibrating all the 
model components and their features is not often easily done (or it could be too much 
expensive). In the worst case scenai'io, the model maker is forced to just formulate 
hypotheses about them. In the best case scenario, the model maker can find some empirical 
data about some model components and part of their features, and not about other 
components and featui'es which are relevant as the formers.
According to the example mentioned before, suppose that the model maker has access to 
empirical data about A+C+D model components specifications but not about N, and thus 
only about A2+ C /+ D3 component featui'es. The consequence will be that the model 
maker will introduce plausible model components and featuies. They will possibly become 
important sources of investigation within the model. For instance, the model maker will 
test different features of N  (N5, N2, and so on), and their effects on the other components 
to generate ka. This is to say that it is usually expected to find empirical data on structure 
components (number of agents, types of agents, and so on) and on the macro behaviour, 
but not on rules of behaviour and interaction structures. The effect of these two 
components is often the real reason for theoretical investigation^^.
The second point is about the sequential order fiom specification-calibration to validation. 
It is natural to approach the order in the opposite way, from a top-down perspective. To 
come back to the example, it is natural to use the simulation model to take advantage of a 
prior selection of model components (yf+C+D+A) and features {A2+ C7+ D3+ N5), and 
to understand if they generate a positive result as regards to the macro behaviour" ka. In the 
best case scenario, once a good fitness in the generated data and thus a good macro 
validation are found, the specification-calibration step is carried on in terms of an empirical 
test for micro foimdations. It is worth mentioning that the argument for the need of such an 
empirical test on micro foundations does not have many suppor*ters. The widespread 
approach implies the idea that once a macro empirical validation is found (a good fit 
between ka and kr), the micro foimdations can be considered as validated even if they are 
not empirically based (see the chapter before and the literature references there cited).
The analysis presented in chapter 9 is similar to the one hypothesised here: agents’ behaviour could not be 
observed, and thus some plausible hypotheses will be studied there.
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Here, we come to a focal point. We argued before that if A2+ CI+ D3+ N5 (being them 
empirically based) come to generate ka and that if ka is closely comparable with Ia\ it will 
follow that A2+ C1+ D3+ N5 can be considered as a causal mechanism able to generate 
kr. But, now let’s suppose that the model maker ignores empirical data for the micro 
specification. The consequence is that is always possible to find out that not only yf2+ C1 + 
D3+ N5 but also other combinations of elements and of their features, for instance A1+ 
R2+ H3+ L5, can come to generate the same ka the model maker is trying to understand.
Put in other words, the point is the following: given that a possible infinite amount of 
micro specifications (and, consequently, an infinite amount of explanations) can be found 
capable of generating the ka close to the kr of interest, what else, if not empirical data and 
knowledge about the micro level, is indispensable to imderstand which causal mechanism 
is behind the phenomenon of interest?
To sum up the argument so far, it is important to remember that empirical data are a 
fundamental ingredient to support mechanism-based theoretical explanations and that they 
can have a twofold input-output function. They have the fimction of supporting the model 
building and to get somid theoretical outcomes out of the model.
Evaluating the explanatory theoretical mechanism behind the model is the general intended 
output of the validation process: it means to use empirical evidences to support the 
heuristic values of the theory in understanding the phenomenon that is the modelling 
tai'get. To have this, model construction and model validation, rather than being considered 
as different stages of scientific knowledge development, should be considered as a unique 
process with strong mutual influences. In the middle of this input-output process, there is 
the mechanism-based theoretical model, which is the overall goal of the process itself. This 
is the reason why it is not opportune to separate the quest of empirical base of model 
construction and validation.
But, which kind of empirical data are useful to have an empirical-based model and a 
validated ABM? According to the aim of the model maker, common approaches to collect 
empirical data can be used. ABMs need for empirical data does not require the 
development of ad hoc strategies to collect such a data. On the contraiy, it requires an 
effective exploitation of available techniques, considering the evolution in the field and the 
fact that different approaches are available for the different kinds of issues to be measured, 
as in the case of Sociometiic tools to understand the structure of social networks (for an 
example of the usage of Sociometric tools to micro found an ABM, see chapter 9) and so 
forth. Instead of focusing on the question of which ai*e the available techniques, we focus 
on direct and indirect strategies to gather empirical data.
For direct strategies, strategies to take out first hand empirical data directly from the target 
are meant. This can be done with different tools, or with a mix of them:
• experimental methods (experiments with real agents, or mixed experiments with 
real and artificial agents);
• stakeholders approach (direct involvement of stakeholders as knowledge bearers) 
(for examples and methodological references see Moss 1998, Moss et al. 2000, 
Bousquet et al. 2003, and Moss and Edmonds 2004);
• qualitative methods (inteiwiews or questiomiaires to involved agents, archivai data, 
empirical case-studies);
• quantitative methods (statistical suiweys on the target)
While the last two are usual tools for any kind of social scientists, the first two need fuither 
clarification. Moreover, chapter 5 will make the case of experimental data even clearer by
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shortly introducing such a kind of research tool, and an example of the usage of such a 
kind of data with ABMs is presented in chapters 7 and 8.
Experimental methods are particularly useful when enviromnental data is already 
available. Experimental data differs from field data because the former is collected in a 
laboratory, that is to say, in a controlled and fixed environment. In fact, to conduct an 
experiment and to get usefiil data, the researcher must already be sure of the enviromnental 
settings to choose in the experiment (which generally will also be used in the ABM). When 
enough data about the enviroimient is available, it is thus possible to design an experiment 
capable of mimicking such an environment, and then it is possible to focus on other issues 
of interest, such as the interaction among subjects or their behaviour, and collecting data 
about them (for a suiwey on the linlcs between experiments and ABMs in Economics, see 
Duffy 2004; for an example of a technique to gather behavioural data in experiments which 
is different than the one that will be presented in chapter 7, see Dal Forno and Merlone 
2004).
Stakeholder approach is a participatory method to gather empirical data. It is based on the 
idea of setting up a dense cross-fertilization where theoretical knowledge of model makers 
and empirical knowledge of involved agents emich each other directly on the ground. It is 
often used in the so-called “action research” approach and in the literature on evaluation 
process. The principle of “action research” is that relevant knowledge for model building 
and validation can be generated by an intensive dialogue between planners, practitioners 
and stakeholders who are all involved in the analysis of specific problems in specific areas 
(Pawsons and Tilley 1997, and Stame 2004). In a different way in respect to the previous 
case, in this case environmental data are not already available. Rather, they are the target of 
action and the output of a multi-disciplinaiy dialogue (among the many references to the 
literature where the debate has taken place, see as examples Moss 1998, Barretau et al. 
2001, Etienne et al. 2003, Bousquet et al. 2003, and Moss and Edmonds 2005). The direct 
involvement of stakeholders allows the model maker to exploit involved agents as 
laiowledge holders and bearers, who can bring relevant empirical knowledge about agents, 
rules of behaviour and target domain into the model, and to reduce asymmetries of 
information and the risk of theoretical biases. An example of such a strategy is given by 
Moss and Edmonds (2005) in a water demand model described in the third section of this 
chapter.
Indirect strategies mean strategies to exploit second hand empirical data, using empirical 
analyses and evidences already available in the field. As in the foregoing case, these data 
could have also been produced through different methods (i.e.: statistical sui-veys or 
qualitative case-studies). Second hand data are used in all the cases in which it is 
impossible to have direct data, when it is possible to exploit the presence of institutions or 
agencies specialised on data production, or when the model maker is constrained by budget 
or reasons of time.
Data to be used are both quantitative and qualitative in their nature. That is to say that they 
can be “hard” or “soft”. The first ones allow the definition of parameters such as the 
nimiber of agents, size of the system, features of the enviromnent, dimensions and 
characteristics of the interaction structme and so on. They refer to everything that can be 
quantified in the model. The second ones allow for the introduction of realistic rules of 
behaviour or cognitive aspects at the micro level of individual action. They refer to 
everything that can not be quantified, but can be expressed in a logic language.
Data should refer to the entire space of parameters of the model. In ABMs, it is natural to 
also consider that qualitative aspects, such as rules of behaviour, are parameters 
themselves, making the word “parameters set” synonymous of “model micro 
specification”. Moreover, it is worth clarifying that, when one speaks about quantitative
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data of a model, one often simply means a numerical expression of the qualitative aspects 
of a given phenomenon.
Data also differs in its reference analytic level. It can refer on micro or macro analytic 
levels. To evaluate simulation results, a model maker needs to find aggregate data about 
the macro dynamics of the system that is under investigation. As a consequence, it is 
possible to compare artificial and empirical data. To specify and calibrate the micro­
specification, a model maker needs to find out data at a lower level of aggregation, such as 
those referring to micro-components of the system itself.
3.2 A  Taxonomy of ABMs in Social Science from a M odel Maker 
Perspective
From the empirical validation point of view, ABMs can be differentiated in “case-based 
models”, “typifications”, and “theoretical abstractions”. The difference among them is 
understood in terms of characteristics of the modelling target. Examples of the different 
kinds that are introduced will be presented in section 3.4.
To siun up: “case-based models” are models of empirically circumscribed phenomena, 
with specificity and “individuality” in terms of time-space circumscribed dimensions; 
“typifications” refer to specific classes of empirical phenomena, and are intended to 
investigate some theoretical properties which apply to a more or less wide range of 
empirical phenomena; “theoretical abstractions” are “pme” theoretical models with 
reference neither to specific circumscribed empirical phenomena nor to specific classes of 
empirical phenomena, but aimed at understanding theoretical terms in some general and 
wide social phenomena.
This section aims at discussing both the difference among these types and their belonging 
to an ideal continuum. As stressed below, these types are not conceived as discrete. This 
allows reflecting upon the quest of emphical generalisation of theoretical findings.
3.2.1 Case-Based Models
Case-based models have an empirical space-time circumscribed target domain. The 
phenomenon is characterised by idiosyncratic and individual featuies. This is what Max 
Weber called “a historical individual” (Weber 1904). The model is often built as an ad hoc 
model, a theoretically thick representation, where some theoretical hypotheses on micro 
foundations, in terms of individuals and interaction structures, are introduced to investigate 
empirical macro properties, which are the target domain of the modelling. The goal of the 
model maker is to find a micro-macro generative mechanisms that can allow for the 
explaining of the specificity of the case, and sometimes to build upon it realistic scenarios 
for policy making.
These models can achieve a good level of riclmess and detail, because they are usually 
built in the perspective of finding accuracy, details, precision, veridicality, sometimes 
prediction. As Ragin (1987) synthesised, case-based models should aim to appreciate 
complexity rather than to achieve generality. Even if there are methodological traditions, 
such as ethnomethodology, which overemphasise the difference between theoretical 
knowledge models and “a-theoretical descriptions”, where the latter are intended to giasp 
subjectivity and direct experience of involved agents, it is clear' that case-based models can 
not be conceived as “a-theoretical” models. They are built upon theoretical hypotheses and
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general modelling frameworks. Often, pieces of theoretical evidence or well-known 
theories are used to approach the problem, as well as to build the model.
Anyway, the point is that a case-based model ideally taken per sé allows for the telling of 
nothing more than a “particular story”. As Weber argues (1904), the relevance of a case- 
based model, as well as the condition of its possibility, depends on its relation with a 
theoretical typification. For instance, a local theoretical explanation, to be generalisable, 
needs to be extended to other similar phenomena and abstracted at a higher theoretical 
level. In om’ terms, this means to relate a case-based model to a typification.
But, from the empirical validation point of view, what matters is that, in the case of case- j
based model, the model maker is confr onted with a specific and time-space circiunscribed |
phenomenon. |
3.2.2 Typifications
Typifications are theoretical constructs intended to investigate some properties that apply '
to a wide range of empirical phenomena that share some common features. They are 
abstract models in a Weberian sense, namely heuristic models that allow for the 
miderstanding of some mechanisms that operate within a specific class of empirical 
phenomena. Because of their heuristic and pragmatic value, typifications are theoretical 
constructs that do not fully correspond to the empirical reality they aim at understanding 
(Wilier and Webster 1970). They are not a representation of all the possible empirical 
declinations of the family itself one can find in the reality. According to the idea of the 
Weberian “ideal type”, typifications synthesise “a great many diffuse, discrete, more or 
less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are ananged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct”
(Weber 1904).
The principle is that the gr eater the degree of distance of the typification with respect to all 
the empirical precipitates of the family it refers, the more convincing the theoretical root of 
the model is with respect to the empirical components of the family itself and its heur istic 
value for scientific inquiry.
This is basically what Max Weber, before others, has rightly emphasised when he wrote 
about the heuristic value of ideal types (Weber 1904). Weber rightly argued that such a 
value does not come from the positive properties of case-based models we have briefly 
describe above, which are the level of richness and detail, the accuracy, precision, and 
veridicality. Such a heuristic value comes from theoretical and pragmatic reasons.
In this sense, the possibility of building a good typification has a ftmdarnental pre­
requisite: a large amount of empirical observation and tentative theoretical categorisations, 
as well as good empirical literature in the field, to be already exploitable. This empirical 
and theoretical knowledge can be used to build the model and to choose the specific 
ingredients of the class to be included into the model.
Here, the point is twofold, as we are going to frirther clarify in the next sections. The first 
one is that typifications imply different empirical validation strategies with respect to case- 
based models. The fact that the model maker is not confronted with a time-space 
circumscribed empirical phenomenon, but with a particular class of empirical phenomena 
implies to embark on a greatly different empirical validation challenge. Often, as we argue 
in the fourth section, case-based models can be an important part of a typification 
validation. The second point is that the reference to a specific class of empirical 
phenomena distinguishes typifications from “pme” theoretical abstr'actions. These last 
mentioned actually take into accoimt abstract theories about social phenomena that do not
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have a specific empirical reference, but a potential application to a wide range of different 
empirical situations and contexts.
There are several examples of typifications in social science, and a few in ABMs, too. An 
ABM example is the industrial district model made in recent years (see Squazzoni and 
Boero 2002, and Boero et al. 2004). The model refers to industrial districts as a class of 
phenomena and incorporates a set of features that connotes the class itself, such as types of 
firms, complementarity-based division of functional labour*, sector specialisation, 
production segmentation and coordination mechanisms, geographical proximity relations, 
and so forfh.
This model does not refer to a typification of an industrial system or of an industrial 
cluster, that is to say, to some theoretical constructs that can be theoretically considered 
quite close to industrial districts. This is because the model incorporates features that do 
not apply in the other cases. For instance, a complementarity-based division of labour 
among firms based on their geographical and social proximity is a feature of industrial 
districts as a class, but not a feature of industrial systems or industrial clusters as a class.
At the same time, the model does not refer to empirically circumscribed industrial districts, 
such as, for example, the Prato textile industrial district, or the Silicon Valley industrial 
district. It is not a case-based model. Rather, it synthesises some general featiu’es of the 
class, without aiming at representing a particular precipitate of the class itself.
Finally, the model is not aimed at reproducing a general model of compétition- 
collaboration among agents, which can shed light upon an issue that applies both to 
industrial districts, industiial clusters, network firms, and to many different social contexts.
3.2.3 Theoretical Abstractions
Abstractions focus on general social phenomena. An abstraction is neither a representation 
of a circumscribed empirical phenomenon, nor a typification of a specific class of 
empirical phenomena. Rather, it is a metaphor of a general social reality, often expressed 
in forms of a typical social dilemma or situation. It works if it is as general and abstracted 
as to differentiate itself from any empirical situation, or any class of empirical phenomena. 
According to the definition given by Carley (2002), if case-based models are 
“veridicality”-based models, aiming at reaching accuracy and empirical descriptions, 
theoretical abstractions are “transparency”-based models, aiming at reaching simplicity and 
generalisation.
They often deal with piu*e theoretical aims, tiying, for instance, to find new intuitions and 
suggestions for theoretical debates. They often lay upon previous modelling ftamework 
and are used to improve some limitations of previous theoretical models, as in the case of 
game-theory ABMs.
Abstractions expressed by means of ABMs abound in social science. Examples can be 
found in game-theory-based ABMs (for examples see Axelrod 1997a, and Axelrod et al. 
2002; for an extensive review, see Gotts et al. 2003a), or in “artificial societies” tradition 
(see the reputation model described in Conte and Paolucci 2002). Recently, some 
interesting reviews of this type of models have become available in social science journals 
(see Macy and Wilier 2002, and Sawyer 2003).
The reason for them being so plentyful is that some mechanisms, such as the relation 
between selfish individual behaviour and sub-optimal collective efficiency in social 
interaction contexts, have been studied for a long time and a huge tradition of formalised 
models already exists. It is evident, and often useful that social science proceeds with a 
path-dependence, gradually and incrementally developing formalised models that have
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been already established. Another reason for their abundance is that the mechanisms that 
are studied by means of these models can be found in many different empirical social 
situations.
3.3 Types in a Continuum
As said before, the different types of ABMs have to be thought of not as discrete forms, 
but rather as a continuum. This implies to take into account the linlcs between the model 
types, and, consequently, the quest of generalisation, as it is argued in the next section.
To give a representation of the continuum between types, suppose to depict the taxonomy 
on a Cartesian plane, as in the left part of figuie 1 (where C stands for case-based models, 
T for typifications and A for theoretical abstractions). The two axes of the plane ideally 
allow for representing a match between the riclmess of empirical detail of the target and 
the riclmess of detail reproduced in the model. Case-based models ideally show the highest 
level of target and model details, because they refer to a rich empirical reality, and the 
model aims to incorporate such a richness. Typifications are all the models in the grey area 
between case-based models and theoretical abstractions, because their reference to a class 
of empirical phenomena implies the loss of empirical details of all the possible sub-classes 
and empirical precipitates the class subsumes^ \
To clarify the point, an example can be suggested, as in the right part of figure 1. Suppose 
that the model maker is interested m studying fish markets. A first possibility is that the 
model maker would like to study a particular real one, like the one of Marseille, France (M 
in the figure -  a detailed work on that market has been reported in Kirman and Vriend 
2000 and 2001). In this case, the model would be a case-based model, aiming at 
reproducing the functioning of that market, with a rich level of details, both at the level of 
model and tai'get, so that the idiosyncratic features of that market would be deeply 
understood.
A second possibility is that, according to theoretical literature and to some previous 
empirical case-studies conducted in the field, which allow to have empirical evidence or 
well known stylised facts, the model maker supposes that some fish markets belong to the 
same class of phenomena, that is to say that all those markets share some similar features. 
In this case, the model would be a typification, aiming at capturing, suppose, the common 
features of all the fish markets which characterise, for example, the French Riviera (FR -  
in the figure), or the Mediterranean Sea (MS) or the world (W). The passage fiom M to W, 
through FR and MS, would imply an increasing generalisation of the contents of the 
model, as well as a loss of richness of target and model details. For instance, the specific 
features of the M model would not be wholly found in FR model, while those of the FR 
model would not be wholly found in the MS model, and so forth. Moreover, the W model 
would contain the common features of all the fish markets as a class, that is to say 
something more, something less or something else with respect to the case of M, namely a 
specific empirical precipitate of the class, or with respect to FR, or MS, namely two sub­
classes of the class itself that show different degrees of empirical extension.
Finally, a third possibility is that the model maker decides to work on a more abstract 
model, so that the model allows for the understanding of the characteristics of the auction
As in Cilliers (1998, pp. 58) “models o f complex systems will have to be as complex as the systems 
themselves”, that does not mean to obtain not-understandable models but to necessarily model the features 
that make the target complex, and thus that, in the graphical scheme presented, implies the fact that 
typologies and models lie on the diagonal.
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mechanism which is embedded in most fish markets. This institutional setting, the Dutch 
auction (DA in the figure), works in many other social contexts. It can be thought of as a 
wide ranging social institution with generalised properties and extensions. In this case, the 
model would aim at studying such an institution to show, for example, its excellent 
performance in quickly allocating prices and quantities of perishable goods such as fish. It 
is evident that the model will be taken as simplified and as theoretically pure as possible, 
with no direct reference at all to empirical concrete situations.
It is worth underlining how the previous example does not imply the embracing of a 
particular fixed research path. A model maker can build theoretical abstractions without 
having built any typification or case based model before and vice versa. It is also possible 
to build a typification which does not refer to a class of time-space circumscribed 
phenomena, as in the famous example of the Weberian burocracy ideal type. Finally, it is 
obvious that empirical cases are not randomly selected, but are the product of the model 
maker’s choice.
Figure 3.1
A representation of ABMs taxonomy according to target and model richness of empirical 
detail (on the left), and the example of fish markets (on the right).
Just as a clarification, and supposing to be following a path towards generalisation, come 
back to the previous example. Suppose that a model maker, after a case-based model on 
the Marseille fish market, would try to generalise some theoretical evidence found in that 
case. As the literature on case studies generalisation suggests, this is a difficult 
undertaking, where there is not a general method.
One of the traditional ways of generalising empirical case studies is to use “methods of 
scientific inference also to study systematic patterns in similar parallel events” (King, 
Verba and Keohane 1994). This is what is done in statistical research: generalising from 
the sample to the universe, trying to test the significance of particular findings with respect 
to the universe. But, empirical case studies profoundly differ from statistical surveys. The 
problem of the heterogeneity of similar cases in the reality and the relation between well 
known cases and unknown cases is usually tackled with a careful selection of cases with 
respect to the entire reference universe. In fact, from a scientific point of view, as Weber 
(1904) rightly argued, cases are nothing but a synonymous for instances of a broader class. 
The selection can be done just under empirical and theoretical prior knowledge and 
following some theoretical hypotheses. This is why typification models can be useful. As 
we are going to suggest, the broader class that is the reference universe of a case-based 
model can be intended both as a class that groups together time-space circumscribed 
empirical phenomena of the same type (as in the example of fish markets), and, at the same
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time, as a class that groups together empirical phenomena of a different type that share 
some properties.
To clarify the last point, suppose that, instead of undertaking an attempt of generalisation 
by considering other seaside fish markets to find features which can be similar to those of 
Marseille case-based model, the model maker considers the study of fresh food products 
(e.g., markets selling fruits, vegetables and meat, wherever their location), or completely 
different perishable goods (for instance markets where some chemical compounds are 
sold), and so forth. This is a generalisation strategy that has a different empirical reference 
target with respect to the first example we began.
Such further example testifies to the two following conclusions; the choice of the classes of 
phenomena to be considered is not closely related to the classification, but to the model 
maker’s research path; and the classification is not bound to research but is a concept 
useful for dealing with empirical data, as better explained in the following section.
3.4 Empirical Calibration and Validation Strategies
As outlined in the introduction, the quest of empirical calibration and validation can be 
approached in terms of possible and multiple strategies. This is because there is not yet a 
unique method. There are just some examples that can be used as best practices to be 
extended, or as a suggestion and tentative to-do list.
3.4.1 Case-based Calibration and Validation
As said before, case-based models are empirical models in their first instance. Usually, 
finding aggregate data about a specific time-space circumscribed empirical phenomenon is 
a not such a difficult undertaking. It is more difficult to figure out a good strategy for 
micro-level data gathering. As argued in the second section, there are different tools to 
obtain first hand empirical data on a target, such as experimental, stakeholder, qualitative 
and quantitative methods.
Two good examples about finding and using empirical data in ABMs literature can be 
selected and they will be presented. The first one is the Anasazi model (Dean et al. 2000), a 
historical phenomenon simulation created by a multidisciplinary research team at Santa Fe 
Institute. It is a good example on how reproducing historical phenomena with case-based 
models, by creating realistic representations of enviromnent and populations, mixing 
different types (quantitative and qualitative) and different sources of empirical data. The 
second one is the model of domestic water demand recently described by Moss and 
Edmonds (2005). This second is a good example of what a stakeholder approach to 
empirical data means. They can be viewed as first examples of possible best practices to be 
further broaden.
The Anasazi Example
The model is the outcome of the Artificial Anasazi Project, which has been the first 
exploratory multidisciplinary project on the use of ABMs in archaeology and can be 
considered mostly as a best practice in the field (Ware 1995, Gmnerman and Kohler 1996). 
The overall goal of the project was to use ABMs as analytical tools to overcome some 
traditional problems in the field of evolutionary studies of prehistoric societies, such as the 
tendency of adopting a “social systems” theoretical perspective, which implies an
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overemphasizing and a reification of the systemic properties of these societies, the 
exclusion of the role of space-time as a fundamental evolutionary variable, and the 
tendency of conceiving cultur e as a homogenous variable, without paying the due attention 
to evolutionary and institutional mechanisms of transmission and inheritance of cultural 
traits.
The backgromid is a multidisciplinary study of a valley in north eastern Arizona, where an 
ancient people, the Anasazi, had lived imtil 1300 A.D. Anasazi were the ancestors of the 
modern Pueblo Indians, and they inhabited the famous Four Corners (between southern 
Utah, south western Colorado, north western New Mexico, and northern Arizona). In the 
time period between the last century B.C. and 1300 A.D., they supplemented their food 
gathering with maize horticulture and they evolved a culture whereby we can today 
appreciate ruins and debris. Houses, villages and artefacts (ceramics, and so on) are 
nowadays the testimony of their culture. Modern archaeological studies, based on the many 
different sites left on the area, stress the mysterious decline of that people. In fact the ruins 
testify the evolution of an advanced cultme, stopped and erased in few years, without 
violent events such as enemy invasions.
The goal of the model is to shed light on the following question: why the Anasazi 
community, after a long durée evolution, eharacterised by stability, growth and 
development, disappeared within a few years?
The research focused on a particular area inliabited by Kayenta Anasazi, the so called Long 
House Valley in north eastern Arizona. That area has been chosen by model makers 
because of its representativeness, its topographical bounds, and the quantity and the quality 
of available scientific data both on socio-cultmal and demographic and enviromnental 
aspects.
An ABM allows for the building of a “realistic” enviromnent, based on detailed data, and 
considering anthropologically coherent agents’ rules. The model aims to reproduce a 
complex socio-cultural empirical reality, and to check if “the agents’ repeated interactions 
with their social and physical landscapes reveal ways in which they respond to changing 
enviromnental and social conditions” (Dean et al. 2000). As Gmnerman et al. (2002) 
suggest, “systematically altering demographic, social, and enviromnental conditions, as 
well as the rules of interaction, we expect that a clearer pictme will emerge as to why 
Anasazi followed the evolutionary trajectory we recognize from archaeological 
investigation”. To use a well known reference (Gould and Eldredge 1972), the analytical 
challenge of Anasazi evolutionary trajectory is conceptually condensable in the overall 
idea of “punctuated equilibria”.
To sum up the quest of empirical data used, it is worth outlining that around 2000 B.C., the 
introduction of maize in the Long House Valley started with the Anasazi presence. The 
area consists of 180 km^ of land. For each hectare, and for each year in the period lasting 
from 382 A.D. to 1450 A.D., a quantitative index capable of representing the annual 
potential production of maize in kilograms has been extracted from data.
The process for finding a realistic “fertility” index to be included into the model has been 
quite challenging. The index was the main building block the model makers used to create 
a realistic “production landscape”. The index has been calibrated on the different 
geographical areas within the valley and created by using a standard method to infer 
production data from data on climate (the so-called Palmer Drought Severity Indices) and 
by completing it with data on other elements, such as the effect of hydrologie curve and 
aggradation curve. Some elements which the paleoenviromnental index considers are the 
soil composition, the amount of rain received and the productivity of the species of maize 
available in the valley at that time. Obviously the process, made for each hectare and each
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year, involved many sources from dendroclimatic, soil, dendroagricultural and 
geomorpliological surveys, using high level teclmologies (for a detailed description, see 
Dean et al. 2000).
Following this approach, a description of the whole valley has been created and reproduced 
into the model, so that actual production opportunities and a realistic environment have 
been mimicked ready to test hypotheses on agents.
In fact, agents have been intioduced, following different hypotheses on their attributes. 
Here, we focus on the smallest social unit, individual households, which have 
heterogeneous and independent characteristics such as age, location, grain stocks, while 
sharing the value of the age of death and nutritional needs. Demographic variables, 
nutritional needs and attributes and mles of household building have been taken from 
previous empirical bio-anthropological, agricultural and ethnographic analyses (for details, 
see Dean et al. 2000). Moreover, households identify both “residential” settlement and 
farming land. Residential settlements are modelled according to empirical evidences on the 
“pithouses” readily seen nowadays in different areas of New Mexico. They include: five 
rooms, five individuals, and a matrilineal regulatory institution.
Household consumption is fixed on 800 kilogiams per year, which is a proxy of data on 
individual consumption (160 kilograms per year for each household member). Maize not 
consumed is assumed to be storable for two years at most. Households can move, can be 
created, and can die. To calculate the possible fission of households, the model makers 
assume that households become “old” by the age of 30 at the latest and that once a 
household member is 16 years old there is a 0.125 possibility of creating a new household, 
thanks to a marriage. Such a probability allows synthesizing different conditions as 
follows: the probability of a presence of sons in a household, time needed to allow sons to 
grow; possibility that a female meets a partner, has a child and gives rise to a new 
household.
Households have the capacity of calculating the potential haiwest of a farmland, identifying 
other possible farmlands, and selecting them, checking if the selected hectare is unfarmed, 
uninhabited and it is able to produce at least 160 kilograms per year for each household 
member. In a similar way, residential areas are chosen if imfarmed, if less than 2 
kilometres away, and less productive than the selected farmland. Finally, as a closure, if 
more residential sites match the criteria, the one with the closest access to domestic water 
is chosen.
Nutrition determines fertility and then population dynamics. The environmental landscape 
allows for the reproduction of the main different periods in the valley, with a sharp 
increase of productivity around A.D. 1000, deterioration aimmd A.D. 1150, and an 
improvement until the end of the 1200s when the so called “Great Drought” starts.
To sum up, the question is: can we explain all or part of local Anasazi histoiy- including 
the departme- with agents that recognize no social institutions or property rights (rule of 
land iiilieritance) or must such factors be built into the model? (Dean et al. 2000).
The simulation starts at A.D. 400 with the historical nmnber of households, randomly 
positioned. It shows gieat similarity with real data. Simulation is able to replicate 
localization and size of real settlements. Moreover, in archaeological record, hierarchy and 
clustering are strictly correlated. In the simulation, hierarchy, even if not directly modelled, 
can be inferred from clustering. Interesting evidence is that aggregation of households into 
concentrated clusters emerges when environmental fluctuations are of low intensity. On the 
contrary, time periods in which there are higher levels of rain, plenty of streams, and 
higher ground moisture, allow the growth of dispersion of households, to exploit new 
possibilities of maize hoificulture. In short, simulation shows that Anasazi population is
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able to generate a robust equilibrium at the edge of concentration-dispersion of household 
settlements and low-high frequencies of enviromnental variability.
In the period between 1170 and 1270, the Anasazi population begins to move to the 
southern area of the valley, because of the erosion and lowering of phieatic sm-face (which 
is an empirical evidence introduced into the model). Despite the empirical evidence about 
the Anasazi departure around 1270, in the simulated enviromnent Anasazi completely left 
the valley aromid 1305. Over the simulation, different low density settlements resist to the 
environmental challenge and even grow in the meantime. The evidence is that, despite the 
embitterment of enviromnental conditions in the period of the so-called “Great Drought”, 
Anasazi were still in a sustainable regime of enviromnental possibilities and constraints. A 
movement towards north areas and a dis-aggregation of clustering settlements were enough 
to survive in the valley.
This solution of replacing production and creating smaller settlements with a much lower 
population has actually been implemented in other Anasazi areas, as suggested by Stuart 
(2000). But, history teaches us that Anasazi completely left the valley in those critical few 
years. Perhaps, social ties or complex reasons related to power and social structure of 
Anasazi community, not yet considered in the model, were the reason for that choice. The 
model makers in fact conclude that “the fact that in the real Long House Valley, the 
fraction of the population who chose not to stay behind but to participate in the exodus 
from the area, supports the assertion that socio-cultmal ‘pull’ factors were drawing them 
away from their homeland [...] The simple agents posited here explain important aspects of 
Anasazi history while leaving other important aspects imaccounted for. Our friture research 
will attempt to extend and improve the modelling, and we invite colleagues to posit 
alternative rules, suggest different system parameters, or recommend operational 
improvements” (Dean et al. 2000, pp. 201).
In conclusion, this case-based model is a good example of empirical data-based ABM. The 
empirical target has time-space circumscribed dimensions. The goal is to understand a 
particular history. The means is a realistic model able to mimic historical evolution. 
Qualitative and quantitative, direct and un-direct empirical data are used to build the model 
as accurately as possible with respect to the target. There is not a typification behind, but 
model makers proceed on the ground, trying to exploit available empirical and theoretical 
knowledge. Theoretical findings of the model show that adaptive settlements, movement 
across space, replacing production and creating small settlements were a possible way of 
tackling enviromnental challenges in the case of the Anasazi in the Long House Valley. To 
generalise these findings, model makers should be able to compaie that particular history 
of the Anasazi in the Long House Valley with other stories of the same kind, both with the 
Anasazi cases in other areas, or with other populations in similar enviroimiental conditions, 
as suggested by Stuart (2000).
The Water Demand Model
The second example is the water demand model described by Moss and Edmonds (2005). 
It is a model intended to directly deal with some methodological issues, such as the 
importance of empirical calibration and validation of simulation via a stakeholder approach 
and the need for a generative model to understand empirical statistical properties.
The example refers to the role of social influence in water demand patterns. From a 
theoretical point of view, such a role can be investigated if heterogeneity at micro level can 
be assumed. As we have argued before, such a property can be formalised with ABMs.
From a methodological perspective, the point is that the model allows for taking into 
account empirical data on behaviom*, so that aggregate macro empirical time series can be
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appropriately generated by the simulation. The goal of the authors was clearly a 
methodological one: to demonstrate how the explanation of the macro statistical analysis of 
an outcome can be greatly improved by a model able explicitly to take into accounts a 
social mechanism. As the authors argue, if the model allows generating leptokurtic time 
series with clustered volatility that can be compared with empirical data on domestic water 
consumption, just a causal model can allow for the explaining of the emerging aggregate 
statistics.
The model has been intentionally designed to capture empirical knowledge of stakeholders, 
in particular the “common perceptions and judgements of the representatives -  the water 
industry and its regulators -  regarding the determinants of domestic water consumption 
both during and between droughts in the UK”.
The first version of the model has been constructed with a little feedback ft*om 
stakeholders. It was intended to demonstrate the role of social influence in reducing 
domestic water consmnption during periods of drought. Stakeholders criticized this first 
version, focussing on the point that, when a drought ended, aggregate water consumption 
immediately retuined to its predrought levels. The second version was designed to address 
this deficiency, introducing more sound neighbourhood-based social influence mechanisms 
and the fact that evidence shows a decay function of such an influence over time.
Cognitive, behaviouial and social aspects of the model can be summarised in the idea that 
agents decide what to do about water consmnption by learning over time and by being 
influenced by other neighboming agents and institutional agents. Institutional agents issue 
suggestions to other agents, by monitoring aggregate data. These aspects are all modelled 
both according to theoretical hypotheses and empirical evidences. Moreover, the model 
also embodies a sub-model, where empirical knowledge about hydrological issues has been 
introduced, so that the occmrence of droughts from real precipitation and temperature data 
can be simulated.
The simulation data show some interesting features, from the statistical point of view, 
which can be explained on the basis of the ABM behind. As the authors outline, most of 
the forms time-series data shown are the results of underlying social processes and a 
consequence of social mechanisms put into the model, such as social embeddedness, the 
prevalence of social norms, and individual behaviour. As Coleman argued in his critics on 
the parameters and variables sociology (1990), the possibility to explain the resulting 
statistical evidence with the mechanisms underlying the ABM is the main difference 
between descriptive statistics and mechanism based models. As Moss and Edmonds (2005, 
pp. 18) accordingly argue, “conflating the two can be misleading”.
In this view, participatory models are an important way to cross the bridge between 
statistical empirical data and theoretical mechanism based models. Empirical obsei*vation 
of “how processes actually occur should take precedence over assumptions about the 
aggregate nature of the time series that they produce. That is, generalization and 
abstraction are only warranted by the ability to capture the evidence. Simply conflating 
descriptive statistics with a (statistical) model of the underlying processes does not render 
the result more scientific but simply more quantitative” (Moss and Edmonds 2005, pp. 18).
In conclusion, this second case-based model differs from the first one. In this case, the goal 
of the model is not intended to shed light on a particular historical evolution, but is 
intended to support methodological issues about the importance of an empirical foundation 
of generative models able to understand macro empirical statistical properties. What is 
important here is that empirical foimdation is done, in this case, by mixing statistical data 
and a participatory method. The latter is a “direct strategy” for empirical data gathering 
that was manifestly unavailable in the Anasazi case.
72
3.4.2 The Case of Typifications
As stressed before, typifications are theoretical artefacts focused on a particular class of 
phenomena. In typifications, the relationship between the model and the empirical data is 
even more difficult than in case-based models, particularly when refeii'ing to data for the 
micro calibration of the model.
The main issue here is the fact of considering a class of phenomena, and not just an 
instance of the class, as the modelling target. As in the example about fish markets 
mentioned before, it is clear how there is less probability to find aggregate data of all the 
French Riviera fish markets than to find them for just a single case (e.g. Marseille), as well 
as it is more expensive to collect them in the first case. Such problematic issues can be 
even more challenging if we do not take into account aggregate data for the macro 
validation process (e.g., the average weekly price dynamics), but micro data for calibrating 
model components (e.g. the average percentage of buyers who are restaurant managers). 
The difficulty rises when qualitative data are taken into account. It is in fact easier to find 
and collect a description of subjects’ behaviom for a single case than for a whole class.
Such bounds to data availability and collection costs aie the reason why typifications 
mostly lay upon theoretical analyses and second hand (un-direct) empirical data, which are 
available for some well known classes of phenomena.
Despite those difficulties, typifications are useful for imderstanding widespread 
phenomena, and they can often be empirically calibrated and validated. To testify the first 
claim (i.e., the usefulness of typifications) the Fearlus model is reported as an example, 
which allows for the miderstanding of how a typification can address several different 
questions related to a class of phenomena and how its flexibility can be exploited to 
analyse similar classes of phenomena. To show a possible procedure for empirically 
calibrating a typification, the example about industrial districts, cited before, is flufher 
illustrated.
The Fearlus Model
The Fearlus (Framework for Evaluation and Assessment of Regional Land Use Scenarios) 
model has been developed at the Macaulay Institute of Aberdeen to simulate issues related 
to land use management.
With the aim of answering reseaich questions related to rural land use change, the model 
structme is composed by a two dimensional space divided into land parcels, a set of land 
uses with different values of yield, and a set of decision makers, that is to say land 
managers able to carry on social interactions (for instance, information sharing).
The model has to be considered as a typification because it allows for the captming of the 
main mechanisms and actors which determine land use change, and, at the same time, it 
allows for a high degree of flexibility to make the model locally adaptable to undertake 
particulai* case-studies.
In fact, the model components and their featmes can be fixed according to either some 
theoretical hypotheses or empirically gromided knowledge. For instance, considering the 
land space as a flat grid, where each parcel is of the same size and of the same climate and 
soil composition, and assmning randomly determined yields dynamics and land prices 
permit to study land managers behaviour and its impact on land scenarios in a general way, 
not bounded by spatially determined peculiarities.
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The target is therefore a class of phenomena: the rm al presence of land parcels owned and 
managed by small land owners which yearly face the choice of their land parcels use. The 
typification is exploited as a means for showing the enviromnental conditions which make 
non-imitative or imitative behaviour preferable for land managers (see Polhill et al. 2001), 
for comparing the outcome of different imitative strategies (Gotts et al. 2003), and, finally, 
for investigating the relationship between land managers aspirational thresholds and 
enviromnental circumstances (Gotts et al. 2003b).
As the reader can note, the kind of questions such a model allows to address affects the 
whole class of phenomena considered. This evidence calls for the creation of a typification 
model, because a case-based model would answer those questions with very bounded and 
specific conditions.
Moreover, scholars working with the Fearlus model have worked in the continuum of the 
typification space. In fact, in the direction of case-based models, they have adapted Fearlus 
to a more specific problem even if not case-based, as explained in Izquierdo et al. (2003). 
Focussing on the problem of water management, the model has been adapted to consider 
the problem of water management and pollution together with land use management. The 
result is a model of river basin land use and water management, considering social ties 
among actors, water flows on the spatial dimension and so forth. Validating the model with 
stakeholders, the new version of Fearlus (called Fearlus-W) is used to “increase our 
understanding of these complex interactions and explore how common-pool resource 
problems in river basin management might be tamed tlii'ough socio-economic interactions 
between stakeholders (primarily ruial land managers), and tlnough management strategies 
aimed at shaping these interactions” (Izquierdo et al. 2003). In other words, the case of 
general rural land use scenarios has been bounded to the case of scenaiios of river basins.
Finally it is worth noting that Fearlus has also been used for more theoretical and 
methodological issues. The fact of being a typification has made possible the comparison 
of the model featur es and results with GeoSim, a model of military conflicts among states. 
The idea was to compare these two models, coming from different fields, in order to 
understand their structural similarities and differences, and to allow cross feifilisation 
between them (Cioffi-Revilla and Gotts 2003). Fuifhermore, the typification has allowed 
for some detailed analyses of its internal structure, as in Polhill et al, (2005), where the 
effects of Floating Point Arithmetic used by programming languages are critically 
presented in comiection with model results.
The Industrial District Model
Coming back to typification empirical calibration and validation issues, it is useful to 
reflect again upon the case of industrial districts. This case has recently attracted increasing 
attention of ABM scholars. Apart from the work done in last years (Squazzoni and Boero 
2002, and Boero et al. 2004), it is worth remembering: the Prato textile Italian industiial 
district model by Fioretti (2001), an example of a “case-based model” developed to 
understand historical change of competition strategies of the district in recent decades; the 
Silicon Valley model by Zhang (2003); the model in Breimer (2001) and the one in Albino 
et al. (2003); Brusco et al. (2002), who have used a cellular automata modelling approach 
to study interaction patterns among localised firms tln'ough a typification; and more 
recently Borrelli et al. (2005). They are examples of a growing literature on computational 
approaches to industrial districts that have found a theoretical systématisation in an 
important contribution by Lane (2002).
In this case, the starting point was the huge body of empirical and theoretical studies 
already conducted in the field in the last 30 years. For instance, it is known that industrial
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districts are evolutionary networks of heterogeneous, functionally integrated, specialised 
and complementary firms, which are clustered into the same territory and within the same 
industry. As it is well known, both by empirical and statistical siuweys, they constitute a 
fundamental bone stiuctuie of Italian manufacturing system. An extensive empirical case- 
based and statistical literature allowed us to identify a set of building blocks, which are 
ingredients that belong to the class (Squazzoni and Boero 2002, and Boero et al. 2004).
It is worth mentioning the first four building blocks of the model, just as an example:
i) huge number of small firms clustered in the same territory;
ii) different types of firms according to the division of labour;
iii) specialised complementary-based production chains that linlc firms together;
iv) informal coordination and hierarchical/horizontal information flow among firms.
These building blocks can be sustained by empirical data and accordingly calibrated. The 
first one i) can be inferred by statistical surveys on the agglomeration of firms across 
space. Referring to the Italian economy, this is considerable statistical evidence about it, 
fi'om wliich it is inferred and monitored (also for policy making reasons) the number of old 
and new industrial districts over time. The evidence is that agglomeration is a typical 
ingredient of industrial districts formula. The second one ii) can be empirically infened by 
different quantitative surveys that allow us to classify firms according to the types of good 
they produce (final, intermediate, phase, raw materials, and so on). A great variety of types 
of firms is the second typical ingredient of industiial districts. The third one iii) is usually 
inferred by empirically reconstructing the production flow, by inteiwiewing entrepreneurs 
or managers. The last one iv) can be derived by empirical suiweys on the absence of formal 
registered contracts and protocols, and the predominant use of traditional communication 
tools as coordination scaffolds.
Some of these data can be acquired by second-hand sources (statistical surveys by 
government institutions, foundations, or local entrepreneurs’ associations). Others, mainly 
the most qualitative ones, can be acquired through first-hand souices.
Another point is that it is also possible to infer if there are different morphologies within 
the same class and to identify different representative empirical cases, according to the 
absence of some typification building blocks or to different featuies between the different 
representative cases. For instance, in the case of Italy, it is usual to consider the case of the 
Prato industrial district and the case of Northeast districts as different morphologies of the 
class. The first one shows huge number of small firms, flat inter-firm networks, 
Mai'shallian externalities-based growth, and so on, while the second ones show presence of 
middle-big firms, internal paths of grovrth, hierarchical and more formalised networks, and 
so on (for a complete reference about this last case characteristics, see Belussi and Gottardi 
2000, and Belussi et al. 2003). These two examples can be considered, and usually they 
are, extreme morphologies of the class.
A particular char acteristic of this class is that empirical case-studies and theories abound, 
while less attention has been paid on formalising models to tests theoretical hypotheses. 
With this respect, a typification can allow us to find out ways of testing theories usually 
developed in the field, or to deepen our imderstanding about the basic properties and 
relations among mechanisms that lie behind the class. For instance, a question can be the 
understanding of the relation between the different representative morphologies of the 
class and the features of the enviromnent in which they are embedded: is the Marshallian- 
like industrial district sub-class (such as Prato) an appropriate organisational formula to 
cope with a stable teclmology and market environment, while is a network-centred district 
a good formula to cope with instable environments?
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In conclusion, one of the main challenging questions here is exactly the relation between 
case-based models and typifications. As Weber (1904) rightly argued, typifications are 
needed to do scientific research, with case-based models. But, in the case of case-based 
model, they are means for theoretically building of the model, whereas, in the case of 
typification, they are the model target itself.
Typifications can be used to embed a case-based model into a wider theoretical reference, 
so that a possible case generalisation is supported, or vice versa: the case, if it is selected to 
be representative of the class or of some important sub-classes, can be used to have an 
empirical test for the typification, so that a deepening of the theoretical completeness of the 
typification is possible.
This second way was explored, for example, by Norbert Elias in his famous model of the 
court society (Elias 1969). The case of the French court society is chosen as an instance of 
the typification model of civilising process in Western societies developed in Elias 
(1939b). The theoretical mechanism under investigation is the role of social 
interdependence, behavioural habiti and new forms of power competition in shaping 
particular configurations of modern social life. It is chosen because of its 
representativeness with respect to the entire class. The idea is that what happened in the 
French comt society is also found to be reflected in other Ancien Régime court societies in 
Europe.
In the best case scenario, the outcome of such a process, let this begin with a case-model or 
a typification, is intended to generate what Merton called a “middle range theory” (Merton 
1949), that is to say an empirically grounded theory able to allow the organisation and 
possibly the generalisation of theoretical loiowledge about specific social mechanisms 
operating in the empirical reality.
3.4.3 The Case of Theoretical Abstractions
Theoretical abstractions refer to general social mechanisms without any reference to a 
space-time circumscribed empirical reality. They are mostly used as theoretical tests for 
implication analyses, as well as an extension for some previous theoretical or modelling 
frameworks, such as in the case of game-theory ABMs. They are tools to shed light on 
some theoretical hypotheses, illustrate some new intuitions or ideas, develop modelling 
frameworks, as well as to test theoretical consistency of hypotheses.
This is to say that theoretical abstractions can have a value per sé. Often, they allow for the 
addressing of some topics that can not be empirically understandable. For instance, ABMs 
of cooperation and social order are used to support a theoretical imderstanding and 
explanation of the role of long time evolution and complex interaction structur es for the 
emergence of robust cooperation regimes over time, or to understand some minimal 
conditions, in terms of social contexts and institutional frameworks, for cooperation to be 
generated and protected (Axelrod 1997a). It is often impossible to understand the role of 
evolution in empirical controlled experiments.
At the same time, it is worth remembering that the most famous theoretical abstractions in 
ABMs literature, such as the game-theory ABMs popularised by Axelrod (1984 and 
1997a) and the segregation model by Schelling (1971), the first one being so far the 
reference for social order models, while the second for models of micro-macro emerging 
dynamics (Macy and Wilier 2002), and which usually serve as general references, 
frameworks and inspiration som*ces for other model makers, were built according to a 
sti'ong empirical knowledge foundation and they can be conceived as ABMs made 
according to the methodological approach based upon explanatory social mechanisms even
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if their interaction structure is taken from Game Theory and thus some doubts about the 
realisticness and the explanatory power of such model elements can be raised.
Models and theoretical foundations smnmaiised in Axelrod (1984) have been cumulatively 
built upon an extensive empirical analysis about strategies of behaviour in interaction 
contexts, as well as on a search for empirical salience in different fields of research, fi'om 
biology to political sciences, which have been a source of discovering of the famous TIT- 
for-TAT strategy and a theoretical and methodological heuristic for subsequent modelling 
experiments and theoretical extensions. It was due to the famous round-robin computer 
tournament between social scientists (enlarged in the second instance to include 
nonspecialist entrants) that TIT-for-TAT, originally submitted by Anatole Rapoport, was 
discovered as the most successful strategy, its robust success being due to its combination 
of niceness, retaliation, forgiveness and clearness (Hofmami 2000).
As Hoffmann (2000) comments, in a recent revisitation of Axelrod-inspired debates, after 
identifying some empirical grounded theoretical findings, Axelrod simulated a learning 
process by allowing a replicator dynamic to change the representation of tournament 
strategies between successive generations according to relative payoffs, with the result 
that, after one thousand generations, reciprocating cooperators accoimted for about 75% of 
the total population, and with TIT-for-TAT displaying the highest representation among 
all. After that, Axelrod (1997a) used a genetic algorithm application to simulate learning 
and evolution, generating the emergence of strategies that closely resembled TIT-for-TAT. 
Subsequent work by Axelrod have been focussed on the analysis of emergence and 
robustness of cooperation regimes, on the role of social stiaictuies in preserving 
cooperation regimes, and on a deepening of the quest for minimal conditions for the 
emergence of cooperation regimes through theoretical abstractions via ABMs (Axelrod et 
al. 2002).
Here, the point is not about discussing theoretical appropriateness and generalisability of 
Axelrod findings. Here, the point is that Axelrod’s work is a demonstration of the utility of 
experimental data and empirical knowledge to suppoi-t theoretical abstractions.
The same applies to Schelling segregation model. Schelling started with an intriguing 
theoretical challenge that emerged from soimd empirical evidences. Are segregation 
patterns that we observe in empirical reality in most of the American mtan contexts an 
emerging property from simple and relatively tolerant threshold preference functions at 
micro level? If we assume that people tend to locally respond and adapt to choices given 
by their neighbours, that is to say if we assume a local interaction structure characterised 
by social interdependence, can a qualitative different macro outcome emerge over time? A 
formalised model was used to address the quest, embedding the segregation empirical 
example in a set of other similar examples about the complex relation between micro 
motives and macro behaviour', which now are summarised imder the category of “tipping 
point” mechanisms.
Subsequent works have attempted to revise the traditional Schelling model. Epstein and 
Axtell (1996) have introduced some modifications in preference functions and interaction 
structures, with a further appreciation of the results of the canonical model. Gilbert (2002) 
has modified the canonical model to allow for a theoretical analysis on the role of 
heterogeneity at micro level and second order emergence, while Panes and Vriend (2003) 
have explored preference functions oriented to intentionally refuse racial segregation. 
Bruch and Mare (2005) have focussed on an implication analysis of the Schelling 
assumptions, discovering that the emergence of tipping point segregation dynamics closely 
depends on the introduction of a threshold function (not continuous) at micro level, which 
does not seem to be supported by a thoughtfiil empirical evidence, and that, by allowing 
agents to respond in a continuous and accurate way to neighbourhood change, as empirical
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evidence suggests people do, a trend toward integration rather than segregation emerges. 
At the same time, they introduce other relevant empirical issues, such as, for instance, the 
role of income constraints (Bruch and Mare 2005).
Coming back to the quest of the use of empirical data, abstractions have the advantage of 
being applicable and testable with respect to a wide range of possible concrete empirical 
situations, and to be simple and transparent to use (Carley 2002). But, at the same time, the 
level of abstraction implies the need for a strong and extensive empirical validation. The 
empirical reference can not be made to just a few empirical realities. A good practice is 
that data used for calibrating and validating an abstraction have to be gathered in many 
empirical situations, in order to find a support for a theory tliat seeks to be as general as 
possible. For instance, such kinds of data can be obtained by smweying very different 
populations or with a proper randomization of subjects, in laboratory experiments.
For example, suppose that one would like to study the role of reputation for the emergence 
and the evolutionaiy robustness of social order, via abstractions, as it happens in the case 
of Conte and Paolucci (2002). In that case, to summarise, the authors formulate a general 
theory of reputation that would apply to a wide range of different empirical phenomena, 
horn infosocieties to on-line communities, fi'om social clubs to corporate markets. The 
theory arises from theoretical debates, reviews and discussions, above all fi'om the 
shareable dissatisfaction expressed by the authors regarding the approach to the subject 
carried out by standard game-theorists. The argument is thoroughly examined via 
abstractions, while different simulation settings are created and compared to focus on close 
details of all the aspects of the theory itself.
The point is that empirical evidences about reputation as an efficient social control 
decentralised mechanism, composed, as the authors argue, by “image” formation and 
“reputation” circulation, abound in different social contexts. The major evidence comes 
from laboratory experiments and social artefacts, such as infosocieties and on-line 
communities. For example the reader can refer to the case of eBay, Sporas, and Histos 
(Zacharia and Maes 2000). If macro empirical evidences about reputation and social order 
abound, this does not automatically imply that the mechanism-based theoretical 
explanation behind the reputation model has to be considered the appropriate one. To test 
it, collecting data for calibrating the theory at micro level is the only available means. This 
could be done both by collecting data on the good functioning of reputation-based social 
artefacts and by rumiing several laboratory experiments on social dilemmas to have 
empirical evidences on the micro theory behind the model.
In conclusion, the relation between types of models leads to a great irony (Carley 2002). 
Abstractions usually are simple models, perceived as transparent, with no requirements for 
empirical data to be validated, but they always generate generic knowledge only “with a 
plethora of interpretations” which are difficult to falsify, and to apply too. As argued, 
without empirical foimdation, the theory cannot find a validation. On the contraiy, case- 
based models or typifications are perceived as being difficult to be theoretically validated 
and generalised, but they actually generate more knowledge and specific understandings, 
so that they are paradoxically more easily falsifiable.
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3.5 Conclusions on Agent Based Models and Empirical Data
The quest for empirical validation is an important feature for the development of ABMs in 
social science. As argued, the standard view is to consider ABMs as both experimental and 
“empirical” methods in their own right, or to consider them just as models to do theoretical 
hypotheses hnplication analysis. This is the reason why for most of the social scientists 
using ABMs validation does not refer to empirical issues.
Obviously, internal verification is an important issue for the growth, the cumulativeness, 
the standardisation and the communicability of results of ABMs in social science. Of 
course, this is something indispensable. But, the quest of empirical calibration and 
validation is indispensable as well.
According to this evidence, this chapter has figmed out some steps forward in the 
consciousness of the importance of methodology and empirical validation in computational 
social science, trying to argue the fruitfulness of beginning to embed ABMs within the 
entire set of empirical methods for social science. Having a look at the ABM literatuie in 
social sciences, it is possible to recognise some enlightening examples and some potential 
“best practices” that have recently emerged on the ground.
In conclusion, it is worth underlining the role that the methodological issues, which have 
just been debated, play in the present work. They have been the guidelines of the research 
process, as will be made clear by the usage of experimental data in chapter 7 and by the 
usage of data about empirical social networks in chapter 8. Moreover, models presented in 
this work can be categorised according to the typology just presented, and their empirical 
validation has been done according to it.
In fact, the model to be presented in chapter 4 is a theoretical abstract ABM where the 
theoretical hypothesis to investigate is the absence of full reference to empirical data. The 
model will show that in the extreme case of complete absence of reference to the empirical 
phenomenon of interest, analytical tools can be misused. Such a result is also a warning 
concerning empirically based ABMs because the risk of having an incomplete set of 
empirical data is always present when dealing with social systems, and the tools used to 
study such models have to be robust and used appropriately, as the presented model shows.
Models presented in chapters 7 and 8 are on the thick border between typifications and 
theoretical abstractions. They deal with public goods provision, a problem that can be 
found in many empirical systems and which involves broader theoretical issues like 
cooperation and competition.
The model presented in chapter 9 is a case-based one, referring to an empirical reality to 
miderstand its explanatoiy social mechanism and to address some policy issues.
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Chapter 4 
Network Analysis and Agent Based Models
As mentioned before, the usage of ABMs implies indirect explanations which involve the 
investigation of each model component, like agents’ behaviour (i.e., agents’ decision 
making and actions) and interaction structure (i.e., agents’ relationships that can shape 
their information set and their possibilities of action).
Interaction structures in ABMs can have many featuies: it is not just a matter of the 
flexibility given by the tool, but it mainly depends upon the research path followed by the 
researcher.
In fact, depending on the research needs, it is possible to consider complicated interaction 
structures or simpler and abstract ones, and all the possible configuiations between these 
two extremes. Interaction structines are elements of the model micro specification and as 
pointed out in the chapter before, many possibilities aie open to empirically ground them 
or to theoretically hypothesise them, and the interaction structuie itself can be the object of 
the research process.
Here, noting that the interaction structure will be a key issue in the analyses through ABMs 
that will be presented in the remaining parts of the work, it is important to underline the 
methodological issues raised by using standard tools to study interaction structures, that is 
to say, statistical tools for Social Network Analysis (SNA) when using ABMs.
The main hypothesis is that SNA tools have to be applied with care to our field of interest, 
in particular when interpreting measures of centrality and prestige, importance or 
prominence, where actors’ and groups’ roles are analysed. In fact, SNA has been 
developed for both evaluating empirical cases (see, as an example among the many, Barnes 
1954), and for abstract network configurations which are mathematically tractable (see as 
examples the abstract network models of Watts and Strogatz 1998, and of Albert and 
Barabàsi 2002), the usage of ABMs means a different approach.
The reason for that is the dynamical dimension of ABMs, and the point needs further 
clarification. In fact it is not just a matter of considering social mechanisms capable of 
modifying and shaping the interaction structure, where SNA indicators have to be 
dynamically re-computed on each simulation step, but also a matter of considering 
behaviom* with a static structure of interaction. In this last case some SNA tools, and in 
pai'ticular the ones referring to measures of centrality, to cliques and groups, have to be 
used carefully.
Therefore, this chapter is organised as follows: the first section introduces an abstract and 
provocative example. It is a sketch of a social system, the target to be studied. It is 
completely defined and we know ex ante all its components but not its systemic features 
and the components roles in determining them.
After the introduction of the system to be studied, in section 2 SNA tools are applied to the 
target system, and both systemic outcomes and internal mechanisms can be plausibly 
hypothesised with the help of SNA.
Section 3 presents the analysis made with ABMs, showing systemic outcomes and 
explaining internal mechanisms with indirect explanation. Besides showing that 
conclusions made only by the means of SNA were wiong, the chapter miderlines how SNA 
tools are useful if used in indirect explanations of ABMs, and they can not be used alone, 
but for cases in which the target is an empirical reality easily accessible and where the
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needed data can be collected easily (but as known, in social systems those cases are rare 
ones).
4.1 The Target System
To verify the proposed hypothesis (on the need of ABMs and indirect explanation), a 
simple and abstiact example has been developed, that can be studied with the mentioned 
tools.
The first important issue of the example is its dynamics. It is built by a set of agents who 
take a decision modifying their internal state on the basis of the information flow received 
by the interaction with other agents and on their internal state. The dynamics of the model 
is thus represented by the macro diffusion at the system level of agents’ internal states, 
without modifying over time the other micro components of the model, that is to say the 
internal cognitive fmiction of agents (i.e. the way they collect and elaborate external 
information and their decision rules) and the interaction stiuctme.
In other words, the model presented as an example is a sort of contagion model, where a 
feature of agents difhises over a fixed network of interaction and where the behaviour of 
agents is also fixed and homogeneous.
The point just introduced is obviously often an uni'ealistic element. In complex social 
systems, as already mentioned, it is quite common to find that the macro outcome is 
capable of inducing modifications in the micro specification of the system, as well as the 
micro elements are not completely independent and they often are codetermined. First 
attempts to develop tools to understand the presence of dynamic structures of interaction 
follow these issues, by explicitly considering the influence that behaviour and cognitive 
functions have on the configuration of interactions, and vice versa (for references to 
Dynamic Network Analysis -  DNA -  see Breiger et al. 2003). But neither standard SNA 
tools consider such kinds of issues, nor the proposed example.
For instance, and to further clarify the point, in reality behaviour defines the kind of 
structure of interactions (defining its range, frequency and intensity), but also the 
interaction structure (which is not determined by the agent alone, but also by others) 
modifies agent’s behaviour (provoking adaptation and action).
Our hypothesis of static behaviom* and interaction structme is due to the aim of the model, 
and it makes easy to comprehend the results obtained and to compare them with other 
interaction structures, as well as it is often possible to consider static behaviour and 
interaction in many cases because the processes which determine their dynamics have a 
different and longer time scale in respect to the dimension of interest. With this example in 
fact we ai e searching for the understanding of the aggregate dynamics, explained by causal 
mechanisms, assuming some static and independent elements.
Coming back to the description of the example, the aim is to understand an abstract system 
composed by ten agents. Agents have only one feature, different for each one at the 
beginning. Such a feature is an attribute of the agent, and it can be metaphorically 
considered as an opinion, a technological standard, a disease, and so forth. For not 
exploiting a metaphor that could need fmlher assumptions, we call it the coloui* of agents. 
It is as their favourite coloui*, or just the one they choose to dress. As said, also assume that 
the colour of agents, at the beginning, is different, completely heterogeneous in their 
population, that is to say that there is not more than one agent with the same colour.
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The cognitive function of agents is made of two parts. Firstly they are able to understand 
the colours of agents with whom they interact. Secondly, they take a decision about their 
future colour, depending on the information received by other agents.
The decision mle is made as follows:
1) the agent obseiwes neighboins’ coloiu*;
2) the agent chooses:
a) with 1% of probability assumes one random colour among the available ones;
b) in the remaming 99% of cases, evaluates if in the neighbourhood a colour* is the 
relative majority, that is to say if more than one neighbour shares the same colour;
c) if the last condition is verified and the agent has a different colour, the agent will 
adopt this new colour*, if the condition is false, agent will keep his old colour*.
Even the cognitive function and in particular the decision rule is completely abstract and 
without aiming to represent any empirical process. But it is very simple, and it uses the 
collected information to change agents’ observable states, giving dynamics to the model 
and the possibility to observe a macro outcome.
Moreover* it is worth noting the role of the point 2a) in the list above. It is a very small 
probability of enor, or of noise, which lets the system start its dynamics. In fact, as we 
said, all agents at the begimiing have different colours and thus without such a noise it is 
impossible to have agents changing their internal state because all agents have different 
states and relative majorities are not possible in any neighbourhood.
Finally, the example is made by a network of interaction, a social network as the one 
reported in figure 4.1^ .^ The network, for* simplicity sake, is made by bidirectional links, all 
with equal intensity^^. Vertexes obviously represent the considered ten agents. The 
network figine should be interpreted as follows: agent V2 interacts with (is neighbour* to) 
agents VI, V3, and V4, but not directly with other* agents, and so forth for each agent.
Such an interaction structure has been chosen because of the heterogeneity that presents: 
without being too complicated, the network is in fact made by vertexes (agents) with very 
different positions in terms of cormections with other vertexes (figure 4.2 testifies how 
vertexes positions are different even if measuring positions with different tools).
Such a network structure is commonly known as “kite network” (in fact it resembles a kite) and it has been 
introduced by David Krackhardt of Carnegie Mellon University.
Network heterogeneity is thus limited to links and does not consider the direction of links or their intensity. 
In other words, some agents interact with just one another, some with many more, but links are all equal and 
that is due to the need for simplicity.
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Figure 4.1
The social network, that is to say the interaction structure of agents
4.2 Social Network Analysis o f the Target
The point is that the described system, although very simple, is not easily understandable 
by just referring to network analysis tools, as well as by other traditional tools. To 
understand why SNA tools can be not sufficient and to explain why their usage must be 
carefully embedded in indirect explanations, it is possible to make a “game”. We in fact 
suppose to study and interpret the system of example without simulating it and finding 
indirect explanations. The just mentioned activities will be then done, and the two analyses 
compared.
It is worth adding that the target system can not be studied with standard tools, for instance 
with Game Theory. Such an approach, besides implying unrealistic assumptions that make 
our search for plausible causal mechanisms impossible, can not be used here because the 
agent behaviour can not be transformed to exploit a maximisation over a utility function 
and because the interaction structure is too complicated for game theoretical standards. In 
other words, here there is not a payoff structure and the interaction structure would create 
too many sub-games to investigate (in fact, a useful strategy for game theoretic problems 
characterised by complicated interaction structures is to build many sub games considering 
sub groups of agents, and then trying to find a solution that matches all sub games, but here 
the task is far too complicated).
It would be different with agents’ behaviour linked to a utility function and with an 
interaction structure in which agents interact in pairs or with all the others without 
distinction, but that is not the case here and the system looks quite simple anyway.
Firstly, our network structure underlies neither a strong hierarchical organisation (e.g., tree 
networks) among agents, nor a centralised one (e.g., star networks). Moreover, despite its 
low level of density (that is to say that the network does not link every agent with any 
other), it is easy to identify at least two main sub-groups depending on agents’ connection 
degrees. One is with a higher level of connections and is on the left of figure 4.1, the other 
is a sort of linear network, on the right part of the figure. It is not clear if V8 belongs to the 
group of high interconnection or to the linear one, but it seems to have a key role for the 
considered system.
Moreover, the network seems to have a high degree of differences in vertex positions, and 
it is not reducible. Its first feature is commonly considered typical of social networks and 
generally necessary to have social network evolution and emergence of roles and 
institutions.
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Statistics related to the network and to agents’ positions are reported respectively in table 
4.1 and figure 4.2^ '^ . The amount of available data is impressive: the statistical indicators 
reported are just examples and many more can be computed following the large literature 
on SNA tools.
But, by exploiting data reported in the table and in the figure, what is possible to 
understand about the system? Which is the dynamics of colour contagion? Does the system 
reach equilibrium? And which are the most important vertexes?
Table 4.1
Main network statistical indicators
Statistics Value
Inclusiveness 1
Average degree 7
Std. dev. Of degrees 8.2
Average betweenness 0.122222
Std. dev. Betweenness 0.018241
Average eccentricity 3.5
Std. Dev. Eccentricities 0.45
Density 0.355556
Diameter 4
Degree centralisation 0.333333
Betweenness centralisation 0.296296
Closeness centralisation 0.270375
■  Degree
□  Degree 2“
O Eccentricity 
A Global centrality 
X Corrected global centrality
■  Betweenness
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 vIO
Figure 4.2
Statistic indicators about vertexes of the network presented in figure 4.1
The way statistics have been computed is shown in Boero (2004) and they have been executed using the 
simulation platform called JAS. The simulation that will be presented later in this section has been developed 
with the same software platform.
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Statistics about the network considered as a whole are not particularly useflil, but for 
comparisons. Results and dynamics coming from systems that are similar but with a 
different network structme are not known. Looking at it differently, having knowledge 
about the results and the dynamics of contagion models very similar to the one here 
described but with a different network structure, it could be possible to exploit the 
information coming from network statistics to forecast its behaviour and to hypothesise 
system dynamics and results, but this is not the case.
What could be understood from network statistics is just a quantitative confirmation about 
the fact that the network is not particularly similar to hierarchical or centralised typologies.
Statistical indicators reported in figm'e 4.2, concern the vertexes’ position. Interpreting 
them it is possible to reach some plausible conclusions about the importance of nodes, and 
perhaps about the network dynamics.
The main elements we can understand are reported below:
1) agent V4 seems to have an important role as the centre of the network, depending on its 
degree (the numbers of other vertexes it can directly reach) and depending on the levels 
of two measures of centrality, in particular the “corrected” one;
2) agents V3 and V6, close to V4, have a similar role, having high values of second level 
degree (the nmnber of vertexes they can directly and indirectly reach in two steps) and 
of centrality measures;
3) agent V8 seems to be another important one, in fact it has the highest values of second 
level degree and betweemiess (a measme of the belonging to all the shortest paths 
which connect each pair of other nodes) and it can be considered the “hub” of the 
network, following the commonly accepted definition (see Wasserman and Faust 1994, 
pp. 209).
These are the results coming fr om the analysis of the main statistical indicators of vertexes 
in a network. Moreover, considering them, it seems that the network can really be 
considered as made of two sub groups, one with the seven vertexes on the left of the figure, 
the other with the last two on the right of the figui'e, with V8 acting as the hub between 
them.
These results concern the importance of agents in the network, their role, and describe the 
division in two groups. They can be used to hypothesise system results and dynamics. For 
instance we can argue that the central nodes we have identified (V4, V3 and V6) will be 
the most important in defining the aggregate outcome, also the main and highly 
interconnected sub-group will shape the result of the network considered as a whole 
because it appears stronger and dominant in respect to the other one. A fourth vertex seems 
to be relevant as a hub interconnecting two sub-groups, and the remaining six seems to be 
of no particular interest. Nothing more can plausibly be said about aggregate outcomes and 
dynamics without making fuiHier assiunptions, not allowed due to our lack of knowledge 
about the system of reference.
Moreover before passing to simulate and indirectly explain the example, it is obvious that 
having an empirical reality to refer to would represent an aid in discovering what we are 
looking for, via fiirther interviews, sui*veys and so on, but here the point is to understand 
the informative value given by the usage of SNA alone. However it could be claimed that, 
thinlcing about contagion dynamics, coloins of most central nodes are the ones with the 
highest probability of diffusion and to be the equilibrium of the system.
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4.3 Simulations Analysis
Now it is possible to test such knowledge by making a simulation of the described system. 
The usage of ABMs guarantees us the possibility to numerically simulate the system and to 
record its dynamics. By investigating its results and dynamics, we can understand the 
causal mechanisms at work there, the role of different agents, the possible equilibria, and 
so forth.
The analysis has been made by running the simulation for 50 time steps, and considering 
elements and actions we introduced before (that is to say that all agents start with different 
colours, they communicate it to neighbours and choose the new colour upon the majority 
rule). 50 simulation steps have been considered as a long enough time period capable of 
letting the system reach an equilibrium; results confirm that such a period is adequate.
Results represent the average of 1,000 simulations, each one with a different seed for the 
random numbers generator: in fact, the noise we introduced for making the model dynamic 
(that is to say the low probability of making errors) is strictly dependant on the random 
nimibers generator. The fact of presenting values which are means of those collected in 
1,000 runs neutralises effects coming fiom the random number generator, while having run 
the simulation only a few times would have left the risk of considering results determined 
by the configuiation of the random number generator used in the model.
The first useful result we can consider is the probability to obtain absolute homogeneity of 
colom' after 50 cycles. It is just 22.9%: it means that only with low probability all 10 agents 
will be of the same colour.
But if we consider a looser concept of colour diffusion, for instance that 8 agents over 10 
share the same colour, the probability is strongly liigher and up to 91.6%. The probability 
of having 8 agents of the same colom* is in fact a threshold coming from results: it is in fact 
highly probable to obtain, in the system, two coloms, one in 8 agents and one in the 
remaining two (below it will be discussed why such an outcome is generated and which 
agents share which colour).
Passing to analyse data about each single colom, results are reported in figures 4.3 and 4.4.
In the first one, each colom* named as the vertex in which originally was present is reported 
and the percentage of network vertexes in which we can expect to find it after 50 time 
steps. Such data can also be interpreted as the capability of a single vertex to impose and 
diffuse his colour to others as well as the probability for a colour to be found in tlie final 
colour configuration, and obviously if we sum all values the result is 100%.
The result is clear: almost all agents have a probability close to 10%, which would be the 
one on a homogeneous network (in fact there are ten agents), but some of the most central 
agents have less probability than others, and, overall, V9 and VIO show very different 
values. In fact VIO has no probability to diffuse his colom*, while V9 is the one with the 
highest probability to be found in the final network.
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Figure 4.3
Average number of vertexes of the same colour over 1,000 runs, depending on the vertex 
of origin
Figure 4.4 presents the probability of diffusion. In fact, for each colour (always referred by 
the name of the agent in which it originally was) three indicators are presented. The first 
column indicates the probability of the colour to diffuse to all ten agents. It is a different 
data from the one presented before because it is not computed as the number of times in 
which a colour is present after 50 time steps and in 1,000 runs (as in the case before) but as 
the number of times over 1,000 in which all agents have adopted that same colour.
The second column for each colour means the number of times over 1,000 runs in which 
the colour reaches a weak domination of the network, which is the fact of being adopted by 
at least 8 agents. The last column shows the persistence of colours; that is to say the 
number of cases over 1,000 in which the colour has lasted in at least two agents.
Before commenting on the results it is worth re-stressing how the measurement of the last 
column (i.e., “persistence”), as well as the others presented in figure 4.4, is computed 
differently than the percentage of vertexes of a colour we can expect to find, as in figure 
4.3. In fact the latter is computed by dividing the number of agents of the same colour by 
the total number of agents that could have adopted the colour (that is to say, for each 
colour, 10 agents for 1,000 runs). The former, on the opposite, is a value computed as the 
number of runs in which there are at least two agents adopting a colour. This different 
measurement justifies two points that could appear incoherent: the former value (i.e., of 
figure 4.4) is generally greater than the latter (i.e., of figure 4.3) and the sum of all values 
of the latter kind gives 100% but that is not true for the former. Such different kinds of 
measurement strengthens the argument that will soon be made about the fact that colours 
do not survive alone, but in pairs at least and in particular that is true for V9.
Anyway, going back to studying the diffusion of colours, we know that in more than 60% 
of the possible cases the colour originally chosen by agent V9 is diffused in at least two 
agents. Such a kind of probability is hardly lower for other colours. But those other 
colours, with the exception of VIO which is a colour that does not have any possibility to 
diffuse, have a higher probability to diffuse in 8 nodes than V9. But, again, V9 has a higher 
probability to diffuse in the whole network, which is to say to be adopted by ten agents.
Taking in consideration the network structure, the just presented results, and the possibility 
to investigate the model by inspecting its internal dynamics, and so on, it is clear how in a 
very high number of cases the equilibrium resulting from the system is the one of having
87
two colours, one is shared by 8 agents, the other by the last two. Such an equilibrium is 
reached by the adoption of V9 colour by VIO with V9 keeping its original colour, while 
the other group is made by remaining agents adopting one colour of those they originally 
started with, and among them each colour has quite a similar and low probability to 
diffuse.
itrong dominaton (aiO) Ow«ak domination (»8) Opafwatanca (>«2)
Figure 4.4
Probability for a colour to diffuse in at least two, eight and ten vertexes
The equilibrium made by two sub-groups is the most probable, but also the one of colour 
homogenisation can be reached even if lowly probable (as said before with 22.9% of 
probability). In this case, the main role is acted again by agent V9. It has the highest 
probability to diffuse its colour, and that is due to the fact that agent V9 can stop the 
diffusion of other colours to VIO, making the full diffusion impossible, while other agents 
do not have the power to stop the diffusion of other colours to other nodes.
The evaluation of centrality roles must be enriched by agents’ behaviour and the social 
mechanisms: most central nodes “weight” is less than expected in determining systemic 
outcomes. Another agent which has no “power” in determining systemic outcomes is VIO 
which is the least central node. The agent in the middle, meaning with centrality measures 
between the two extremes is the most important agent in the system and the one which 
determines systemic outcomes.
4.4 Conclusions on Network Analysis and Agent Based Models
Summarising, through simulations we have discovered systemic outcomes, dynamics and 
causal mechanisms, making evident the relation between the decision rule and agents 
network position.
Agent V9 is in a position (in the network) that, together with its behaviour and the social 
mechanism, makes it capable of imposing its colour over the system (agents on the left part 
of the network depicted in figure 4.1 adopt V9 colour), or at least of stopping the diffusion 
of other agents’ colours to VIO, by not adapting new colours, and thus determining a 
different systemic equilibrium.
Comparing SNA tools when used “alone” and simulation results, the analysis shows 
completely different importance for agents. Without having an empirical reality to refer to 
and without the possibility of solving the model, network analysis tools can even be 
misused and lead to wrong conclusions, either about systemic or agent features. The agents 
who were supposed to be the most important for defining aggregate outcomes are not so 
relevant, while some marginal agents are the really important ones.
Even if agents’ behaviour is known, which often happens when studying empirical social 
systems, the problem of SNA statistics interpretation is not certain because the relevant 
element of social mechanisms is not clear. SNA tools camiot then be used without or 
before the simulation of the system.
On the contrary, the usage of network analysis tools together with ABMs can be effective 
and necessary to understand the ABM internal dynamics and for indirect explanation (see 
chapter 2), as will be made clear further in the chapter 9, where the understanding of 
simulation results will be made possible by the exploitation of some network analysis 
procedures, underlining the role of complicated interaction structures for problems of 
cooperation.
This chapter presented an example that obviously does not aim to show the uselessness of 
network analysis but the need to integrate it with ABMs. The example, moreover, although 
manufactmed for that specific puipose, is interesting because it calls for the very general 
arguments that have just been presented about the impossibility to exploit network analysis 
alone when looking for social causal mechanisms.
In conclusion, partial analyses of social mechanisms (i.e., analyses that focus on single 
elements of the social mechanism that is considered, like the interaction structure) can lead 
to wrong systemic explanations and predictions if done alone, while systemic analyses of 
social mechanisms (i.e., made by simulating the whole mechanism tlnough ABMs) lead to 
results that, because of their complex and “opaque” natine, call for deep analyses of the 
role and influence of each mechanism component in the resulting systemic dynamics.
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Data
Considering the methodological relevancy between the empirical data and the modelling 
task, as shown in chapter 3, before proceeding in presenting the research analyses about the 
social dilemma of interest, it is worth introducing the kinds of data used in the last part of 
the work.
In chapters 7 and 8 data recorded in experiments will be used, while in chapter 9 the choice 
is to use mainly empirical data collected in the field through open interviews and postal 
questionnaires, but there also second-hand data will be used coining from chapters 7 and 8 
and the literature.
The inference process of subjects’ behaviour with Genetic Programming that will be 
presented in chapter 7 is an imiovative attempt and it is due to two main reasons: as 
explained in the begimiing chapters, the analytical approach asks for a stronger empirical 
foundation of ABMs; the second reason is that founding behaviour is probably the most 
difficult task in finding empirical foundations for ABMs and there are no standard 
teclniiques available, but human actions are the most important kind of facts jin the social 
sciences (Hayek 1948, pp. 57-76) (other issues related to the inference procedure will be 
fully presented in chapter 6 and 7).
The chapter is brief and divided into two sections. The first one deals with data collected in 
the field. Such a section does not naturally deal with techniques needed to collect such 
kinds of data, because they belong to the common toolbox of each social scientist, but it 
deals with a few problematic issues found in collecting data for models presented in 
chapter 8 which can also help in pointing out elements in favour of the inference procedure 
of behaviour already mentioned.
The second section deals with experiments. It is in fact important to miderline that 
experiments are used here as sources of data and not as a research framework, and thus a 
definition and short introduction to experiments is necessary.
5.1 Field Methods
The collection of data in the field could be made with different tools, questionnaires and 
open interviews are just two examples, but any attempt to do such a task should refer to 
what is needed to build an empirically based ABM.
The case considered in chapter 9 is a good example. It is a system composed by a set of 
producers which interact by sharing information and that aie interdependent because their 
products share the possibility to be recognised in the market (it is a sort of trademark, as 
explained in chapter 9), and thus the quality of single producers’ production affects 
everyone.
The system has been firstly studied by interviewing some “stake holders”. Such open 
interviews have been useful to miderstand the composition of the system (e.g., the number 
of producers), recent system dynamics and performances. The point was also to understand 
the boundaries of the system, for instance to understand if other actors were capable of 
modifying producers’ behaviour or to shape the system by other means. In fact the
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empirical system has to be “reduced” to a target where relevant actors aie present, while 
others aie considered but are not modelled. Intei-views also helped in better understanding 
the research question. In fact, while at the beginning of the research process the question 
was something like “what kind of mechanisms makes the system working by enforcing 
producers’ cooperation?”, by listening to the description of the monitoring mechanism and 
of the present challenges to the system evolution, the research question has been re-focused 
as the following one: “is a formal control mechanism necessary to ensure cooperation?”.
Having defined the research question and having imderstood the composition of the system 
of reference (i.e., the target), the following step has been to prepare a paper-based 
questiomiaire that has been sent to system producers (i.e., the actors).
The kind of information looked for was concerning tlnee main elements. Firstly it was 
important to understand if producers have different production capacities so to examine 
possible relationships between their weight in the system and their power to shape 
systemic outcomes.
For collecting such quantitative information it was asked, in the first part of the 
questionnaire, the number of goods produced in the last four years.
The second kind of information was about the systemic interaction structure. In fact some 
interactions involving actors happen because of the control mechanism, but some others 
are not connected to it. Thus, it is important to understand when actors meet or 
communicate in general, and have thus the possibility to share information.
In the second part of the questionnaire it was asked to each producer the frequency of 
meetings with other producers, and it is important to underline that such a kind of question 
is allowed by the low number of actors present in the system.
In fact, for systems with hundreds or thousands of actors, besides the increased costs 
needed to print, send and collect questionnaires, such a kind of question could become 
stressful for subjects who have to identify the people they know and meet in a list of many. 
In that system the number of actors was 19, and each producer had to say just the 
frequency of meetings with each of the other 18.
In systems composed by more agents it is possible to design a non-standard sampling 
teclmique (the possibility of having an heterogeneous network in fact do not allow the use 
of standard sampling techniques, but others can be used like “snowball” sampling as in 
Atkinson and Flint 2001 or the ones reported in Erickson and Nosanchulc 1983), but in this 
case the whole universe has been studied.
Having collected information about the system components (with interviews), and about 
components’ featuies and interaction structure (both with the questiomiaire), just one 
element is left to be found on empirical grounds: agents’ behaviour.
In the considered system it was not possible to infer it from past data: producers’ have not 
yet faced a system characterised by the absence of formal monitoring mechanism, and thus 
data is not available on such a situation.
Even other tecliniques to understand behaviom' (e.g., direct elicitation) can not be used: the 
behaviour is hypothetical because the modelled situation is so. Thus, the choice has been to 
exploit second-hand data by means of analogy, meaning that data collected by others and 
also fomid in the analysis presented in chapters 7 and 8 can be used as good estimations of 
what subjects could possible do in the hypothetical situation represented in the model.
The behaviour we are refen'ing to, in fact, has been fomid in several cases in which the 
social dilemma of public good provision (the one also chai acterising the system modelled 
in chapter 9) plays a key role in systemic outcomes. Thus such behaviour is considered as
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“partially” empirically grounded, and it becomes one of the variables of interest in the 
model. The analysis will in fact focus on possible variations of the hypothesised behaviour, 
showing systemic outcomes and social mechanisms.
In chapter 7 a tool, (based upon Genetic Programming), for infening information about 
behaviour from experimentally collected data will be presented. Are others techniques 
available?
A different strategy to collect information about agents’ behaviour could be to ask agents 
directly to describe their reasons for choosing a particular behaviom”. Such an activity is 
usually called “direct elicitation” in literatme. Besides the difficulties in applying it (in fact 
often agents answer the question by tiying to rationalise their behaviom, finding plausible 
reasons for their behaviom which are ex post), it is worth verifying the obtained 
description of behaviour with the behaviour followed by the same agents. The direct 
elicitation of subjects’ behaviom" can be considered a useful means but also a difficult one, 
and obviously it can not be used for the case in chapter 7 because it was not applied at the 
time of the experiment (and obviously that can not be done now) and in the example of 
chapter 9 where the behaviour is hypothetical (for an example of the usage of direct 
elicitation for creating ABMs see Dal Forno and Meiione 2004).
When data about agents’ choices are available, it is possible to use such data as a 
description of subjects’ behaviour or to study it with appropriate tools. As mentioned, in 
this work a teclmique to analyse behaviour will be presented and it is based upon Genetic 
Programming, but other tools to accomplish such a task are available: the choice of the tool 
derives from the kind of behaviour analysis and description looked for, and chapter 6 will 
point out that Genetic Programming seems to be a good solution for searching for 
descriptions of behaviom” in terms of fast and frugal heuristics as introduced in chapter 1.
5.2 Experiments
Experiments are the scientific tool on which many scientific fields have based their 
development and evolution. The usage of experiments is paiticularly widespread in natural 
and physical sciences, where the nature of the studied subject makes it possible to establish 
realistic experimental enviromnents in the laboratory and where it is possible to easily re­
implement experiments, to test and verify their outcomes.
Outside those fields, and paiticularly in social sciences, experiments find more difficulties 
being accepted and exploited by scientists, and even the methodology is not standardised.
An example is the case of Experimental Economics. There, with a tradition partially 
derived from the psychological and the physical ones, scholars using the experimental tool 
have gained acceptance in the community (as some recent Nobel prize laureates, like 
Vernon Smith and Daniel Kahneman, testify), but the experimental tool is neither 
considered inside the most recent and widespread methodological textbooks (for a recent 
example see Dow 2002 and for one of the most adopted methodological references see 
Blaug 1993) nor taught as fundamental in Economic degrees.
Methodologies even in this case are not standardised and debates about incentives, subject 
recruitment, auxiliary hypotheses and so forth are widespread in literature (for a general 
introduction to Experimental Economics and its methodological issues see Kagel and Roth 
1995, or Friedman and Sunder 1994, for reference about issues related to auxiliary 
hypotheses see Smith 1991 and 2002, for other methodological issues see Guala 2002 and 
Guala and Mittone 2002).
93
In other social sciences the usage of experiments is even less considered a scientific tool. 
In Sociology, for instance, there are few examples of “traditions” of experimental research, 
and among them thi'ee can be listed:
• the so called “simulations”, games in which the goal is to build a virtual social 
reality from which the scholar can gain observation data, in particular for discourse 
analysis (for some references see Giuliano 1997);
• the work about “social experiments and quasi-experiments” (i.e. experiments 
without the randomization of subjects) stalled by Donald Campbell and focussed 
on the “normative” role of sociology, aiming to test solutions to social problems 
(for references see Campbell and Stanley 1963, Campbell and Russo 1999, Brewer 
and Collins 1981 and in particular Kidder 1981);
• “experiments in the field” to test intuitions on hypothesised social mechanisms, like 
in the “small world problem” and many other experiments similar to the one 
originally made by Stanley Milgram (for reference to this experiment in the field 
see Travers and Milgram 1969 and Milgiam 1977).
The difficulties found in applying experimental methods for studying social systems derive 
from the peculiarities of the systems that are considered, in particular because of the fact 
that experiments involve people and it is not easy to “put” them in a laboratory.
Anyway, here it is important to note that the experimental research methodology is neither 
highly diffused in the social sciences, nor is it used in the present work.
In fact, experiments here are just considered as sources of empirical data, and the point 
needs further clarification.
Following the experimental research approach means to set up a laboratory, that is to say a 
controlled and closed enviromnent where eventually everything can be recorded or 
manipulated. Then, the experimenter uses experiments to establish relationships (mainly 
statistical ones) between the treatment and the experimental outcome. In fact because the 
experimenter can control the enviromnent, it is possible to modify one element and to 
obsei-ve the results. Because the system is controlled and closed, the difference in results 
coming fiom systems with two versions of the element aie only due to the modifications 
which occurred between them. Moreover, experiments can be replicated to verify results 
and conclusions.
The so defined experimental research approach is not followed here. In fact it generally 
searches for statistical explanations (which have been excluded from om* methodological 
approach in chapter 1), but it can be useful for finding empirical data.
Experiments are generally categorised depending on their pmpose (see for instance Kagel 
and Roth 1995 and the intemews section in Andersson and Holm 2002), and they can also 
have different characteristics.
Here it is possible to avoid considering experiments for teaching or training pmposes, and 
it is possible to say that experiments can be used for inducing explanations about the world 
or for testing theoretical ones. In this work they are a means to follow the first purpose, but 
the opportunity of using experiments to test different solutions to common problems is 
absolutely not denied.
Moreover these two activities and goals are not to be considered completely sepai ated, but 
they both generally belong to a complete and iterative research process where reality is 
studied and understood, and solutions are proposed.
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When experiments are used for testing theoretical explanations, their usage can be 
categorised in tlnee sub classes (Davis and Holt 1992). There are “theory tests” which test 
entire theoretical explanations and “component tests” which test just portions of theories. 
There are also “stress tests” that aim to understand die boundaries of the validity of 
theories or of their components.
Othemise experiments can be used for inducing explanations on empirical phenomena and 
that means to consider them as sources of data to be used with other research approaches. 
In fact, as mentioned in chapter 3, when studying social systems it can be useful to collect 
data in a controlled environment, and in this case the data collected is not in the field but it 
is called experimental.
Experiments for collecting data require some conditions: for instance, some of the 
elements of the target system have to be well known, so that the researcher can design the 
experimental setup. To claiify the point, assume being interested in studying a problem of 
voluntary public good provision, as in the system considered in chapter 7. Designing the 
experiment means that the interaction structure, payoffs, the space of agents’ choices, and 
other enviromnental elements must be specified in a way that the resulting system presents 
a dilemma of voluntary public good provision to subjects. Subjects’ behaviour, which is 
recorded in the experiment and it is not controlled by the experimenter, will then be a good 
source of new information for comprehending the designed dilemma, being the element 
that not only the experimenter does not want to control but the one that the experimenter 
wants to obseiwe.
Experiments can thus help in collecting data about some elements of the given system 
when the others are fixed to a particular configuration.
Obviously even that implies some risks, like, for instance when collecting data about 
agents’ behaviour, the possibility to collect biased data because of subjects’ enrolment 
(e.g., when subjects are university students, and they can not be representative of other 
classes of age, etc..), because of the presence of other incentives, or because subjects are 
“playing” and not behaving as they would do in the field.
The replicability of experiments and the possibility to integrate other somces of data (see 
for instance Fein* et al. 2003 where laboratory results are emiched by field data) can be 
means to overcome such risks.
In conclusion, experiments can be considered as a useful tool that emiches the toolbox 
available to social scientists collecting empirical data, but it is not a neutial tool, as any 
other. For this same reason, when using second-hand data, like the experimental one 
considered in chapter 7, that is to say when using data collected by others, the followed 
collecting procedure must be studied to understand the possible biases and to usefully 
integrate the data with other sources (and in fact that is what the presentation of the 
experiment in the first section of chapter 7 aims to do).
5.3 Conclusions on Collecting and Re-using Empirical Data
Concluding the discussion about the sources of empirical data that are used in this work as 
the empirical foundations of ABMs, in the following chapters both experimental data and 
data collected in the field will be exploited. Each kind of data has its own advantages and 
each of them can be collected and inserted in ABMs using several analytical tools.
This chapter did not aim to fully discuss the relevant but very complicated issue of the 
needed link between empirical reality and models, but to introduce, starting with what was
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said in chapter 3, the sources of information exploited for ABMs that will be presented in 
the following chapters. These sources of information are two, they are very different and 
they pose, from the methodological point of view, relevant issues, the main one of which 
has been introduced and briefly discussed.
The relevancy of the just presented issues and a fiirther clarification of the choices made 
about the sources of information and about the way in which such information has been 
embedded in ABMs will become clearer in showing the applications of the approach here 
proposed.
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Chapter 6 
Inferring Rules of Behaviour from Data
Excluding the possibility of direct elicitation of agents’ rules of behaviour means to revert 
to a different approach. It is in fact needed to collect data about agents’ choices and then to 
infer from them an explanation of the followed behaviour.
For inferring data many tools are available: they can be evaluated and selected upon the 
criteria mentioned in the first part, that is to say by searching the most effective tool in 
inferring fast and frugal heuristics.
Before proceeding in describing the chapter structure, it is worth adding a fiirther 
reminding note, aiming to contextualise the proceduie presented in this chapter in the 
episteinological and methodological approach. The fact of knowing, somehow, the rule of 
behaviour used by agents is always crucial in ABMs and it is qualifying the approach here 
considered.
ABMs are in fact based upon “inter-acting” agents: the action of agents is thus a process 
that involves agents, where they retrieve or receive information about their environment 
(often including other agents) and they take a decision on the action to pursue.
Such a process (i.e., the decision making and acting process of agents) is formally 
translated in the ABM and thus it needs to be formally specified by the researcher. Under 
which aims and constraints should this process go on? As said before, we consider here an 
approach aiming at finding social causal mechanisms capable of explaining social 
phenomena. Mechanisms should be “final explanations” as defined in chapter 1 and should 
consider, fi'om the point of view of agents actions, rules of behaviom- that are rational in 
the sense, defined in chapter 1, of ecological rationality and fast and frugal heuristics.
This chapter thus describes an inference procedme that takes data collected in a laboratory 
and transfonns it into a description of subjects’ behaviom- that is consistent with ecological 
rationality. The evaluation of the results of such a procedme will be presented in the two 
chapters following this one, where the results of the procedure will be analysed and tested.
The first section of the chapter deals with the problem of choosing an inference tool: it 
considers the available possibilities and justifies the choice of Genetic Programming, a 
mathematical optimisation heuristics that derives from the field of Artificial Intelligence 
and belongs to a broader category of mathematical heuristics which take inspiration from 
natural processes.
Section 2 presents some important elements of the tool, that is to say the components of 
solutions considered by the tool. Section 3 presents the remaining core elements which are 
the hemistic processes which make the tool work and reach a solution. They are 
mechanisms for creating the first generation of possible solutions, the mechanism for 
evaluating fitness of possible solutions and the ones for evolving solutions towards the 
direction of the best one that solves the given problem.
6.1 Genetic Programming as the Tool for Inference
The process of inferring a rule of behaviour capable to explain the choices made by agents 
strictly depends upon the form of the rule that is searched for.
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For instance, if a functional form is searched as >» = ax + h, which comiects the choice, y, 
to a dependent variable or soui'ce of information, x, it could be inferred by estimating the 
parameters a and b. Statistics and its application to social sciences has developed several 
estimators to accomplish such tasks.
In our case the form of behavioural rules searched for is made by fast and frugal heuristics. 
That implies several issues: firstly it means that fmictional forms are denied and, instead, 
forms like algorithms are focussed on; secondly it means that, a priori, all possible 
information souices should be considered as inputs for the decision making process, but 
following an approach that aims to consider bomided cognitive capabilities, results are 
expected to show that not all souices of information are relevant, ex post', thirdly it means 
that the searched form of solutions is not particularly bounded in the sense that the 
flexibility of different algorithmic structmes must be allowed (and even here, by 
considering boimded cognitive capabilities, structuies which seem to be less complicated 
and weighty from a cognitive point of view, should be considered more plausible, as 
discussed below).
Because of the “heuristic” form of solutions, standard statistical techniques for estimation 
(e.g., linear regression) can not be used but different mathematical hemistics aiming to 
solve optimisation problems are worth considering.
Two of them (i.e., artificial neuial networks and genetic algorithms) have been introduced 
in chapter 2 as possible modelling tools for finding explanatory social mechanisms: as well 
as in that case, they can not be used for the purpose here considered (i.e., for inferring an 
ecologically rational description of subjects’ behaviour), but the reasons for that are here 
different.
Artificial neural networks can not be used because their inference process leads to a 
representation of subjects’ behaviour that is far different from the one here considered. In 
fact artificial neural networks, if trained with enough data, can learn to replicate subjects’ 
decisions, but the data needed is often gieater than the one usually collectable from human 
subjects. Moreover the adapted neural network is the solution, in the sense that the reasons 
for each subject’s choice can not be understood. Artificial neuial networks are black boxes 
and they can not be accepted according to our approach.
The case of genetic algoritlnns is more complicated and it is worth presenting them along 
with genetic programming.
Genetic Programming (GP) is a computational technique developed by Jolm Koza and 
presented in a complete way for the first time in his book called “Genetic Programming. 
On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natuial Selection.”(Koza 1992)^ .^ His 
work starts where another seminal book ends, in which Holland (1975) showed the utility 
of using the analogy of natural selection and evolution processes to solve many problems.
GP constitutes a sub field of Artificial Intelligence and it solves a problem of program 
induction, i.e., GP aims to generate computer programs able to solve problems without 
being explicitly programmed for them. GP can be conceived as a mathematical heuristic 
capable of finding solutions for problems in huge and complicated search spaces.
In this chapter the basic fi-amework introduced by Koza 1992 is presented. It is the same version of the 
heuristics exploited in the analyses that will be presented in chapter 7 and, despite its simplicity, it allows for 
reaching the expected goal. Nevertheless, this field of research shows many interesting evolutions of the 
basic framework capable of improving GP performances. For a reference to the most important 
improvements of GP see Kinnear 1994, Angeline and Kinnear 1996 and Spector et al. 1999.
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The starting point of GP is Genetic Algoritlims (GA)^ .^ The last ones are a set of 
algorithms capable of simulating the adaptation of a genetic code to the environment. 
Thus, any problem studied with this tool is modelled considering an environment and some 
“individuals”, who are differently adapted to it. The function to evaluate the adaptation of 
individuals to the environment is generally called the “fitness” function, and it is chosen as 
the best way to evaluate the degree of optimality of possible solutions (i.e. comparing 
candidate solutions depending upon their fitness to the environment, that is to say their 
capability to solve the problem).
The second element of GA is an algorithm able to generate a first set of possible solutions. 
This algorithm, called the “breeding” fimction, is necessary because GA is mathematical 
heuristics and they try to find the right solution exploring large segments of the solution 
space. GA needs a starting point for the exploration, i.e. a first generation of possible 
solutions and a first step in the learning process.
The third element of GA is solutions themselves. They are stiuctured as a genetic code, a 
set of numbers of fixed or variable size. Generally they are just binaries, 0 and 1, 
representing alleles.
The fouith GA element is a set of functions and algoritluns that could be called the 
“reproduction process”. Taking inspiration fi'om natural processes acting in Darwinian 
natui'al selection and in genetic evolution, in GA “crossover”, “mutation” and 
“reproduction” operate. The aim of such processes is to drive the search for the optimum, 
avoiding the expensive search of the whole space of solutions.
Crossover is a process with which two genetic codes of two parents are crossed for 
creating two children with new codes. Mutation is a process that creates a children with a 
different (i.e. modified) DNA fiom the parent’s one. Reproduction is the most simple 
process and generates a child that is the same as the parent.
All these processes are generally relevant, and they are applied to populations according to 
the individual fitness. By using a computer program capable of managing all these 
features, it is usually possible to find optimal solutions for the given problem.
In figure 6.1 the flowchart of a generic computer program capable of implementing GA is 
shown. It is just a schematic representation of what has just been said: an ordered sequence 
of operations, with some of them nested in others, some happening just when specific 
conditions are present, and with others which are iteratively repeated until other conditions 
are respected.
26 For an introduction to Genetic Algorithms see Mitchell 1996.
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Figure 6.1
Flowchart of the conventional genetic algoritlini (Koza 1992, pp. 29)
The GP paradigm is similar to the GA one, but for the solution stmcture. Figure 6.2 
presents the flowchart of GP and it is worth focussing attention on the close similarity with 
the one of GA in figure 6.1. Considering that we are referring to “conventional” versions 
of the two algorithms (Koza 1992, pp. 27), the only difference is the conventional one of 
GP considers a null P„„ the probability of mutation. That is to say that in GP mutation does 
not usually occur, but it is possible to consider it, if needed.
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Figure 6.2
Flowchart of the genetic programming paradigm (Koza 1992, pp. 76)
In GA solutions are represented by codes of fixed size, and genes are numbers representing 
something of interest, in GP solutions are programs.
Moreover in GP solution genes are represented by programming instructions, variables, 
and so on, and the structure of the solution is not a sequence of numbers but a “tree” of 
instructions, with no boundaries on the form, the width and the length.
Figure 6.3 depicts a simple example of a solution. It is the mathematical expression 
fa*bj+c, represented as a program in the tree form.
Figure 6.3
Tree representation of the expression (a^bj+c
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The figui’e presents a solution in the tree form because that is the form internally used by 
GP to consider solutions, as will be soon explained. The tree form is a formal way to 
graphically formalise nested expressions by putting operators as roots and arguments as 
branches. But it is important to understand that there are not a priori constraints on the 
structure and the elements composing solutions, and that while boundaries on the elements 
to be considered are anyway needed and decided by the user, boimdaries on the stmcture 
are possible but not compulsory. Such flexibility is the key reason for choosing GP: in fact 
starting fr om the absence of eonstraints to the form of solutions, some constr aints will be 
imposed later to the process for obtaining solutions in the form of fast and frugal decision 
heuristics, and such constraints and assumptions will be presented in chapter 7.
6.2 Genetic Programming Elements
GP can be used for many purposes, shown to be effective and flexible for many problems, 
otherwise unsolvable. Without intention of being exhaustive, some of those are  ^ : optimal 
control, plaiming, sequence induction, symbolic regression, automatic programming, 
discovering a game playing strategy, empirical discovery and forecasting, symbolic 
integration and differentiation, inverse problems, discovering mathematical identities, 
classification and decision tree induction, evolution of emergent behaviour, automatic 
programming of cellular automata.
Except for the rare case of automatic programming, at the core of the usage of GP there is 
the fact that solutions are represented by programs and thus they are suitable to model 
many problems. In respect to GA solutions which are fixed-length character strings, GP 
solutions are more effective because they provide the hierarchical structure central to the 
organization of computer programs (into programs and subroutines or objects and 
methods), the organization of behaviour (tasks and subtasks, or methods and submethods), 
incorporation of iteration or recursion, dynamic variability (the initial selection of string 
length in GA limits in advanee the number of internal states of the system and limits what 
the system can learn).
In the present ease, GP is used as the inference engine for understanding subjects’ 
behaviour: solutions aie, in this case, algoritlims representing actions in the form of a 
decision rule that receives some inputs (the information set) and generates an output, i.e. 
the decision.
Going back to the general description, GP is an adaptive system in which generations of 
solutions are undergoing adaptation. A solution can be conceived as a single point in the 
search space, whatever it represents, and thus the process of optimisation is conducted in 
parallel because it simultaneously involves hundreds or thousands of points in the search 
space (a generation of solutions).
The boundaries on the inference proceduies that the user must impose on the GP relate to 
the set containing all the possible structuies of available basic elements (i.e., the search 
space). The available elements compose two sets, one is called of “fimctions” F  = 
fn}  ^ which includes all considered language instructions which need an argument to be 
evaluated. The other is called the “terminal” one T = {ai, 0 2 , Om) which includes all the 
considered elements that do not need arguments.
For examples and other applications see Koza (1992) and Koza (1994).
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Thinlcing about the tree representation of a program, terminal elements are the ones at the 
end of each branch (the circles). All others elements are functions. Considering the 
example in figure 6.3, the function set is F = {+, and the terminal set is T = {A, B, CJ 
where A, B and C aie the possible arguments of + and *.
Such sets must have some properties to let the heuristics work. The first one is their 
closure. It means that each of the fimctions in the function set must be able to accept, as its 
arguments, any value and data type that may possibly be retmned by any function in the 
function set and any value and data type that may possible be assumed by any terminal in 
the terminal set.
The second and last property is the sufficiency: the two sets combined must be capable of 
expressing a solution to the problem. This feature does not depend on the tool used but on 
the researcher expertise in using the tool and in modelling problems: it means that it is not 
possible to represent, for instance, a square root function with a function set including only 
the “sum” operation and a teiminal set made by positive natural numbers. The heuristics 
could work finding a solution for a few cases but not for obtaining a robust outcome 
because the problem is set up wiongly. Anyway, it is important to underline that there are 
not general rules for evaluating sufficiency and that in some cases few elements can be 
effective in some domains. For instance, considering Boolean expressions, a function set 
like F  = {AND, OR, NOT} is sufficient for realising any Boolean function, as well known 
in Logics. In other words it is important to consider that functions can be combined for 
obtaining more complicated fimctions, and thus for guaranteeing sufficiency it is often the 
case that basic elements capable of being efficiently combined are enough.
6.3 Genetic Programming Basic Mechanisms
Having defined the solution space with terminal and fimction sets, and the “loose” solution 
form, and having already introduced the main mechanisms of the algoritlnn by showing the 
flowchart in figure 6.2, such mechanisms are still to be fiilly explained.
6.3.1 Breeding Solutions
For starting to explore the search space, the GP process needs a point at which to begin. 
The first population of solutions must be randomly generated, trying to create a set of 
solutions capable of collecting the most of information about the search space by exploring 
it and also capable to be enough diversified to contain each useful instruction.
The last issue is due to the need of avoiding the risk to fall in a local optimum, and in fact 
it is important to keep a good degree of variability in all generations. If a function is not 
present enough in the first generation, it risks disappearing too early in the process of 
finding the solution (unless other processes that will be described below, such as 
“mutation”, re-introduce it). Considering that inserting fimctions in populations later in the 
process is a complicated task, the algorithm for generating the first population is quite 
relevant and must deal with such issues.
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Figure 6.4
Starting to create a random program tree: the function is chosen as the root of the tree 
(Koza 1992, pp .91)
The process of generating first population program structuies can be easily understood 
looking at figures 6,4, 6.5 and 6.6. In the first a function (“+”) is chosen as the root of the 
program tree.
In the second (figure 6.5) another function is put as a second level node on one branch of 
the tree (i.e. as an argument of the root fimction).
Figure 6.5
A second function is randomly chosen to expand a branch (Koza 1992, pp. 92)
In figure 6.6 the program tree is completed by putting terminal nodes at the end of each 
open branch, and obtaining a tree solution identical to the example presented before in 
figure 6.3.
Figure 6.6
Terminal sets are randomly chosen for completing the program tree (Koza 1992, pp. 92)
Obviously function and terminal nodes are randomly chosen from fimction and terminal 
sets. The generative process for choosing them and for deciding when to end a branch is 
called the “breeding fimction”.
It can be developed in many different ways, but following Koza (1992) tluee main 
methods can be identified. The first is the “full” one: it creates the first generation of 
solutions made as trees with branches all of the maximum allowed length.
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The “grow” method is the second possibility and creates trees that are variably shaped: 
each branch of each tree is of random length, the branch growing via a random choice of 
each node in both function and terminal sets (i.e. the branch ends when a terminal is 
randomly chosen or when the maximum branch length is reached). The ratio between the 
number of functions and the number of terminals is a good measme for the expected 
average length of branches.
The third method is called “ramped half-and-half’. It is probably the most useful because 
the size and shape of the solution aie generally not known a priori^ and it produces a wide 
variety of solutions of various sizes and shapes, mixing the approach of both the fall and 
the gi'ow method.
It works creating an equal number of solutions that has, as maximum depth, a value in the 
range between 2 and the general maximum specified depth. As in Koza (1992, pp. 92): 
“For example, if the maximum specified depth is 6 (...), 20% of the trees will have depth 2, 
20% will have depth 3, and so forth up to depth 6”. Then, half of each sub class of 
solutions (created in the way just explained), is made following the full method and the 
other via the grow method.
6.3.2 Fitness Evaluation
Fitness is the driving force of optimisation. It is the way to evaluate how individuals are 
“good” for the environment. Looking at it fi'om the point of view of evolution, it means a 
measure of the probability that a genetic code reproduees itself.
Fitness can be evaluated in many different ways, but the most common one is to create an 
explicit fitness measure for each individual in the population. Fitness can also be computed 
in a co-evolutionary enviromnent, where the evolution of individuals depends upon the 
evolution of others.
There are four important ways to evaluate fitness. The raw fitness is a measure of the 
individual acting in the environment, over some fitness cases. For instance, if the problem 
is about an ant eating food in thi'ee sites, the raw fitness is the total amount of pieces of 
food eaten. Or, if the problem is about a machine answering ten questions, the raw fitness 
is the amount of right answers (or of wrong answers).
Mathematically speaking, the raw fitness measuies the eiTor o f an individual i in the 
population of size M at any generational time step t and it is:
where S(i, j)  is the value retmiied by the function for fitness case j  (there are in total N  
cases) and where C(j) is the correct value for fitness case j.
Because the raw fitness is evaluated over some fitness cases which depend on the problem, 
the better value could be either smaller or larger.
Raw fitness is therefore difficult to manage, neither knowing which is the best value nor 
the right direction. Thus another measure is needed: standardised fitness re-computes the 
raw fitness so that a lower value is always a better value. If, in a particular problem, a 
lesser value of raw fitness is better, standardised fitness will be identical to raw fitness:
s{i,t) = r ( i j ) .
When a greater value of raw fitness is better, it is necessary to consider the old measure 
upper bound (i.e. the maximum possible value of raw fitness, denoted r,„ax)'-
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Sometime it is also convenient to have the value 0 as the best value of raw fitness. This 
could easily be done by subtracting a constant.
The adjusted fitness measur e a(i, t), starts from the standardised fitness s(i, t) and it is 
bound to a defined intei-val, as follows:
a{i,t)= ^l + s(i,t)
where s(i, t) is the standardised fitness for individual i at time t.
This measure of standardised fitness lies between 0 and 1 and it is higher for better 
individuals.
In GP, moreover, it is possible to use several different selection mechanisms for evolution 
operations. As said, fitness values are the guide for selecting individuals for evolution, but 
many techniques are possible. One of the most common and effective is the fitness 
proportionate mechanism (Holland 1975).
In this last case another measure is needed. It is the normalised fitness n(i, t), using the 
adjusted fitness a(i, t), as follows:
This final measure ranges between 0 and 1, it is larger for better individuals, and the sum 
of all its values is 1.
6.3.3 Optimisation Processes
In GP two main mechanisms for evolution and optimisation -  i.e. operations used for 
generating new solutions -  and five rarer ones are available. The two main are Danvinian 
reproduction and crossover (sexual recombination).
Darwinian Reproduction
The Darwinian reproduction is based on survival of the fittest individual. The same 
mechanism is implemented in GP for asexually reproducing fittest individuals. In other 
words, fittest individuals are copied from the cuiTent population into the new one without 
alteration.
Crossover
The crossover mechanism creates variation in the population, combining and crossing 
individuals and thus exploring the search space thr ough new solutions.
The first step is to choose two parents belonging to the cmTcnt population. This choice is 
made according to the fitness proportionate criterion as for reproduction. Then a “point” 
(in other words a node, a fimction) in each parent is chosen. In figure 6.7 two parents are 
shown, for the first one a random process has chosen the point labelled 2, for the second 
parent the point labelled 6.
106
ou OR
AND) OR AND)
DOD1 DI Dl NOl) (NO’I) (N O 'f
DO DO
Figure 6.7
Two parent individuals (Koza 1992, pp. 101)
Afteiwards, the two branches starting from these “cutting” points (reported in figure 6.8) 
are split from the parent trees and then swapped in their parents, obtaining a result as the 
one of figine 6.9.
NOT AND
NOT) ( n o t
DO
Figure 6.8
Two branches to swap (Koza 1992, pp. 102)
The trees so obtained and reported in figure 6.9 are the children belonging to the next 
generation. If the process of randomly choosing the cutting points selects the root in both 
parents, the crossover operation degenerates in reproduction.
OR OR
AND) N O DAND) OR
N O l) ( N C n  (  DO .not. D t
DO D r DO
Figure 6.9
Two new individuals (Koza 1992, pp. 102)
Mutation
Among secondary mechanisms, the most used is mutation. It introduces random changes in 
solutions. As said before, sometime it is usefrrl to re-consider some elements (functions or
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terminals) that have disappeared from the generation of solutions. Mutation is a way to 
insert them and to explore undiscovered space.
When passing from a generation to the following one, mutation selects an individual 
following the process described before for reproduction, then it randomly chooses a point 
of the tree where it applies random modifications. The tree so obtained is then copied to 
the next population.
An example of mutation is reported in figure 6.10. The parent is depicted on the left: inside 
it a node is randomly selected, namely the one labelled “3”. Mutation modifies the content 
of the node by also adding a further short branch, as in the right part of the figur e.
OR
2  (AND, ANIÏ DO
Dl
Before AfterD l
Figure 6.10
Mutation of an individual (Koza 1992, pp. 106)
Further Mechanisms
Another minor mechanism is permutation that changes the order of arguments inside 
functions: the mechanism chooses an individual from the current population, a point of its 
tree and then swaps the order of the branches coming from it.
The example of figure 6.11 shows the chosen parent on the left: nodes labelled “5” and “6” 
are selected and swapped to obtain the structur e in the right part of the figure.
Before After
Figure 6.11
Permutation of an individual (Koza 1992, pp. 108)
Moreover, fiirther mechanisms are possible. Editing, for instance, applies particular rules 
during reproduction. For instance it could be useful to say that (a * b) equals (d + e)\ the 
editing mechanism checks individuals during reproduction and when it finds in the tree a 
function with arguments "ar" and it substitutes the sub-tree with the other one.
Encapsulation, similarly, is a process able to recognise some patterns (sub-trees, relevant 
structures, etc..) in individuals and substitute them with some “more aggregate”. In some
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cases it helps to make the solution search process faster and helps the researcher to 
imderstand results. The disadvantage of this method is that it strongly reduces the variation 
of population and it closes the possibility to explore some re-combinations.
In some cases, it can also happen that the distribution of fitness values over the initial 
random population is skewed so that a very large percentage of individuals have very poor 
fitness. In these cases, at the beginning, many generations are used to grow the fitness 
obtained. The decimation operation helps to speed-up this initialisation, destroying a 
percentage of the population. It is based upon two parameters: one is the percentage of the 
population to cancel, the other is a criterion for activating it, as, for instance, the number of 
the generation when applying it or the average level of fitness for activating it, and so 
forth.
6.4 Conclusions on Genetic Programming
The main featuies of GP have been presented, having shown that the tool is one of the 
most flexible and can therefore be used for inferring fast and frugal heuristics.
However, GP is a complicated mathematical algoritlnn and the features here presented are 
just the main ones. Many further details and modifications of the procedur e can be thought 
and applied, but the inference process used in chapter 7 exploits the conventional version 
of GP here presented, which aimed also to introduce the topic to the reader.
Moreover, GP has many purposes and applications, but here it is considered just as an 
inference tool, and its purpose can be called “symbolic regression” because it can be used 
for inferring symbolic expressions from empirical data. Symbolic regression with GP in 
social sciences has already been used for founding economic models (Duffy and Warnick 
2002), but in that case the form of solutions was completely different and thus it is not 
comparable to the one here described.
In conclusion, in table 6.1 it is possible to find a summary of GP parameters, with some 
examples of values. All parameters are self evident and they have been introduced in the 
chapter. The values presented in the table are the ones used for the analyses reported in 
chapter 7.
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Table 6.1
Main GP parameters and values
Parameter Value
Population size 500
Maximum number o f generations to run 51
Probability o f crossover 90%
Probability of reproduction 10%
Probability o f choosing internal points for crossover 90%
Maximum size of trees created No
Maximum size for trees created in the initial population 6
Probability of mutation 0.0%
Probability of permutation 0.0%
Frequency o f editing 0.0%
Probability o f encapsulation 0.0%
Condition for decimation No
Decimation target percentage 0.0%
Generative method for initial random population Ramped half-and-half
Basic selection method Fitness proportionate
Spousal selection method Fitness proportionate
Fitness type Adjusted fitness
To briefly discuss the values presented in the table, the reason for considering only 
reproduction and crossover and not mutation and further mechanisms is the fact that 
keeping a big population size (500) and a high probability of crossover in internal points of 
structures already means to parallel explore a wide area of the solution space and to keep a 
high degree of heterogeneity in the population. In other words, because of values 
considered for other parameters, mutation does not seem to be required for finding 
“optimal” solutions.
Nevertheless, the best verification of the parameters values that have been selected will be 
the analysis of the proceduie results.
A final comment worth being done concerns the sensitivity of the inference process to 
different parameters values. The GP inference process is a rather robust one, aiid as 
suggested in Chaudlui et al. 2000 it is often the case that a modification in the set of the 
parameters governing the algorithm only affects the way with which the algorithm 
discovers solutions.
For instance, a decrease in the probability of crossover, in some conditions (i.e., for some 
problems with a specific form of the solutions space), can decrease the speed at which 
solutions are discovered by decreasing in each generation the chances to explore 
completely new solutions and to exit fi'om a local optima. Dealing with other problems, the 
effect of the decrease of such a paiameter can go in the opposite direction and thus making 
the inference process faster.
In the GP application here considered solutions are easily accepted when they clearly are 
global optima. When it is not clear if they are the best solution available in the solution 
space, the algorithm and its parameters are checked even by looking at the multiple runs 
that are made for each problem, as described in the next chapters.
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Application to a Social Dilemma:
Social Mechanisms of Voluntary Public Goods Provision
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Chapter 7 
Cooperation and Free Riding in Public Good Provision 
Experiments
The aim of this chapter is to present the first example made following the approach 
presented previously for analysing experiment subjects’ choices and for finding their rules 
of behavioui".
The example is about the study of cooperation and free riding among subjects in a game 
that mimics a standard problem of public goods provision. It is a tradition of research that 
has involved many sociologists, psychologists and economists for decades and it is still 
valid (for a literature survey see Ledyard 1995).
The choice of using an abstract public good provision framework, as the one implemented 
in the experiment, is due to the aim of testing the methodology presented and in particular 
the part concerning the possibility to use experimental data as empirical ones, and to infer 
from them individuals’ behaviour with Genetic Programming. Moreover the analysis will 
enrich our* comprehension of social mechanisms of public good provision by giving us 
some clues about the relevant role played in that situation by subjects’ behaviour.
The results found in this chapter will also be useful later, in chapters 8 and 9, and they will 
be an important element for building a mechanisms-based theory of public good provision 
(chapter 10).
The first section presents the experiment used as the empirical basis of models. It is an 
experiment made by a leading scholar in the field, and the free availability of the data 
generated there has been one of the key elements in choosing it. Obviously, as said in the 
preceding part of the work, the experiment will be fully presented to completely 
understand its design and thus the intrinsic value of the data there recorded, but the 
experimental fiamework is used just as a way for collecting data and not as a research 
framework, as intended by the author of the experiment.
Afterwards, in section 2, the process that has been used for inferring experimental subjects’ 
decision rules from data is shown by listing and describing the chosen assumptions and 
parameters values. Moreover a short analysis of inferred decision rules focussing on just 
their structuie is presented: it is in fact possible to understand how the treatments applied 
in the experiment for following the usual research procedure of experimental research have 
affected subjects.
Finally, section 3 focuses on the possibility of classifying the inferred rule of behaviour 
obtained behaviom- according to tlnee idealised kinds of behaviour that have been pointed 
out as particularly relevant in recent literature: the process of classification is presented 
along with a brief analysis of the results.
7.1 An Experiment on Voluntary Public Good Provision
Public goods provision is a consolidated research theme. It has been studied using 
“games”: they present a stylised situation that resembles common public goods provision 
problems like, for instance, the provision of a television among room mates or of an 
ambulance in a community.
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Games are simpler than real situations, thus they can be studied with tools like game theory 
to understand the possibility of equilibria, depending on the payoff stmcture and on 
subjects behavioui'. In fact a game is composed of some players that have to take some 
decisions upon their endowment. Depending on the aggregate outcome, they receive a 
payoff. Exploiting the theoretical approach scholars try to understand the different kinds of 
equilibria depending on the hypotheses on subject behaviom* and how robust such 
equilibria aie.
Making subjects play the game means to experiment how humans play close to, or fai*, 
from equilibrium, and that is a generally meant as a test of the correctness of theoretical 
conclusions.
In the case of the standard public goods game, players have an endowment of tokens and 
they have to choose the amount to invest in a private good and the amount to invest in a 
public good (they generally have to consume all their endowment, thus the choice is how 
much to invest in the public good).
The two goods have a different retmn rate, higher for the private one, but contributions of 
all group members (generally the group composition ranges between four and ten people) 
to the public good are smnmed, and its revenues are enjoyed indistinctively by all group 
members (that is defined by the concept of public good, wliich is a non appropriable one).
Exploiting Game Theory concepts and its approach characterised by the presence of agents 
behaving according to the rational choice model (from now on such an approach, 
characterised by subjects selfishly maximising their utility function constituted by 
monetary payoffs and being capable of perfectly forecasting other subjects’ behaviour, will 
be called the Game Theoretical Rational -Choice Model -  GTRCM), the payoff structure 
emerging fiom those return rates creates two important equilibria.
The Nash equilibrium is the one chosen when players behave “fully rational” in the sense 
of GTRCM. It is a robust equilibriiun, the most robust because the only one “self 
reinforcing” in the sense usually meant in Game Theory^^, and thus the expected result 
from the point of view of that theory: it is the case when players do not cooperate at all, 
they are all fi'ee riders, they invest their entire endowment in the private good.
Another equilibrium is the Pareto one, that is the one that guarantees the maximization of 
the collective welfare, but it is weak because it is not self enforcing. It is represented, in the 
game, by the case in which all players cooperate at the maximum level possible, that is to 
say when they invest their endowment completely in the public good.
To better explain why the Nash equilibrium is the one forecasted by Game Theory it is 
worth focussing on its feature of being self reinforcing: even if a subject knows that the 
Pareto equilibrium is the best solution possible, he will know that each game participant is 
subject to the temptation of a small deception. Each small deception from the maximum 
contribution level, (that is to say the situation in which even just one token of the total 
endowment is invested in the private good) means, coeteris paribus, an increase in welfare 
(i.e. a higher payoff) for the deceptive subject.
It is a self reinforcing equilibrium because whatever the choice made by other players (i.e., other group 
members) the player can improve its monetary payoff by defecting (i.e., contributing all the endowment to 
the private good). All players, according to Game Theoiy, know this fact and thus there is complete fiee 
riding and complete lack of provision of the public good. The fact that the expected outcome is characterised 
by poor payoffs at the group level (i.e., at the social and systemic level), lower than the ones obtainable with 
the Pareto equilibrium which are, by definition, the ones maximising social welfare, is the reason why such a 
kind of games are usually called “social dilemmas”.
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Thus, considering that the temptation to deceive is strong, and that a rational agent should 
expect that all the others participants are making the same considerations and are subject to 
the same kind of temptation, the only rational and prudent behaviour is to not invest any 
token in the public good. This choice, in fact, protects against others’ possible deceptions 
and similar choices. The Nash equilibrium, even if known as a worse solution than the 
Pareto one, is the one to be chosen, besides the possibility (excluded in this case) of 
“strategic behaviour”.
In fact experiments have demonstrated the theoretical possibility of strategic behaviom*: 
when the interaction between the same group of people is allowed, it is possible to exploit 
behaviour as a device to communicate for choosing, as a group, a higher equilibrium  ^ (a 
strategic behaviour is thus similar to a signal directed to others, making players able to 
build a reputation in cooperating). In fact, even if direct commimication is not possible, 
subjects who repeat the interaction with the same other group members in the considered 
game settings can try to build up a reputation to cooperate, looking for the same degree of 
cooperation from others, and then changing their attitude when the others deceive (thus, 
considering these settings, it is not just a matter of the presence of forward looking 
signalling behavioms, but also of backward looking adaptive behaviours, as experimentally 
fomid and reported in Somiemans and al. 1999). That is perfectly rational even following 
the GTRCM. But another condition should be considered: subjects should not loiow a 
priori the number of times they interact, that is to say they should not know how long the 
game will last.
This last condition influences the possibility of strategic behaviom* and the expected 
systemic outcome for the following reason: a subject who knows that this is the last thne 
he meets the other participants, knows that his deception, even if they were cooperating 
before, means a higher payoff for his choice. But if he laiows that the other subjects know 
the same, it would be necessary to anticipate the choice of deception in the game session 
before the last. But if others know such a fact as well, it would be necessary to anticipate 
the free riding behaviour to the session which is twice before the last, and so on. Thus, 
following this kind of reasoning, which Game Theorists call “backward induction”, a 
player in a public good repeated game where the information set contains the dmation of 
the game, will rationally free ride from the begiiming and he will avoid sti'ategic behaviour.
Summarising, Game Theorists and experimenters have acknowledged the problem of the 
possibility to establish communication between subjects, even when it is strictly not 
allowed, using stiategic behaviom* and they have designed games where such kinds of 
signalling is impossible. It is, for instance, the case of our experiment which is a “one-shot 
repeated” one. That means that each time subjects participate in the game they know that 
their group members have been randomly chosen in a draw form a larger set of individuals. 
Each time subjects are asked to play it is like a one shot game, with different players, and 
then the possibility to behave strategically is avoided.
Although the Game Theoretical approach forecasts the stabilisation in the Nash 
equilibrium in the presented conditions, experiments with real subjects have shown a 
collective behaviom* far fr om the theoretical prevision. For example, in the experiment here
For instance. It is rational to cooperate in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas when other people have signalled 
the exploitation of a tit-for-tat strategy (a reciprocating behaviour -  that argument has been developed in 
Axelrod 1984). And even if the signal is misunderstood, the decision to cooperate or defect can affect other 
players’ choices in following decisions, establishing a dynamic link between players’ choices, which further 
complicate the possibility to rationally found a robust equilibrium a priori considering strategic behaviour.
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considered made by Aiidreoni^® (1995b), which is as said a “single shot repeated”, the 
contribution to the public good is, in the first three cycles, greater than 50%, slightly 
lowering to the mean value of 26.5% of the last cycle (the tenth one).
Other similar experiments repoi*ted in literatm'e confirm such an outcome, showing that in 
experiments made by ten single shot interactions subjects start contributing nearly half of 
their endowment, slightly decreasing it later, until reaching, at the end, a value that ranges 
between the 15% and 25% (see, as examples of other experiments strengthening these 
results, Isaac and Walker 1988 and Andreoni 1988).
Such an empirical salience is impossible to explain inside the GTRCM framework, even if 
considering that public goods provision experiments could show a greater “wi'ong” 
contribution in respect to other similar experiments (e.g. common pool resources) because 
of their structuie. In fact standard public goods experiments have a Nash equilibrium 
which is a corner solution, because subjects can make mistakes only doing “over 
contribution”, while in other experiments the mistake can be both positive and negative (as 
in the case of standard common pool resources, where subjects can exploit too much or to 
little the shared resource in respect to the equilibrium solution -  for examples of public 
good games and experiments with interior equilibria, see Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 1999 
and Keser 1996, which confirm results found in corner solution experiments).
In conclusion, the motivation that led Andreoni to make the considered experiment is to 
exactly understand the causes of such an outcome (i.e., the cause of cooperation). The 
author in fact tried to distinguish between two possible reasons for cooperation, 
“confusion” that summarises all the phenomena of misinterpretation of game instructions 
and payoffs by subjects, and “kindness” with which altruism, reciprocity, warm-glow (for 
analyses of the relevancy of this behavioui* see Andreoni 1990 and Andreoni 1995a), etc.. 
are meant.
The experimenter studied such a topic following the experimental reseai*ch approach and 
thus making different groups (3) subject to different treatments (2).
7.1.1 Experimental Design
The experiment, as just mentioned, is organised into thiee conditions, or experimental 
settings. In each one 40 subjects played the game, making a total of 120.
The first condition is called Regular, and it is the standaid framework for public goods 
provision experiments. It is a 10 single shot repeated experiment, in which group 
composition is randomly changing and the group size is 5. Subjects, at the beginning of 
each cycle, receive 60 tokens (i.e., the endowment): for each token they choose to invest in 
the private good they know they will receive one cent of a dollar, for each invested in the 
public good they will receive half a cent.
The return subjects receive from the public good (i.e., 0.5 cents for each invested tokens) is 
obviously computed over the sum of tokens contributed by all subjects in the same group. 
In this way, the Nash equilibrium is the one in which all 5 group members free ride and do 
not contribute to the public good: each one of them invests his entire endowment (60 
tokens) to the private good and receives back 60 cents. The Pareto equilibrium, on the 
contrary, is the one in which each group member invests his entire endowment in the
The author gratefully acknowledges James Andreoni because he shared the results of his experiment, 
publishing them on the Internet.
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public good earning 150 cents (the group contribution to the public good in fact is of 
60*5=300 tokens, generating a return of 150 cents per group member).
The “weakness” of the Pareto equilibrium, according to the game theoretical approach to 
rational choice, is due to the fact that there is a strong incentive towards deception: if a 
single player chooses to free ride in a cooperative group where all the other members 
contribute their endowment to the public good, he will receive 180 cents (60 cents from his 
investment to the private good and 120 from the others’ contribution to the public good), 
and the other group members will receive only 120 cents.
The second condition is the Rank one. The experimental design is the same as the one 
before but the payoffs for subjects’ investments do not go directly into their pockets. In 
fact they are used to build a ranking list of each group. With such a tool, monetary payoffs 
are assigned to subjects as in table 7.1 (Andreoni 1995b).
Table 7.1
Monetary payoffs for Rank condition (in dollars)
Highest Lowest
Position 1 2 3 4 5
Earning 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.73 0.65
The table shows the monetary payoffs for each member in the group: in the case that two 
players have the same ranking position, they equally split their earning. For instance, if 
tlii’ee subjects are all at the first place, they receive 0.873 dollar each, computed as the 
average value of the first tliree earnings: (0.95+0.87+0.80)73.
The Ranlc condition is considered by Andreoni an experimental setting in which a 
treatment has been applied, and the results of which are comparable to the control group 
(i.e., the standard public good experiment).
As said, the whole experimental research is an “attempt to separate the hypothesis that 
cooperation is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow from the hypothesis that 
cooperation is simply the results of errors or confusion” (Andreoni 1995b, pp. 891).
The intention of the experimenter in applying the treatment in the Rank condition is to 
eliminate any possibility of “kindness” in the individuals, making them face a different 
game where the incentive structure is different and where the Pareto equilibrium for 
aggregate and individual welfare optimisation is not possible. In fact the structuie of 
monetary payoffs reported in table 7.1 modifies the payoff structuie for the Regular 
condition. The new monetary structure is a super-game where the positions in the ranlcing 
list are determined by subjects’ participation to the public good sub-game.
The Pareto equilibrium is not possible anymore: subjects understanding the game know 
that choosing to contribute to the public good does not increase their payoff even if other 
group members will cooperate. In fact, in the case in which all the members contribute the 
same amount of endowment to the public good, their payoff is the same as if they were all 
free riding, while the only way to increase payoff is to defect when others cooperate.
Such a treatment possibly makes the results not comparable (subjects in fact are not facing 
a public good game anymore), but anyway it is a priori clear that a decrease in public good 
provision should be expected because the incentive to free ride is stronger.
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The last condition considered in the experiment is called RegRank. It is as the Regular one, 
with the same stmcture of game and of incentives. But the tieatment is on the information 
set available to subjects: the group ranking list made by payoff earnings is published each 
time to subjects, after they have chosen the investment. In this way the author wants to 
measure the part of the contribution which can be eliminated by providing infomiation 
which focuses subjects more on the comparison of their earnings with that of other group 
members.
7.1.2 Results
Results of the original experiments are synthesised in table 7.2 and 7.3, which respectively 
show the amount of public good contribution and the number of free riders (i.e., subjects 
who do not contiibute any token to the public good) in all experimental rounds and 
reported as percentages of the total. It can be noted how cooperation decrease over time, 
without ever reaching zero (table 7.2). Similar behaviour can be noted seeing the number 
of free riders that increases over time and it is greater in the RegRank condition and even 
more so in the Rank one (table 7.3).
Table 7.2
Percentage of contribution to the public good
Round
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Regular 56.0 59.8 55.2 49.6 48.1 41.0 36.0 35.1 33.4 26.5 44.07
RegRank 45.8 45.4 32.6 25.0 23.1 17.8 11.3 9.5 8.3 9.0 22.79
Rank 32.7 20.3 17.7 9.9 9.2 6.9 8.1 8.3 7.1 5.4 12.55
Table 7.3
Percentage of free riders
Round
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Regular 20 12.5 17.5 25 25 30 30 37.5 35 45 27.75
RegRank 10 22.5 27.5 40 35 45 50 67.5 70 65 43.25
Rank 35 52.5 65 72.5 80 85 85 85 92.5 92.5 74.5
Andieoni concluded that, even deeply analysing differences among conditions, it is 
possible to consider the two candidate reasons for explaining cooperation, kindness and 
confusion, each responsible for almost the 50% of the cooperation usually found in such 
experiments.
In fact, the difference in cooperation between RegRank and Ranlc conditions is a measuie 
of the minimum amount of contribution due to kindness (as said the Rank condition is 
assumed to be “kindness free”), the cooperation in Rank is a measure of confusion while 
the difference between the Regular condition and the RegRank one is attributable to both 
kindness and confusion.
Table 7.4, taken ftom Andreoni 1995b, summarises such conclusions, computing the 
needed differences from data about the percentage of fi'ee riders in the experiment (see 
table 7.3). Looking at the percentage value referred to the total contribution (the line 
“percentage of 100-Regular”) as an average of all the experimental rounds (the column 
labelled “mean”), it is clear how each reason for contributing seems to represent almost
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50% of the total. In fact, looking at the table, kindness weights for 43.41+(23.26/2)= 
55.04% and confusion weights for 33,33+(23.26/2)= 44.96%.
Table 7.4
Percentage of free riders
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Kindness:
Rank-Regrank 25 30 37.5 32.5 45 40 35 17.5 2Z5 27.5 31.25
As percentage of 
100-Regular 31.3 34.3 45.5 43.3 60 57.1 50 28 34.6 50 43.41
Confusion:
100-Rank 65 47.5 35 27.5 20 15 15 15 7.5 7.5 25.50
As percentage of 
100-Regular 81.3 54.3 42.4 36.7 26.7 21.4 21.4 24 11.5 13.6 33.33
Either:
RegRank-Reguiar -10 10 10 15 10 15 20 30 35 20 15.5
As percentage of 
100-Regular -13 11.4 12.1 20 13.3 21.4 28.6 48 53.8 36.4 23.26
Moreover, considering the evolution of cooperation over time, the author points out that, 
although some learning processes are imaginable for the first cycles, for the others it is 
conceivable that cooperation decrease is due to some subjects who aie inclined to 
cooperate but who face a negative feedback from other group members.
In fact until round 6, the total amount of cooperation is rather stable, while its confusion 
part is strongly decreasing. After the sixth round the confusion part of cooperation is now a 
rather stable value, while the kindness part decreases, making the total to decrease as well. 
The author notes that “when individuals who start off confrised finally learn the dominant 
sti'ategy, it appears that they may first try to cooperate but then eventually turn to free 
riding” and he suggests that “for some subjects kindness may depend on reciprocity” 
(Andreoni 1995b, pp. 898).
The experimental approach exploited by the author following the tradition of experimental 
methods in Economics can not answer the points opened by the author^ \
The presence of incentives learning has shown not to be determinant: it is cleai', from the 
experimental results and from previous works of the same author (Andreoni 1988) that 
even when it is clear that all the subjects have understood the incentives to free ride, they 
continue to contribute and that the contribution dynamics is characterised by a decay.
' Thus, the presence of reciprocating behaviom*, due to fairness or whatever, seems to be the 
best option but it is not frnthermore testable with data collected in the experiment, and a 
new set of experiments should be designed and executed to test such hypotheses,
Moreover, the kind of explanation searched in that experiment is, as said in the first part of 
the work, a statistical explanation which looks for correlations between variables. 
Nevertheless, the author can not avoid suggesting a mechanism based explanation for what 
has happened in the experiment, but he can not go fiirther investigating the point.
For further critical comments about this experiment see Houser and Kurzban 2002.
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To overcome this limit of analysis, some ABMs can be made to look for issues such as the 
ones introduced by Andreoni, and many more. But firstly a deep analysis of subjects’ 
behaviour is needed.
7.2 The GP Infererence Process of Subjects’ Behaviour
In an experiment the environment is controlled and all that is happening there is recorded. 
For making an empirically based ABM, it is worth remembering the need to find empirical 
data about the model micro specification. Recalling what was said in the earlier chapters, 
the micro specification can be based on three kinds of data: data about the system 
composition and agents’ endowments, data about agents’ interaction structure, data about 
agents’ behaviour.
Regarding the first kind of data that is needed, all experiments are in general a very good 
source of information. In fact, considering the controlled environment, the number of 
subjects participating in the experiment (120 in total, 40 for each group) and their 
endowments (60 tokens given to each subject at the begiiming of each round) are 
immediately apparent.
The interaction structure is as follows: the game is a public good single-shot repeated 
game, thus we know that subjects mteract with other subjects of the same experimental 
group (i.e., subjects interact with subjects which are receiving the same experimental 
treatment, for instance subjects of the Regular group interact just with subjects of the 
Regular condition) and each roimd they are randomly assigned to sub-groups of 5 people, 
where the public good is shared.
As a good practice spread in the experimental community, during the considered 
experiment the composition of each group has been registered for each cycle, even if 
randomly detennined, and such information can be used just as it is, knowing for instance 
that in the real experiment subjects number 1,5,7, 12 and 19 were in the same group at the 
fifth round, and thus at that moment they shared the earning of their collective investment 
in the public good.
Finally, passing fo data on behaviour, we laiow for sm*e the kind of choice subjects are 
facing. They all have the same information about the experiment rules, they all have 
information about the results of their last romid, and they are facing the choice about how 
many tokens to invest in the public good. In other words, we are sure that all subjects have 
received the same instructions about the game and therefore we can avoid explicit model 
heterogeneity caused by the understanding of the game (if such heterogeneity happens, it 
will be discovered in the process of behaviom analysis, but we do not assume its presence 
a priori). Moreover, for each player, and for each round, we know his available 
information, that is to say, for instance, that we know that player number 17, when 
choosing the contribution level in romid 6, knows that in round 5 he has contributed 10 
tokens to the public good, that the total contiibution of the group he belonged to was of 30 
tokens and that his payoff was of 65 cents.
Nevertheless, the understanding of subjects behaviour is not immediate, but quite a 
complicated task. What is the behavioural rule that leads a subject who knows data about 
his past, to choose the amomit of contribution? The behaviour description is fundamental 
for building the ABM, and also for imderstanding the underlying mechanisms of public 
goods provision, as already pointed out.
The solutions to the problem of modelling behaviour in om case can be many.
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One solution could be the exploitation of a theoretical paradigm of behaviour. Such a 
solution is the one often chosen, for instance, by scholars adopting the introduced GTRCM 
approach: they assume that individuals are optimising their expected utility and model their 
behaviour following such assumptions^^.
But the rational choice approach can be interpreted in even different ways, as pointed out 
in section 6 of the first chapter. For instance, it could be possible to adopt not maximising 
behaviour descriptions, considering “satisficing” agents or altruistic agents. These 
solutions are fiequently adopted by still exploitmg some features similar to the previous 
solution: individuals, if altruistic, maximise the collective expected utility, or, if following 
the satisficing criterion, maximise their utility until their satisfaction is reached. Both the 
mentioned solutions allow for different solutions to the Nash equilibria, but they are based 
on a representation of behaviour based on utility functions, that is not of our interest as 
argued in the first chapter.
Then, if searching for a heuristic representation of behaviour, two solutions can be tried. 
The first is the exploitation in the model of some well known and commonly accepted 
behavioural heuiistics, which have been founded in case based studies and reported in 
literatuie in the field of public good provision (e.g., the presence of reciprocators, and so 
forth). Such a solution is not adopted in this case, but it will be further discussed in section 
8 and it will be used in the example presented in the following chapter.
The second possible solution to the problem is to find, for each subject, fast and frugal 
heuristics capable of effectively describing his behaviom.
The strategies to achieve such goals, that is to say, to imderstand the behavioural rules used 
by subjects in a experiment, can be categorised in two approaches: the direct elicitation of 
heuristics and the induction of them.
The case of direct elicitation has been presented in chapter 5, wliile other tools and 
approaches to behaviour induction have been mentioned in chapter 6. In our case the 
induction approach has been chosen, in particular with the exploitation of Genetic 
Programming (GP).
As already mentioned, the induction approach carries on several issues, coimected with 
heuristic identification and of hemistic structme. Moreover the usage of Genetic 
Programming implies the choice of several parameters which could affect the induction 
results. The following sub-sections describe the steps of the procedure and the assumptions 
implied.
It is worth adding that Game Theorists follow a “pure” rational choice approach considering that 
individuals are self centred, maximising their expected utility and capable of considering others’ behaviour in 
making maximisation (and exploiting backward and forward induction, in the case of game repetition). The 
expected results in such cases are the ones already cited (i.e. complete fi'ee riding and absence of public good 
contribution), and obviously they are not consistent with experimental results, making useless further 
modelling of the public good provision game with those theoretical assumptions about subjects’ behaviour.
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7.2.1 Experimental Data Adaptation
Describing subjects’ behaviour with inferred fast and frugal heuristics as they have been 
introduced in the first chapter means to follow some criteria for making the needed 
assumptions.
In fact, the process of inference needs assumptions for two main reasons: the form of the 
heur istic searched and the problem of heuristic identification (regarding this last issue, see 
as a different example the case reported in Rieskamp and Hoffrage 1999, pp. 155).
The heuristic inferred from experimental data should be fast and frugal, and that choice 
depends on the plausibility of such heuristics, as argued in chapter 1. Fast and frugal 
heuristics have been introduced in Gigerenzer et.al. 1999 as generally made up of three 
basic mechanisms: a search rule, a stop rule and a decision rule. As argued before, that 
heuristic structure is appropriate when thinking about adaptive behaviour'. Here, one 
important hypothesis about subjects’ behaviour* is that it is already adapted. In other words, 
we hypothesise that players do not adapt their* behaviour during the experiment, but that a 
decision rule is chosen at the begirming of the experiment, and then that during the 
experiment subjects just apply their decision rule.
The impact of such a hypothesis will be discussed later, in the conclusions, considering 
results from hemistic analysis and simulations.
Going back to om* problem, we know that beyond instructions before the experiment star*t, 
subjects receive a flow of updated information over the experiment dmation. It consists of 
the nmnber of total tokens invested by group members in the public good, subject’s 
earning, and subject’s rankings, in the cases of the Rank and RegRanlc conditions.
The action undertaken by subjects is the choice on the amount of tokens to invest in the 
public good, knowing that the remaining par*t of the endowment finishes invested in the 
private good. Moreover, it is plausible to consider that subjects also use memory to 
preserve information for some rounds and to exploit such information for making choices.
Thus, the induction process aims to find, for each player, the function that maps the inputs 
received (current and memorised information) into the output (the cunent investment 
choice). That map is the decision rule. For instance, a player receives some values, like 25, 
70 and 45 and chooses how many tokens to invest, like 20.
Teclmically speaking, it is a foreseeable problematic issue in the issue of “over-fitting”, 
partially overlapping with the issue of hemistic identification. Such a problem arises when 
data set are not complete, in the sense that they do not show all the possible circumstances 
which subjects could face.
As a example making the point clearer, imagine having a subject which free rides all the 
experimental rounds, but who always interacts with free riders. We can not say, in this 
case, which is the decision rule used by the subject. It could be either a reciprocator or a 
selfish, and perhaps other robust heuiistics can be imagined for obtaining such choices. 
That is the problem of hemistics identification.
As a fm*ther example imagine a player who staits contiibuting two tokens to the public 
good on the first romid, and then he doubles his contribution each roimd that follows mitil 
he reaches the total endowment. Such a player has a behaviour that can be the result of a 
decision rule which simply doubles the previous choice. The decision rule is not miique, 
because we can find other heuristics which are candidate to explain the behaviom*, and that 
is the problem of identification. But the decision rule of doubling the contribution seems, at 
a first glance over fitted, because it ignores information about the environment, even if it 
seems plausible following criteria of cognitive plausibility (e.g., because the computation 
needed for doubling such numbers could be considered acceptable). The “doubling” rule
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can be considered very effective and probably the simplest one in terms of cognitive costs, 
but it probably would not be effective to describe the behaviom of the subject if he would 
have faced different informative inputs.
In the field of the usage of heur istics deriving fiom AI, like Neural Networks and Genetic 
Algorithms, the problem of over-fitting has emerged as soon as such systems “learned” too 
much of the problem, becoming optimised just to execute the problem they have faced, but 
not others. For the reader who is a little aware of such tools, it is like when training a 
Neural Network to make multiplications, it happens that it learns the times table, not the 
operation, so to be able to answer the product of 2 and 4 coiTCCtly, but not the one between 
75 and 3, if it has not faced this case in the learning process.
In those fields the solution to avoid such a problem has been the one of considering some 
test windows over data: it means to avoid using some data for learning but using it for 
testing and verifying if over-fitting occurs. In the present case such a solution can not be 
applied because the data sequence generated by experiments is too shoi*t for the boundaries 
of human participation.
To summarise the issue, identification and over-fitting are close issues, and they can be 
solved by following some criteria: for instance the search for decision rules capable of 
considering received information, and the search for heuristics which respect the plausible 
bounds to human cognition, obtaining fast and frugal heuristics that could be robust (the 
robustness here meant is the one introduced in chapter 1).
Another issue when using experimental data is the problem of cognitive plausibility. In fact 
a map leading to the choice of the value of 20 starting from values like 25, 70 and 45, as in 
the example before, must implement some mathematical functions to manipulate numbers. 
The kind of behaviour description obtainable is like a mathematical expression, not a 
logical one capable of showing the logical process of subject’s thought. Moreover, to 
obtain an effective mathematical expression, the kind of needed functions can be like the 
computation of square root and sinus: only in this way experimental data can be 
reproduced, and this is obviously difficult to consider plausible (not in the sense that 
subjects are not able to do such operations, but that they really do them every time to take a 
decision).
As said the aim is to find fast and fiugal heuristics, in the sense of a fast and frugal search, 
stop and decision rules. Experimental data thus needs to be adapted to a form that can be 
used for inferring plausible behaviour rules with GP.
The data induction will focus on the decision rule, by adapting data with a sort of 
homogenous search rule that will be explained soon below: we know that subjects usually 
firstly elaborate the enviromnental information, then they take their decision. We apply the 
elaboration of information before infening the decision rule, and we concentrate our 
attention on how such elaborated information is used to take the decision.
The fact of using a unified criterion to adapt data (i.e., the way we elaborate the 
information is the same for each subject) implies the assumption that non relevant 
differences are present in this phase of subjects’ heuristics. In other words, following some 
assumptions on the plausibility of the information tiansfbrmation process it is also 
assumed that subjects are similar in that cognitive phase, and the discussion of such an 
issue is left to the conclusions, after having presented the results.
The transformation of the original data has been applied to both inputs (i.e., the 
information received on each round and the one kept in memory) and outputs (i.e., the 
decision taken) and it has been done with the following function:
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The meaning is immediate. A value, for instance the one of earnings, at time t is compared 
with the one at time t-1, and if tlie former is greater, the new data value is 0, if they are 
equal it is 1, or 2 for the remaining case. Such a ti'ansformation works of couise because of 
the “assumption” about the presence of memory in human subjects.
The justification, from the cognitive point of view, of this simplification of informative 
inputs is that it is cognitively less heavy than considering exact values of the several 
variables: subjects “catch” and remember only the dynamic direction of informative 
variables and exploit those as sources of information for decision making. Considering 
precise values is a process requiring much more effort of subjects, in particular in terms of 
attention. The process to transform the data available to subjects (i.e., precise values of 
variables) to the values here considered (i.e., the dynamic evolution of variables) is quite 
easy, obliging subjects to make a simple comparison between two values, and it can be 
assumed to be made without significant errors.
But how wide is the memory? The answer it is not known and it is impossible to determine 
it for each player. Thus, the solution has been the one to choose a value of two (in the 
sense that each player is assumed to be able to keep in memory two transformed values of 
each source of information), and results will show that very few subjects exploits the oldest 
data. As an example, in table 4.4 inputs and outputs of a player at time 5 are shown. 
Elements are listed in the first coluimi, their precise value on the second, hi the third 
column is wi'itten the relationship between the values considered, and then in the last 
column the transformed value is reported, which is the elaborated information available to 
the hypothetic subject for taking a decision.
Table 7.4
; time 5
Original Relation Transformed
INPUT
Investment on the public good -I pg4=30 Pg4 < Pg3 2pg3 = 45
Investment on the public good -2 pg3 =" 45 Pg3 > Pg2 0Pg2=0
Group investment -I gi4= 170 gu = gu 1gi3= 170
Group investment -2 gi'3= 170 gl‘3 > gl'2 0gi'2= 150
Earning -1 ea4= 115 ea4 > eas 0
ea3= 100
Earning -2 ea3= 100 eaa < eaz 2
eaz= 105
OUTPUT
Investment on the public good Pgs=30 Pg5 = Pg4 1Pg4=30
In the table, pgt means the player’s contribution to the public good at time t, grt the group 
total contribution at time t and eat the monetary payoff obtained at time t.
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In summary, the data transformation applied in this case has a twofold meaning: on one 
side it is a way to effectively study subjects’ decision rules, based upon plausible cognitive 
assumptions; on the other side it introduces assumptions, such as the identity among 
subjects on how they elaborate information, that are to be carefully taken in consideration.
The impact of such assumptions will be discussed in the conclusions, after showing the 
results made possible by them.
7.2.2 Set-up and Execution of Genetic Programming
As said the Genetic Programming procedure aims to infer a description of the subjects’ 
decision rules that are general and logical, avoiding over-fitting and guaranteeing cognitive 
plausibility.
For this reason OP fimction and terminal sets^  ^ are composed by very simple elements. 
Terminals are all the possible values of inputs and outputs (0, 1, and 2) and references to 
the inputs: the decision rule can simply refer to a somce of information by calling it (in 
other words, it is possible to have a rule as “increase, decrease or keep constant the public 
good investment directly follo'wing what has recently happened for the group total 
investment”, that is to say directly referring to the information contained in the input 
variable called “group total investment”).
Functions are Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT) and conditional operators (IF, THEN, 
ELSE), so that it could be possible to find rules such as “IF earnings are growing AND 
group contribution is decreasing, THEN increase contribution, ELSE keep it constant”.
Moreover, it is worth remembering that the transformation function explained above 
assumes that subjects have the capability to make comparisons between precise values, that 
is to say they are capable of using comparison operators (<, >, and =), but these operators 
are not considered by the Genetic Programming process.
Another element that has been used in the Genetic Programming induction regards the 
problem of identification: as said it is obvious that there are many decision rules capable of 
perfectly matching each subject’s behaviour. In the evolution process carried out by the 
GP, the fitness evaluation has been modified: the first part of fitness is computed according 
to the capability of the candidate solution to replicate the choices made by subjects, but the 
second part awards shorter candidates.
The weights used for computing the aggregate fitness of each candidate gives more 
importance to the first part, making preferable a candidate capable of representing 
subject’s choices, even if longer. But if two or more candidates are equally capable of 
replicating subject’s choices, the shortest has the highest fitness value, and thus it has the 
best opportunity to suiwive and mate in the next generation of candidate solutions.
Such a modification of the standaid fitness evaluation typical of Genetic Programming is 
necessary to identify the solution and to obtain the most plausible solution. In fact, the new 
fitness evaluation mechanism awards decision rules which show less cognitive costs (see 
Rubinstein 1997, pp. 168-170, for a mathematical formalisation of cognitive “complexity” 
costs because of counting). Decision rules cognitive costs have been measured by 
computing the number of nodes (i.e., functions and terminals) composing the candidate 
solution.
”  GP technicalities, such as “functional and terminal sets” and the others following in the text, have been 
fully explained in chapter 6.
124
Using parameters showed before in table 6.1, a single run of the inference process can be 
effectively executed, using 50 generations of 500 candidate solutions: the evolution 
generates a possible solution to the problem represented by the best performing decision 
rule present at the end of the 50^ * generation. To have more confidence about the outcomes, 
20 inference process runs have been made, each with a different random seed.
In fact, because Genetic Programming follows a learning path that is dependent on the 
starting point, and such a point is randomly chosen as seen in chapter 6, the usage of runs 
with different random seeds helps to increase the researcher’s confidence about having 
found the most plausible decision rule.
The executed runs have shown some dissimilarity. In some cases the execution of 20 
induction processes with different starting random seeds has showed to be superfluous, 
because they all evolve the same solution. In other cases it has demonstrated the need for 
such a procedm'e, because in some rmis a cleaiiy better (in the sense that it has a higher 
value of fitness) solution has been found than in other runs. In some cases, different 
solutions with the same value of fitness have been found: they generally have a similar 
structure, and they mostly differ because of the soiu'ce of information considered to lead to 
the choice. In such cases there aie not criteria of plausibility to guide the selection of the 
decision rule: one has been randomly chosen among the possible ones.
7.2.3Inferred Behaviour and Experimental Treatments
The result of the inference process has been the obtaimnent of 120 rules of behaviour (120 
is the number of participants to the experiment).
Decision rules can be depicted as decision ti-ees, as in figure 7.2 that is the one followed by 
player number 5 of the experimental group called Rank 2 (as said, iiT each of the tluee 
experimental sets there were 40 subjects, but they were split in two classes -  1 and 2).
[true] [false]
if(ea rn 1  t )
inv <-> inv = totlnvl
Figure 7.2
Behaviom al rule of player 5 of group Rank2
The figure has to be interpreted as follows: the player checks if his earnings increased over 
the last two cycles, if they did he will keep the investment on the public good constant (in 
respect to the last decision, if not, he will follow the evolution, over the last two cycles, of 
the total amount invested in the public good by the gr oup. That is to say that if it decreased, 
he will decrease the new investment as well, and so forth.
Another way to represent the inferred decision rules is through pseudo code, as follows for 
the subject we are considering:
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IF (EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED)
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
All obtained decision rules are reported in the appendix, using the pseudo code 
representation.
It is interesting to analyse how different experimental settings have influenced subjects’ 
behaviom*.
Firstly we define “short rules” the ones which keeps the choice constant over the whole 
experiment (that is to say the behaviour of players always choosing the same amount of 
tokens to invest in the public good) and “too long rules” the ones for which the rule found 
seems not to be plausible because too complex, miless a cycle is removed fiom the data
se ft
Secondly it is possible to understand how the addition of an information source that points 
towai’d the establishment of an environment in which subjects compete (the case of 
RegRank condition) and how the further addition of stronger incentives to free ride (as in 
the case of the Ranlc condition where cooperation is not more useful) means to obtain 
simpler strategies.
As can be seen in table 7.5, both modifications seem to have reduced the complexity of 
behaviom* (i.e., the length of decision rules, computed as the total amount of nodes, as 
mentioned before), increasing the adoption of short rules by subjects, while lowering the 
complex rules level.
Table 7.5
Simple and complex inferred rules in different experimental settings (percentages)
Condition Short rules Too long rules
Regular 17.5 15
RegRank 20 5
Rank 57.5 0
Referring to the table, it is worth noting how, in absolute terms, the RegRank condition 
had a stronger impact in the decrease of too long rules, while the Ranlc condition in the 
adoption of short rules.
In some cases, the inference process has shown how a strategy capable of describing the whole set of 
events faced by subjects could be conceived as not plausible because the algorithm expressing the strategy is 
made of too many expressions and steps. The interesting thing is that, for each of these possibly unrealistic 
cases, the inference process has found a more plausible (i.e., a significantly shorter) description of the 
subject’s behaviour working for all cases but one. This one is often the last cycle of the experiment. For this 
reason, and because of the fact that subjects knew the number of rounds in the experiment and because of the 
general aim of finding fast and frugal decision rules, in the appendix are reported such plausible strategies, 
and they are the ones used in the simulations presented in the remaining part of the chapter. In other words, it 
seems plausible that subjects followed such a decision rule for their game but for one round, and thus their 
artificial representation in the simulations follows such rule for all the rounds but one, in which it follows the 
choice the referring subject made in the experiment. Such rare cases (8 subjects over 120) can be interpreted 
as a mistake in subjects’ behaviour or, particularly when the case happens in the last round of the experiment, 
as if subjects were thinking to exploit the possibility to defect on the last round avoiding future retaliations.
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That seems to suggest that the availability of more sources of information (or, better, of a 
source of information that is strongly different from the others available) helps subjects to 
adopt a rule. While the modification of incentives, leads to very short rules.
As an argmnent in favour of such hypothesis, it is also worth noting that it is not a matter 
of information contents, in the case of the RegRank condition. In fact the contents of the 
information source are not the ones responsible for the decrease in environmental 
complexity and thus in the choice of a decision rule not too complicated, but it is just the 
presence of a different enviromnent faced by subjects (because of the ranking information 
availability)^^. Similarly for the Rank condition: in tliis case the choice of subjects is 
towards very simple rules, because the goal is clearer, Fmthermore, it is worth 
remembering that the inferred rules are not the result of a learning process going on over 
the experiment rounds, but because they describe subjects’ choices thioughout the 
experiment, they must be considered as chosen before the experiment starts.
Moreover, analysing each single rule, we can note that the information about ranlcing, 
obviously missing in the Regular set, is used in many decision rules but not in all the ones 
which are in the other two experimental conditions and which are “not short”^^ . In fact, in 
the RegRank condition, among 32 non short rules, just 6 subjects used such information, 
wliile in the Rank condition they are 5 among 17. This suggests, for the Ranlc condition, 
how information does not seem to be directly evaluated by many players perhaps because 
many of them directly choose free riding due to incentives or because they prefer to look at 
earning values which are directly linked to rankings, in this condition. For the RegRank 
condition, we can thinlc that many subjects simply ignore such information because it is 
irrelevant for their payoff.
A fmther confirmation of the impact of changes in information and incentives comes from 
another measurement that can be applied on inferred rules. In fact, we can measure the 
complexity of each mle by simply enumerating the elements which are present in the iTile. 
That is to say, as already introduced when we presented the fitness evaluation implemented 
in the Genetic Programming process used to infer the rules, that the measure is the 
enumeration of the terminal and fimction nodes used by each decision rule.
The results of the measur ement are presented in table 7.6 and show the average complexity 
of decision rules chosen by subjects in the different experimental conditions.
Table 7,6
Complexity measure of decision rules in different experimental settings
Condition Mean value Standard deviation
Regular 13.48 10.43
RegRank 12.18 9.16
Rank 6J3 8.76
The average complexity of decision rules adopted by subjects in the Regular condition is 
slightly greater then the one of subjects in RegRank, wliich is sti'ongly greater than in 
Rank,
It is in fact the experimental design to impact on subjects’ rules of behaviour and not the content of the 
different information sources available to subjects in different experimental treatments.
The “not short” rules are the ones previously defined “too long” and the ones which lie between those and 
the short ones, that is to say the large majority.
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Mentioning the fact that relevant differences in complexity measniement do not appear in 
the sets of not simple and not complex rules in different conditions, the complexity 
measure reinforces the idea that the addiction of information and incentives modifies 
subjects’ imcertainty and thus their behaviour, that, for the considered experiment, means 
not only to make more frequent the choice of free riding.
In conclusion, a first analysis of the inferred decision rules sheds light on the relation 
between the choice of the decision rule made by subjects and the environment subjects are 
going to face in the experiment. The availability of more sources of information means an 
easier identification of a clear rule to act. The presence of incentives leading to fi'ee riding, 
which is a very simple rule, obviously makes many subjects choose that rule, and thus 
makes the average complexity of subjects’ rules of behaviom lower.
7.3 Behaviour Classification of GP Inferred Rules of Behaviour
through a Tournament
In analysing results of his experiment, Andreoni concluded by suggesting the presence of 
reciprocating subjects (as explained previously). In recent years, the theme of reciprocal 
behaviour' has been one of the main issues considered by scholars working on voluntary 
public good provision (for a recent and complete overview of the main issues touched by 
that debate, see Gintis et al. 2005). It would be then worth trying to analyse the results 
presented before, that is to say the descriptions of subjects’ behaviour' obtained with the GP 
procedure, in order to verify if such a kind of behaviour, often also called “conditional 
cooperation”, has been exploited in the experiment, by whom and with which 
consequences.
The analysis should be made also focussing on two other kinds of behaviour' that are easy 
to forecast in such settings. In public good provision settings. Game Theory predicts the 
spreading of free riding, i.e. a selfish behaviour' where all endowment is contributed to the 
private good and nothing to the public one. Moreover, both sociologists and economists 
have presented evidence (fr om experiments) of the presence of altruistic behaviour, a form 
of unconditional cooperation where subjects implicitly care about the wealth of others and 
thus contribute all their endowment to the public good.
The further analysis here presented thus aims to understand if each subject’s behaviour is 
consistent with one of this thr ee “idealised” kinds of behaviour: unconditional cooperation 
(or altruism), conditional cooperation (or reciprocation) and selfishness.
Instead of directly using data recorded in the experiment, the starting point will be the 
infened subjects’ behaviour. Then, new models which are like “tournaments” where it is 
possible to evaluate and then classify subjects^^ ar e used. The evaluation of behaviour* is 
made by making each subject’s inferred decision rule facing different enviromnents, and 
comparing the results obtained with some abstract and pure strategies which correspond to 
the ideal type of each considered category.
In other words, to understand if a subject’s behaviour is consistent with an idealised kind 
of behaviour, a tournament is prepared where both the idealised kind of behaviour' and the 
infened rule of behaviour face a set of different enviromnental conditions. In such a way
The idea of using a tournament comes directly A om the famous example in Axelrod (1984), but while the 
scores obtained there were just used for understanding the performance of different strategies in different 
environments, here they are used for the classification.
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the results generated by the inferred rule of behaviour are compared to the ones generated 
by the idealised behaviour and so the degree of similarity to the idealised kinds of 
behaviour is measured. Subjects’ behaviour' sho'wing high values of measurement of 
similarity to a selfish behaviour will be classified “selfish”, and so on, as explained below.
Moreover, because of the multiplicity of different information sour'ces present in the 
experiment, the attempt to understand results depending on all variables is a very difficult 
task. In fact the essence of reciprocation is to react upon some information. In the case of a 
two players Prisoner’s Dilemma, the reciprocating individual is the one who chooses to 
cooperate or defect depending on what the other player has done in the romid before. There 
the only information available is cooperation/defect by the other player, but in a public 
good experiment the situation is different, because five players interact together in their 
group and there is not a binary definition of cooperation and defection. Therefore we could 
consider information about the evolution of gi'oup total contribution or the evolution of 
personal earnings, which are partially independent. Moreover we could think about 
reciprocators who consider the last information available or with a time lag, that is to say 
considering information in memory, with late reactions. To solve such doubts, it has been 
chosen to refer to just one information source, i.e. the evolution of personal earnings in the 
last two time steps. Such an information source has been chosen because the one most 
players referred to.
Idealised kinds of behaviour are used as defined in table 7.7, where each kind is illustrated 
saying what is its behaviour according to what is happening in the environment, i.e. to 
personal earnings. The definition of selfish and altruistic behaviour is intuitive, while for 
the reciprocating one the definition adopted is the one of “strong reciprocity” as in Fehr et 
al. (2002).
Table 7.7
Definition of idealised decision mles of behaviour, depending on evolution of the 
environment
Kind of Behaviour Evolution of Earnings Choice on the Public 
Good Investment
Altruistic Increased increase
Decreased increase
Stable increase
Selfish Increased decrease
Decreased decrease
Stable decrease
Reciprocating Increased increase
Decreased decrease
Stable keep stable
Even selfish and altruistic (sometimes called fi'ee riders and unconditional co-operators), 
idealised behaviours are “strong” versions of them. In fact weaker versions can be 
conceived, as, for instance, a weak altruist who keeps stable his conti'ibution level if his 
earnings are decreased. The fact of considering strong idealised kinds of behaviom* is 
worth taking into account later when experimental behaviom* is evaluated against these 
rules: it is highly probable that few inferred behaviours will have performances identical to 
the idealised ones, but considering extreme positions in the space of possible behaviours 
makes the classification possible.
129
The idealised kinds of behaviour are considered as terms of comparison, but a 
measurement system is needed to transform these behaviours, idealised or inferred, in a set 
of values for classification purposes.
The measurement is represented by the tournament, where inferred rules of behaviour face 
different enviromnental settings. The tournament is built making inferred rules facing each 
possible enviromnental configuration, and then giving values to each choice made 
depending on how similar it is to the choice made in the same enviromnental setting by the 
tlnee idealised behaviours.
The kind of evaluation obtained by the tournament is like the one depicted in table 7.8 
where the evaluations refers to the idealised strategies just explained: using the 
classification over the well known idealised strategies presented in table 7.7 helps in 
pointing out the limits of effectiveness of the process.
Table 7.8
Normalised scores obtained by idealised behaviours in the tournament (i.e., terms of 
compaiison for infened decision rules classification)
Scores
Behaviours Altruistic 1 Reciprocating 1 Selfish
Altruist 1 0.333 0
Reciprocator 0.333 1 0.333
Selfish 0 0.333 1
The table should be read per row in the following way: if the classification is applied to the 
altruistic behaviour, the result will be a score of 1 for altruism and a 0.3 for reciprocation. 
The second and the third row obviously present scores obtained in trying to classify the 
other two idealised kinds of behaviour* presented in table 7.7.
It is evident how it is almost impossible to make a completely “separate” evaluation, in the 
sense that even pm*e and idealised strategies score the maximum in the classifying process 
of their category, but they also have a small evaluation on different categories. In other 
words, the table stresses the importance of considering that idealised behaviours sometimes 
produce the same output facing the same environment. For instance, as it is also clear by 
looking at table 7,7, the altruistic idealised behaviour* acts in the same way as the 
reciprocator in the case of increased personal earnings, in fact in that case they both 
increase their contribution.
The measurement process is quite simple to understand: as we said, the basic concept of 
tournament measurement is to inalce each behaviour* face all possible environmental 
situations, and then calculate the number of times in which the idealised outcome has been 
chosen. For the case presented in table 7.8, that means to measure the idealised behaviours 
which have just tlnee possible enviromnental conditions, depending on the evolution of 
earnings. That is the reason why, as the example we made before, the reciprocating score 
of an altruist is 0.333: in just one case over tlnee it chooses the same action as a 
reciprocator does.
But, for the case of inferred rules of behaviour, the enviromnent is far more complicated. 
In fact inferred decision rules can depend upon many information sources (six in total), and 
for obtaining a more precise measurement of their similarity to the tlnee idealised 
categories it is not enough to just consider information about earnings, but it is worth 
dealing with each possible combination of the other 5 information somces (which are, as a 
remainder, the dynamics of personal earnings two rounds before, the dynamics of the
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personal contribution level one and two rounds before and the dynamics of group 
contribution, one and two rounds before).
Thus, the tournament gets more complicated and makes each inferred decision rule facing 
243 environmental cases (mathematically speaking, the total number of variations with 
repetition of 3 elements choose 5 -  the tlnee possible values of information sources and the 
five information sour ces -  is 3^  = 243): on each of them the inferred rule receives the three 
possible values of the dynamics of interest, i.e. personal earnings, and takes a decision on 
the next contribution level. Depending on the choices made in each enviromnental case, 
the scores representing the similarity to idealised kinds of behaviour are computed, 
normalised and bounded between the values of 0 and 1, where 0 means absence of 
similarity and 1 a complete one.
The many tournaments rmi (each complete tournament for each of the 40 subjects in 
Regular condition is made by 3x243=729 choices) produced the results reported in table 
7.9.
Table 7.9
Classification of subjects’ behaviour depending on personal earnings
Percentage of “clear” selfish 
subjects;
17.5%
Percentage of “unclear” 
selfish subjects:
15%
Total percentage of selfish 
subjects:
3Z5%
Percentage of “clear” 
reciprocators:
5%
Percentage of “unclear” 
reciprocators:
30%
Total percentage of 
reciprocators:
35%
Percentage of “clear” altruists: 
15%
Percentage of “unclear” 
altruists:
10%
Total percentage of 
altruists:
25%
Percentage of unclassified: 
7.5%
Percentage of classified: 
92.5%
In the table, idealised categories have been further split into two parts: “clear” and 
“unclear”. It means, remembering that each inferred rule has been associated to three 
scores and each one represents the level of similarity to the tlnee idealised rules of 
behaviour, that a strategy is classified “selfish” if it has the highest score in the selfish 
category, but it is “clear selfish” if it scores a value between 0.666 and 1 in the selfish 
measurement, while is called “unclear” if it scores between 0.333 and 0.665 and that score 
is still the highest of the tlnee (i.e., the score is a value greater than the values of 
unconditional and conditional cooperation).
Table 7.9 main results are two. The first one is that it seems possible to consider that in 
conditions similar to the experimental one, people really behave according to the three 
behavioural patterns considered. The second is about the distribution of the three kinds of 
behaviour: each weights almost one third of the whole (reciprocators 35%, selfish 32.5% 
and alti'uists 25%), and that kind of distribution is generally confirmed by other 
experimental studies (see for instance the configurations considered and referenced in 
Bravo and Tamburino 2005 or the experimental one found in Burlando and Guala 2005).
Some miclassifiable subjects are present, but few, and representing less than the 8% of the 
total (i.e., 3 subjects). They could be interpreted as confused players who generate noise in 
the system (for an analysis of the effects of noise on cooperation and reciprocation in the 
different but not too distant framework of Prisoner’s Dilemma, see Wu and Axelrod 1995) 
or subjects adopting different kinds of behaviom*, but by looking at their infened decision
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rules and their contribution levels, there are not evident suggestions which can be made to 
confirm the second hypothesis.
Moreover, the measurement process has outlined how the reciprocating behaviour seems to 
be the one less clear to subjects: its degree of similarity to the pure idealised rule is lower 
because just the 14% of the total of reciprocators gets a score higher than 0.666, even if 
only in one subject over 40 the score of “1” is reached, and it is for a reciprocator (i.e. there 
is only one subject which adopts the idealised behaviour as it is and is one of the strong 
reciprocators). But it is worth remembering that tournaments are not aimed at measuring 
the simplicity of the rules but to discern among three kinds of idealised behaviour, and to 
see if they are capable of describing subjects’ behaviour.
Considering the definition of the three idealised kinds of behaviour and the aggregate 
experimental data, we can expect that the average contribution level of subjects classified 
as selfish is lower than co-operators, that is decreasing over experimental time and that 
subjects classified as conditional co-operators start with high levels of contribution to the 
public good (i.e., they start by trying to cooperate) and they then lower such a level 
because of encountering selfish subjects.
Figure 7.3 confirms such expectations and verifies the validity of the whole procedure 
(including also the inference of rules of behaviour with GP) applied here by presenting 
average values of contribution to the public good in the experiment depending on the 
classification.
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Figure 7.3
Average contribution over time per kind of classified behaviour (in the original 
experiment; behaviour classified with a tournament of rules inferred with the GP 
procedure).
7.4 Conclusions on Analysing Experimental Behavioural Data
Summarising, the proposed GP-based inference procedure seems to be effective in 
capturing the rules of behaviour followed by subjects in the experiment. The following 
chapter will focus in on testing if the inference process is capable of capturing the relevant 
part of subjects’ rules by using simulations of the experiment.
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Nevertheless, some interesting analyses can be made with the inferred rules of behaviour 
and in fact this chapter has clearly shown the impact of different experimental settings 
characterised by the availability of different information souices and payoff structures on 
the rules of behaviour followed by subjects.
Moreover, the measurement of infeiTed rules through tournaments and comparison with 
idealised kinds of behaviour seems to be effective and the results obtained are relevant. In 
fact they suggest that people really behave in public goods games following one of the 
tliree considered generic behavioural rules, which are altmisrn, selfishness and 
reciprocation. They also point out the presence of a few unclassifrable subjects who 
probably generated noise in the dynamics. Finally, results confirm that the distribution of 
the thr ee kinds of behaviour over the total which have been found in several experimental 
studies and different approaches to that kind of measurement.
The next chapter will help in understanding the limits of GP inferred behavioural rules 
which seem to be more descriptions than explanations and in verifying the generic rules of 
behaviom which seem to give an explanatory power that will be discussed in remaining 
chapters.
In conclusion, concerning both GP inferred rules and generic ones, a claim made at the 
begimiing of tliis chapter needs to be discussed. It is the claim about the stability of 
subjects’ behaviour over time. The experiment lasted for just a few rounds but that is not 
enough to argue that there has not been learning. Two elements can help in confirming 
what is claimed: firstly, both GP and generic rules have been found capable of perfectly 
describing (i.e. replicating) subjects’ behaviour without making explicit reference to time, 
and thus subjects’ behaviour can be described and perhaps explained in terms of rules 
which are stable over time; secondly, as simulations in the following chapter will show, 
such stable behaviom al rules are perfectly capable of generating the dynamics of interest 
even at a systemic level and in conditions of noise and perturbations.
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Chapter 8
Simulating Public Goods Provision Experiments
Figure 7.3 presented a first set of data testifying the right application of the procedure here 
proposed for studying human behaviour in the social dilemma of interest (i.e., the 
voluntary provision of public goods).
Nevertheless, much more evidence is needed to confirm the procedure and much more 
analysis is required for canying out the task of finding a mechanisms-based causal 
explanation of voluntary public good provision. In this chapter agent-based simulations 
capable of accomplishing such tasks and based upon the experiment introduced in the 
preceding chapter are presented.
Simulations are made and presented firstly by considering rules of behaviour inferred with 
GP, then by considering idealised rules of behaviour as introduced before.
Section 1 presents simulations built upon experimental data and GP-inferred rules of 
behaviour. The interesting point that comes to attention seeing basic simulation is the 
perfect replication of experimental results, and it is an element capable of suggesting a 
fiuther verification of the followed approach, that is to say that the process has at least 
been applied without mistakes, even if the confirmation about the importance of the 
process for analytical research is still to be shown.
The thiee following sub-sections are based on basic simulations and they concentiute on 
modifying just an element per time of the model so to make the results comparable with 
others found in experimental literature (i.e., with other experiments reported in literature).
Section 8.1.2 in fact presents simulations of the basic models modified in their grouping 
function. By changing the group composition (and it is worth adding that groups are 
important in public good provision because their belonging members share the public 
good) some tests are run and, by looking at different experimental treatments, a major 
methodological point in the usage of ABMs for analytical social research is pointed out. In 
fact the usual practice of randomisation of variables inside models to neutralise effects of 
path dependency upon starting values can be misunderstood. Some times, and as this case 
stresses in particular when dealing with interaction structuies among agents, it is not 
possible to consider only average systemic outcomes as valid, but on the contrary many 
systemic outcomes are possible and valid, and some of them are just more probable to 
occur.
Section 8.1.3 focuses on shifts of group size. Literature has pointed out the counter­
intuitive result that an increase in group size could generate an increase in levels of 
cooperation^^. Models show a clear outcome similar to the one found in literature and 
suggest the presence of particular kinds of subjects’ behaviour as leading forces of the 
social mechanism.
Section 8.1.4 presents models considering a similar issue: when public good return rate 
increases without modifying the payoff sti'uctiue, public good contribution could vary. And 
even in this case the model suggests the presence of specific behaviour as the key in 
understanding the social mechanism.
It is a counter intuitive result because, as explained in the section, the higher number of possible free riders 
should, reasonably, increase the probability of free riding behaviour.
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The second section of the chapter focuses on simulations based upon the idealised kinds of 
behaviour that has been classified in the previous chapter. Simulations are made of the 
basic system, capable of being compared to original experimental results, and by 
modifying the same elements considered in the first section: groups definitions, groups size 
and public good return rate. These last simulations can be compared to the ones made 
before with GP-inferred rules of behaviour and can help in better understanding the social 
mechanism at work, besides confirming the right application and the effectiveness of the 
work made before for analysing subjects’ behaviour.
8.1 Simulations on Inferred Behaviour
Having obtained a representation of subject behaviour and knowing endowments and the 
interaction structure of the experiment, it is possible to build ABMs of the experimental 
system. Exploiting them, via the modification of parameters and the comparison of results 
with literatuie, it is possible to further investigate causal mechanisms happening in public 
goods provision, but it is firstly worth leaving the system imtouched, simulating the 
experiment as it was. In such a way it is in fact possible to test the capability of inferred 
rules of behaviour to represent a good description of the ones uses by subjects in the 
experiment.
8.1.1 Basic System
First of all, it is worth underlining how inferred mles are implemented as agents’ 
behaviour.
Decision rules have a very simple output: the decision to keep constant, raise or decrease 
the level of contribution. The decision must be transformed in a numerical value, because 
that is the kind of decision happening in the real situation (for instance, the contribution of 
13 tokens). The models here presented have been built making agents applying the precise 
value of the “deltas” applied in the real experiment^^ (thus, if player 7 decreased the 
investment in the public good the first time by 20 tokens, the artificial agent modelled with 
his inferred decision rule will do the same when he will decrease the public good 
contribution for the first time in the simulation).
Separate models have been built, each one to represent each session of the original 
experiment. That is to say that 6 model structures have been built: that is due to the 
experimental design for which each condition was split in two classes and subjects of each 
class could just interact with other players of the same class.
The analytical process started on the basis of such a set of models.
In these basic models the interaction structure is the same as the experimental one, that is 
to say that group composition, randomly defined dming the experiment, is the same as the 
original one. The payoff structme (goods return rates, etc..) has even been put in basic 
models as the original ones.
It is worth adding that there is no correlation between the size of deltas and the size o f strategies. In fact 
there are some complicated rules connected to small changes of the investment size (in the order of 5 tokens) 
but also the opposite, that is to say some very simple rules with strong variations (even of the whole 
environment, 60 tokens, for each change), and many mixed solutions.
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Going back to inferred behavioural rules, because of the transformation process needed to 
obtain logical and plausible decision rules, each subject has an initial state"^ ® that is needed 
by its strategy to work. It contains data about the tluee first rounds of the experiment, and 
thus the models run over 7 rounds and the analyses done are on that part of the original 
experiment. Such an initial state can be considered as an heterogeneous endowment, 
deriving from beliefs and other heterogeneous characteristics of subjects, or completely 
determined by randomness.
8.1.1.1 Results
The basic models, built as explained, have recreated the results of the experiment exactly, 
confirming the correct execution of the whole research procedrue.
This result is quite important and worth being underlined: the ABM has been empirically 
micro calibrated, and the first attempt to validate its macro outcome is positive because the 
same time series is generated, regarding both the average level of contribution and the 
number of fi'ee riders.
After that, some variables to change in the model have been chosen, following two 
guidelines: on the one hand, it is necessary not to distort experimental structure losing 
behaviour significance; on the other hand it is important to obtain results comparable with 
literature, because of the novelty of the methodological approach that calls for empirical 
confirmations.
The reason for not distorting the environment is that subjects choose to behave in a specific 
way facing a particular framework, and in one much different they would behave 
differently, as it has been concluded to be highly probable in the analysis of the inferred 
rules (where experimental treatments impacted on the subjects’ choice of the decision rale 
to follow).
The possibility to compare results with others in literature, all obtained in experimental 
settings, can make a first evaluation on the opportunity and effectiveness of the proposed 
procedure possible. Moreover, following the analytical approach to social science, using 
ABMs means also to take into account a closer relationship with empirical data, as debated 
in chapter 3 : the attempt to validate results and hypotheses is very important.
For such pui'poses, thi'ee variables have been identified to be firstly modified: they are 
group composition, group size and goods return rates.
Moreover some different models have been prepared to evaluate possible behavioural 
explanations of cooperation: those have been suggested by recent literatuie in the topic and 
will be described lastly, and they are even useful for confirming explanations derived from 
first simulations.
A final methodological note, before presenting other models and results, is about the fact 
that whenever modifications of basic models have required the usage of randomly chosen 
values, such models have been repeated 1,000 times, each with a different seed for the 
random numbers generator, and then the average value is presented in graphs and in the 
text. Such a common operation, anyway, has emerged to be not “so effective” as usual, as 
it will be soon explained for the case of RegRank condition.
The term "initial state” has not been chosen by chance: it is because it reminds the term used by physicists 
studying state transitions of complex systems.
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8.1.2 Simulations on Group Composition
What would happen to experimental outcomes if changing the group allocation of subjects 
was changed? Is the particular matching of subjects in groups used in the experiment 
determinant of experiment results? These are the questions here addressed, remembering 
the importance of groups because their members shai*e the same return of the total amount 
contributed to the public good and they could be important for the hypothesised presence 
of subjects willing to cooperate.
As said group composition changes each cycle and subjects do not know who the other 
group members are, making it impossible to know if they are interacting with somebody 
they will eventually know or with whom they have already interacted.
In the experiment groups were randomly drawn on each round, and the group composition 
is the one of the data recorded in the experiment. While the basic simulation was made by 
grouping subjects in the exact same way as the experiment, here the idea is to try different 
random group compositions and to compare results.
In figure 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 results are depicted, for the three different experimental 
conditions. They present the comparison of two time series: the first one is the one 
. generated in the experiment and in basic models, while the second is the average value of 
1,000 runs with randomly assigned groups.
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Figure 8.1
New random allocation of subjects to groups in the Regular condition: percentage of 
endowment invested in the public good (above) and percentage of free riders (below), as 
mean of 1,000 random runs.
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Figure 8.2
New random allocation of subjects to groups in the RegRank condition: percentage of 
endowment invested in the public good (above) and percentage of free riders (below), as 
mean of 1,000 random runs.
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Figure 8.3
New random allocation of subjects to groups in the Rank condition: percentage of 
endowment invested in the public good (above) and percentage of free riders (below), as 
mean of 1,000 random runs.
From the figures some qualitative results emerge. In the case of Regular condition, it seems 
that the average time series generated with random group allocation is quite similar to the 
experimental one. Data about public good contribution is very similar, and it has the same 
slight dynamics of decreasing contribution over time. Even the time series regarding the 
percentage of free riders is very similar to the original one, with an increase over time of 
the number of free riders.
In the case of RegRank condition the situation seems different. Instead of a stronger (than 
Regular) decrease in contribution over time, the average contribution level with random 
groups fluctuates in the range between 25% (the starting value, not affected by random 
group allocation because depending on the initial state) and 20%, while the original series 
ends with a value of 9% of contribution. When looking at the result of the number of free 
riders, the impression of facing a different kind of dynamics is strengthened, with an 
increase in their number which is less important than the experimental one.
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Figure 8.2 clearly points out that the decision on group composition has a strong impact on 
simulated data; firstly it is worth ending this first analysis with the remaining figiue before 
proceeding with conclusions.
Looking at results regarding the Rank condition, we find a situation that is a sort of mid 
way between the two already presented. The dynamics of the number of free riders is quite 
similar to the original one, and its values are similar. But the data about the contribution 
level seems to be different, even if not so strongly as before. The movements of the 
original dynamics (increases and decreases over time) have mostly been followed, but 
values reached at the end of the experiment are different, as the shape of the line.
For a quantitative measurement of such results, a simple statistical coefficient has been 
evaluated. The Pearson correlation coefficient is computed as the division of the 
covariance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviations. Its formula is:
_ cov(Z,T)
It can help in showing the correlation between the two time series in each condition, and 
thus to understand if the qualitative considerations just made can find a stronger 
confirmation.
In table 8.1 the coefficients are presented: for each experimental condition it has been 
computed considering the data with the experimental group allocation and the artificial one 
with the average of random group allocation. The time series considered here are the ones 
regarding the percentage of contribution to the public good.
Table 8.1
Pearson correlation coefficient computed on the artificially generated contribution series 
and the experimental ones.
Condition Correlation coefficient
Regular 0.95
RegRank -0.14
Rank 0.18
The quantitative measurements confirm the qualitative analysis made before. The Regular 
condition shows a very high correlation in the series. The Rank condition a weak 
correlation, but positive. The RegRanlc shows a weak negative correlation which means 
having significantly different data in the two time series. Also, the direction of the 
dynamics often takes different paths.
Summarising, we have found that if we change the composition of groups in the 
experiment, coeteris parihiis, we could find different resulting values and dynamics. Such 
results are not completely different fiom the ones found in the experiment, for instance a 
strongly fluctuating dynamics that starts with a contribution level of, say, 20%, and then 
jumps to 90%, and then to 40%, and so forth, can not be found nor can a dynamics in 
which the contribution strongly and constantly raises. But anyway the found differences 
are sometimes relevant. Moreover, it seems that the differences can be relevant or not 
depending on the condition considered, and thus on the different experimental settings or 
on the fact that they were different experiments.
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The different treatments do not appear to be a plausible and logical cause. There are not 
elements in favour of a hypothetical causal relationship between the treatments in RegRank 
and in Rank and the results found.
The fact that they were different experiments, on the contrary, could be seen as a good 
explanation if considering the problem of external validity, typical of experiments and of 
the results obtained from them. In reality the issue is far more complicated but considering 
external validity is the mean needed to solve the dilemma.
Following the experimental tradition, the meaning of the words “external validity” of an 
experiment is twofold: it means the possibility to replicate the experiment obtaining the 
same results, and the possibility to extend the experimental results to reality. The second 
meaning of the words is partially dependant on replicability, and it is worth remembering 
how the experimental method has been developed in scientific fields like natural sciences 
where the possibility of replication often implies also the possible direct extension to the 
physical world in general.
Anyway, considering for now external validity just as a synonymous of replicability, it 
seems that RegRank condition has a low external validity, because on average the expected 
dynamics is mostly different. In other words, it is highly probable that a repetition of the 
experiment would lead to soundly different results. Unfortmiately in literature replications 
of the RegRank condition are not reported, but the issue is not over.
In fact we can consider not the experiment replicability but the ABM one. The basic model 
of the experiment has showed that the results of the experiment can be replicated. The 
difference in the two possibilities is just on the fact that the replicability of an experiment 
is in itself boimded by the difficulty to find the same subjects, to have them behaving in the 
same way and to make them interact in the original way (with the random group 
composition drawn in the original experiment). In our ABM that is easily done, and thus 
the Andreoni’s experiment is replicable, no matter the treatment, while by using real 
experiments that is almost impossible.
This can be a point in favour of ABMs, but it is worth considering the broader picture. In 
fact even with ABMs it is important to have an external validity that is not just the 
possibility to replicate the model, but also to extend the obtained knowledge to reality.
Are thus results coming from Andreoni’s experiment and from oui' ABM not externally 
valid? No, that is not true, but it is important to explore the conditions on which model 
results can be applied to empirical reality (as underlined and debated in the first part). 
Moreover, when dealing with an abstract model like the one considered on public good 
provision, the comparison with empirical data, in this case coming from experiments, must 
be carefully done focusing on the conditions on which results obtained in the abstract 
settings typical of the game can be found in reality.
The case of the RegRank condition reported by Andreoni is not a wi'ong and useless 
experiment in the sense that the emerging dynamics and results must be considered valid 
even if they are difficulty replicable in both experiments and ABMs. And the same could 
be said for the all the 1,000 experiments run with different group composition, but the ones 
close to average values have more external validity, either in terms of replicability or 
extension, and it is because of the shape of the distribution of the random time series that 
shows higher values around average values. But each run is valid; it is important and has a 
meaning. In fact group composition matters and a general emerging dynamics can be seen 
(the slight decrease of cooperation over time, for instance) but many particular cases with 
low probability to occur aie possible, and anyway valid.
The analysis of group allocation has thus been demonstrated useful because it allows for 
the evaluation of the external validity of experimental results. Moreover, despite the fact
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that group allocation seems to lack analytical relevance by itself (i.e., it does not allow 
considering relevant analytical issues of the problem of interest that is to say of the 
phenomenon of volimtary public good provision), its analysis is often useful for better 
understanding the phenomenon of interest when models are built to investigate the effects 
of other variables. In fact, as the following paragraphs and chapters will show, models built 
to study the effect of changes in other elements of the system of interest often do not allow 
to replicate the same group allocation as in the original experiment and thus the analysis of 
the impact of different random group allocations becomes necessary (it is for, instance the 
case of groups of different sizes: in such a case the original allocation of individuals to 
groups obviously can not be preseiwed).
The ai'guments just presented about average values can be understood better by looking at 
figure 8.4, where the distribution over time of the contribution levels of 1,000 rmis with 
different random group composition are depicted, in the Regular condition. It explains why 
we claimed before that average values have more probability to occur.
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Figure 8.4
Distribution of 1,000 different runs of models about random groups allocation in the 
Regular condition: time steps 2 to 7, with normal function.
In the figure, for each relevant round (i.e. avoiding considering the first round that is not 
influenced by group composition but just by the model initial state), is presented the 
distribution of contribution levels, also with the normal function and the statistical values 
of mean and standard deviation.
Remembering that the distribution of probability used by the random number generator, 
from which the different group compositions were drawn was uniform, as is usual in these 
cases in which it is worth giving the same probability to each possible combination of 
members in groups, it is clear how the results obtained are distributed under a bell shaped 
normal function.
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Because of the normal distribution, the results close to mean values are the most probable 
result to find if you replicate the experiment and the ABM, assuming that you replicate the 
model with a group composition different horn the experimental one.
But even if you obtain values in the tail of the distribution, they are valid and important. 
They just show how the interaction structure matters even in this abstract case, where the 
number of subjects interacting in groups is fixed to five, but where because of behaviour 
heterogeneity, the allocation of members to groups can generate slightly different results.
The dynamics in general is a robust result: you can see that the mean values of contribution 
slightly decrease over time, as was also showed in figure 8.1. Such a result is very robust, 
and can be found in almost all the possible replications of the model and of the experiment, 
and the reason for its robustness is the movement of the normal function over time towards 
lower values of contribution, while keeping a very low standard deviation"^\
In conclusion, the model with random group allocation has generated many interesting 
results. The first is that there are robust dynamics emerging from the model and the 
experiment, even if group allocation is changed. These dynamics aie the slow decrease of 
contribution and increase of free riding over time. They apply to each experimental 
condition. The model secondly showed how the different treatments have an impact on the 
starting level of contribution and of free riding on which such dynamics operate.
Thirdly, the model it made possible to understand that, on one side, the levels of 
contribution found on the Regular condition are highly probable to be obtained in 
replicating the experiment (and in fact they are similar to those of experiments reviewed in 
Ledyard 1995) but also other levels of contribution and free riding can he obtained in a 
close range. On the other side, the analysis of determination of groups composition has 
also shown that it woiild he more difficult to replicate the same dynamics of Rank 
condition and of RegRanlc in particular, hut in literature experiments with those 
experimental settings are not reported to confirm such outcomes.
Finally, the modification applied in the presented models has corroborated the intuition 
that subjects behave differently and thus how they are associated in groups has an impact 
on aggregate results. As will be analysed later, imagine finding thice kinds of behaviour: 
selfish subjects, altruistic ones and reciprocators. If groups are made in such a way that 
reciprocators interact mainly with altruists, a higher aggregate contribution level than 
building groups where reciprocators interact with selfish subjects could be expected.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the impact of changes in other relevant parameters of 
models, it is worth noting that from now on we consider only the Regular condition. The 
reason for such a choice is the possibility to compare the results obtained with other 
experiments reported in the literatuie. The experimental setting exploited in the Regular 
condition is in fact the one typical of public good provision games, and thus it has often 
been replicated and its results published. Aiming to compare future model results with 
other experimental references, such a choice has been compulsory.
8.1.3 Simulations on Group Size
The fact that standard deviation reported in figure 8.4 for the regular condition increases over time is not 
relevant because the values are very low. In other words, the normal function over time shows two processes: 
a relatively strong movement toward the left of the graph, to lower values of mean contribution, and a very 
little flattening, implies a raise in the function tails. The second effect is so weak that it is irrelevant.
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The second parameter to be considered is the group’s size. In groups, members share 
earnings of the public good (which is a non excludible good, as known), and the original 
size of such groups was five subjects.
Changing the group size means to change group allocation, and thus results here are 
obtained as average values of 1,000 randomly different runs.
Two kinds of models have been built; in the first kind groups are made of 10 subjects, in 
the other one groups are of 20. Results are graphically reported in figure 8.5.
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Figure 8.5
New group size in the Regular condition; percentage of endowment invested in the public 
good (above) and percentage of free riders (below), as mean of 1,000 random runs.
Figure 8.5 reports a result obtained as mean values of groups of ten and twenty subjects 
and compares them with results obtained in the original case. The level of average 
contribution in the case of groups with 10 members is higher than the case of groups with 5 
members. In addition, a group with 20 members means higher contribution than groups of 
10 and 5 members. Considering the number of free riders in each session, the result is
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confirmed, with the lowest values for groups with 20 members and the highest ones for 
groups with 5 members.
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Figure 8.6
Group size and random group allocation in the Regular condition: average percentage of 
endowment invested in the public good and its standard deviation for groups of 5 and 10 
members
Figure 8.6 confirms what has just been said and what has been discussed in the preceding 
section and in figure 8.4. The figure in fact presents average values of contribution 
obtained in the experiment, and in simulations with random allocation of individuals to 
groups of 5 members (in the graph is the line labelled “md grp 5 members”) and 10 
members (label: “md grp 10 members”). For those two last series, also the value series of 
standard deviation is plotted (lines labelled “std dev md grp 5 members” and “std dev md 
grp 10 members”). It is important to stress what kind of standard deviation is plot: it is in 
fact not the one between individual levels of contribution but the one over the population 
average values obtained in the 1,000 mns of the simulation that have been made in order to 
neutralise possible effects of the seed of the random numbers generator'* .^ It is, in other 
words, the standard deviation of average (over the population) values of contribution to the 
public good obtained in several simulation runs based upon different random seeds.
The first point to stress is how such a value is low, being at most about 4% of the 
endowment: because of that average values are highly significant, and the bell shaped 
distribution depicted in figure 8.4 is confirmed for all the simulations here considered.
The second argument worth being done is about the dynamics. At the first simulation step 
contribution values are the same in all the cases because are defined by starting values of 
individuals, and random group allocations start to influence different settings from the 
second time step: the standard deviation start rising from that moment on, but it suddenly 
reaches a stable and small value.
Considering the kind of standard deviation that is considered here and the fact that each experimental 
group was split into two classes of 20 subjects (a division that has been kept in simulations), it is clear how 
the case that considers groups of 20 members would result in null values of standard deviation of the 
contribution level. In such a case in fact the randomisation process of groups does not work because there is 
just a single group containing all individuals.
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As said, standard deviations depicted in figui'e 8.6 confirm not only what has been said 
before about the replicability of some experimental results but also the robustness of the 
small differences resulting from cases considering different group sizes: the difference is in 
fact always bigger than standard deviation, and, for instance, that means that average 
values of contribution obtained in groups of 5 members are always smaller than the 
minimal values obtained in groups of 10 members.
As discussed, the modification of group size affects the level of contribution and free 
riders, but that is not true for the general dynamics over time: a slight decrease of 
contribution and an increase of free riding over time can be seen in all cases.
It is evident how the increase of group size implies the increase of cooperation and the 
decrease of free riding. Such a correlation between group size and cooperation is a well 
known phenomenon and it has been reported in several experimental studies, as for 
instance in Isaac et al. (1994), Chamberlin (1974), Marwell and Ames (1979), and Bagnoli 
and McKee (1991)“ .
The result seems to be counter intuitive, in particular from the point of view of a GTRCM 
approach: following the concepts of subjects’ selfishness and of subjects’ capability to 
forecast others’ behaviour, the fact of having more members in the group should mean an 
higher probability to suffer free riding, and thus less willingness to cooperate.
Results say the opposite, and it is another element confirming the idea that there are 
subjects who try to cooperate and react depending on what is happening around them. In 
fact, having more subjects in a group means, coeteris paribus^ getting a higher total 
investment in the public good, and thus a higher earning from that good. This could 
explain the initial higher values, but the fact that such higher values are kept over time, 
testifies that it is an increased value of cooperation driven by group size and maintained by 
subjects behaviour.
The usage of ABMs here demonstrates one of its advantages: it allows for the finding of 
proof of hypothesised mechanism acting in public goods provision. While effects of group 
size on conti'ibution have already been found in experiments, the reason has not been clear 
for them. Only with ABMs it is possible to say that the greater level of contribution is not 
due to a different attitude of subjects towards greater sized groups. The effect in fact seems 
to be due to the game structure, as explained before, which makes the following 
mechanism work: if a greater group is created, the amount of earnings coming from public 
good will increase; if the amount of public good earnings increase, a higher contribution 
level will also be expected in fiituie rounds. The proof of the mechanism comes from the 
ABM and it is sound, even inspecting model dynamics in details. But more proof could be 
found, as well as the hypothesis on the reason why such a mechanism works (i.e., the 
presence of subjects willing to cooperate) is still to be analysed.
8.1.4 Simulations on Goods Return Rates
The last model parameter taken into account has been the value of public good return rate. 
In the original experiment it was set to half cent of a dollar for each token invested. In the
It is worth noting that experimental results and case-based studies have shown a bound to the phenomenon 
here reported, for general problems of coordination and also for cooperation ones (Kerr and Bruun 1983) and 
public good provision (Olson 1965, pp. 9-16). It means that over a limit, the increase of group size, if not 
accompanied by an effective communication system, can lead to a decrease of coordination and in our case to 
a decrease of cooperation (Stangor 2004, pp. 301). This point will be further and fully investigated with 
ABMs in the last chapter.
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following examples it has been increased to 0.75 cents, keeping constant to 1 cent per 
token the private good return rate.
Such modifications do not affect game equilibria and strategies dominancy at all, and that 
fact is quite important because it does not alter the experimental structure too much and 
thus keeps inferred decision rules significant.
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Figure 8.7
Increased public good return rate in the Regular condition, with original group allocation: 
percentage of endowment invested in the public good (above) and percentage of free riders 
(below)
In figure 8.7 the results given by the model with the increased public good return rate are 
presented together with the original time series, for comparison purposes. It is worth 
underlining that in this case the randomisation of the composition of groups is not needed: 
in fact the analysis can be made in the model by just keeping the group allocation sequence 
used in the experiment.
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As the figure points out, an increase on public good return rate, even if not affecting the 
game stmcture, means a very slight increase in cooperation (i.e., higher levels of public 
good contribution and less presence of free riders) over time. Such an outcome is relevant 
and confirmed by experimental literature, as in Rapoport and Sulemain (1993), Brown- 
Kruse and Hummels (1993), Isaac and Walker (1988), and Kim and Walker (1984).
Nevertheless, the systemic outcomes obtained by increasing the public good return rate are 
not significantly different to the ones obtained in the case of random group allocation and 
it is thus not possible to conclude if the derived increase in the level of public good 
contribution is only happening with that particular group allocation or if it is a more 
general evidence.
Moreover these results strengthen the argument of the before case. The mechanism is the 
same: greater earnings from the public good which generate greater contributions. It is also 
made more robust the general outcome of public good situation of slight decrease of 
contribution over time until a stable level is reached.
8.2 Simulations on Selfish and Cooperating Behaviour
The first models outcome gives strong suggestion about the leading role of agents willing 
to cooperate but able to defect if facing an environment where it is not possible to 
effectively cooperate. Such a kind of behaviour has been called “reciprocation” and 
“conditional cooperation” and it has been one of the main issues debated and studied in the 
field of social dilemmas in recent years. Experimental evidence of its presence and 
relevancy has been found (as a well-known reference to reciprocating behaviour consider 
Axelrod 1984; for an introduction to the problem and to the evolutionary relevancy of 
reciprocation see Fehi* and Gachter 2002, as other references to the same theme, see 
Hammerstein 2002 and Gintis et al. 2003).
In the preceding chapter a classification of subjects’ behaviour has been presented. The 
classification considers thr ee kinds of behaviour, selfislmess, unconditional and conditional 
cooperation. Such rules of behaviour can be, for now, claimed to be ecologically rational, 
and the aim here is to verify if their presence, in subjects classified before, is a key element 
in the causal mechanism of volrmtary public good provision.
Moreover, creating models with idealised behaviour means also to to verify if the 
procedure presented before is correct and if it is possible to pass fr om GP-inferred rules to 
these ones, which are more abstract but more comprehensible. The issue of “abstraction” 
can be very relevant because of loss of information sources and can have a negative impact 
on system dynamics: in fact, in classifying inferred decision rules just one of the possible 
information sources have been selected, mainly because it would impossible to evaluate 
the presence of a reciprocating behaviour if we do not know what information source 
subjects are controlling for understanding if other group members are cooperating. But, by 
simply looking at the inferred mles reported in the appendix, it is clear that they consider 
all six information sources. It has been claimed that the simplification can be accepted a 
priori because the choice of considering the recent dynamics of personal earnings as the 
variable to focus on is the most intuitive and logical, because information sources are not 
fully independent and personal earnings is ' therefore also a result of total group
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contribution and personal contribution' '^ ,^ and also because it is the information source most 
used in inferred rules, but not the only one.
Nevertheless, if idealised behaviour' will be sufficient to generate acceptable systemic 
outcomes, and will help in explaining them, it will be possible to conclude that such 
behaviour are really determining systemic outcomes and that they are important elements 
of the explanatory mechanisms.
8.2.1 Basic Model
The simulation is built by starting from the standard, basic, model, the one with the 
original game structure (i.e., return rates, group composition and size are as in the 
experiment) and the original inferred behavioural rules, and then substituting those rules of 
behaviour with the idealised ones founded in the classification.
Thus, excluding the tlii'ee subjects of the forty participants to the experiment'*  ^ for which a 
clear classification has not been reached (they represent the 7.5% of imclassified rules as 
reported in table 7.10), the new simulation considers subjects taking their decision 
according to one of the three idealised decision rules illustrated before and synthesised by 
table 7.8. Obviously, each subject’s decision mle has been substituted by one of the 
idealised ones chosen according to the classification made before, and not at random.
The outcomes of the simulation are reported in figure 8.8 where, as usual, both the time 
series regarding the average contribution level and the number of free riders are depicted 
and compared to the original ones.
Just to clarify this point, the payoff structure of the game says that personal earnings are determined by 
total group contribution and personal contribution. The former in fact determines returns coming from the 
public good, while the latter the ones coming from the private good. But because subjects are looking at 
dynamics and not at precise values, the relationship is loose: for instance, while a decrease in personal 
contribution and an increase in total group contribution always imply an increase in personal earnings, it is 
not foreseeable if an increase in both total group and personal contributions has a positive effect on earnings.
As it happened when presenting the classification, only the Regular condition of the original experiment is 
here considered.
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Figure 8.8
Idealised strategies (altruism, selfishness and reciprocation) in the Regular condition, with 
original group allocation: percentage of endowment invested in the public good (above) 
and percentage of free riders (below).
The results obtained and presented in the figure are very interesting. The average 
contribution level is very similar to the original one, and in fact the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the two series is very high and precisely of 0.96.
The series regarding the number of free riders is more different even if it qualitatively 
conserves the original dynamics: that result is acceptable because it is understandable that 
the substitution with idealised decision rules means a sort of radicalisation of choices.
The results thus confirm that the complicated classification mechanism worked, and that 
subjects’ decision rules can be classified in the three considered categories. Moreover, it 
suggests that the three kinds of behaviour are robust towards chaotic information 
landscapes. Such patterns of behaviour are in fact chosen even if subjects receive many 
partially different kinds of information, that is to say that they are able to reciprocate even 
when they receive multiple information sources and when the understanding of others 
cooperation is not immediate.
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8.2.2 Simulations on Group Composition
Figure 8.9 presents results regarding group composition: instead of using the allocation of 
members to group randomly drawn in the experiment, 1,000 new random draws are made 
for each round and the mean is presented in the figure.
Figure 8.9
Percentage of endowment invested in the public good with random group allocation 
(means of 1,000 runs) and idealised strategies (altruism, selfishness and reciprocation) in 
the Regular condition.
As for the case of GP-inferred rules of behaviour, with idealised rules of behaviour the 
systemic outcome with different random group allocation generates very similar results to 
the experimental ones.
8.2.3 Simulations on Group Size
By modifying group size it is possible to further investigate the impact of such a 
modification on systemic outcomes. With GP-inferred rules, in fact, an increase in group 
size generated an increase in the average level of contribution to the public good, but the 
case of twenty members in each group generated the same outcome as the case of ten 
members for the last round.
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Figure 8.10
Effects of increasing group size with idealised strategies (altruism, selfishness and 
reciprocation) in the Regular condition: percentage of endowment invested in the public 
good (above) and percentage of free riders (below).
With idealised behaviour, as in figure 8.10, this outcome seems to be stronger because the 
passage from 5 to 10 members in groups means a clear increase in levels of contribution, 
while the passage from 10 to 20 points out an increase for the first rounds but a decrease 
for the last ones.
Such an outcome is particularly interesting because the lower part of figure 8.10 points out 
the increase in group size clearly determines an increase in free riding, but the outcome of 
such modifications on the last round level of contribution is not very clear.
A possible solution in explaining such an issue is the fact that 20 members per group 
means, because the Regular condition here considered was conducted in the experiment 
with two classrooms of 20 subjects, to pass from a single-shot repeated game to a repeated 
one, that is to say that groups do not change over time, and each subject meets all the other 
in each round.
Such issues will be further analysed in the last chapter, but for now it is important to 
underline how GP-inferred rules and idealised ones show consistent results and that with 
increases of small group sizes, the model generates an increase in average values of
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contribution, even if final values (i.e., values for the final round) are not significantly 
higher.
Such a last conclusion is confirmed by figure 8.11 where the case of 10 members in each 
group is not only compared to experimental results but also to the case, presented before, 
of different random allocation to groups: a relevant higher value for the last round is also 
generated by random groups, an it is then only due to different matching in groups. The 
random matching in groups is, of course, also implemented in the case of 10 members 
because there is no experimental data available on such a configuration (in the experiment 
in fact groups were made of 5 members).
The case of new random groups of 5 and 10 members generate close final levels of 
contribution.
Figure 8.11
Percentage of endowment invested in the public good with random group allocation 
(means of 1,000 runs) and idealised strategies (altruism, selfishness and reciprocation) in 
the Regular condition, compared with experimental results and the case of groups of 10 
randomly allocated members.
8.2.4 Simulations on Goods Return Rates
Even by raising the return rate of the public good to 0.75 cents, keeping constant to 1 cent 
per token the private good return rate, results are similar to the ones obtained with GP- 
inferred rules and confirmed by literature.
Figure 8.12 in fact presents this last modification to the system structure. The simulated 
system generates higher levels of contribution over time than the experimental ones. 
However, levels of contribution are not much higher than experimental ones, but for the 
last round (the same result obtained before with GP-inferred rules).
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Figure 8.12
Percentage of endowment invested in the public good with an increase in the marginal rate 
of return from the public good (means of 1,000 runs) and idealised strategies (altruism, 
selfishness and reciprocation) in the Regular condition.
The increase in contributions due to the increase in public good return rate have before 
been claimed of being not particularly significant because if compared with a neutral 
modification in the system structure (i.e., the case of different random group allocation), 
systemic outcomes are quite close.
Figure 8.13 presents data confirming that, for the case of GP-inferred rules of behaviour 
and for idealised ones.
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49,6% 46,3% 43,1% 40,9% 39,5% 38,8%landom group
42,3% 38,5% 40,2% 35,4%
Figure 8.13
The impact of increases in public good return rates compared with random group 
allocation: percentage of endowment invested in the public good in the Regular condition 
with GP-inferred behaviour (above) and with idealised strategies (altruism, selfishness and 
reciprocation -  below).
In conclusion an increase in return rate seems to have a very slight effect on the system, in 
fact an increase of 50% of the return rate (i.e., the case here considered where public good 
return rate passes from 0.5 to 0.75) generates such a slight increase over time of 
contribution that is equivalent to the results of differently randomise groups composition.
8.3 Conclusions on Public Good Provision in Experimental Settings
The chapter presented an in depth analysis of an experiment on public good provision. The 
analysis was made exploiting ABMs based on the analyses presented in chapter 7.
Many research questions have been answered in the analysis process, and they can be 
divided into the ones which are methodological and the applied ones.
The main methodological results have been:
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• it is possible to exploit experimental data for building ABMs, that is to say to micro 
specificate and calibrate ABMs with experimental data;
• an effective way to reach the goal just mentioned is by inferring subjects’ 
behaviour with Genetic Programming;
• another way is to classify experimental data about subjects’ behaviour, even if such 
an approach is only possible if diffused behavioural patterns are well Imown;
• results coming from experiments and ABMs should be checked against their 
randomisation processes: such processes were intended as a means to neutralise 
some issues, but in reality they generate a range of possible outcomes, and the 
analysis related to external validity must take into account such probabilities of 
result and the fact that a low probability of replicability does not imply that results 
are invalid;
• micro calibrated simulations built with such an approach generate outcomes which 
are empirically validated and thus permit to study many points with the advantages 
coming from ABMs;
• among those advantages, besides modifying simple parameters and understanding 
mechanisms at work, it is also possible to answer much more complicated 
questions which involve the evaluation of robustness of empirical findings (e.g., the 
case of the observation of typologies of behaviour), a task that is very difficult to 
use other means because of issues raised by replicability;
• it is possible to use ABMs as a tool to “obseive” and to find empirical proof of the 
presence of typologies of behavioiu, and as it has been shown such a goal can be 
accomplished by classifying empirical behaviour and by substituting idealised 
typologies in models.
The main applied results are the following:
• despite the issue of probability of outcomes, experiments and models in public 
good provision show robust results which are characterised by a slow decrease of 
contribution until a level is reached;
• the treatments applied in the original experiment really affected subjects in the 
choice of the behavioui' to follow;
• the level of contribution is determined, among the many factors, by the matching of
subjects in groups, and that is due to their behaviour which is often sensitive to
what others do;
• the increase of group size could mean an increase of contribution level because of
more contributions to the public good and some subjects reciprocate, but it could
also mean lower final levels of contribution if group size is so big that many 
conditional cooperators are lead to cease cooperation;
• the increase of public good return rate seems to mean a very slight increase of 
contribution because of the same mechanism just described and that happens with 
very narrow conditions: public good retuim rate thus seems to have, from a broader 
perspective, a neutral effect on the contribution levels;
• subjects involved in a social dilemma, such as a public good provision one, behave 
according to tlu'ee kinds of behaviour: selfislmess, altruism and reciprocation;
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• reciprocation has been obsei'ved as a fast and frugal heuristic: in fact it respects the 
needed features implied by ecological rationality, because it is robust, found in 
several cooperation contexts and in evolutionaiy terms (see Fehr and Gachter 
2002), and it exploits the structure of the enviromnent that is characterised by a 
difficult coordination towards cooperation, to ensure good results for its adopters.
Starting from these last points on the knowledge about idealised behaviom- and from the 
methodological aim of exploring the possibility to empirically found ABMs with data 
collected in the field, the following chapter will present a case-based ABM aiming to 
address some policy issues. The last chapter will then complete the analysis of the causal 
mechanism of voluntary public good provision.
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Chapter 9
Quality as a Public Good in Rural Communities
Social dilemmas as voluntary public good provision are quite widespread in the real world. 
The scientific modelling of the phenomenon for theoretical analysis with Game Theory and 
experiments could lead to an imderestimation of important elements, and the knowledge 
deduced from theories and verified and obseiwed in experiments should always be checked 
on empirical cases.
Thus, in order to verify if the causal mechanism identified before it is useful to 
comprehend the real world and to verify if the elements considered in the abstract setting 
before are sufficient or if some others could influence the phenomenon of interest. It is 
worth concentrating on an empirical investigation aimed at understanding a real case of 
voluntary public good provision, where some critical issues that could be addressed by the 
scientific effort done here have emerged in recent times.
As said, the real world is frill of interesting cases that could match the requirements of the 
phenomenon of interest. Some requirements are obvious, in fact the chosen case should be 
chai'acterised by a dilemma of public good provision where economic incentives to free 
ride are relevant and where the provision of the public good is crucial to the welfare of the 
community involved in its voluntary provision.
Some other requirements are mainly due to practical reasons, for instance the need to have 
the possibility to efficiently interact with the actors in the community for suiveying them 
on the issues of interest.
Other interesting characteristics that should be seaiched in the system to be selected are the 
fact that the system presents a good example of a wider class, in order to obtain from the 
chosen case study a knowledge that can be extended to other similar cases, and the fact of 
being a system presenting critical issues of the contemporary world, in order to consider 
issues that are relevant now and in the near futui'e, and that ask for immediate solutions.
Because of the factors just mentioned, the chapter focuses on a case of à particular kind of 
localised productive organisation established in Italy a few years ago.
The reason for studying such a kind of organisation and for presenting the results here is 
that like many other kinds of non hierarchical and widespread organisations, it is 
characterised by many problems of coordination and because of its featui'es the actors 
involved are coping with a problem of public goods provision. Moreover, the kind of 
structure we will talk about is, as today, a relatively small one, involving dozens of 
subjects. Because of these features of the system, it is possible to study it in detail, ideally 
extending the results found before into an empirical case.
Furthermore, an important issue is the novelty of such a kind of productive organization. 
That means the lack of scientific studies on the matter and the need for a broader 
introduction to let the reader understand the kind of phenomenon and its social and 
economic relevancy. Moreover, that means a more challenging task because it deals with 
practical problems where useful insights referenced in other analyses can not be foimd.
The kind of productive organisation we will talk about has been labelled by those who 
started it a “presidium” and the origin of the name as well as its features will be presented 
below. But to complete the introduction to the chapter it is worth noting how such a 
productive organisation, because of its newness and of other factors, presents some frailties 
which have been recently outlined by the action of several factors, such as market
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competition and demand evolution. That means that such kinds of productive organisations 
are facing many challenges derived by the enviromnent and by the internal organisation 
itself, and that is the reason why some interesting organisational questions can be 
addressed to a case-based ABM. In particular, for the case on which the analysis will 
focus, the main question will be about the need for formal means to control cooperation 
among actors.
In conclusion, and for the reasons just mentioned, the chapter is organised as follows: the 
first section deals with the general phenomenon of interest, which is this new kind of 
localised productive system, underlining its main features, its history and its relevancy; the 
second section presents how data has been collected in the field, touching methodological 
issues raised in finding first-hand empirical bases for an ABM in the field; and thirdly, the 
results coming from simulations will be presented and analysed, aiming to answer the 
research question which led the whole research process.
9.1 The General Phenomenon of Presidia
The larmch of presidia is connected to the diffusion of a cultmal movement called 
“Slowfood”, which was started in northern Italy, in the small town of Bra in the 
administrative region called Piedmont, in 1986'^ .^
Slowfood is nowadays a world wide cultural movement which aims to preseive and 
promote a healthy and sustainable culture about eating and drinking, taking its name as a 
demonstration against fast foods. It focuses on the preservation of local traditions about 
food, as a protection of important cultmal issues and as a guarantee for human health.
Slowfood'^  ^ is composed of several organisations which have local offices in several 
countries. The main structme is the association which involves more than 80,000 members 
in the world, grouped in 800 local sections active in 50 comitries. Moreover himdreds of 
people are employed in structures directly contiolled by the association such as the 
publishing house, the fairs organisation office and others.
At the end of 1988, after an experience in cataloguing alimentary products which were in 
risk of extinction with the project called the “Ark of Taste”, a new active strategy was 
plamied and started.
The idea was to create a sort of small productive cluster of products under the risk of 
extinction. Those clusters were named presidia (presidium is the singular noun), a Latin 
word that can mean garrison, defence, protection or aid. i
A very important issue in the creation of presidia is that, since the very beginning, they I
intended not just to preserve an alimentary product for the friture. In fact, even if that was '
the final goal, the alimentary product has been ever conceived as the final result of a I
complicated process, and thus, to presei-ve and promote the product it is necessary to i
preserve and promote many local featmes, like the environment, the shared knowledge, the i
history, the social capital and so forth.
Unfortunately, there are not, as today, available references on Slowfood and presidia in English. For the 
interested reader some references in Italian can be suggested. Petrini and Padovani (2005) for instance shows 
the historical evolution o f Slowfood and presidia, Milano et al. (2002) presents updated references of each 
presidium, and finally Bailo et al. (2004) introduces problematic issues which presidia are nowadays facing.
Quantitative data reported here refers to the beginning of 2005 and has been provided by Slowfood.
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Presidia do not thus aim to be just a new form of production, and they have a deep impact 
on many social issues in the areas where they are located, and that impact is not a casual 
by-product but a desired outcome"^*.
9.1.1 The Impact of Presidia
Presidia initially started in Italy and, at the begimiing of 2005, they were 198 in Italy and 
64 in the rest of the world. They worked very well from an economic perspective and the 
data presented below confirm that claim.
In table 9.1, for instance, are reported data collected in an analysis promoted by Slowfood, 
II Sole 24 Ore (the main Italian business newspaper) and Bocconi University (Antonioli 
Corigliano and Vigano 2002). The analysis was made on a sample of 51 Italian presidia 
and considered two years, from the beginning of 2000 to the beginning of 2002. It testifies 
the success of presidia in increasing the price obtained by producers and the quantity 
produced. It is worth noting how before the creation of presidia, the production of those 
goods was strictly limited as well as the demand for those products. Moreover, the data 
reported shows how in each sector the increment in price and quantity is impressively 
higher than average market trends.
Table 9.1
Increases in 51 Italian presidia, in the period 2000 -  2002 Source: Antonioli Corigliano 
and Vigano (2002).
Sold Goods Price
Fish 11% 39J%
Cured Meat 53% 20%
Bakery Goods and Sweets 36% 21.5%
Cheeses 46% 28%
Animal Breeds 161% 19%
Fruits, Vegetables and Pulses 74% 68%
Average Growth 63.5% 32.6%
By looking at more recent data collected by Slowfood on a sample which considers four 
Italian administrative regions (i.e.. Piedmont, Veneto, Tuscany and Sicily), the success of 
the initiative is confirmed.
The sample considered 1,161 companies in 2005, while the Presidia considered in the 
research included 854 companies when created (i.e., at their starting year): such data 
confirms the capability of attracting companies to presidia and to create new ones.
Moreover, although it is worth adding that some companies have been created in occasion 
of the creation of the presidia'^  ^and that companies external to a presidium can join it later, 
the values depicted underlines the positive effect of presidia in entrepreneurship. Presidia 
belonging to the considered sample in fact also generated the creation of 671 new jobs and
An interesting analysis on how presidia have had a strong impact in preserving local environment, social 
customs and historical monuments through promoting a form of sustainable tourism can be found in 
Antonioli Corigliano and Viganô (2002) (which is also, unfortunately, available only in Italian).
It is not a rare case that in the process of creation of a new presidium, Slowfood aids the creation of new 
companies, as will be explained below.
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the effect must be wholly considered: presidia are located in rural areas where 
opportunities in the job market are very rare.
In figure 9.1 the same kind of data is reported as an increase in percentage for the 
considered four regions. It is worth noting that such a percentage trend is not on a yearly 
basis, but aggregate, and that the data reported is consistent with the diffusion of presidia. 
Piedmont is in fact the region where presidia firstly started, as well as Sicily which is the 
last region in which they have been introduced. The graph thus points out how the 
introduction of presidia is capable of increasing the number of companies involved.
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Figure 9.1
Percentage of increase in the number of companies belonging to presidia, from the starting 
year to 2005 Data source: Slowfood, Italian Presidia Department.
Moreover figure 9.2 points out one of the reasons for the creation of new companies: the 
quantity of products which has been sold has sharply increased in a few years, and the 
consideration made before about the difference among regions here is almost as well valid 
as before.
Presidia in fact show a stable trend of growth of quantities sold, that is to say that the 
positive effect in stimulating the demand is not exhausted in the first years after the 
creation of the Presidium but has lasted. Obviously, some differences are present even in 
each region and they depend mostly upon the kind of alimentary product considered, as 
outlined also by table 9.1.
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Figure 9.2
Increase in the quantity of sold goods (from the starting year to 2005) Data source: 
Slowfood, Italian Presidia Department.
The difference of composition of alimentary sectors in the different regions is one of the 
reasons for having different values in increase of the price per unit sold, as reported in 
figure 9.3. But there are other reasons, for instance the fact that in Sicily prices and the cost 
of living are lower than the rest of Italy, while the market demand for presidia product is 
generally nationwide and set to higher prices, and that explains the higher increase in that 
region: the cause is the passage from a local demand used to very low prices to a national 
demand capable of paying more.
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Figure 9.3
Increase of price per unit (from the starting year to 2005). Data source: Slowfood, Italian 
Presidia Department.
Even figure 9.3 stresses how presidia have been successful in generating very positive 
economic results in a few years. And it is worth considering that the years of reference 
have been particularly severe for the Italian economic conjuncture, with yearly increase in 
GDP which have always been lower than 2%.
As said there are no scientific studies about the phenomenon, except for Antonioli 
Corigliano and Vigano 2002. Moreover few surveys have been made to understand the
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evolution of presidia. Data in fact were collected in 2002 for the analysis just cited and in 
2005 for internal puiposes of Slowfood, and they are the source of the figures above. But 
inteiviewing people working in the department of Slowfood dealing with presidia, the 
shared opinion is that presidia are a successful initiative not only by the economic point of 
view. In fact it has been often stressed how the positive effect extended to the preserving of 
local traditions, to the promotion of sustainable kinds of tourism, and so forth, so to fully 
achieve the goal of bringing sustainable development in those ruial areas, preserving the 
environment and social capital.
The interviews made with producers belonging to two presidia producing special kinds of 
cheese in the Alpine valleys confirmed such opinions, as well as the intei^views with people 
involved in the presidium which has been the object of the following analysis.
9.1.2 The Supporting Action
But before proceeding in presenting the case we considered, it is important to outline how 
Slowfood acts to promote presidia, for a better understanding of the resulting structures.
Once an alimentary product in extinction has been recognised, Slowfood sends a task force 
into the area of interest composed of agronomists and other scientists that study the process 
needed to produce the final good. They start by obseiving the actual process of production 
and collecting data about techniques not used anymore. They then write a production 
regulation which aims to let the best product quality and the way to preserve local 
resources (culture, enviromnent, and so on) be known. They study the economic and social 
enviromnent in the area and they identify a person who will be in charge of coordinating 
the presidium. Such a person should not be economically involved in the presidium (for 
instance he should not be a producer), but he should have a role of responsibility to solve 
arguments between producers and must be a linlc between the presidium and the 
surrounding economic and social subjects. Such a person is often chosen in the cultural 
elite of the area, because of the recognised prestige that could help him in easily gaining 
authoritativeness among producers.
Then the productive regulations are ready and a person of reference is chosen, Slowfood 
asks all possible producers if they want to adopt the new regulations in associating 
themselves. Slowfood in fact aids the establishment of a new organisation of producers, 
generally an association, but often also more complicated organisations like consortia.
By inteiwiewing both Slowfood staff and producers in several presidia, the idea of aiding 
the creation of new cooperative structures is seen as a necessary means to start a presidium. 
It is worth adding that in several cases the cooperation evolved also in structures, making 
the fr ee association of producers to transform into more structured and legally compelling 
organisations for cooperation^^. Moreover, Slowfood often aids the creation of such 
cooperative organisations and sometimes even of productive companies, supplying them 
with managerial and legal advices, or helping them in obtaining financial credit from local 
banks.
Considering the Italian laws on productive associative structures and the history of some presidia, the 
forms of formal structures of cooperation can be: associations, consortia and cooperative companies. The 
first two are used when single small companies are already in existence or when the production process needs 
them. The latter is used when production needs the work of single individuals, and then they are grouped into 
a cooperative company of production, where they are paid for their work and where profits are equally 
divided among members.
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When a presidium is created, Slowfood aids it through other means. In particular, it 
promotes presidia in all its publications and events, and it helps in establishing new 
markets for their product, by promotion and by freely giving exposition stands in 
international and national fairs K
Summarising, Slowfood helps presidia creation and growth by four kinds of means:
• scientific tools: agronomists and other scientists study the production process and 
the chemical peculiarities involved, preparing the production regulation which is 
the basis of the presidium;
• institutional advice: producers who adopt the productive regulation and become 
part of the presidium, are generally stimulated to create formal structures of 
cooperation and they often receive advice on the economic management of their 
companies;
• small reliable markets: producers can participate for free at important fairs, where 
they meet a small but important and reliable demand;
• marketing tools: as the diffusion of the movement grows, presidia are perceived by 
common consmners as “brands” guaranteeing liigh quality, and Slowfood promotes 
them by describing their activities in several publications with high diffusion^^.
To complete the fi*amework in which presidia generally operate, it is worth adding that it is 
infrequent that companies enter or leave presidia after their creation. Moreover, as a final 
and very important remark, a producer found breaking regulations is expelled.
9.1.3 Problematic Issues
While interviewed Slowfood staff recognised the success of the initiative and its 
international expansion is programmed and executed, some issues of concern were raised. 
In fact oldest presidia show some problems of gi’owth: the more their development, the 
more problems are met guaranteeing cooperation among producers. Even if producers have 
enough resources (cultural and economic) and they have the chance to make a big step 
forward in reaching new markets, the level of investment and involvement requested calls 
for more selfish behaviour. Such a point will be better explained below in describing the 
challenges the chosen presidium is facing, but for now it is important to stress that such 
problematic dynamics are due to the sti'ucture of alimentary products distribution.
In fact, in the first steps of a presidium growth, the problem of cooperation does not come 
out. The enthusiasm and the values predicated by Slowfood, as well as the ease in reaching 
new markets, guarantee the possibility to establish a stable presidium. Producers trust the 
mission and the values of Slowfood, and they have many advantages in embracing them. 
By respecting productive regulations, they have to sustain higher costs but they know they
It is worth noting that fair participation is a very effective mean to ensure a demand for presidia at the 
beginning of their creation. In fact, by interviewing some producers belonging to presidia producing cheese 
in the area close to the Italian Alps, we have understood that during the first years presidium sells all its 
production in fairs, gaining resources to invest in incrementing its production capacity. After the first few 
years, the demand ensured by participation in fairs organised by Slowfood is no longer sufficient to sustain 
the presidium growth.
Besides books and magazines published by the publishing house managed by the association, which 
anyway reach thousands of readers in the world, Slowfood is also responsible for preparing contributions 
regarding food in several other media, in particular in Italy, like in commercial television programs and in 
national newspapers.
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are going to meet a consistent demand met in fairs and represented by consumers who 
follow Slowfood initiatives.
But if the success of the presidium is quickly growing, the next step will be harder because 
of the distribution structure of alimentary goods. In fact, the main market for such 
alimentary goods would be represented by large scale distribution. But that poses two 
issues on presidia. The first one is structural and it will not be on the focus of our analysis: 
it is the fact that large-scale distribution is usually composed by a long chain of retailers. 
Products coming from presidia have the opportunity to get higher prices because of their 
quality which is recognised by consumers, but this added value is a difficulty recognised 
by retailers, and corporations owning the last parts of the retailing chain are used to retain 
such an added value.
In other words, although consumers recognise the quality of presidia products and are 
willing to pay higher prices for them, retailers tend to keep such a surplus and not to give it 
back, along the retail chain, to producers who sustain heavy investments to reach high 
quality standards.
The second and equally important issue is the problem of cooperation. For increasing 
production to levels high enough to sustain agreements with large-scale distribution, more 
relevant investment is asked of producers. The form of cooperative structures now 
implemented in presidia does not avoid the strong risk perceived by presidia producers 
about others’ opportunistic behaviour. The level of trust among them is not enough with so 
many resources at stake.
9.2 A Presidium in Piedmont
In the present section the case of a presidium is presented: in this case the problem of 
distribution of value in large-scale distribution has been resolved, but the problem of 
cooperation still exists, and it has, up until now, been solved with an expensive and 
complicated monitoring system.
9.2.1 History and Structure
The presidium for the breeding of the Piedmontese cow was one of the first ever created, 
dating back to 1998.
The motivation for its creation was the extinction of the local breed of cows. The breeding 
of those animals was abandoned in recent decades because other breeds produced a higher 
quantity of meat in the same time. In other words, refemng to the case of cows bred for 
producing meat and not milk, some breeds in the last centuiy spread in the local farms 
because they guaranteed higher quantities of meat, despite the fact that the local cow was 
acknowledged as the one “producing” the best kind of meat.
At the end of the nineties the situation was critical: a few animals were sui'viving in a small 
number of farms. The presidium started by defining a strict regulation to maximise the 
quality of the meat (via a severe regulation about the kind of food with which cows must 
be bred, as, for instance, by making compulsory the usage of fresh pure local water, and so 
on) and by finding producers wanting to revitalise such a kind of animal species.
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The presidium is, in 2005, composed by 19 producers and by one person responsible^^ for 
its organisation: he is a retired veterinarian who knows the sector and the producers well. 
At the end of the presidium lie five slaughterers, who are also butchers, and who sell the 
produced meat to common consumers, or to restaurants and to other butchers.
Producers are grouped in an association called “Associazione La Granda”, the activities of 
which are principally the promotion of the presidium and controlling quality levels, as 
explained below. Producers are located in a rural area at the foot of the Alps, in Piedmont, 
precisely in the province of Cuneo, between the towns of Cuneo and Fossano; the area is 
almost 20 kilometres wide.
9.2.2 Recent Results
The presidium proved a great success, increasing the number of producers involved as well 
as the number of cows bred. Its recent evolution in turnover is depicted in figure 9.4.
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Figure 9.4
“Piedmontese cow presidium” turnover, 2002 -  2005, millions of Euro. Data source: 
Associazione La Granda
The figure shows how the presidium increased its turnover, and how 2005 is a year of 
sharper increase (estimated value).
Among the successes reached by the presidium, a very important one has been the one of 
protecting producers from market price fluctuations '^*. Such an advantage has been 
particularly important after the negative shock resulting from mad cow disease and even in 
recent years as outlined in figure 9.5. Underlying such results there is the particular way in 
which prices are set in this presidium.
”  From now one, such a person will be called “the responsible for the presidium” literally translating from 
Italian the way such person is called.
It is interesting to add that the importance of such results has been pointed out in separate interviews with 
the veterinarian responsible of the presidium and with the producer who is the president of the association.
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Once per year, in fact, producers (as sellers) and slaughterers (as buyers) all meet together, 
and they bargain for the price on which slaughterers commit themselves to buy the meat 
from presidium producers in the following year. The quantity of meat is just potentially 
infinite: slaughterers agree to a price knowing approximately the following year’s 
production, and knowing the amount of last year’s production. Thus, even if not 
formalised, they agree to buy a quantity of meat in a realistic range, while a sharp increase 
in production would surely mean a new bargain. Anyway, such a problem has never 
emerged in the presidium life, and on the contrary slaughterers, who have a more 
immediate contact with final consumers, have always requested stronger increases in 
production.
Figure 9.5 graphs the dynamics of prices for the presidium product and for its close rivals. 
In Cuneo in fact there is a gross market for meat, where local cattle breeders go to sell their 
animals to buyers. Buyers are of many kinds: from small butchers to important buyers of 
large-scale distribution. The figure is the result of data transformation and it focuses on 
female cows because presidium producers breed females and muttons, but for the latter the 
Cuneo gross market does not keep trace of the prices. The data adaptation made is useful 
for comparing the three time series: in fact, original data from the Cuneo gross market are 
recorded considering the weight of live animals, and the opposite for presidium prices (i.e., 
for dead and already slaughtered animals). Thus, data from the presidium are transformed 
assuming that from a live female cow, the yield in terms of weight is of 67%^ .^
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Figure 9.5
Female cows of 19 months, VAT net prices in local wholesale distribution markets, Euro 
per Kilogram, live weight. Data source: MIAC (Mercato all’Ingrosso Agroalimentare di 
Cuneo) and Associazione La Granda.
The yield of 67% used to convert prices referred to the weight of slaughtered cows to prices referred to the 
weight of live animals has been suggested by the same producers and slaughterers involved in the presidium 
as the standard yield obtained in slaughtering female cows bred according to the presidium regulations.
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The figure points out how over the last years the presidium mechanism to set prices has 
guaranteed that producers obtain very high and stable prices. In fact the line representing 
the evolution of presidium prices is, in 2002 and 2003, coiTesponding to the maximum 
prices registered in the gross market, but stable, and for the last few years it has meant the 
obtaining of prices higher that those obtained in common markets.
9.2.3 The Problem Faced
Despite the positive outcomes, the Piedmontese cow presidium is facing hard challenges. 
In fact, the next step in the growth path is particularly difficult. The presidiimi has 
bargained a contract for providing meat to a large-scale distributor that will buy the 
product directly from producers, avoiding the mentioned problematic issues related to the 
long retail chain.
Such an agreement implies a stiong increase in the breeding of cows and that could be 
achieved in two ways, by letting new producers enter the presidium or by having existing 
producers find and invest in new resomces. Both solutions are perceived by the president 
of the association of producers and by those responsible for the presidium as factors 
stressing the mutual trust among producers.
In fact, the requested increase in production means sometliing like doubling the breeding of 
cows in less than two years time, and can be translated to at least doubling the nmnber of 
producers (dependent on finding producers with similar productive capacity) or requesting 
existing producers to invest a greater than anyone has ever made before. Although there 
are some possible entrants willing to adopt presidium regulations and some sources of 
financial aid have been found, any choice made to solve the problem (or a mix of them) 
would not avoid the problem of cooperation.
Existing presidium actors in fact obviously do not trust new entrants, worrying that they 
will defect the established cooperation and take advantage of them, and they do not even 
feel completely sure about the already existing members in the case of so relevant exposure 
to financial risks. New members could, in fact cheat by not following productive 
regulations and selling their cows as bred according to them. That would generate serious 
tlneats to other producers’ investments: cows bred without respecting productive 
regulations produce lower quality meat, and the image of the whole presidium would be 
damaged.
Even as external observers, it is worth noting that the proposed strong increase in the 
number of producers could immediately raise the possibility of defecting behavioui* 
because of the impact that the event could have on the “need to belong” of producers. The 
strong increase in group size could generate lower levels of commitment in producers (for 
the relationship between group size and commitment, with outcomes on cooperation, see 
De Cremer and Leonardelli 2003).
Whilst the opposite, if incumbent producers stay alone in the presidium and make new 
investments to increase their production, the resources at stalce more than double the 
monetary incentives to fiee ride, and it is difficult to quantify precisely how the monetary 
incentive affects the whole incentive to free ride (that is to say the one considering also 
social incentives), but anyway it means a strong increase.
That calls for an effective monitoring and control mechanism. While the prmislnnent for 
traitors has always been and will be the exclusion from the association and from the 
presidium, the monitoring contiol mechanism has always, since the beginning, been far 
more complicated.
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The mechanism is severe, it has been an example for other presidia as it is the oldest and 
very effective, and it has been designed by those responsible for the presidium. It is made 
of the following elements:
• the association keeps a unique genealogical record for all bred cows, taking record 
of their birth and death date and of their offspring;
• independent chemical laboratories make random inspections in presidium 
producers’ cowsheds, chemically analysing what they find in mangers;
• when each cow is slaughtered, a piece of meat is used for organoleptic analysis;
• there are monthly compulsory meetings, in which producers meet to share 
information and to solve eventual problems;
• every semester producers meet and taste meat coming from all of them.
Such a structure of monitoring mechanisms is complicated, and expensive, but effective^  ^
Also, working in conjunction with a sanctioning system means the exclusion of defective 
producers from the presidium -  for an example of the different dimensions in which 
control and sanctioning systems operate, such as monetary and emotional depending upon 
social value orientation, see Beckenkamp and Gilmbel 2000.
Facing the challenges explained before and considering that such a control system is 
difficult and expensive to extend for future needs, the question to be answered is, is it 
needed? It is not known what the future structure of the presidium will be, but it is 
possible to understand the existing one and to investigate if the severe monitoring and 
control system is really necessary. Answering such a question can shed light on the 
relevancy of a formal monitoring and control mechanism, now and in the future, 
considering that the actual formal mechanism will probably soon become unaffordable or 
non-efficient because too expensive^^.
9.3 Data Collection
To obtain data about the existing presidium composition, two main sources of empirical 
infomiation have been used. The first one is the usage of unstructuied interviews with 
presidium main stakeholders (i.e., those responsible for the presidium but also the 
president of the association of producers), from whom came the information described 
above, aiming to generally understand how the presidium works, the typical problems of 
the sector, the control mechanism, and other general issues of the presidium. The second 
one has been represented by suiweying the 19 producers with a questionnaire, divided into 
two parts, aimed at understanding each producer’s production capacity and the social 
network among producers.
Data about production capacity has been cross checked with data recorded by the 
association. Data about the social network has been a more complicated issue. The part of 
the questiomiaire devoted to retrieve such data was built to imderstand the fr'equency of
^ According to the presidium coordinator and to producers, the mechanism has worked well because it has 
helped, in the past, in selecting two producers, who were not “capable” of following productive regulations 
and who have been expelled.
The control mechanism gets more expensive as produced quantity increases because each slaughtered cow 
is chemically analysed and because random controls in sheds must be made more frequently.
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meetings with other presidium producers, excluding occasions related to the presidium life 
(i.e., excluding monthly and semester meetings of the association which belong to the 
formal monitoring mechanism). Thus, the kinds of answers obtained were for each 
producer and related to each producer, a frequency of meetings, but that data can be 
perceived differently by subjects. In fact, to be clearer, imagine that producer A says that 
he meets producer B once every two months, while producer B say that he meets producer 
A once per month. This kind of discrepancy can be due to different perceptions between 
producers but in the original data collected those differences were minimal. Anyway, to 
build the model, the average value of the two frequencies has been considered as the equal 
probability of meeting between producers, that is to say, coming back to our example, that 
producers A and B in the model have probability equal to 1 to meet once every month and 
a half.
It is worth adding that some producers were interviewed by telephone to check their 
answers in the paper based questionnaires, which has suggested that the frequency of 
meetings depends on two .factors, proximity and age. Proximity is relevant not just for 
intuitive reasons but it must be considered that producers live in farms spread across the 
countryside, and thus their proximity mainly means to frequent the same village market. In 
fact, in villages in the area of the presidium a market takes place once per week (on the 
morning of one day of the week), and producers go there to sell small quantities of 
products different from cows’ meat: they generally in fact also breed small farm animals 
and vegetables, for their auto consumption and for increasing their income. Living nearby 
thus does not generally mean to meet other producers casually on the street but to meet 
them sometimes at the village market. Passing to the age factor, the interviewed producers 
say that they are friends with neighbour producers who were schoolmates (i.e., having the 
same age and thus who attended the same school in the same years).
The data collected are depicted in figure 9.6, where the network of producers is drawn. 
Vertexes of the network obviously represent producers, and the size of them is a 
representation of their production capacity, outlining the heterogeneity of the distribution 
of such a value. Despite the heterogeneity, differences are not big, and production cannot 
be considered polarised in few subjects but is spread in the network.
Figure 9.6
The network of presidium producers: each link thickness represents the frequency of 
interaction between the connected producers. The size of vertexes representing producers 
depends on their production capacity.
172
The thickness of linlcs connecting vertexes in the figure represents the frequency of 
meetings between them. A thicker link means a higher frequency.
Finally, it is worth adding that the figures do not show spatial disposition of producers: 
vertexes have been put on the plane according to a visualisation algorithm for networked 
graphs that depicts closer vertexes more connected in terms of links strength. Such a kind 
of visualisation helps in suggesting clusters of more comiected vertexes and it will be used 
later for analysis purposes.
9.4 Simulations
As said we are focusing on the need for a formal control mechanism. To explore the issue, 
we simulate the presence of an informal control mechanism and the absence of the formal 
one.
The informal control and punisliment mechanism considered is the exploitation of 
reciprocating behaviour. To malce this assmnption possible, it is necessary to explain why 
this problem can be seen as a public good provision one and at the same time it will be 
explained why the chosen informal control and punisliment system can be considered 
plausible.
The main idea is the fact that the respect of regulations and the consequent high level of 
quality in cows’ meat is a public good shared by producers. But high quality is subject to 
free ride: regulations are expensive to respect, because many other means to breed a cow 
are available at a minor cost and the evaluation of meat quality is made by end customers 
in respect to the whole production. Considering that all producers have a small fraction of 
total production, the system could sustain a few fr*ee riders: a small decrease in quality can 
not be perceived by customers, and despite the presence of new laws about labels attached 
to meat for backtracking breeders, the process of eventual identification of free riders takes 
too long time and it is less likely to happen, if left to market reaction and end consumers.
In the alimentary sector there are other examples of similar quality problems that can be 
referred to a public good provision framework, as in Bravo (2002). In that case, the subject 
of research was a wine consortium located not too far from the presidium area (almost 60 
kilometers). Wine producers came together in a consortium many decades ago to obtain a 
trademark for their specific wine. They had regulations establishing a minimum level of 
quality to use the trademark. In recent decades, with the international success of wines 
coming from that area and with a new managerial attitude, many producers started to 
impose new personal brands and abandoned the old consortium and the trademark. That 
happened because after exploiting the public good of the consortium trademark which had 
guaranteed their survival for decades, they were able to improve the quality of their wines, 
but using a shaied trademark implied the sharing of their investment. Thus they left, and 
although the consortium still exists, its producers have less market share every day and 
they are following a path of decreasing quality. Cooperation in that case partially failed.
In our case the situation is different: they are not producers big enough or with resoui ces to 
impose their product, and they all need the presidium to work. But, the temptation of the 
easy gain ensured by deception is always present and it is due to savings by breaking 
regulations and by the difficulty of clearly detecting defectors.
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On aggregate, the problem would be other producers’ reaction to a known defection: if the 
defector cannot be identified and punished, expelling him fi*om the presidium, information 
about defections can spread among the network of producers according to their reactions.
In simulations we use the data collected in the field, that is to say the ûequency of 
meetings used as probability and the production capacity. Each simulation step is a basic 
time unit, which represents a week because the highest frequency of meeting that has been 
found is of once per week. The fact of using probability means that, for instance, two 
producers who are used to meet once per month, have a little less than 0,25 probability to 
meet each simulation step.
Each producer has to choose each simulation step if producing high or low quality cows. 
The production capacity collected has been divided by 52 to represent the number of cows 
slaughtered each week.
It is worth noting that those are simplifications: it is obvious that it takes longer than a 
week to breed a cow and that it is not possible to breed and slaughter fractions of it. But 
that should not change results, because even the choice of defection cannot be so discrete 
but continuous, for instance by partially respecting presidium regulations, and information 
about defection can, as well, spread continuously and not only when cows are slaughtered. 
The model needs a higher level of simplicity and the used structur e still represents the real 
weight of each producer on the aggregate outcome.
Passing to the problem of producers’ behaviour, it is worth noting how it is impossible to 
collect such data in the field. In fact, the absence of a formal control system is purely 
theoretical, and thus there is neither data available or collectable on such conditions.
It is then possible to use idealised kinds of behaviour such as the ones studied in the 
previous chapter. Producers can be altruists, always respecting regulations, or 
reciprocators, respecting regulations if others do. There carmot be selfish producers who 
never respect regulations: the participation to the presidium is voluntary and producers are 
selected before entering, thus the assumption about the absence of selfislmess is realistic.
Reciprocators are modelled reacting upon singular and immediate defections of 
neighbours. Without further empirical analyses, such a choice seems as plausible as the 
one in which reciprocators switch to a defective behaviour only after reiterated defections 
of the majority of their neighbours. The choice that has been made is due to the fact that 
immediate reciprocation upon single defections of neighboms is an extreme case that helps 
in pointing out the effects of the informal control mechanism which punishes 
uncooperative behaviour' by means of reciprocation (i.e., it is a choice that helps in 
answering the research question here considered).
Finally, and before proceeding to analyse simulation results, it is worth adding that both 
altruists and reciprocators are not stupid. In fact, the modelled behaviour* implies that both 
kinds of behaviour stop the cooperation (i.e. to produce high quality) if the average quality 
of the presidium production drops under 50%. In other words, if more than fifty per cent of 
the meat produced by the presidium is of low quality, and all the producers abandon 
regulations, the presidium fails because consumers will stop buying its meat. Such a 
modification in idealised behaviour* is a discontinuity and it is foreseeable that it will 
impact on system dynamics.
As said we consider two kinds of behaviour for producers, altruism and reciprocating. We 
do not know how producers actually behave, thus we investigate some hypothetical 
configurations.
It is wor*th starting with the worst case scenario: all producers are reciprocators. That is to 
say that each one of them, if they receive information about a deception (i.e. the fact that
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one producer has broken regulations) react by producing low quality. The kind of 
reciprocating behaviour considered is a strong and benevolent one; if further information 
about deceptions does not reach the producer, he will turn back in following regulations at 
the next step (and that is due to the fact that other producers not breaking regulations 
means that they are respecting them).
The resulting simulation is as follows: we hypothesise that one producer defects, and 
according to producers’ behaviour and the possibility to meet and thus to be updated about 
others deception, we investigate how deceptions can spread in the presidium. Obviously, 
saying that, information about defections can spread among producers and if defectors are 
not identifiable means the information is partial, not so certain to sustain the accusation for 
expelling a member from the presidium.
Knowing that if high quality production falls below the 50% a strong feedback comes from 
the market and the presidium fails, and knowing that producers interaction depends upon 
their probability of meeting that is simulated by using a random numbers generator, the 
results are reported as probabilities of the presidium to survive, computed as average 
values over one thousand runs with different seeds considered by the random number 
generator.
Figure 9.7 presents the probability of survival of the presidium after 10 weeks of a 
producer’s deception. The probability of survival equals the probability of high quality 
production, which is the public good of the presidium. Those values are represented as 
grey columns. The fact of having columns with different values depends on a producer’s 
position in the social network, and it will be studied below, but for now is important to 
underline that each data means the probability of the presidium to survive if that specific 
producer defects. For instance, that means that if the producer called PIO defects, the 
probability of the presidium survival will be slightly higher than 25%, while if P4 defects 
the presidium will be doomed because it does not have any probability of survival.
t r i l l  1mr
producers
■ production 
□ prob. of PG
Figure 9.7
Producers productive capacity and probability of public good (PG) production in the 
presidium, after 10 weeks from a producer’s deception. Results from simulations with all 
reciprocating producers.
Darker columns in figure 9.7 represent the producers’ percentage of total production 
capacity. This data is drawn to make clear how even if heterogeneous, production capacity
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do not differ very much and it does not seem to be particularly relevant for aggregate 
dynamics, at least considering producers one by one. In fact, we can see that there is no 
clear correlation between the impact of one producer’s deception and its production 
capacity.
As said, thinking about the working mechanism behind the model and studying its results, 
it seems that a very important issue to explain the latter is related to producers’ position in 
the social network.
In other words, we want to know for instance if producers who generate extreme values of 
presidium survival probability have relevant positions in the network.
For making such an analysis on a social network, many statistical tools and techniques are 
available (see references to Social Network Analysis -  SNA -  mentioned in chapter 4).
The network analysis that has been made is useful for answering the question just 
mentioned and will be useful for further analyses reported below, but before proceeding it 
is worth explaining how, among the many available, one particular tool of SNA has been 
chosen.
SNA gives plenty of tools for investigating several issues related to the structure of social 
networks, and they can be categorised following their purposes. A category of statistics in 
fact relates to the network structure in general: they are measures (for instance the 
connectivity, the diameter, the average degree of nodes, etc...) that are able to shed light 
on some aspects of the global network structure and particularly useful when comparing 
networks.
The second kind of purpose at which SNA tools aim is about the position of nodes or 
groups of nodes in the network. They are statistical measures of features of each node, like 
its degree (i.e. the number of links with other nodes), its centrality measured on the basis of 
some algorithms (for instance its global centrality, betweeness, etc..), and so on. Based on 
such measures two further analyses can be made: the analysis of the role of nodes and of 
sub-groups in networks.
The problem of analysing nodes roles Has been deeply debated in chapter 4, and the 
possibility to refer to an ABM and an empirical case as shown can allow the understanding 
of realistic roles. A priori, here we cannot exclude also the presence of groups.
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Probability of public good (PG) production in the presidium, after 10 weeks from a 
producer’s deception: results from simulations with all reciprocating producers. Producers’ 
values of global centrality and weighted degree (as a percentage of the maximum value in 
the population).
Nevertheless, it is possible to make an example of the difficulty here referred to. Consider 
figure 9.8 where the probability of public good provision (as in figure 9.7) is presented 
along with two network statistics. Those statistics are measures of nodes centrality. The 
first one is usually called global centrality and measures the centrality of the node as the 
sum of the lengths of the shortest paths comiecting that node with each other (for details 
see Schott 1991, pp. 85). The other data is the weighted degree of the node, that is to say 
the sum of the weight of the links to which the node is coimected, presented as a 
percentage over the maximum value obtained in the population of nodes to be just put and 
represented in the same scale of the other two values in the figure.
If we consider the probability of public good provision and global centrality it seems that 
most central nodes are the ones which are less influential in the provision of public good 
because their defection is the one generating less probability of complete loss of public 
good (see for instance producers 10 and 13). Considering weighted degrees the result is the 
opposite: the most peripheral nodes seems to be the ones leaving more chances to public 
good provision. Such ambiguous results does not only show how node centrality can be 
measured with statistical tools that give raise to completely different results, but also 
stresses how different causal mechanisms (and explanations) could be derived by adopting 
different measures of centiality. The only way to avoid such a risk and to understand the 
system dynamics is to apply a more complicated analysis, looking at mechanisms and 
network structure peculiarities.
Thus the technique used to investigate the differences among producers’ positions in the 
network allows for considering both single nodes and groups of them. The chosen 
teclmique is called “K-core analysis” (for reference see Schott 1991, pp. 110 ff., or 
Wasserman and Faust 1994, pp. 266-267; for a more in depth introduction to the technique 
see Seidman 1983 and Doreian and Woodard 1994), which helps in pointing out cohesive 
subgroups in social networks^
The network has thus been studied according to the degree of nodes. Nodes in our network 
in fact are comiected by linlcs which represent the possibility of meetings between the two 
considered producers. The analysis proceeds by grouping nodes depending on the 
differences in their degree value, and to further analyse the investigation of sub gi'oups in 
the analysis processes linlcs have been filtered.
This point needs more clarity. Consider for instance figure 9.9 where the normal network 
analysed with the K-core approach is presented. The result is the presence of a group of 17 
producers, each represented by vertexes of the same size, and two single nodes of different 
size and darkness. Those two nodes, PIO and P13 do not belong to the same group, 
because of their different degree, and in fact they are the ones least comiected. If we filter 
the lowest weighted linlcs out of the network, that is to say if we erase from the network all 
links that represent a fr equency of meetings with a value less than once per month, and we 
re-apply K-core analysis, we are able to make an analysis of the sub group of 17 indistinct 
producers found before. The result is depicted in figure 9.10, and will be soon discussed,
Talking about cohesive subgroups, it is important to add that many authors have studied the role of social 
cohesion for explaining social phenomena. For instance, Friedkin (1984) used social cohesion as an 
explanatory variable for studying the emergence of consensus in social groups.
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but it is intuitive how eliminating lower links can increase understanding of sub groups in 
networks because it reshapes (and diminishes) the range in which the analysis finds 
similarities among nodes. It is also a way to point out groups that have higher frequencies 
of meeting.
As a final remark, the analysis has been carried out using a visual tool on a computer, 
NetDraw, which helps in filtering and analysing the network. Moreover, the nodes’ 
position has not been changed, to identify different nodes more easily.
Figure 9.9
Presidium producers network, K-core analysis, all links
Figure 9.9 presents the network with all links: it points out how two producers are weakly 
connected to the other seventeen. They are PIO, the one with the lowest degree, and PI3. 
The figure is similar to the one of figure 9.6, but here node sizes are determined by the 
weight of the nodes.
Eliminating the weakest links, we obtain a network that represents producers and the links 
that mean a meeting of at least once a month.
Repeating the K-core analysis on the new network, we obtain figure 9.10. The emerging 
group composition is here more complicated, but we can focus on the presence of very 
poorly connected producers, which are the three named P9, PIO and P I3, and of several 
differences among the other producers. It is thus possible to further repeat the process.
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Figure 9.10
Presidium producers’ network, K-core analysis, links connecting producers who meet at 
least once per month
Figure 9.11 considers a network made by links that consider a frequency of at least two 
meetings per month between producers. Almost half of the producers do not have this type 
of connection, and just ten of them remain connected. Moreover they appear to belong to 
two distinct groups. One seems to be well intra-connected and central, and made by P4, P5, 
P I5 and P I8. The other is made by remaining connected producers, which are mainly 
linked with the central group.
Figure 9.11
Presidium producers’ network, K-core analysis, links connecting producers who meet at 
least twice per month
The centrality of the group of four producers is confirmed even by further filtering links 
and leaving the ones which mean having at least three meetings per month, as in figure 
9.12.
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Figure 9.12
Presidium producers’ network, K-core analysis, links connecting producers who meet at 
least three times per month
Taking into consideration the links present in figure 9.12, we can note that each of the four 
producers is connected with two links to others. We can investigate if it is the central node 
of the sub-group by further filtering the links, as in figure 9.13 where just links meaning a 
meeting per week are considered.
Figure 9.13
Presidium producers’ network, K-core analysis, links connecting producers who meet at 
least once per week
The result of figure 9.13 is the last in the procedure by exploiting K-core analysis. It is not 
possible to further filter links (the frequency of weekly meetings is the highest one found 
in the empirical data set) and other sub-group differentiations can not be made.
The result is the presence of three central and highly connected producers. Their internal 
connection structure is quite clear and simple: inside the group of mostly connected (in
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terms of frequencies) producers, there is one central vertex (producer PI 8) which interacts 
frequently with the other two.
An interesting point to note is that PIS is the president of the producers association, 
nominated by other producers. Moreover it is worth noting how even when searching for 
sub-groups and producers’ roles, there is no clear correlation between producers’ size and 
position. In fact, as can be noted in figure 9.14 where the last stage of K-core analysis is 
presented but just for the links, while nodes size represents producers’ production capacity, 
it is clear that while in general the least connected producers are not among the ones with 
the highest levels of production capacity, there is no other strong evidence and the central 
producer, PI 8 is not one of the biggest ones.
Figure 9.14
Presidium producers’ network, links connecting producers who meet at least once per 
week, as in figure 9.13, but with vertex size depending on production capacity
Hence, it is possible to use the K-core analysis results to better interpret differences found 
in first simulation outcomes. In fact, in figure 9.8 a different effect of defections on public 
good production probability has been noted. It has been supposed that it was due to the 
producers’ position in the network, a causal influence of production capacity at a first 
glance not being plausible.
With K-core analysis and the last presented figure it can be excluded that the network 
structure is even indirectly determined by production capacity, and thus it can be avoided 
to further consider such an explanation.
Producers suggested that network structure has been shaped by age and spatial location. 
We can take it as it is, and consider it as a stable and given element of the model.
Anyway, it is still not clear about the mechanism that makes defections coming from 
different producers have such a different impact on the aggregate public good provision. 
Consider figure 9.8 and the following ones, focussing on extreme cases. It is possible to 
notice that defections coming from producers P4, P5, P15 and P I8 determined the end of 
presidium, by guaranteeing 0% of public good probability. It has been found that those 
producers are the four most connected in terms of meeting frequencies. On the other side, 
in figure 9.8 we noted PIO and P13 as the two with minimal negative impact on the 
presidium. They are the least connected producers, as can be seen in figure 9.9. The third
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least connected producer is P9 (figure 9.10), and figure 9.8 points out that it is also third in 
the ranking of the ones with the least negative impact on the presidium. For all other 
producers similar arguments can be made.
Summarising, it is clear that negative impact is positively correlated with producer’s 
connectivity, and the causal mechanism is quite simple to understand looking at the model.
Defections coming from less connected producers have less a chance to diffuse, while if 
most central producers defect, the reciprocating reaction of other producers met by them 
will surely determine the end of the presidium. Thus at the core of the mechanism there is 
the diffusion of defection due to reciprocating behaviour upon the information received.
New simulations can be made, starting to consider not only the presence of reciprocating 
behaviour, but also the one of altruism. As said before, we exclude a priori the possibility 
of selfish producers inside the presidium, while the behaviour of an altruist is the one that 
always chooses to respect regulations unless the aggregate high quality production falls 
below half of the total, thus ignoring information received about defections.
It is worth firstly studying the impact of altruism in the presidium, for each producer. That 
is to say those first simulations have been made by considering just one altruistic producer 
per time, and leaving the others to reciprocate. Results are presented in figure 9.15 by 
presenting the average probability of public good production after ten simulated weeks 
over 1,000 runs with different seed for the random generator.
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Figure 9.15
Probability of public good production after 10 weeks from producer’s deception, with 
reciprocating and altruistic producers (deception from anyone)
Figure 9.15 represents the probability of presidium survival considering one altruist per 
time: that is the reason why probability values for each producer are reported. In fact 
columns represent the public good probability in the case of having the corresponding 
producer acting as an altruist, while the others are reciprocating. As it is possible to see, 
assuming that defections are coming from randomly chosen producers, the impact of the 
presence of single altruists is almost nil because the probability of presidium survival is in 
each case very low. Moreover we can note small differences among producers, but they are 
not relevant. In fact, the single impact of altruism can not be directly related to the 
producer’s position in the network (and neither to his production capacity).
182
The almost null positive impact of individual altmism is a very important result. In fact, 
considering the opposite result found in considering the negative impact of individual 
defections, we face a dilemma in which single altruistic actions are not capable of 
sustaining a positive aggregate, while single selfish choices can determine very negative 
outcomes. Such an asymmetry is typical of social dilemmas where the positive collective 
action is defined by the co-presence of many opportune micro behaviours.
Network position is however important. That is testified by the last tlnee columns reported 
in figure 9.15, where the probability of presidium survival is computed considering the 
presence of several altruists.
The first column to be considered is the one labelled “P9P10P13”, where the probability is 
computed considering those tlnee producers acting as altruists. The result is low, similar to 
the presence of just one altruist, and it is because these are the thiee least connected 
producers. In fact the following column, “P5P15P18”, more than doubles the rate of 
suiwival probability because the chosen tlnee altruists are the most central ones. Moreover, 
as testified by the last column in the figure, if the four most connected producers behave 
altruistically, the presidium survival chances will increase, even if the resulting level is 
rather low.
Summarising we have fomid many interesting results. The first one is that individual 
altruists do not have the power, if alone, to change the aggregate outcome. Secondly, it has 
been understood that only altruism coming fi'om groups of well connected producers can 
raise the possibility of ensuring cooperation in the presence of short defections. Finally, the 
probability of presidium sui*vival is in any case very low: even if the four most central 
producers devote themselves to the presidium by ignoring others’ defections, the 
probability of presidium survival is still lower than 18%, after ten weeks from the first 
defection.
It is also possible to investigate the evolution of public good production probability over 
time. As we laiow, the simulation starts with a defection from a single producer, which can 
generate defecting reactions by other producers who get the information about the 
defection. The diffusion of defecting behaviour in the producers’ network is the 
mechanism leading to the results presented, but it is not known if the evolution of 
probability over time and the presented level of probability, the one computed at the 
moment that corresponds to ten weeks after the first deception, is a stable one.
In figure 9.16 the evolution in time of presidimn sui'vival probability is plotted for the case 
of the four most coimected producers behaving altruistically. By observing the dynamics, it 
is clear how defections quickly spread in the producers’ network and how values soon 
stabilise at low probability.
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Figure 9.16
Probability of public good production over time since a producer’s deception, with four 
altruists (P4, P5, P15, P18).
But how many altruists could have been expected to be found among presidium producers? 
There is no empirical data to evaluate each producer’s expected behaviour, that is to say, to 
understand that he would altruistically behave in the case of absence of formal control 
mechanisms in the presidium. But it is known, from previous analyses reported in the 
previous chapter and from similar outcomes found in literature, that in general there are 
approximately 1.4 reciprocators for each altruist (for instance in the experiment previously 
reported before there were 35% of reciprocators and 25% of altruists).
Considering that ratio between reciprocators and altruists, it can be expected to find eight 
altruistic producers in the presidium. The issue, obviously, is which ones? Figure 9.17 
presents a summary of all possible scenarios. The worst case scenario is the one with all 
producers reciprocating: the probabilities obtained by considering this case are presented in 
the first pair of columns, the first of which represents the value after 5 weeks from the 
original deception, and the second one relates to 52 weeks after the original event. As can 
be expected, in the worst case scenarios probabilities of presidium survival are decreasing 
over time and very low.
As a best case scenario it is possible to ideally think that is the situation in which all 
producers are altruists, but it is not plausible and the outcome in that case would always be 
complete cooperation.
The most plausible best case scenario is the one with a set of eight altruistic producers 
composed of the most central producers. Their position could let them stop the spreading 
of defections and guarantee the survival of the presidium. This one is the case reported in 
figure 9.17 as the third pair of columns. Otherwise from what was said before, in this case 
the probabilities of survival are very high. But that positive result is strictly dependent on 
the fact of choosing the eight most connected producers. In fact, the last pair of columns in 
the figure shows probabilities in the case in which the eight altruistic producers are the first 
seven and the ninth most connected. Probabilities of survival strongly decrease, even if just 
the eighth most coimected producer has been substituted by the ninth.
Finally, if the eight least connected producers are selected as the ones behaving 
altruistically, the very low probabilities presented in the second pair of columns are 
obtained.
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Figure 9.17
Probability of public good production after some weeks from a producer’s deception: 
different behaviour composition in producers’ set.
Results presented in figure 9.17 show that the informal control mechanism in the case of 
the considered presidium cannot guarantee the survival of the presidium. This answer to 
our research question is also testified by results in figure 9.18. There, the evolution of 
probabilities of survival over time is shown. It is clear just how the best case scenario, the 
one with the eight central producers behaving altruistically, is the only one with high 
probability that can stop defections from spreading, so that, going forward in time, the 
probability of presidium survival raises because defections are eliminated from the 
producers’ network. In all other cases the probability is always decreasing or stable over 
time. In other words, the case with the best eight altruists shows an important capability 
which is the fact of wiping out defections after they had been introduced in the network. 
The other cases show positive probabilities, but they depend on the cases in which 
defections are immediately stopped from spreading.
— -all reciprocators
Figure 9.18
185
Probability of public good production over time since a producer’s deception: different 
behaviour composition in producers set.
9.5 Conclusions on the Case-based Model of Public Good Provision
The absence of mechanisms for cooperation enforcing means high risks for the survival of 
the considered system. If, as it seems probable, in the near future the system is 
characterised by a diminution of trust among producers and in an increase of incentives to 
free ride, the system’s future will surely be strictly dependent on the capacity to keep the 
actual monitoring system or to find another institutional mechanism capable of 
guaranteeing the same results (and this one could be the outcome of a negotiation process 
among the producers, possibly mediated by those responsible for the presidium).
In other words, the model does not say that the presidium without a control system of 
cooperation is automatically doomed. It just says that even a small defection, in absence of 
the control system, can probably determine the end of the system, and that because 
nowadays challenges to the system seem to depict a framework in which defections will be 
more probable, the issue is relevant.
The presence of reciprocating behavioui’ that is commonly seen as a means to enforce 
cooperation of individually based, autonomous and informal mechanisms, in a system like 
the considered one, is not a mean to enforce cooperation. On the contrary, the commitment 
of the most “central” agents can be a mean to guarantee the provision of public good if it 
means that such agents will not adopt reciprocation.
Nevertheless, the best case scenaiio is so unlikely to be true in reality that the system needs 
an effective monitoring system to work.
The system presents a clear trade-off: from one point of view the adoption of a 
reciprocating behaviour can be motivated by reasons of justice, as a means to ensure futme 
cooperation (i.e., in both the last cases, as a punishment for free riders) and because the 
eventual defection is not expensive and in the short run, on the contrary, generates higher 
profits. From another point of view, a cooperating behaviour is the only means to 
guarantee the suivival of the system and thus the collective welfare.
The peculiarities of the given system are the final reasons for the trade off. In fact recent 
theories of cooperation and public good provisioif^ have often stressed the positive role of 
reciprocity for ensuring cooperation, and could have let, a priori, say that reciprocation 
would be the key for presidium suivival and could have suggested such behaviour to 
presidimn producers. But the model, with its specific systemic mechanisms, has shown that 
the positive value of reciprocation here is not enough and a stronger, cooperating 
behaviour should be requested of producers, at least of the most central ones.
Therefore it is possible to extend conclusions coming from the presented example to the 
theory of public good provision, and the first point to make is about the dynamics of public 
good provision as shown in figmes 9.16 and 9.18. The qualitative dynamic is absolutely 
comparable to the one found in experimental and abstiact settings, and the only difference 
is the consideration of different behaviour composition in the group and the discontinuity 
in agents’ behaviour. In fact the discontinuity lowers the stable level of public good 
provision which is reached after some time steps of decreasing values.
For a discussion see Gintis et al. 2005 or references presented in chapters 7 and 8.
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The most important point, however, is another one. In fact the case-based analysis has 
stressed the role of interaction structures in systems where one of the most widespread 
behaviours is strictly dependent upon the received information about others’ behaviour. 
Even in experimental based models we had the possibility to understand, when modifying 
random group composition, that the interaction structure is relevant. Here, the argument is 
more detailed, and points out how going out of the laboratory or abstract enviromnents, the 
asymmetric structme of interaction has a deep impact on levels of public good provision, 
and thus it is not just a matter of composition of behaviom" in the considered agents’ set.
Nevertheless the system probably shows a weakness in its interaction structure. In fact, 
while individuals’ behaviour, reciprocation included, is the outcome of an evolutionary 
process which promoted simple and effective rules of behaviour (see Sadriech et al. 2001, 
pp. 84-85), the interaction structme seems to be probably caused by external factors such 
as age and geographical proximity. In other words, we can consider the behaviour used by 
producers robust. Selfishness and altruism are two personal attitudes, md it is known that 
in the system selfish behaviour- as defined in chapter 7 camiot exist. Reciprocation seems 
the most problematic behaviom-, but it is also as robust as the elementary one of altruism. 
In fact it is caused and promoted by social norms (Sadriech et al. 2001, pp. 99), by simple 
processes of reinforcement learning in several contexts (Erev and Roth 2001, pp. 215), by 
processes of imitation of behaviour patterns and of social learning (Laland 2001, pp. 243 
and also Mellers et al. 2001, pp. 271 ff.). On the contrary, the interaction structure is not 
adapted for cooperation.
Such a point until now has not been acknowledged by research and theory on public goods 
and calls for flirther studies.
The analysis of the interaction structure in a context of public good provision could be 
made by a comparative study of similar cases characterised by different interactions 
structures or by theoretical reasoning on the systemic effects due to the spreading of 
information of defections with reciprocating behaviour. But to accomplish the latter task, a 
more complete theoretical approach is needed.
The causal mechanism of voluntary public good provision is in fact still not completely 
unveiled. For instance it is not clear how extreme conditions on systemic elements can 
modify systemic results.
The next step in the research effort is thus the necessary attempt to build a theory that can 
help in exploring the causal mechanism and in answering further questions such as the 
ones about the interaction structure.
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Chapter 10
Towards a Mechanisms-based Theory of Voluntary Public 
Goods Provision
Preceding chapters have pointed out how the empirical phenomenon of voluntary provision 
of public goods which camiot easily be explained by social sciences can be explained in 
terms of a formal and causal social mechanism.
The explanatory mechanism is built by a context defining the social dilemma of interest 
and by the interaction of individuals behaving according to different kinds of behaviour-. 
Each kind of behaviour can be explained according to different reasons.
The experimental and empirical analyses presented before have increased the confidence 
about the validity of such an explanation by allowing for the measurement of some 
elements such as behaviour, by helping in identifying formal representations of the 
mechanism, by accurately reproducing empirical results and by confirming that the tools 
chosen are suitable for understanding the phenomenon.
The present chapter aims to define a formal theory that generalises the loiowledge 
developed in the preceding chapters. Such a theory, besides being consistent with the 
approach adopted here, should be a scientific (i.e., falsifiable) tool allowing for the 
understanding of empirical phenomena of voluntary provision of public goods, in 
forecasting their dynamic and even in helping to design solutions to modify the levels of 
provision of the public goods according to policy goals.
But what is a theory in this context? What does it mean to build a theory based upon social 
causal mechanisms? What is the difference between a theory and a model? Without aiming 
to fully answer such kinds of questions which would need more than a full book to be 
addressed, the first section (10.1) will show how some answers can be pointed out, helping 
to defend the need for a mechanisms-based theory of voluntary public good provision and 
in identifying its main characteristics.
The second section of the chapter (10.2) will then focus on the description of the 
theoretical model upon which the theory is based. Such a description defines the boundary 
of applicability of theoretical results and introduces different model components.
The theory will be made by modifying model components and analysing derived results: 
the sections that follow the second are thus devoted to analysing the effects that each 
component of the model has on the system of interest. Thus, section 3 focuses on the 
impacts of heterogeneity in agents. Section 4 analyses different group sizes and section 5 
the difference between groups that are stable and the ones that change the members each 
time.
Section 6 focuses on impacts due to modifications in the level of return rates coming from 
public and private goods, and section 7 presents the possibility of considering different 
kinds of conditional cooperation.
Section 8 presents slight modifications made considering different kinds of network 
structures comiecting group members: changes in the way information travels can impact 
on public good provision.
Section 9 concludes by enliancing the impact of different network structures by 
considering not only their effect on the information structm-e but on group composition too 
(i.e. on the definition of groups sharing the public good).
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10.1 On the Form and Aims o f Theories based upon Explanatory 
Mechanisms
Considering the approach presented in the first part of the present work and the analyses 
presented in preceding three chapters as a starting point, mechanisms-based theories must 
be defined and their main characteristics should be discussed.
For instance, as said in chapter 1, a theory based upon explanatory mechanisms is 
characterised by being intrinsically not universal, recalling Merton’s concept of middle- 
range theories. Theories are, in general, conceived as made by universal statements and not 
only by particular, singular statements. The way a theory can be constructed without
universal statements needs to be discussed as well as its usefulness.
A mechanisms-based theory is also a theory about complex systems, because the 
mechanisms here considered apply to complex social systems. If one of the assumptions at 
the basis of the methodological approach here considered is the fact that social systems are 
complex, the derived theory must continue to consider social systems as complex. 
Complexity impacts on the theory form and on the procedure to obtain the theory, in 
particular because of the large number of variables influencing each other (i.e., that are not 
independent).
Before proceeding to define mechanisms-based theories and in discussing such 
characteristics, it is firstly needed to show the expected advantages of obtaining a
mechanisms-based theory to justify the need for this final step.
10.1.1 Aims of Mechanisms-based Theories
Chapter 8 showed how it is possible to use mechanisms-based explanation to understand 
voluntary public good provision in an abstract enviromnent such as the one of economic 
experiments. The experimental enviromnent has been designed to be abstract for 
controlling relevant variables that could affect results, but it can also be considered an 
abstract setting that is more general than empirical cases.
In chapter 9 an empirical case has been presented: tlnough mechanisms discovered earlier 
it has been possible to understand and forecast future dynamics of the system according to 
some policy scenarios.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the models used in those two cases, both models 
used to understand mechanisms of public good provision in the experimental and the 
empirical case were very particular: the first one considered specific behavioural rules for 
each agent and specific treatment settings applied in the experiment of reference (e.g. 
group size, etc...); the second one considered more general rules of behaviour, but very 
specific data about agents such as the population considered, endowments and the 
interaction structure.
With those models it has been made clear how some elements are at the core of voluntary 
public good provision. They are the kinds of behaviour used by agents and the interaction 
structuie. With just that kind of knowledge (i.e. the one collected tlnough the analysis 
presented in chapters before) we still do not fully understand the mechanisms behind 
public good provision because we do not know the role of specific (i.e., referred to the 
specific case considered, either experimental or empirical) information put in models.
The preparation of a mechanisms-based theory of voluntary public good provision should 
aim to overcome such limits. The theory should be a tool whereby to fully understand
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voluntary public good provision by explaining the effect of each element on the macro 
dynamics (i.e. the public good provision level).
To say it differently, the models developed before were based upon some theoretical 
assumptions (i.e., the complex nature of social systems, the opportunity to use fast and 
frugal heuristics for agents’ behaviom* and the need for agent-based simulations) and some 
specific hypotheses concerning the cases of reference, and they made it possible to obtain 
specific knowledge about the target systems. With a theory, the aim is to generalise the 
knowledge obtained before by exploring the impact of specific hypothesis on results.
The theory will thus be made based on the knowledge about the impact of the different 
elements on the dynamics of interest, relaxing the hypotheses boundaries typical of 
specific models. The knowledge contained in it could also be used to quickly comprehend 
other empirical cases and to forecast their possible fiitme behaviour as well as policy 
suggestions to modify it.
The mechanisms-based theory here introduced has two main aims. The theory starts from 
an explanatory mechanism that works for a specific case and the theory firstly aims at 
better .comprehending such an explanation by stressing and testing its elements and 
miderstanding the consequences.
Secondly, by exploring the boundaries of validity of the explanation, as said a process of 
exploration that is made by stressing and testing each element of the explanation, we aim 
to obtain a explanatory mechanism that is no more a specific one but rather a family of 
mechanisms (see section 1.5.3) that works for several different empirical cases belonging 
to the vast family of social dilemma with volimtaiy public good provision.
10.1.2 Definition of Mechanisms-based Theories
Mechanisms-based theories are not a common concept in the literature, and thus a shared 
definition of them is not available. Nevertheless the research path here followed has 
naturally led to the need of a theory of public good provision based on the explanatory 
mechanisms shown in the preceding chapters. Before proceeding in developing the theory 
it is thus worth defining the general concept.
A mechanisms-based theory is the exploration and generalisation of the boundaries of 
validity of a mechanisms-based explanation, that is to say a measui’e of its robustness.
The process of building a mechanisms-based theory does not aim to find an explanation 
but to explore the boundaries of already known explanatory mechanisms.
The theory is derived starting from known elements with a logic and deductive approach. 
The knowledge contained in the theory can be falsified, by logical and deductive means 
but also by empirical works. Logical and deductive mistakes can be made in the 
developing process of the theory: it is thus very important to present and make clear such a 
process so that it can be replicated and verified by anyone. Empirical cases can falsify the 
theory by showing macro behaviour inconsistent with the theory adapted to the conditions 
of the empirical reality. In that case, if logic and deductive errors are not found, the 
falsification process does not invalidate the theory only, but also the set of assumptions on 
which it is based.
A mechanism-based theory, being a generalisation that is made through an exploration of 
the boundaries of validity of a mechanisms-based explanation, produces, as a by-product, 
further knowledge about the explanation itself.
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10.1.3 Characteristics of Mechanisms-based Theories
A mechanisms-based theory should be so called because it contains laws (as causal 
statements) in the form of mechanisms. A mechanisms-based theory is a middle-range 
theory as defined by Merton, because of the kind of “miiversal” laws that it contains (i.e., 
they are not covering laws valid for every case in time and space). The laws contained by 
the theory are social and not natuial ones. As tlnoughout this work, social systems are 
considered as made up of different levels, for simplicity a micro and a macro one, having 
at the bottom the level of interacting individuals: mechanisms-based theories consider 
social systems as composed in the way just described, and that is due to the nature of the 
explanatory mechanisms (i.e., to the kind of social explanations used). Furthermore a 
mechanisms-based theory is complex, because of tlie natuie of social mechanisms which 
are intrinsically non-linear because of relationships between micro entities and between 
micro and macro layers.
The characteristics just listed are the main ones encountered in a mechanisms-based theory 
and they need to be fully presented.
Mechanisms-based theories are “middle range”, that is to say that they are “interconnected 
conceptions which are limited and modest in scope, rather than all-embracing and 
grandiose” (Merton 1949, pp.5).
Such boundaries to the scope of theories directly derive fiom this kind of explanation: as 
said in the first part of the work, the mechanisms-based approach is opposed to the search 
of universal covering laws. In fact the complexity here considered, mainly due to the non- 
linearity of social systems and their multi level stincture (in which each layers can 
influence each other), implies the impossibility of aiming for universal covering laws for 
social systems. As seen at the beginning, such a consideration makes inevitable the passage 
to a methodological approach based upon complex models of interacting agents that can 
not be used by standard means as equilibrium analysis. Such a consideration also affects 
any attempt to build a theory on such kinds of explanations: a social mechanisms-based 
theory can not be inconsistent with the epistemological and methodological assumptions at 
the basis of social explanatory mechanisms.
It is worth underlining that it is the research approach by itself that implies the limits on the 
scope of mechanisms-based theories: the motivations of this characteristic of theories are 
thus due to the elements discussed mainly in the first chapter. Furthermore, starting from 
this last point, it appears obvious that mechanisms-based theories are also made by the 
epistemological and methodological assumptions made upon social systems and theories in 
the first part. When evaluating the result of the theory building process presented in the 
following sections it will then be necessary to keep in mind those assumptions, for instance 
the complexity of social phenomena, the need to study agents interaction to comprehend 
the working mechanism capable of generating social phenomena, the need to find reasons 
for agents’ behaviour avoiding black boxes, the adoption of ecological rationality and fast 
and frugal heuristics, and so on. All those elements are, here, part of mechanisms-based 
social theories.
A final remark can be made about middle range theories, showing that even a not very 
common practice in scientific research can fit in standard frameworks: in fact considering 
one of the most influencing works about science, Popper’s “Logic of Scientific 
Discovery”, it is possible to say that a complete causal explanation is made by "''universal 
statements, i.e. hypotheses of the character of natur al laws, and singular statements, which 
apply to the specific event in question and which should be called ‘initial conditions’.” 
(Popper 1935 pp.38, original italics). When studying social systems we must consider a 
particular kind of universal statements, which are not natural laws but social ones. A
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complete social explanation will then be in the form of a social mechanism but that does 
not imply the impossibility to build social theories.
Social mechanisms deny the possibility of covering, “fully universal” laws, but allow for 
“partially universal” statements, called “numerical universal” in Popper’s terminology. 
While in fact “strict universal” statements claim to be valid for any place and any time, 
“numerical imiversal” statements refer “only to a finite class of specific elements within a 
finite individual (or particular) spatio-temporal region. Statements of this latter kind can, in 
principle, be replaced by a conjunction of singular statements; for a sufficient given time, 
one can enumerate all the elements of the (finite) class concerned” (Popper 1935 pp.41). 
Theories made by mechanisms are thus not strict universal but nevertheless they are, in a 
different manner, universal, and they can be useful because they can avoid the need for 
building a specific model for each empirical case we find in the real world.
To discuss differently the issue of partially universal statements in middle-range theories, it 
is possible to say that Popper firstly identifies the two extremes, strict universal statements 
that are valid in any space and time, and singular statements that are valid only for a 
specific point in time and space. Then, a further category can be added, which relaxes the 
definition of strict universality towards the one of singular statements: it is the case of 
partially universal statements which are neither valid for all the cases nor for just one, but 
that are valid for many cases identified and bounded in a region of time and space.
For concluding the presentation of the main characteristics of mechanisms-based theories, 
one last issue must be considered: the complexity of the social system they explain. Such a 
feature has a deep impact in the form and in the developing process of these kinds of 
theories.
In fact, each element of the theory it is not independent and it can have a non-linear effect 
on the others and vice versa. Thus, an element can not be “separated” fi'om the others: an 
element that seems to have a certain influence on the system of interest can have a 
completely different kind of influence on it if considered in conjunction with other 
elements. The theory should thus be more complicated and consider many elements 
together: the standard methodology of isolating a single element in the system and 
studying its effects on the system (such a methodology relies on the common practice of 
making modifications coeteris paribus, that is to say leaving the rest as it is) can not be 
efficient in mechanisms-based theories. In the following sections this point will be made 
clearer by defining the form and the procedure of mechanisms-based theories, as well as by 
showing a mechanisms-based theory of voluntary public good provision.
10.1.4 Form of Mechanisms-based Theories
In natural sciences theories are based upon axioms and developed as sets of equations. In 
social sciences like mainstream economics, theories have the same form because they have 
been epistemologically and methodologically modelled as natmnl sciences.
Following the presented approach and the definition of mechanisms-based theory, such a 
kind of form is not available because it is not possible to model the relationships between 
the elements of the system considered by means of equations. In mechanisms-based social
The coeteris paribus methodology to analyse systemic elements, although here claimed to not be suitable 
for developing mechanism-based theories, is often useful for finding explanatory mechanisms, as some of the 
analyses in the preceding chapters testify. Briefly, the usefulness of such a methodology is due to the 
different time scales of dynamic processes in social systems, which often allow for the consideration of a 
mechanism, a structure or an element of the system of interest as given.
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theories equations are substituted by agent-based models for the same reasons stated in 
chapter 1, that is to say, for the fact that social systems are assumed complex.
Mechanisms-based social theories are thus based upon some axioms (i.e., the theoretical 
assumptions cited before and concerning the nature of the social system and the 
methodological approach to be followed, and some more assumptions specific to the issue 
considered by the theory, for instance, for the case of voluntary public good provision, the 
opportunity to exploit few specific heuristics to describe individuals’ behaviour) and 
developed with agent-based models: as said in the first part of the work, the choice of 
agent-based models for formalising explanatory social mechanism is due to many reasons, 
but it is worth remembering that it is not the only available tool. Therefore, the fact of 
developing mechanisms-based theories with agent-based models is not a compulsory one 
but, of course, is a choice that shapes the form of mechanisms-based theory here 
developed.
A second peculiarity concerns the kind of analysis done on the sets of considered models 
for extracting the knowledge that, in a sense, constitutes the theory.
In theories of natural sciences, as well as in social theories following the same approach, 
the knowledge about the behaviour of the system, causal explanations and the predictive 
power, often comes from equilibrium analysis that is the appropriate way to study ordered 
systems with equation-based models.
In the present case the kind of analysis is different and not only because of the kind of 
models used. In fact, because of the hypothesised complexity of social systems it is not 
possible to exploit equilibrium analysis and thus models are studied in the way described 
thi'oughout this work. Moreover, because of the definition of mechanisms-based theory and 
of its aims, the analysis is not generally directed to understand equilibrium outcomes, but 
to stress the model configuration to understand and explore it and the space of validity of a 
mechanism as a causal explanation.
The knowledge contained in the theoiy is thus not only made by explanatory mechanisms 
(for that purpose a model would be sufficient), but also and particularly by the precise 
understanding of the general and formal conditions under which a mechanism is a social 
explanation, that is to say mider which conditions the explanation we start with is valid and 
general (in the sense that it can be applied to a broader class of cases than the specific one 
in which the explanatory mechanism has been developed).
To obtain the knowledge about the limits of validity of an explanation, the theory 
developer looks for the impacts of the modifications made on the model elements. The 
mechanisms-based explanation is, in other words, stressed and completed: the process of 
finding its limits of validity also means to imderstand why such limits exist and thus to 
better understand and to extend the explanation itself.
Just to make an example, a social mechanism could not show constant scale effects: causal 
mechanisms in fact can be not neutral to modifications on the size of one element. After 
having found the limit over which the change in the size of the considered element affects 
so much the macro outcome that the considered explanatory mechanism is not anymore a 
valid explanation of the social phenomenon of interest, it is important to understand why 
such a limit exists and what happens to the modelled dynamics over such a limit. In other 
words, it is important to fully understand what happens when the limit is overcome 
because such information completes the knowledge about the explanatory mechanism. In 
the example just cited, it could be found that the size of an element bigger than a tlneshold 
means that another kind of social dynamics prevail in the system and drastically impacts 
the macro outcome.
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The theory building process is thus made by the exploration of the space of model 
configurations and by the analysis of the results obtained. The kinds of impacts obtained 
by modifications in configuration are many: for instance there could be scale effects as the 
one just presented as an example, but to better understand the point it is simpler to look at 
the following sections in which an example of a mechanisms-based theory is presented.
A final issue worth discussing concerns differences between models and theories. It is 
often said that models are formalised theories. From that perspective in fact each model 
contains theoretical knowledge, but not all models are built for developing theoretical 
knowledge. It is in fact the case of specific and empirical models, as the one presented in 
chapter 9, where even if a large part of theoretical knowledge is present, the model aim is 
to understand an empirical case and not to directly develop further theoretical knowledge.
Models can refer to empirical cases as well as to theoretical and abstract systems, as seen 
in chapter 3: in the latter case the amount of theoretical knowledge shaping the model is 
obviously greater than in case based models, and differences in modelled target and aims 
in using the model are the elements that allow for different kinds of agent-based models.
Moreover, even if in case-based models the exploration of the space of parameters is a 
common and needed operation, there is a significant difference in such a procedure 
compared to the case of models built for developing mechanisms-based theories. In fact in 
case based models the parameter space that is explored is bounded to the limits of 
feasibility found in the empirical case (i.e., the limits of the parameters exploration are 
empirically defined). When building theories, parameters space limits are relaxed, 
analysing impacts for any logically possible region of the parameter space (i.e., the limits 
of parameters exploration are logically and theoretically defined).
Logical limits of the parameter space to be explored^ ^ are the ones which change the nature 
of the system of interest. In the case of public good provision, some logical limits concern 
the intrinsic nature of that particular kind of social dilemma: for instance it is not possible 
to consider a useless public good, one giving zero return rates, because that would make 
the system not a dilemma of public good provision, but different one.
When dealing with an empirical model, such boundaries are far narrower: in the case of the 
model presented in chapter 9 the possible effects and variations on explanatory 
mechanisms due to a flat interactions structure have not been studied because the available 
data about the empirical case excluded such a possibility (i.e., in an empirical case it is 
useless to hypothesise the presence of an interaction structuie that is known for sure to be 
different, while in theory such a possibility exists in other empirical cases, located in 
different points of time and space).
10.1.5 A Procedure for Developing Mechanisms-based Theories
A large part of the procedure for developing mechanisms-based theories has been already 
introduced: to build such a kind of theory it is in fact necessary to have at disposal some 
explanatory mechanisms valid for some specific cases. Then the proceduie will follow by 
exploring the robustness of such explanations, that is to say, to test its validity on a wider 
basis and in more contexts.
In this section the term “parameter space” is often used as a shorter synonymous of the more correct 
sentence “space of possible configurations of the elements composing the system”.
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The theory building process thus means a process of logical and computational deduction 
on the set of initial conditions (i.e., system configurations) that are needed to maintain the 
explanatory power of mechanisms.
Going to the case of interest here, mechanisms explaining the voluntary provision of a 
public good, it is possible to sketch the theory structuie and the process to obtain it.
As explained before, the mechanisms-based theory of voluntary provision of public goods 
starts from some theoretical assumptions which shape the followed methodology: it is the 
case of the relevance of non-linearity in social processes and of the need to find 
explanatory mechanisms of social phenomena. These are what can be called the premises 
of the theory.
Then the knowledge collected before (and presented in the preceding chapters) about social 
mechanisms, robustly explaining some empirical and experimental cases (this is the second 
element to start developing the theory, that is to say an explanation working on some 
empirical cases), will be tested on some analytical hypotheses: such hypotheses aim to 
establish the boundaries of validity of considered explanations, finding system 
configurations in which such explanations do not work, and finding the reasons for that. 
Thus, outcomes will not only be made by a definition of the validity space but also by the 
comprehension of the reasons of validity in such a space and of invalidity outside such a 
space.
The understanding of the reasons of validity and invalidity of the explanatory mechanism 
on which the theory is based is allowed by the fact that the agent-based model in which the 
theory is formalised can be studied with any configuiation.
To say it with an example, it is possible to find that the explanatory mechanism depicted in 
chapters before for explaining voluntary provision of public goods works only with a 
group size up to a certain level, but the development of the theory requires to find 
explanations for either why it works below such a threshold and does not work above it.
The attempt to build such a theory is described in the following sections and it is made 
with an additive approach: because of the fact that we are dealing with a complex system 
made by interdependent elements, we should expect system elements to influence each 
other in a non-linear way. Thus, each time a new modification of the system configuration 
will be made, it will also be needed to repeat such a modification in conjunction with the 
ones already tried to evaluate possible non linear and unexpected influences.
Because of the length of the procedure reported in following the pages and for guiding 
readers’ attention tlnough it, table 10.1 presents an outline of the following sections of the 
chapter describing their contents. It is worth remembering that graphs will be reported only 
for relevant results.
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Table 10.1
The development of a mechanisms-based theory of voluntary provision of public goods: 
the followed procedure and the organisation of the theory presentation.
Section Contents
10.2 The Theoretical Model a) description of the basic model and its components;
b) presentation of results o f the basic model.
10.3 Heterogeneity and 
Initial Conditions in Agents
a) description of model modification done for introducing heterogeneity 
in agents;
b) presentation of results due to modification on heterogeneity in agents.
10.4 Group Size a) description of model modification done for analysing the impact of 
different group sizes;
b) presentation of results due to such a modification;
c) crossing of the modification done here with modifications done in 
section 10.3 and presentation of results.
10.5 Group Stability Over 
Time
a) description of model modification done for analysing the impact of 
different organisation of groups over time;
b) presentation of results due to such a modification;
c) crossing of the modification done here with modifications done in 
section 10.3 and 10.4, and presentation o f results.
10.6 Return Rates a) description of model modification done for analysing the effect of 
different values for public and private good return rates;
b) presentation of results due to such a modification;
c) crossing o f the modification done here with modifications done in 
section 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5, and presentation of results.
10.7 Conditional 
Cooperation and Population 
Composition
a) description of model modification done for investigating the presence 
of different kinds of behaviour in the considered population;
b) presentation of results due to such a modification;
c) crossing o f the modification done here with modifications done in 
section 10.3, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6, and presentation of results.
10.8 Public and Private 
Information: Network 
Structures
a) description of model modification done for investigating the presence 
of different kinds of networks distributing information among subjects;
b) presentation of results due to such a modification;
c) crossing of the modification done here with modifications done in 
section 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6 and 10.7, and presentation of results.
10.9 Groups with Different 
Network Structures
a) description of model modification done for investigating the presence 
of different kinds of networks distributing information among subjects 
and defining groups sharing the public good as social neighbourhoods;
b) presentation of results due to such a modification;
c) crossing of the modification done here with modifications done in 
section 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8, and presentation o f results.
10.2 The Theoretical Model
As said, the theory building process is based on the exploitation of a theoretical agent- 
based model where variations on its constituents are tried and analysed. The first step of 
the process is thus the definition of the starting model: enumerating and formalising its 
constituents also allows for selecting the information that is considered relevant for the 
topic of interest. Here, with a focus on voluntary provision of public goods, the starting 
model strictly resembles the one encountered before in experiments.
It is again worth remembering that all model elements will be subjects of inquiry for the 
theory making process, because it mainly aims at investigating elements configuration 
impacts on the system.
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The model is agent-based and by setting it with initial conditions (values) similar to the 
ones found before (for instance the dimension of group size, the retmn rates of private and 
public good, etc...) we should find similar systemic results.
Before proceeding in analysing different system configurations, the starting version of the 
model is presented to make clearer its components and to help in an understanding of the 
consequent process of structural modifications.
10.2.1 Agents
In the model agents always belong to groups where they share the public good. All agents 
as a whole form the population of the model, which can contain many groups, but at least 
one.
Agents represent humans involved in the dynamics of interest: agents are modelled 
according to the methodological premises presented at the begiiming, that is to say, with 
limited cognitive capabilities and acting according to fast and frugal hemistics. They can 
remember data about last interactions in the form of dynamic evolutions of few sensitive 
variables. Such variables are the total contribution of the group to which they belong, their 
personal earning and the obsei*vation of the numbers of other group members that are 
defecting by lowering their level of contribution.
Agents also remember how much they have contributed to the public good on the last 
interaction so that they are capable of deciding the precise amount of investment in the 
public good (e.g. if they choose to keep constant their investment, they remember how 
much such a value was before).
Agents modify their investment according to thi'ee general kinds of behaviour: 
unconditional cooperation, uncooperative behaviour and conditional cooperation. Such 
behaviour as the last will be studied in different forms: conditional cooperation can in fact 
be represented by several behaviouis, one kind of which has been presented in previous 
chapters.
In the case agents choose to modify the level of investment to the public good (and thus 
also to the private one because it is the only possible alternative, in fact agents’ endowment 
is finite and it must be entirely invested), they do so by modifying the previous level and 
by adding or subtracting a “delta”, that is a variation on such a level. Deltas can be 
homogeneous among agents or not, and it will be a vaiiable amoimt to be studied in the 
theory development process. The same discoui'se applies for the cases in which 
heterogeneity occurs in the level of endowment given at each time step to agents and for 
the level of contribution to the public good at which agents start their interaction.
10.2.2 Information Structures
In experimentally based models, as the ones presented in chapter 8, interaction structures 
are completely dense: each member of the group interacts with any other member of the 
group and that happens on each time step. Considering public goods as, by definition, 
shared in groups, the relevancy of interaction structure can be firstly conceived as limited 
to exchanges of information and consequent effects due to reactive (i.e., conditional to the 
received information) behaviour. With a broader perspective, interaction structures could 
be a representation of groups, where networks put individuals in relationships where they 
perceive their neighbourhood as their gi'oup. In such networks, it is possible to expand the 
concept of groups to a more plausible one where one individual could belong to different 
groups and these latter are nested and overlapped.
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In the first case, while the public good could be interpreted as an ex post public (to the 
group) information, shared by any group member no matter the interaction structure, in the 
case of information communicated by single agents, such as their personal contribution 
level, the interaction/information structure can matter, as pointed out by the case studied in 
chapter 9.
In the second case, besides relationships by which subjects exchange information, the 
network structure defines groups and public goods by defining groups of neighbours as 
individuals who aie directly comiected in the network.
Tlnee general kinds of interaction structme will be considered: the dense one, similar to 
the experimental one, where each agent equally meets any other member of tlie network; a 
small world, a network structure that appears to be quite common in social contexts; a 
scale fiee network, an interesting network topology not very common in social contexts but 
capable by its nature to be neutral to variations in network size.
While dense networks are very easy to be modelled by letting each agent interact with any 
other in the group, small world and scale fi'ee networks require a harder modelling effort.
For the set of models here considered, two widespread approaches to model those network 
structures have been exploited.
Small world networks have been modelled by following the Newman-Watts model 
(Newman and Watts 1999a, 1999b) which is a modification of that of Watts-Strogatz 
(Watts and Sti'ogatz 1998).
The algoritlim implementing the Newman-Watts model starts by creating a ring network 
where each group member is connected to the fbui* closest neighbour's in the ring. Then 
with a probability equal to 0.01 (1% of probability) a long range connection between a 
selected node and a distant one is created (avoiding, obviously, to duplicate already 
existing links). Such a process, in the network, creates 0.02xN (where N is the network 
size) long range links between members that would be part of different neighbourhoods. 
Following the Newman-Watts model also means avoiding the risk present in the Watts- 
Strogatz model where for each long range link a neighbourhood link is deleted and some 
completely isolated neighbourhood can emerge.
When the group size is five, the resulting network is equivalent to a dense one. When the 
group size increases, the structure of the network changes, being always a small world one 
with high clustering coefficients and short average path lengths^ .
Scale free networks are characterised by a power law degree distribution and are modelled 
by exploiting the two mechanisms described in Barabasi and Albert 1999. The first 
element of the algorithm generating the scale free network considers a small number of 
nodes (strictly smaller than network size), then attaches a new node until the network size 
is matched. Each node is coimected to others by 3 links (the degree order chosen for the 
scale free network is thus equal to 3), and the targets of such links are chosen according to 
preferential attachment: the probability that the considered group member attaches to
Besides Newman and Watts 1999a and 1999b, for a complete discussion of the procedure and for a 
testimony that the resulting network will show high levels o f clustering coefficient and low values of average 
path length, Albert and Barabasi 2002 can be suggested as further reference.
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another member depends upon its degree^^. The probability n  that a node is connected to 
node i depends on the degree kj of node i is as follows: n(/c,.) =
10.2.3 Other Systemic Elements
Agents’ characteristics (i.e., behavioui-, endowment, contribution delta and contribution 
starting level) and interactions structur e are some of the elements of the model to be 
investigated. But there are other elements of the model which constitute the “environment” 
of agents’ interaction and that shape the system as a social dilemma of voluntary public 
good provision.
In some cases, in fact, it is worth considermg the possibility that agents are regrouped on 
each time step (as in the one-shot repeated scheme in models of chapter 8) or that group 
composition remains stable over time.
Even group size could vary, theoretically, from the minimum of two, with dyadic 
interactions, to population size.
Public goods and private goods should have a different return rate, but public good return 
rate could be anywhere in between the minimmn of zero to the maximum of the private 
good one (limits of the range should be excluded).
For analytic purposes it could be interesting to also modify other elements such as 
population size and the number of groups present in the population. By developing the 
theory all such modifications will be presented and discussed: not all possible 
configurations of the elements that have been just listed should be considered because 
some of them overlap and some could lead to transform the system into another one.
For instance it is intuitive that there can not be a small world interaction structuie for group 
sizes lower than five.
Or, there can not be a case in which the public good return rate is 0.5, the private one is 1.0 
and the group size is two: it is not anymore a public good dilemma because individuals will 
obtain the same payoff by investing all their endowments either in the public or in the 
private good. That is a case in which the systernic configuration does not have meaning 
and should not be considered due to the transformation of the nature of the system and of 
the changing of the phenomenon of interest.
10.2.4 The Initial System Configuration
The model configuration considered as the starting point to derive the mechanisms-based 
theory is summarised by the set of parameters reported in table 10.2.
^ Even in the case o f scale free networks, the modelling algorithm explicitly avoids the creation of repeated 
links between members.
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Table 10.2
Parameters considered in the theoretical model and their starting values.
Parameter Value
Number of runs 1000
Network structure Dense
Group stability One shot repeated
Heterogeneity in agents No
Population size 100
Group size 5
Private good return per token invested 1.0
Public good return per token invested 0.5
Percentage o f agents acting altruistically 0.2
Percentage o f agents acting selfishly 0.4
Percentage of reciprocators on group 
contribution
0.0
Percentage o f reciprocators on single 
defections
0.0
Percentage of reciprocators on personal 
earnings
0.4
Initial contribution level (as percentage of  
the endowment)
0.5
Size of delta (as percentage of the 
endowment)
0.3
Endowment per round 100
Number of iterations 10
Such a configuration closely resembles the one of models in chapter 8. It is worth 
describing the model configuiation by examining parameters in the table one by one. The 
simulation is repeated 1,000 times to avoid influences of the random number generator 
(results, in fact, are presented as average values over 1,000 rims with different random 
seeds).
The chosen kind of interaction structme is the fully dense one, and such dense groups 
change their members on each simulation step (the group stability parameter is, in fact, set 
to the value of “one-shot repeated” interactions).
The number of agents considered is 100, while group size is 5. The return rate coming 
fi'om a contribution to the private good is 1, while the one coming from the public good is 
0.5.
There is 20% of the population acting according to a behaviour of imconditional 
cooperation (contributing all their endowment to the public good), 40% acting 
uncooperatively (contributing all their endowment to the private good) and 40% acting 
according to a conditional cooperative behaviour' which reciprocates the level of public 
contribution according to the evolution of personal payoffs over simulation time.
On each time step each agent receives a homogeneous endowment of 100, starts 
contributing 0.5 of the endowment to the public good and then updates such a value with 
deltas equal to 0.3 of the endowment. Thus, there is no heterogeneity in agents’ internal 
parameters.
Finally, the system is run and obsei-ved for ten simulation time steps.
The model with that configuration unsurprisingly generates results as in figure 10.1, where 
the typical dynamics of public good provision are present.
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Figure 10.1
Average public good contribution over time, obtained with parameters as in table 10.2.
The level of average contribution to the public good does not show evidence of complete 
free riding (it is worth noting that here the bounded maximum level of free riding is 20, 
defined by the 20% of unconditional co-operators who start with the initial value of 
contribution to the public good and then increase it to the full endowment) but of a 
decreasing dynamics to a level less than 50% of the endowment.
10.3 Heterogeneity and Initial Conditions in Agents
The first elements worth testing are the ones related to agents’ components but for their 
behaviour (that will be considered separately). In fact it is interesting to firstly focus on the 
presence of heterogeneity in agents’ endowment, on the attitude to modify their 
contribution level (i.e., contribution delta) and on the level at which agents’ start to 
contribute and interact.
Such parameters, besides the possibility of being heterogeneous across agents, could also 
have values different than the ones considered for the basic configuration. Nevertheless, 
such parameters are considered static during the simulation because it is difficult to 
suppose them dependent on other dynamics generated by the simulation. That assumption 
regarding contribution deltas is plausible due to the short length of interaction (the attitude 
to modify contribution levels can be considered stable for a short time) and is the only 
possible choice not having at disposal a deep knowledge of the psychological processes 
that leads to modifications in such a value. The assumption about stable levels of 
endowments (i.e., stable over time) is plausible too, mainly because such a variable is 
intuitively exogenous and not dependent upon the modelled system.
10.3.1 System Configurations
The first system configuration to be presented is the one in which heterogeneity in agents’ 
parameters is introduced. As the empirical source informing the modelling of 
heterogeneity, it is possible to refer to the experiments reported in chapter 7.
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As said before, the agents’ parameters considered here for heterogeneity are three: 
contribution delta, the endowment and the initial contribution level.
Referring to the results of the experiment introduced in chapter 7, it is possible to note in 
figure 10.2^ '^  how negative modifications of the contribution level (i.e., modifications that 
decrease the contribution to the public good) are, on average, bigger than positive ones.
^  25%
Uncooperative Conditional cooperative
Figure 10.2
Average size of positive and negative contribution deltas as percentage of the endowment, 
per kind of behaviour (data from the experiment reported in Andreoni 1995b, behaviour 
classification as in chapter 7).
Data reported in figure 10.2 is useful because it gives an idea of the size of deltas, 
according to the classification of subjects’ behaviour presented in chapter 7. Negative delta 
values of unconditional co-operators (altruists) and positive ones of uncooperative (i.e., 
selfish) subjects are less significant: they are few cases, exceptions of a general behaviour 
that should not allow such actions.
However, it is important to note the mean value of delta contribution in the experiment 
over all kinds of behaviour: it has been of 32.49 % with 21.41 % of the endowment as the 
size of the average deviation from the mean. And it is also possible to check if such levels 
have a significant dynamic over experiment duration (see figure 10.3).
^ From now on, in the rest o f this chapter, on the Y axis of graphs the percentage of endowment contributed 
to the public good is represented.
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Figure 10.3
Average contribution delta over time for experimental subjects, excluding players 
contributing constantly over time from the computation of the mean, and its standard 
deviation (data from the experiment reported in Andreoni 1995b).
Figure 10.3 shows that standard deviation follows, over experiment duration, the evolution 
of the mean and of the number of subjects modifying their contribution level over time. 
Such a result can be interpreted as the fact that size of deltas is surprisingly proportional to 
the number of subjects considered, while the amplitude of heterogeneity of deltas 
unsurprisingly directly follows the amplitude of average delta. Considering that subjects 
modifying their contribution level are not always the same over time and the issues just 
presented, it is possible to hypothesise that heterogeneity (measured by standard deviation) 
is equal for equal mean values (heterogeneity can not change with average values that are 
static over time) and that heterogeneity does not directly depends upon the number of 
subjects modifying their contribution level.
In conclusion, there is a rather stable size of deltas over time, changes in means and 
standard deviation are directly dependant on the number of subjects modifying their 
contribution level, but if such a value can be considered rather stable, the other two 
dynamics can be too.
We can thus suppose to have equal positive and negative deltas (with an average value of 
30% of the endowment) and we can see if heterogeneity in delta (a standard deviation from 
the mean of 30% of the endowment) has a structural impact.
Passing to consider endowments, it has already been made clear that is a complete 
exogenous variable. But if in the experiment we had a homogenous endowment, in the 
empirical case of chapter 9 endowments were heterogeneous because there were producers 
with heterogeneous productive capability. To explore such a hypothesis, we could 
investigate the case of random endowments with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 
30% of the endowment.
Finally, figure 10.4 shows the initial levels of contribution to the public good found in the 
experiment.
203
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
69%
□  m e a n
□  s t d .  d e v .
64% 61%
37%
29% "34%" 32%
19%
Cooperative Uncooperative Conditional
cooperative
Unclassified
Figure 10.4
Mean and standard deviation of initial contribution levels as a percentage of endowment, 
per kind of behaviour (data from the experiment reported in Andreoni 1995b, behaviour 
classification as in chapter 7).
Unsurprisingly subjects that have been classified as unconditional cooperators are the ones 
with the highest average values, while selfish subjects show the lowest levels. However, 
considering the aggregate data, the average value of initial contribution is 57.63% with a 
standard deviation of 28.22% (they are expressed, even for this case, as percentages of the 
endowment) and thus, for exploring heterogeneity of the initial contribution level, we can 
hypothesise contribution levels randomly generated with a mean equal to 50% of the 
endowment and 30% of standard deviation.
The analytic hypothesis about heterogeneity, that is to say the investigation about if and 
how heterogeneity affects the social causal mechanisms identified before for explaining 
public good provision, is thus made by comparing the homogeneous case of the basic 
configuration to a heterogeneous configuration where the three elements are randomly 
assigned to agents, following mean and standard deviation values described before, and 
randomly generated with a uniform distribution.
The second kind of modifications on the basic configuration deals with the duration of 
interaction and with the average values just described. Even if in the experiment of chapter 
7 (and in many others reported in the literature) average values were very similar to the 
ones considered in the basic configuration, it is possible to doubt that the explanatory 
mechanism works even for soundly different initial conditions, as well as it is possible to 
imagine a surprising and different systemic dynamics after the time step here considered as 
the end of the system dynamics.
10.3.2 Results
Considering the modifications of model configuration explained before for making agents 
heterogeneous, and leaving the other components as in the basic case synthesised in table 
10.2, the new model can be run to compare results with the ones obtained before (figure 
10.5).
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Figure 10.5
Average levels of contribution to the public good with homogeneous and heterogeneous 
values in agents for delta, initial contribution and endowment (std. dev. = 0.3, mean = the 
value considered in the homogeneity case).
Results presented in figure 10.5 suggest that heterogeneity has a very slight impact on the 
system and none on the causal mechanism: the average contribution level of agents is 
almost identical, but the one of the heterogeneity case is strictly lower than the one of 
homogeneity case, over time.
Contribution levels show the same dynamics (the Pearson coefficient between the two 
series is 0.9977), and the average size of the difference between the two series over time is 
1.47% of the endowment. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how heterogeneity 
determines a slight but continuous tendency towards lower levels of contribution levels.
The heterogeneity case could be considered more plausible, empirically speaking, and it 
should be considered as the one of reference for further investigations. However, 
sometimes in the proceeding of the theory development, differences between homogeneity 
and heterogeneity will be showed when analytically interesting or when it is conceivable 
that differences in heterogeneity of agents values can affect system outcomes and the 
validity of the explanation.
The second kind of modifications introduced before concerns initial values and time 
duration of the simulation.
Starting from the initial level of contribution to the public good, it is interesting to note 
how the causal mechanism works also for initial levels that are far different than the final 
ones (about 50%). In fact figure 10.6 shows how starting with an initial contribution level 
(homogeneous or heterogeneous, meaning for the latter the average value over the 
population of agents) of 25% of the endowment, the result is the same: the average level of 
contribution in fact quickly raises to the levels of the basic configuration, and then slowly 
drops to the final levels found before.
When the starting value of contribution is higher than 50% of the endowment, the slightly 
descending dynamics is confirmed and obtained final levels of contribution are perfectly 
similar to the ones obtained with other initial values.
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Figure 10.6
Average public good contribution over time, obtained with parameters as in table 10.2 but 
with a starting level of contribution (for the heterogeneity case: with an average starting 
level of contribution) to the public good of 25% of the endowment.
Even if the dimension of delta is changed, the causal mechanism and the macro dynamics 
are still valid. Figure 10.7, where on the left are reported results when the delta size (and 
for the case of heterogeneity, the average size of delta) has been changed to the value of 
10% of the endowment, and on the right results are plotted when such a value is 50% of 
the endowment, does not show significant differences with the basic case where the value 
of 30% of the endowment is considered.
50,505 48,128 46.53 44,248 43,466 42,61 42,276
41,023
42,9551 42,9638homogeneity
40,9137 40,5945 59,071 45,982 1,436 43,321 42,421 41,809 41,446
Figure 10.7
Average public good contribution over time, obtained with parameters as in table 10.2 but 
with a delta size (for the heterogeneity case: with an average value of delta) of 10% of the 
endowment (on the left) and 30% of the endowment (on the right).
Unsurprisingly, if we compare figure 10.7 with figure 10.5 it is possible to note how a 
modification in the size of the contribution delta means a change in the smoothness of the 
time series, but nothing else.
Finally, if simulation duration is increased, results do not change. In fact the typical 
dynamics of public good provision systems described in preceding chapters is confirmed
206
also for longer periods of time, such as in figure 10.8 where the system behaviour is plotted 
until the 30‘ time step.
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Figure 10.8
Average public good contribution over 30 time steps, obtained with parameters as in table
10.2 and considering heterogeneity and homogeneity in agents.
10.3.3 Conclusions
The first set of modifications to the system configuration allows for some conclusions.
Firstly, it is now possible to appreciate the robustness of the theoretical model we are 
considering and of the underlying causal mechanism: it is capable to explain usual 
outcomes of social systems dealing with public good provision even if initial conditions in 
agents are drastically changed.
Secondly, it shows how the theory building process is going on: starting from a theoretical 
model and explanation working on a specific set of conditions, we have found that some of 
such conditions are not crucial in defining explanation validity.
Thirdly, besides methodological issues about building a mechanisms-based theory, we now 
know that the causal mechanism of voluntary public good provision works fine in the 
entire space of possible configurations of some values of agents involved in the system. 
Such variables are the initial level of contribution, the amount of contribution used to 
modify contribution levels and agents’ endowments. Moreover, the presence of 
heterogeneity does not mean anything in particular but a slightly lower level of 
contribution and the duration of the simulation should be long enough to give rise to the 
systemic dynamics as it happens in 10 iterations, but it does not need to be longer because 
the systemic behaviour does not significantly change after the first ten time steps.
10.4 Group Size
A second set of modifications that can be made regards the dimension of groups in which 
the public good is shared. The game theoretical approach, because of the higher probability
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to meet a free rider, forecasts that an increase in group size means a stronger incentive to 
free ride. But also other expectations about system behaviour could be done by following 
what has been presented and referenced in sections 8.1.3 and 8.2.3.
By modifying group size we want to understand which systemic outcome can be explained 
and forecasted by the causal mechanism we are considering.
10.4.1 System Configurations
The first modification that can be made regards group size alone. As figure 10.9 shows, the 
fact of modifying only that element means to change the number of groups considered in 
the population, because this last parameter remains constant.
30
Figure 10.9
Number of groups when increasing group size (population = 100).
As said before dyadic groups are not considered because with such a group size and the 
considered return rates configuration the resulting system is not a public good provision 
dilemma.
Models presented in chapter 8 seem to outline that an increase in group size means an 
increase in public good provision, but not proportionally and only for first iterations. For 
final levels of contribution, the effect was not clear. A possible explanation of such a 
result, considering a constant structure of return rates for which the marginal per capita 
return of public good investment remains stable, is the existence of a relationship between 
population size and group size.
In fact, as figure 10.9 points out, with a constant dimension of population, an increase in 
group size means a decrease in the number of groups considered. And considering the kind 
of group stability, that is as in the experiment a “one-shot repeated” scheme, we can expect 
different systemic behaviour when only a group is considered: in that case in fact the game 
becomes a repeated one because group members are always the same and there is no 
regrouping at each simulation step because the members are all together in one group.
To fix this problem and to try to separate the group size effect, a further modification can 
be proposed: the increase of group size is done with a parallel increase in population size, 
keeping constant the number of groups. Such a setting also implies the fact that any agent 
keeps stable the probability to meet at each simulation step a new group member that did 
not belong to the group previously.
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Such modifications will define two new models; in one the runs are made by considering 2 
groups, in the other by considering 20 groups. The resulting population size, as group size 
increases, is depicted in figure 10.10.
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Figure 10.10
Population size as group size increases, keeping constant the considered number of groups.
10.4.2 Results
Running the model from the minimum group size (3) to the maximum one (i.e., the 
constant population size, 100), the final contribution levels, at time step 10, are as in figure 
10.11.
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Figure 10.11
Average public good contribution levels at simulation time 10 depending on group size.
Three issues coming from results must be discussed. Firstly it appears that group sizes 
lower than 50 result in an increase in group size and a decrease in the number of groups, 
which means a decrease in the final contribution level. Secondly, when the group size is 
above 50% of the population size, with only one group (which thus is stable over time) the 
contribution level increases with group size. Thirdly, such an increase when group size is 
above 50 is evident in the case of heterogeneity, while in homogeneity the level suddenly 
reaches the maximum possible.
In fact, in the case of homogeneity for group sizes above 50 all reciprocators reach their 
maximum contribution level: the average level is not stable at 60% as expected (having
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60% of co-operators, 20% as unconditional and 40% as conditional) but is very close to 
this level because by modifying the group size from 51 to 100 some discontinuities in the 
population distribution appear. To say it differently and to make the point clearer, when the 
group size is 100, 60% of co-operators means a precise level of maximum contribution of 
60% of the endowment having 60 cooperating agents, while then group size is 99 the 
number of cooperating agents could be 59 or 60, and on average the level of maximum 
contribution is slightly greater than 60.
Moreover it is interesting to note how, as said before, when a group size is above the 
threshold of 50% of the population, the repetition scheme becomes a repeated one, always 
having the same members in the group (over simulation time). Different repetition schemes 
will be considered below, but for now it is important to note how heterogeneity in agents 
means significant lower levels of contribution that are obviously due to the noise in 
systemic behaviour given by heterogeneous values, but surprisingly those “noisy” effects 
do not increase with group size and, on the contrary, a group size increase means an 
increase in contribution levels due to an effect that will be studied in the following section 
when considering group composition stable over time.
A further point to be considered is the dynamics leading to the results just explained. 
Comparing figure 10.5 (the case of group size equal to 5) to figure 10.12 (where group size 
is 3 on the left and 100 on the right), it is evident how system dynamics are much different.
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Figure 10.12
Average levels of public good contribution over time when group size is 3 (left) and 100 
(right).
Differences are particularly significant for the homogeneous case, confirming what has 
been said before: with group sizes above 50 (and only one group) homogeneous agents 
suddenly reach the highest possible level of contribution (see the grey line on the right of 
figure 10.12).
In the case of heterogeneity it seems that the dynamic is characterised by having an initial 
over shooting effect (in fact contribution levels increases over time at the beginning of the 
simulation, for every group size considered) and a final decreasing dynamic of contribution 
levels.
Such an “oscillation” effect can be better understood by looking at figures 10.13 and 10.14.
Figure 10.13 shows that in the case of homogeneity (on the left in the figure) the effect is 
clear by comparing the values of 5 and 50, as group size. While having 5 members in each 
group means to have a slight and regular downward dynamics after a sudden increase in
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the level of contribution that happens at the beginning, in the case of 50 members the 
initial contribution level is higher for the first half of the time period, but decreases after a 
few time steps and thus the second half of the period is characterised by lower values of 
contribution, determining a poor performance at the end.
Moreover, when group size is above 50, the homogeneity case shows how only the first 
part of the dynamics works, with a sharp initial increase in contribution levels and then 
stability of them.
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Figure 10.13
Average public good contribution levels over time when group size is 5, 50, 51 and 100: 
case of homogeneity (on the left) and heterogeneity (on the right) in agents.
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Figure 10.14
The oscillation effect: average levels of contribution to the public good over time when 
group size is below 51 in the case of heterogeneity in agents.
The figure on the right of 10.13 shows how, with heterogeneity, the oscillation effect 
works for any group size and number of groups considered. The only difference when the 
group size is below or above 50% of the population is the fact that only when it is above 
such a value the final contribution level is higher than in the case of small groups.
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Figure 10.14 focuses on the oscillation effect. With heterogeneity in agents and for group 
sizes below 50% of the population (and with more than one group), an increase in group 
size means a modification in the time series in the sense depicted in the figure by arrows, 
that is to say by increasing the amplitude of the oscillation.
The oscillating behaviour of the system is consistent with the considered causal mechanism 
and in particular with the presence of conditional co-operators who firstly try to cooperate 
but then are forced to diminish their contribution levels. Such kinds of dynamics (try to 
cooperate first, then, if necessary, retaliate) generates oscillations in the average level of 
contribution to the public good and such an oscillation increases in amplitude as group size 
increases.
Group size, in conclusion, seems not to pose boundaries to the validity of the considered 
explanation, but helps in pointing out some interesting and different systemic behaviour.
The most interesting is the one just described: it is also confirmed by data presented in 
figure 10.15. In fact in presence of the oscillation we expect that the average contribution 
over time (that is to say cumulated average contributions made by agents divided by the 
length of the considered time period) should not be very different for different group sizes 
and that when the size is above 50 the positive effect prevails.
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Figure 10.15
Average contributions to the public good in the ten simulation steps: the case of 
heterogeneity in agents.
The figure confirms such expectations, and for group sizes below 50 the data spans from a 
minimum of 44.35 to a maximum of 46.76, with no clear tendency.
To conclude the analysis of the first set of modifications on group size, the point 
introduced before about the presence of two effects should be remembered: the increase in 
group size is here connected to a parallel decrease in the number of groups (if the 
population size is kept stable) and in the probability to meet unknown agents in future 
group compositions, and the discontinuity of resulting data when group size is above 50% 
of the population is due to the fact that there the game becomes a repeated one, with stable 
group compositions.
To separate such effects it is worth analysing the case in which the number of groups and 
the probability to meet new members is constant: the population size will thus increase as 
group size does, as in figure 10.10.
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Figure 10.16
Average public good contribution levels at simulation time 10 depending on group size and 
the number of groups considered (with heterogeneity in agents).
Results reported in figure 10.16 makes evident the fact that an increase in group size that 
does not affect the probability of encountering unknown group members means a decrease 
in the final level of contribution to the public good.
Such a result is true even when the probability of encountering new members is positive 
but the smallest possible (when only two groups are considered). The increase in the final 
contribution level found before when group size exceeds half of the population size is thus 
due to the change in the group composition scheme and it will be analysed in the following 
sections.
Dynamically speaking, the first issue to consider is to evaluate if the oscillation effect 
generated by the causal mechanisms before is confirmed when the number of groups is 
stable. Figure 10.17 shows that such an effect is due to the increase in group size and it is 
not influenced by stability of population size. In fact the figure compares simulation 
dynamics for group sizes of less than 50% of the population size, such as in figure 10.14 
but with a constant number of groups (20).
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Figure 10.17
The oscillation effect with variable population size (20 groups): average public good 
contribution levels over time when group size is below 51 in the case of heterogeneity in 
agents.
Results presented in figure 10.17 are true also for group sizes greater than 50 but here, with 
a constant number of groups, the final contribution level continues to decrease and the 
oscillation effect increase in amplitude.
Finally it is interesting to consider the cumulative level of contributions to the public good 
over the whole simulation period (i.e., in the ten simulation steps) to check if such a level 
is stable, on average, because of the oscillation effect.
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Figure 10.18
Average contributions to the public good in the ten simulation steps over group size: the 
case of heterogeneity in agents, with different numbers of groups and population sizes.
Figure 10.18 presents data about the average amount of contribution over the ten 
simulation steps in the cases of 2 and 20 groups, comparing the result with the one of 
figure 10.15 that was the one with constant population size and a decreasing number of 
groups.
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The very interesting result pointed out by this last figure is that the oscillation effect 
described before and determining a decrease in the final level of contribution as group size 
increases, also determines a small but robust increase in the total amount of contribution to 
the public good made over the whole considered period.
10.4.3 Conclusions
The analysis of group size pointed out some interesting results: firstly, group size does not 
bind the validity of the causal mechanism explaining voluntary provision of public goods.
Secondly it showed some new results that help in better understanding the explanation 
itself and empirical cases too. Group size in fact changes the dynamics of the system, by 
creating a bigger oscillation of contributions over time. The reason for such a result is the 
fact that with a bigger group size more conditional co-operators are present, but also more 
selfish agents. Thus, as group size increases, more conditional co-operators try to 
cooperate at the beginning of the interaction and they seem to sustain each other in first 
rounds, then they more often conclude that cooperation is futile because of the higher 
number of uncooperative agents, leading to lower final levels of contribution.
New system configuiations also pointed out the relevancy of the group stability scheme 
and, in a more general and rigorous way, of the probability to meet new, unlcnown, group 
members: when group size is greater than half of the population, the group is stable and the 
resulting dynamics is different and the number of groups present in the system of interest, 
determining the probability to mix group compositions, is a crucial element to be 
considered. Such points are worth being discussed with some new configuiations, and call 
for interesting applications in real cases where the relationship between the size of groups 
sharing the public good and the population of individuals involved is often forgotten.
10.5 Group Stability over Time
As seen when analysing group size modifications, significantly different results seem to 
appear when groups are stable.
The attention on stability of the groups composition is typical of Game Theory: if games 
are one-shot, the theory predicts that a rational agent does not act strategically, for building 
reputation capable of being a signal about future behaviour, while if players know that they 
will meet the present group members in the future, a strategic behaviour is expected so that 
signals can be sent and a sort of communication established between subjects.
Do different group stability schemes affect the causal mechanism? Which are the expected 
systemic impacts of different schemes?
10.5.1 System Configurations
In system configurations considered until now the rule of group compositions was that on 
each time step of the simulation groups were composed from scratch. Such a kind of 
scheme has been called, in Game Theory, “one-shot repeated” or “single-shot repeated” 
because each time step is considered to be a one-shot iteration.
To analyse the impact of such a group stability scheme, it can be compared with a new 
configuration characterised by having a stable gi'oup composition, letting the same group
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members interact for ten simulation steps. Obviously, on each of the 1,000 rounds made to 
neutralise random generators effects, groups are composed differently.
The new configuration is tested not only on a simple run but also crossed with 
modifications already introduced such as those in group size.
10.5.2 Results
Modifying the initial configuration by introducing stable groups, results are very similar to 
previous ones.
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Figure 10.19
Average public good contribution levels over time with one-shot repeated and repeated 
interactions, homogeneity (on the left) and heterogeneity (on the right) in agents.
Figure 10.19, for instance, points out that with homogeneity in agents (the left side of the 
figure), the final level of contribution is almost the same with one-shot repeated and 
repeated schemes, and in fact the Pearson coefficient between the two time series is 0.96.
Stability of groups seems to impact by slightly lowering contribution level dynamics, even 
in the case of heterogeneity in agents (Pearson coefficient for the right figure of 10.19: 
0.98).
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Figure 10.20
Average public good contribution levels over time with repeated group interactions: cases 
of homogeneity and heterogeneity in agents.
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While heterogeneity in agents seems to have, even with group stability, the usual slight 
effect (see figure 10.20), these first results are difficult to discuss further: the close 
similarity of the two cases, perhaps depending on other elements of the considered 
configuration, do not permit relevant differences to be pointed out, except for a slightly 
lower contribution dynamics in the case of repeated interaction65
It is thus needed to verify the impact of group size. Before presenting results, it is worth 
adding that in this case there is no relationship between group size and population size: in 
fact with groups which are stable over time, it is useless to consider the probability to meet 
unknown members when the group is redefined, because the group is not redefined over 
time.
6 0
3 0
—  h o m o g e n e o u s
—  heterogeneous
Figure 10.21
Final (at time 10) average levels of public good contribution reached by systems based 
upon the “repeated” group composition, over group size (cases of heterogeneity and 
homogeneity in agents).
Figure 10.21 presents results due to variation in group size: with group stability, either in 
the homogeneous or the heterogeneous cases, an increase in group size means an increase 
in final contribution levels.
The result is valid but for groups of less than 10 heterogeneous agents: in fact for those of 
lower size the final contribution level decreases when group size increases. The increase in 
contribution is stronger in the case of homogeneity: the maximum level possible is reached 
when group size is about 50.
In figure 10.22 it is possible to compare the dynamics shown in figure 10.21 for the 
heterogeneity case with the one obtained before from the single-shot groups: it has been 
claimed that with single-shot repetition and group sizes above 50% of the population, the 
resulting system showed dynamics such as in the case of group stability (i.e., repeated 
games). The figure confirms the point; not only from a logical point of view but even from 
a computational one (the Pearson coefficient of the two data series above 50 is 0.93).
^ The lower level in repetition than in single-shot repetition evidently goes against game theoretical 
predictions about reputation building. For an experimental confirmation of the results here obtained with 
small group sizes and for a complete reference on the literature debate on the matter see Andreoni and 
Croson 2002.
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Figure 10.22
Final (at time 10) average public good contribution levels over group size: comparison 
between the repeated scheme and the one-shot repeated one with constant population size 
(case of heterogeneity).
We could wonder if the oscillation effect mentioned before equally works here with 
repeated groups. Figures 10.23 and 10.24 show that in both the case of homogeneity and in 
the one of heterogeneity results are the same: when group size is greater than 50, final 
contribution levels are greater than the ones of very small groups.
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Figure 10.23
Average levels of contribution to the public good over time with repeated group 
interactions: cases of homogeneity (on the left) and heterogeneity (on the right) in agents 
with different group sizes (5, 50, 51, and 100).
The figure on the right side of 10.23 shows higher final contribution levels with greater 
group sizes, but the smallest group size considered is 5. Figure 10.24 shows that 
considering a group size of three agents, the oscillation effect is confirmed by not only 
showing a dynamics with an increase in the amplitude of the oscillation but also by 
generating lower final levels of contribution to the public good. Nevertheless, considering 
group sizes above the biggest one presented in the figure (i.e., group sizes greater than 50) 
allows for greater final contribution levels than in the case of group size equals to 3.
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Figure 10.24
Average contribution levels over time with repeated group 
heterogeneity in agents with different group sizes (3, 25, 50).
interactions: cases of
Finally figure 10.25 shows a comparison between the single-shot case with a constant 
number of groups (20) and the repeated case. It is the most interesting comparison that can 
be made to evaluate the overlapping issues of variations in group size and group stability.
The figure points out that, in general, an increase in group size means a drop in the final 
level of contribution to the public good in the case of single-shot repeated games, and an 
increase in such a level in the case of stable group compositions.
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Figure 10.25
Average final public good contribution levels over group size: cases of repeated and 
single-shot repeated interactions of heterogeneous agents.
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Figure 10.26
Cumulated average public good contribution levels with repeated and single-shot group 
interactions: the case of heterogeneity in agents.
In the case of single-shot games, it has been underlined before that the amplitude of the 
oscillating dynamics generated by the increase in group size also means an increase in the 
average total amount that each individual contributed over the ten simulation runs. Having 
found a very similar effect even with repeated groups, a similar increasing dynamics over 
group size could be expected in this latter case. Figure 10.26 confirms such expectations, 
adding that with very big group sizes the amount contributed over the whole simulation 
time is greater in the case of group stability, while for smaller groups the opposite is true, 
that is to say that single-shot repeated games can determine a more cumulative 
contribution.
As a last point, in figure 10.24 the time series referring to groups of 25 members suggests 
that for that group size the contribution dynamics over time is strongly oscillating and that 
it could increase in time steps after the 10*'’. The left part of figure 10.27 shows that in the 
case of repeated groups the dynamics is truly oscillating over long time periods, but the 
oscillation is decreasing in amplitude.
 group of 3
group of 5 
—  group of 10
Figure 10.27
Average public good contribution levels over 30 simulation time steps; groups of 25 
heterogeneous agents with different group composition rules (on the left) and small 
repeated groups (on the right).
The figure on the right part of 10.27 shows how small groups behave over long periods of 
time. A group of three players, on average, shows a dynamics quickly oscillating over a 
value slightly higher than the one obtained by a group of 5. The case of groups of 5 
members has already been discussed (figure 10.8). Considering groups of 10 subjects
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means to obtain an oscillating dynamics with a lower frequency and with a decrease over 
time in amplitude, and an asymptotic level of contribution that seems to be similar to the 
one obtained with 5 subjects per group.
Passing to the case of bigger groups, figure 10.28 points out that a further increase in group 
size means two main results. The amplitude of the oscillation tends to decrease and the 
average, asymptotic, value to increase, with a sort of shift of the data series (see for 
instance in the figure the case of groups made by 25 members and the ones of 100 
members).
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Figure 10.28
Average public good contribution levels over 30 simulation time steps: repeated groups of 
heterogeneous agents.
The dynamics just shown explain how the surprising result of figure 10.21 regarding 
repeated groups is obtained: for the smallest group sizes, the final level of contribution 
decreases when group size increases because there is a passage from a higher value of a 
quickly oscillating data series to a more stable but slightly lower dynamics (figure 10.27 on 
the right, groups of 3 and 5 members); over the smallest group sizes, an increase in group 
size implies an increase in the final level of contribution (figure 10.28).
Moreover, these last results show how the time length could impact with some 
configurations of the system of reference: whenever an oscillation is in progress, it would 
also be worth looking at average and asymptotic tendencies of resulting dynamics.
10.5.3 Conclusions
The theoretical exploration here developed by considering new system configurations 
concerning group stability has shown that the causal mechanism considered here is capable 
of describing voluntary provision of public goods even in the case of repeated games (i.e., 
even when groups are stable).
Moreover, it has been shown how different rules for group composition can interact with 
other modifications of the system. In particular, a very interesting relationship with 
modifications of group size has been found.
Such a result is not only useful for forecasting future behaviour of empirical cases but also 
to explain some “puzzling” results found in literature. For instance, Andreoni 1988 found 
that with groups of five subjects, the repeated game solution held to a lower level of 
contribution than in the single-shot case, while Croson 1996 reported the opposite for
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groups of four subjects. Such results can not be explained by many common approaches 
such as the theory of games, but they are completely coherent with the ones here presented 
(the same result is in fact described in figure 10.25) and can be explained by means of the 
explanatory mechanism here considered.
10.6 Return Rates
The next issue to be explored is the return rate of the two considered goods, the private and 
the public one. For studying impacts of variations in return rates, it is possible to focus on 
the retur n rate of the public good, keeping constant the private good one.
10.6.1 System Configurations
The marginal gain fi*om contributing a unit of the endowment to the public good is given 
by the public good return rate, that is to say the amount of return per imit that each member 
of the group receives by any member’s contribution of a unit.
The marginal rate of substitution between the public and the private good is, of course, just 
the division between the marginal gain from contributing to the public good and the 
marginal gain from contributing to the private one, that is to say the ratio between the 
public good retmii rate and the private one. Such a ratio is called, by game theorists and 
experimental economists working on public goods provision mechanisms, the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR).
MPCR is particularly interesting here because it allows for analysing impacts of retuin 
rates by only modifying the public good one and leaving the private one untouched. In fact, 
in the configiuations here considered, the private good return rate remains constant to 1, 
and the MPCR has thus the same value as the public good return rate.
New configurations consider variations of MPCR that spans in a range that goes between 
0.21 and 0.99. The need for such a variation range is due to the aim of keeping the 
structure of the system as a social dilemma. In fact the condition to have a social dilemma 
is generally the following: 1/N < MPCR < 1.
Considering five agents, as in the basic configuiation, means an MPCR > 0.2, because with 
an MPCR below such a limit the structme of the dilemma would change completely, 
without the possibility, speaking in the terms of game theory, of an unstable social (Pareto) 
optimum allowing higher payoffs than the stable Nash equilibrium.
Having an MPCR equal to 1 or greater than such a nimiber, also means changing the 
problem to one where the contribution to the public good is not expensive because the 
return rate is at least equal to the one of the private good.
New configurations also consider the possibility of mutual influence with other systemic 
elements: it is in fact easy to verify if variations in return rates influence the impacts of 
other modifications such as homogeneity and heterogeneity in agents, or group stability. A 
much more complicated task is the exploration of influences between return rates and 
group size: configurations with different group sizes can be tested over the wide range of 
return rates, but to understand better the relationship between variations in those two 
dimensions, two further configmations are presented.
The first one, depicted in figure 10.29 with a black line, increases the MPCR as group size 
increases. The second one, depicted in figuie 10.29 as a grey line, decreases MPCR as 
group size increases. In those two configurations, group size spans from 3 to 100, as usual,
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and MPCR from 0.33 to 0.99 to ensure the presence of the original social dilemma (in fact 
0.34 is the minimum MPCR at which the system with groups of three subjects is a social 
dilemma).
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Figure 10.29
MPCR in the two considered configurations, over group size.
10.6.2 Results
Figure 10.30 shows the result of modifications of MPCR in single-shot repeated groups of 
5 homogeneous and heterogeneous agents. Variations in MPCR do not have an impact on 
the final level of contribution to the public good. Even by looking at the total amount 
contributed over the 10 simulation steps and not just the last one, there is no significant 
impact of different values of MPCR on the system (figure 10.30, on the right).
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Figure 10.30
Average final public good contribution levels (on the left) and average public good 
contributions per time step (on the right) over marginal per capita return (MPCR): cases of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity in agents, with single-shot repeated group composition.
Figure 10.31 shows that, despite the lack of impact on cumulated and final contributions, 
variations in MPCR have an impact on single-shot repeated groups of five agents; the time 
series of contribution levels becomes smoother as MPCR increase (in the figure, MPCR 
starts from the value of 0.21, then assumes the value of 0.6 and 0.99).
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Figure 10.31
Average public good contributions over time: cases of homogeneity and heterogeneity in 
agents, with single-shot repeated group composition and five group members.
Passing to the case of repeated groups, results referring to the average level of contribution 
per simulation step are not so different: the right part of figure 10.32 testifies that over the 
whole simulation period the cumulated levels of contribution do not show significant 
changes depending on variations of MPCR.
But the left part of figure 10.32, on the contrary, shows a clear effect for final levels. 
Lowest and highest levels of MPCR are those who guarantee higher levels of final 
contribution to the public good, and values of MPCR lower than 0.5 are those generating 
the highest levels of final contribution.
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Figure 10.32
Average final public good contribution levels (on the left) and average public good 
contribution per time step over MPCR: cases of homogeneity and heterogeneity in agents, 
with repeated group composition.
Looking at the dynamics over simulation time (figure 10.33), it is clear that even with 
repeated groups the main impact of variations in MPCR is a change in the form of the 
contribution time series that becomes smoother.
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Figure 10.33
Average public good contributions over time: cases of homogeneity and heterogeneity in 
agents, with repeated group composition.
Nevertheless, such results are quite surprising: it could be expected that an increase in 
MPCR, that is to say an increase in the marginal rate of substitution between the public and 
the private good should mean higher levels of contribution, on average and at the end of 
the simulation, both for single-shot repeated and repeated groups.
At least for small group sizes, results shown here predict that such an increase does not 
happen, and the considered causal mechanism is not capable of explaining eventual 
empirical observations of such a phenomenon.
Moreover, in preceding sections, when dealing with modifications of group size, it has 
emerged an oscillation effect, while here it seems that there is a “smoothing” effect of the 
time series of public good contribution due to an increase in MPCR.
It is now worth studying the co-presence of these two effects by increasing the group size 
and focusing on heterogeneous agents.
Figure 10.34
Average final public good contribution level over group size: heterogeneity in agents and 
single-shot repeated groups (on the left) and repeated groups (on the right).
The left part of figure 10.34 shows the results for the case of one-shot repeated groups. 
Remembering that for group sizes over 50 results are typical of a repeated groups and will 
be discussed just below, the figure points out that MPCR, whatever its dynamics does not 
have impact on single-shot repeated small groups and the resulting dynamics is identical to 
the one seen before: the group size effect prevails when groups are single-shot.
In the case of repeated games (figure 10.34, on the right) results are far more interesting: 
MPCR seems to increase the level of contribution and to act in line with the group size 
effect. In fact when MPCR is at higher levels final contributions are higher than the case of
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MPCR of 0.5. It happens for small groups for the line “MPCR decreasing” (in fact in this 
case MPCR is higher for smaller groups) and in bigger groups for “MPCR increasing” (in 
fact in this case MPCR is higher for bigger groups). Moreover, the opposite is also clear: 
lower levels of MPCR negatively affect contribution such as in the case of “MPCR 
decreasing” which generates the lowest values for big groups.
MPCR thus seems to have an impact depending mainly on the kind of group interaction 
and slightly on group size.
The left part of figure 10.35 in fact shows, again, that for the case of single-shot repeated 
groups MPCR does not significantly impact. Lower levels of contribution obtained by 
groups of 50 members are due to the group size effect, and for such kinds of group size it 
would be slightly better to have lower values of MPCR.
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Figure 10.35
Average final public good contribution levels over MPCR: groups of 5 and 50 
heterogeneous agents, with single-shot repeated group composition (on the left) and groups 
of 5, 50 and 100 heterogeneous agents with repeated groups (on the right).
On the contrary, in the case of repeated, stable, groups the effect is significant (see figure 
10.35 on the right). In the case of big groups, such as of 50 or 100 members, higher values 
of MPCR mean higher values of contribution. For small groups the opposite is true: lower 
values of MPCR mean higher final levels of contribution.
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Figure 10.36
Average contributions over simulation time: groups of 5 (left) and 50 (right) heterogeneous 
agents, with single-shot repeated group composition and different levels of MPCR.
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Figure 10.37
Average contributions over simulation time: groups of 5 (left) and 50 (right) heterogeneous 
agents, with repeated group composition and different levels of MPCR.
Looking also at dynamics of public good contribution over time reported in figure 10.36 
(single-shot repeated groups) and 10.37 (stable groups), it is possible to conclude that for 
small values of MPCR it is better to have small groups or, at least, to have groups that are 
reformed upon rules such as the single-shot repetition, but when groups are bigger and 
stable, MPCR positively affects the final level of contribution.
10.6.3 Conclusions
It is quite difficult to estimate the impact and the boundaries posed by variations on MPCR 
to the causal mechanism and thus to the theory.
A good point that could be made is that many of the values considered here for MPCR 
have never been tested in experiments and are difficult to find in reality. Consider for 
instance an MPCR of 0.99: it is a case that in reality could not be considered a social 
dilemma, and even agents involved could think the same and act differently than predicted 
by the theory here considered because the difference between the return rates of the public 
and private good could be perceived as negligible.
MPCR, and the relationship between the public good return rate and the private good one, 
thus becomes a key issue in explaining voluntary public good provision. The theory and 
the causal mechanism here presented works with any value of MPCR but the expected 
effect of variations of such elements need to be further studied, particularly by referring to 
empirical cases that could falsify or confirm some of the interesting points raised here.
The present section has in fact shown that while the mechanism and the explanation seem 
to work, the expectation about the role of MPCR should be strictly connected to the 
considered specification of other elements such as group size and stability.
Moreover, MPCR is a key element characterising the system to be a social dilemma, but 
perhaps agents change their behaviour according to the “grade” of the dilemma. For 
instance agents facing a high MPCR such as 0.7, or 0.8, could be induced to act 
cooperatively because the system is not perceived as a social dilemma and the fact of 
allowing other group members to gain advantage from personal resources could not be 
perceived as expensive (i.e., altruism becomes very cheap).
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10.7 Conditional Cooperation and Population Composition
Until now the presence of only conditional co-operators who react upon the evolution of 
their personal earnings has been considered. In preceding chapters such a choice has been 
motivated by referring to two main reasons. The first one is that personal earnings are the 
best information source available for individuals about their welfare, because other sources 
such as the total amount of contribution to the public good realised by the individual’s 
group or the number of defections in the group are indicators that do not directly mean a 
worsening of individual wealth.
To say it differently, while personal earnings coming from both public and private goods 
are a measure of personal welfare, an individual who observes a decrease in group 
contribution or the spreading of free riding in his group can not forecast the evolution of 
his welfare (i.e., personal earnings) because it depends also on individual’s choices (for 
instance he could have decreased his contribution much more than other group members, 
increasing his personal earnings).
The second reason for choosing this kind of conditional cooperation has been the fact of 
observing that the variable of personal earnings was the most exploited in rules of 
behaviour inferred with GP on experimental data (chapters 7 and 8).
Nevertheless, it is worth understanding if different kinds of conditional cooperation impact 
on the system. Kalian (2005), for instance, plausibly suggests the coexistence of three 
different kinds of conditional co-operators. In fact, “a relatively small fmction of the 
population... consists of committed free-riders, who shirk no matter what anyone else 
does, and another small fraction... of dedicated co-operators, who contribute no matter 
what” is present too, but “most individuals are reciprocators who cooperate conditionally 
in the willingness of others to cooperate. Moreover, some reciprocators are relatively 
intolerant: they bolt as soon as they observe anyone else free-riding. Others relatively 
tolerant, continuing to contribute even in the face of what they see as a relatively modest 
degree of defection. And a great many more -  call them neutral reciprocators -  fall 
somewhere in between” (Kahan 2005, pp.345).
As the author suggests, such a classification can give rise to more complex mechanisms, 
such as for instance the one where free-riding of committed fr-ee riders “provoke non- 
cooperative behavioin by the less tolerant reciprocators, whose defection in turn risks 
inducing the neutral reciprocators to abandon ship, thereby prompting even the tolerant 
reciprocators to tlnow in the towel, and so forth and so on” (Kahan 2005, pp-345-346).
It is thus worth modelling and analysing such tlnee kinds of conditional cooperation. 
Relatively intolerant reciprocators will be the ones who reciprocate on single defections of 
other group members. In other words, they are agents that stop cooperating if they see an 
increase in the number of defections (i.e., in the number of group members who decrease 
their contribution level), while they come back to cooperative behaviour if defections are 
decreasing. They do not care if defections impact on total group contribution and on their 
personal earnings: an increase in the number of defectors do neither surely imply lower 
levels of group contribution nor personal earnings as well as a decrease in their number 
does not surely mean an improvement of group and personal welfares, but such kinds of 
agents are focussed on defectors and they do not tolerate them. Such behaviour will also be 
called “reciprocation on single defections”.
Less tolerant (or neutral) reciprocators are the ones who react upon total group 
contribution. In other words they do not care if, for instance, a decrease in total group 
contribution does not mean a decrease in personal earnings, and they thus stop cooperating 
if total group contribution falls. Obviously, they re-start cooperating as soon as total group
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contribution begins to rise. Such behaviour will also be called “reciprocation on group 
contribution”.
Tolerant co-operators are those who reciprocate on the evolution of personal earnings, thus 
forgetting defections that do not imply an immediate worsening of personal payoff. They 
are modelled as reciprocators on personal earnings and they are the ones, until now, 
exploited as reciprocators. They can be called “reciprocators on personal earnings”.
10.7.1 System Configurations
Some models are thus built to test if the substitution of the reciprocating behaviour 
considered imtil now with the two other kinds of conditional cooperation impact on 
systemic dynamics and results.
Models are made by confronting populations with 20% of unconditional co-operators, 40% 
of selfish agents and 40% of conditional co-operators. Such a population configm*ation is 
the one used before, but here the kind of conditional co-operators present in the model has 
changed. Systems are compared even regarding the stability of groups.
Results from these first models suggest the possibility to analyse conditional cooperation 
in conjunction with the other modifications introduced before, in particular about group 
size and the public good return rate. To make such analyses, models are built to compare 
results obtained before with two other kinds of population structure. The “old” population 
structui-e was with 40% of reciprocators on personal earnings, while the two new ones are:
i) 20% of altruists, 40% of selfish, 40% of reciprocators on total group 
contribution;
ii) 20% of selfish, 20% of altruists, 20% of reciprocators on single defections, 20% 
of reciprocators on total group contribution, 20% of reciprocators on personal 
earnings.
In other words, besides the population composition considered in preceding sections, the 
second population here considered is made by substituting reciprocators on personal 
earnings with reciprocators on total group contribution, while the third is made with 
consideration for each possible behavioiu’ (i.e. 5) an equal percentage (i.e. 20%) of 
subjects.
10.7.2 Results
Figure 10.38 considers the standard group size of 5 members and compares results coming 
from reciprocation on personal earnings and group contribution. Over time, populations 
where conditional co-operators reciprocate on personal earnings (i.e., the ones also defined 
as “tolerant” reciprocators) generate higher levels of contribution to the public good. With 
both kinds of conditional cooperation, single-shot repeated games generate higher values 
of contribution than repeated groups.
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Figure 10.38
Average public good contributions over simulation time. Groups of 5 heterogeneous 
agents, 40% of conditional co-operators reciprocating upon different rules of behaviour: 
reciprocation on personal earnings (“Earn”) and group contribution (“Group c.”) with 
single-shot repeated (“s. s. r.”) and repeated groups.
Conditional co-operators who stop to cooperate whenever they see a defection (i.e., 
whenever they observe a decrease in the level of contribution to the public good) by a 
member of their group generate very “poor” results. In fact the contribution levels 
generated by this population configuration sharply decreases at the beginning of the 
simulation time, and in this case single-shot repeated games reach lower levels (figure 
10.39).
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Figure 10.39
Average public good contributions over simulation time. Groups of 5 heterogeneous 
agents, 40% of conditional co-operators reciprocating upon different rules of behaviour: 
reciprocation on personal earnings (“Earn”) and single defections (“Single”) with single­
shot repeated (“s. s. r.”) and repeated groups.
The last figure suggests that the presence of 40% of intolerant reciprocators (i.e., 
reciprocators on single defections) means the lack of public good provision: it is however 
interesting to consider the co-presence of all kinds of conditional cooperation and the other 
two kinds of behaviour.
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Figure 10.40 presents results for populations with 40% of reciprocators on personal 
earnings (already presented in preceding sections) and total group contribution (with 40% 
of selfish agents and 20% of altruists), and for the population divided in equal parts of 20% 
for each kind of behaviour.
With single-shot repeated games, as explained before, results should be carefully 
considered when modifying group size without changing population size. The left part of 
the figure in fact points out that with over 50 members in groups the game becomes a 
repeated one.
Considering group sizes below with a threshold of 50, it is evident how with every kind of 
population composition which is considered an increase in group size means a decrease in 
final levels of contribution. Populations rich of reciprocators on personal earnings generate 
higher levels of contribution than other configurations, but for sizes over 40 the 
configuration made of 20% of each behaviour reaches higher levels of contribution (it is in 
this case worth remembering that such a configuration has half the amount of selfish agents 
less than the other two).
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Figure 10.40
Average final contribution level over group size (with constant population size on the left 
and two groups on the right): single-shot repeated groups and heterogeneity in agents, with 
different population behaviour.
As seen before, it is also possible to increase population size along group size, keeping 
constant the number of groups. The right part of figure 10.40 presents results for the case 
of two groups and it is evident how reciprocity on personal earnings allows for higher final 
levels of contribution for small groups, but lower ones for big groups.
In other words, a conditional cooperation that is tolerant pays more in smaller groups, 
while less tolerant conditional cooperation seems to imply better results for bigger groups.
It is also possible to check different configurations of behaviour in population in the 
contribution dynamics over time, as in figure 10.41 where results are presented for the 
considered three configurations and with two groups of 50 members (with single-shot 
repetition). It is evident how the passage of considering together more kinds of 
reciprocating behaviour amplifies the oscillation of the data series, leading to slightly 
lower final levels of contribution. The increase in the width of the oscillation can be 
explained by the presence of more reciprocating agents (i.e., 60% of the population).
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Figure 10.41
Average public good contribution levels over simulation time, groups of 50 members: 
single-shot repeated groups and heterogeneity in agents, with different population 
behaviour.
When groups are stable, results are different. Figure 10.42 shows that an increase in group 
size generally means an increase in the final level of contribution. The two main 
exceptions are group sizes below 10 for all considered configurations (but the presence of 
reciprocators on personal earnings and on single defections amplify this effect) which 
decrease their contribution level with increases in group size and the outliers generated by 
the configuration equally composed of the five kinds of behaviour.
In conclusion reciprocators on total group contribution are less sensitive to modifications 
in group size.
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Figure 10.42
Average public good final contribution level over group size: repeated groups and 
heterogeneity in agents, with different population behaviour.
Figure 10.43 helps in explaining the outliers generated by the population, where each 
behaviour weighs 20%. When increasing group size and keeping population size constant, 
it is off en the case that some agents do not participate in the “game”. For instance, when 
group size is 99 and population size is 100; one agent does not belong to any group. This 
happened before (excluded individuals changed the actual distribution of behaviour in the
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population) but it did not impact on system outcomes. Here, because of the considered 
kinds of behaviour, the effect is deeper.
Public good contribution levels are in that case due to the absence of some agents that 
makes the population division in equal parts of behaviour not perfectly true. In other 
words, data series out of the outliers is generated when it is not true that there is exactly a 
20% representation of each behaviour, but a different proportion of behaviour due to the 
discreteness of the system.
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Figure 10.43
Average final public good contribution levels with a population made by 20% of each 
considered behaviour and the number of agents not included in groups, over group size: 
repeated groups and heterogeneity in agents.
Passing to the analysis of modifications of public good return rates, figure 10.44 presents 
results for single-shot repeated games involving the three different configurations of the 
population and in the case of two group sizes, 5 and 50.
Unsurprisingly, the only configuration affected by modifications in MPCR is the one 
considering reciprocation on personal earnings (already discussed before) while the one 
considering reciprocation on group contribution generates very stable outcomes. Groups of 
5 and 50 members generate different final levels of contribution as just seen.
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Figure 10.44
Average final public good contribution levels over MPCR, groups of 5 and 50 members: 
single-shot repeated groups and heterogeneity in agents, with different population 
behaviour.
When groups are stable (repeated games), results are the same with the already presented 
exception of the case of reciprocation on personal earnings. Figure 10.45 confirms such a 
point and verifies already discussed issues, as, for instance, the very low levels obtained by 
groups of 50 members drawn from a population equally composed by the five kinds of 
behaviour.
The fact that populations made by reciprocators on earnings are the only ones significantly 
affected by changes in MPCR is not surprising because such behaviour is intuitively 
affected by the return rate of public goods because the latter directly affects the value of 
personal earnings.
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Figure 10.45
Average final public good contribution levels over MPCR, groups of 5 and 50 members: 
repeated groups and heterogeneity in agents, with different population behaviour.
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10.7.3 Conclusions
Modifying the kind of reciprocal behaviour considered and also the distribution of 
behaviour in population, it has emerged that the specification of such behaviour poses very 
few limits to the validity of the explanation. Very “punitive” reciprocation obviously 
generate lower levels of contribution (e.g., the case of considering only reciprocation on 
single defections), but such an effect can be compensated by the co-presence of other kinds 
of conditional cooperation.
Group size effects are not modified by the presence of different kinds of reciprocity, while 
changes in MPCR do not impact on the system if reciprocation is not dependent upon 
personal earnings.
Tolerant reciprocators, finally, give raise to higher levels of public good provision when 
groups are small; less tolerant reciprocators do the same when groups are big.
10.8 Public and Private Information: Network Structures
Agents interact with the group but also with other group members when they observe them 
behaving. We have assumed that behaviour is observable; it is a sort of public information 
that allows other members to see defections and acts of cooperation and in dense networks 
that means observing all other group members. In other kinds of network structures that 
means to observe only the behaviour of neighbouring (i.e., directly connected) agents, 
while public good and its retuim is determined by all group members.
It is thus also possible to consider interaction structmes as information networks where 
behaviour is not always (and not for everybody) public information. Such information is 
private and not accessible by distant group members, while it is reachable and shared 
between neighbours.
10.8.1 System Configurations
As said in section 10.2.2 it is feasible to test the effect of interaction structures by 
comparing the standard network usually considered in theoretical and experimental cases 
of voluntary public good provision (a dense network where each node is equally comiected 
with all others) with other kinds of networks.
The new configurations of interaction structure are two: small-world networks, often found 
in societies, and scale-free networks, sometime found in social settings but more often in 
other networks such as computer ones.
The three kinds of networks must also be tested in conjunction with the other modifications 
of system structure (i.e., the ones presented before) as, for instance, group size.
The only particular issue is the one of group stability over time: it is not plausible to 
consider one-shot interaction with network structures which implies the building of a social 
structure. To say it differently, it is not very plausible to think that subjects interact with 
others in social networks such as small-world ones for just one moment in time because it 
is only the repetition of social interaction that can justify the presence of such kinds of 
interaction stmctures. System configurations will thus consider only repeated games.
Moreover, considering the kind of reciprocating behaviour to be considered in populations, 
it is intuitive that only reciprocation on single defections is affected by different network 
structures of information exchange. Reciprocators on personal earnings and on total group
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contribution, in fact, react upon information (i.e., the return coming from the public good 
and the sum of all members’ contributions) which is public in the group and not affected 
by different information structures. Reciprocators on single defections, on the opposite, 
react upon defections made by subjects they meet, that is to say made by their neighbours.
Thus, among the population configurations presented before, the one made by 20% of each 
kind of behaviour is the only one here considered.
10.8.2 Results
Figure 10.46 presents public good contribution levels generated by groups of 25 
members^^. It is evident how the presence of information structures organised as small- 
world and scale-free networks allows for an increase of the very low levels of contribution 
in final time steps characterising fully dense networks. From this perspective, a social 
network that allows for the direct observation of only the neighbours behaviour seems to 
help in the public good provision.
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Figure 10.46
Average final public good contribution levels over time, groups of 25 members behaving 
in equal parts according to the 5 considered kinds of behaviour, with different network 
structures of information exchange.
Considering modifications on MPCR (figure 10.47), information structures organised 
differently than in a dense network, generate higher levels of final contribution for a very 
wide range of MPCR. The only exception is for a very small range close to minimum 
values of MPCR where the opposite is true. Moreover, while dense networks of 25 
members show a sharp decrease in final levels of contribution as soon as MPCR increases, 
with other network structures the decrease happens but much more slightly.
^ The choice of groups composed by 25 subjects is due to the need to consider a group size big enough to 
have significant differences in information structures organised according to different network types.
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Figure 10.47
Average final public good contribution levels over MPCR, groups of 25 members 
behaving in equal parts according to the 5 considered kinds of behaviour, with different 
network structures of information exchange.
Passing to consider effects due to changes in group size, figure 10.48 presents the case in 
which modifications in such a value are made leaving population size constant. In such a 
case small-world and scale-free networks present similar puzzling dynamics, but outliers 
are less evident than in the case of dense networks. However, besides discontinuities due to 
the discreteness of modifications (as the ones discussed in the preceding sections), a 
decreasing tendency of contribution levels seem to emerge when group size increases.
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Figure 10.48
Average final public good contribution levels over group size with a constant population 
size, groups of 25 members behaving in equal parts according to the 5 considered kinds of 
behaviour, with different network structures of information exchange.
To confirm that, it is possible to refer to figure 10.49 where modifications of group size 
with different networks of information exchange are made by adapting the population size 
so that the number of groups is constant and equal to 2.
In this case, all network structures show a decreasing final level of contribution as group 
size increases, but small-world networks generate higher levels of contribution when group 
size surpasses the value of 25.
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Figure 10.49
Average final public good contribution levels over group size with 2 groups of 25 members 
behaving in equal parts according to the 5 considered kinds of behaviour, with different 
network structures of information exchange.
10.8.3 Conclusions
The presence of structured networks of information exchange has shown that they can 
mean higher levels of public contribution if they are more similar to social networks than 
fully dense structures usually considered for dilemmas of public good contribution.
Such a result is particularly strong towards modifications in MPCR. Moreover, it is 
increasingly significant when group size increases.
10.9 Network Structures Defining Groups
The last point to consider as possibly relevant to improving knowledge about the 
explanatory mechanism and as a possible impact on the system and on the validity of the 
explanation itself, is the presence of different kinds of group structures sharing the public 
good.
The preceding section has presented some results in favour of positive effects of social 
networks such as small-worlds on public good provision. But in that case the network 
affected only the information exchange and the subjects who, because of their behaviour, 
directly observe others’ actions.
Here the network structure, in addition to the function presented before, assumes even the 
role of defining groups sharing the public good, giving rise to systems composed not by 
separated groups which are fully connected inside (as in the case of dense networks), but 
by groups overlapped and nested.
10.9.1 System Configurations
The modifications on the model implied to change subjects’ behaviour: whenever subjects 
need to compute their group’s total contribution they look at their neighbours (i.e., to the 
subjects to whom they are directly connected) and compute the sum of the contributions.
Besides such a modification, it is worth making a modification in the lexicon used to 
present results in order to avoid misinterpretations.
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In fact, groups sharing the public good are here defined as neighbourhoods of subjects. 
Networks, on the opposite, are the fully connected trees composed by all subjects. In dense 
networks two such concepts collapse, but in the other two kinds of considered networks 
they are quite different.
Because of that, in the following results some modifications are relabelled if compared to 
the ones made before. It is, for instance, the case of modifications on network size: when 
only dense networks were considered, groups and network coincided, but here groups are 
neighbourhoods and modifications are on network size, thus group size depends upon the 
network definition algorithm.
10.9.2 Results
Figure 10.50 presents results over time with the three different network structures and 
repeated networks of 25 members. Dense networks generate the lowest contribution levels 
by amplifying the oscillation due to reciprocity (i.e., an initial increase in contribution and 
then a decrease due to the spreading of free riding). Small worlds generate a smoother 
dynamics that reaches final levels of contribution slightly higher than the ones generated 
by dense networks. Scale free networks generate the best results and a dynamic oscillation 
with a high frequency.
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Figure 10.50
Average public good contribution levels over simulation time, groups of 25 members: 
repeated groups and heterogeneity in agents, with different network structures.
Passing to modifications of network sizes, figure 10.51 shows final levels of contribution 
from the size of 5 to 100, i.e. the population size. The starting value, 5, has been chosen 
because for lower group sizes it is impossible to create different kinds of network structure: 
with few agents it is obviously impossible to have small-worlds connected by few long 
cormections.
Moreover, because of the network creation mechanism exploited in models and presented 
at the beginning of the section, small-worlds and dense networks are identical when 
network size is of five members, and in fact results are the same for that size.
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Figure 10.51
Average final public good contribution levels over network size: repeated groups and 
heterogeneity in agents, conditional co-operators (40% of the population) reciprocating on 
personal earnings (on the left) and on total group contribution (on the right), with different 
network structures.
The figure presents, on the left, data about a population made by 20% of unconditional co- 
operators, 40% of selfish agents and 40% of reciprocators on personal earnings. Scale-free 
networks are, in this case completely neutral to network size: changes in network size are 
thus a change in scale when reciprocators react upon personal earnings. Small-world 
networks determine a result that is opposite to dense networks: an increase in network size 
determines a decrease in the final level of contribution.
Figure 10.51 on the right presents results when the population is composed as before but 
the 40% of conditional co-operators behave according to reciprocation on total group 
contribution. In this case scale-free networks are influenced by network size, and what was 
said before is confirmed: small-world networks generate lower final levels of public good, 
which decrease when network size increases, while dense networks generate the opposite 
dynamics, with an increase in final levels of contribution as network size increases.
Figure 10.52 presents the case when population is made up of 20% of each kind of 
behaviour, and the generated outcome, for dense networks, is the same as presented before 
with a few very low outliers. Even in this case results are confirmed: small-world networks 
generate decreasing final levels of contribution as network size increases, scale-free 
networks are almost stable and dense networks are positively correlated to increases in 
network size.
60 -,
 small world
50 — scale free
40
30 -
20
Figure 10.52
Average final contribution level over network size: repeated groups and heterogeneity in 
agents, population composed by 20% of each considered behaviour with different network 
structures.
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Passing to MPCR modifications, figure 10.53 on the left shows how reciprocators on 
personal earnings are sensitive to changes in public good return rates. For dense networks 
the result is not so clear (a sharp decrease, a period of stability and then a slight increase in 
final contribution levels as MPCR increases), while for other kinds of network structures 
an increase in MPCR means a clear decrease in final levels of contribution. Scale-free 
networks make contribution levels decreasing less than small-world networks.
Figure 10.53
Average final public good contribution levels over MPCR; repeated groups of 25 members 
and heterogeneity in agents, conditional co-operators (40% of the population) reciprocating 
on personal earnings (on the left) and on total group contribution (on the right), with 
different network structures.
However, such a result is strictly dependent upon the presence of reciprocators on personal 
earnings that are obviously modified by changes in return rates. When reciprocators act 
upon the evolution of total group contribution (as on the right of figure 10.53), results are 
obviously not influenced by changes in MPCR whatever the considered network structure.
When population is composed by each kind of behaviour (20% of selfish agents, 20% of 
unconditional co-operators and 20% of each of the 3 kinds of conditional co-operators), an 
increase in MPCR means a decrease in final levels of contribution. Dense networks show a 
slight increase in such values when MPCR overcomes 0.5, while scale-free networks show 
less of a decrease than small-world ones.
 dense
 small world
— scale free
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Figure 10.54
Average final public good contribution levels over MPCR: repeated groups of 25 members 
and heterogeneity in agents, population composed by 20% of each considered behaviour 
with different network structures.
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The interesting result is that for lower values of MPCR, that is to say when the provision of 
public goods is particularly expensive, small-world networks out-perform fully dense 
structures, while when the public good provision is less expensive the opposite is true.
Figure 10.55 shows average levels of contribution over time generated by different 
configurations of behaviour in population and by different interaction structures. Figures 
must also be compared to figure 10.50 where the case of 40% of reciprocators on personal 
earnings is presented.
The result is that free-scale networks are the ones less sensitive to oscillation over time, 
while dense and small-world networks are subject to such dynamics determining lower 
final levels of contribution.
Figure 10.55
Average contribution level over simulation time: repeated groups of 25 members and 
heterogeneity in agents with different network structure, population with conditional co- 
operators (40%) reciprocating on group contribution (on the left) and population composed 
by 20% of each considered behaviour (on the right).
10.9.3 Conclusions
Even when groups sharing the public good are defined as “social neighbourhoods” (i.e., 
neighbourhoods determined by a social network), the explanatory mechanism is valid with 
every considered interaction structure. Among the many results that have been presented, 
the two main ones are the following.
Firstly it is evident how scale-free networks would be more efficient in voluntary public 
good provision, but they are not very common in social systems perhaps because the 
dynamic mechanism determining social networks (e.g., preferential attachment) does not 
spontaneously lead to scale-free networks.
Secondly, small-world networks that are often considered the ones more common in 
societies (or, at least, the networks more similar to social ones among those considered 
here), generate lower levels of contribution to the public good for high levels of network 
size and MPCR. Small-world networks allow for sufficiently high levels of public good 
provision when the dilemma is strongly suggesting the choice of private goods (i.e., for 
lower values of MPCR) and the network size is not too big.
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10.10 Conclusions on Building M echanisms-based Theories
Concluding remarks about this chapter should be made regarding both the presented 
procedure and the outcome of the procediu'e.
Concerning the procedure presented here for developing the theory, the main comment is 
about the evident burden of complexity. In fact, accepting to consider the system of interest 
(i.e., the social system that is studied) as complex is perhaps a more plausible hypothesis 
but it implies the co-exploration of each system element in building the theory because 
such elements are not considered independent.
The many sections, comments and graphs presented in this chapter have demonstrated how 
complicated, effortful and long the procedure is to develop the theory by inspecting one 
element per time and by re-inspecting all system modifications each time a new element is 
considered.
Commenting on the outcome of the procedure, that is to say the theory is more difficult 
because it would need some efforts in applying the theory to the empirical world, but 
nevertheless some general remarks can be made.
An advantage given by the result of the procedure is that all possible influences on the 
explanatory mechanism have been explored completing the understanding about how it 
works. Moreover, besides this added knowledge about the explanation, precise boundaries 
are defined for it.
Before the building of the theory, for instance, it was not possible to know if the 
explanatory mechanisms could explain the voluntary provision of public goods with 
groups organised according to non dense network structures. The explanation was, in fact, 
developed starting from data collected in experimental environments where the only 
interaction structur e considered was dense.
The theory is thus firstly useful because it helps in better understanding and specifying the 
explanation.
But the theory could also be useful for other purposes. Firstly it is now possible to use and 
test the theory in several contexts, while before developing it, it was more difficult to test 
and falsify the explanatory mechanism because it was bounded to the very narrow 
conditions defined by the particular empirical cases from which the explanation was 
originally derived. Whenever an experiment is made or an empirical reality is observed, its 
configuration can be compared to the respective theoretical one and forecasting about the 
behavioiu' of the system of interest can be achieved.
In such a way the theory can be tested, falsified or validated, and the researcher will have 
an available theoretical hypothesis that could even be useful in the planning of his 
research.
Even if the causal mechanism explaining the volimtary provision of public goods on which 
the theory is built will be falsified, the theory has helped in defining it and in better 
comprehending its implicit consequences.
Finally the theory could be useful for proposing modifications of real systems. The theory 
in fact predicts that with different configurations of the system (e.g., different group sizes 
or interaction structur es) the level of public good provision can be raised: scholars working 
on policy making can use the theory to propose tools to shape the system of interest aiming 
to increase the level of public good provision.
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Conclusions
The attempt to define and put into practice a research approach for the social sciences has 
been presented tliroughout the chapters of this work.
In doing so, much inspiration has been taken from Analytical Sociology and from studies 
on Complexity. Other useful sources of inspiration have been Experimental Economics, 
Cognitive Sciences, Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence, in particular Automatic 
Machine Learning.
This work did not aim to show that one approach is better than others, but rather to 
“develop and explore” it in order to give the reader some initial results as a basis for 
making possible the immediate evaluation of its characteristics and for futur e comparisons.
Particular attention has obviously been paid to following the fille rouge of “definition and 
exploration” comiecting the different parts, from episternological issues to methodological 
ones and from field cases to social theory.
The second part of this work focused on an application of the research approach to a social 
dilemma. The case that has been presented is just an example that can be replicated by 
studying different kinds of social dynamics: the proposed research approach aims at every 
kind of social phenomena.
What Has Been Presented
Among the many arguments that have been presented in this work, it is worth reporting 
one which concerns the need for an analytical approach to social sciences. Such an 
approach aims to solve some critical issues of common practices in the research 
community, for instance the lack of explanatory causal power and the lack of rigorous 
modelling which lead to well knovm difficulties in the falsifiability of scientific knowledge 
and in understanding, predicting and governing empirical phenomena.
The analytical approach to social sciences is characterised by searching for causal 
explanations that cope with the complexity of social systems, which intrinsically ar e multi­
level. The causal explanation in complex and multi-level social systems thus takes the 
form of a mechanism where the causal dynamics connecting different levels of the system 
is clearly and formally presented, showing the causes, the effects, and the feedback loops 
acting at both the micro and macro levels and between them.
The proposed approach, moreover, immediately calls for modelling techniques which 
consider the multi-level composition of social systems and which allow for the 
consideration of heterogeneity without posing, ex ante, constraints to any part of the 
model.
From the point of view of models and tools, the analytical approach to social sciences is 
thus characterised by looking at recent developments, such as social simulation, which 
overcome traditional limits of modelling (e.g., the linearity of actions and relationships, 
analyses based only on equilibria, etc...).
The reason for preferring those novel tools to more established ones is that such tools give 
the opportunity to fully grasp social phenomena by allowing the modelling of structural 
peculiarities of social systems while traditional tools have been developed and have proved 
to be effective in other disciplines where systems of interest show different chai acteristics. 
The choice of new tools, thus, comes with two important issues: traditional tools are
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considered analytically powerful for physical and natural systems but not so much for 
social systems where they show some relevant limits; new tools must be explored and tried 
in the field and even, sometimes, developed and adapted, and the selection of a particular 
kind of modelling approach and toolkit thus needs to start from an evaluation of the state of 
the art of the tools available when the selection happens.
Other relevant issues implied by the adopted approach regard the possibility to generalise 
explanations and the interest towards individual rationality.
Social explanations in the form of causal mechanisms allow for the identification of 
“families” of mechanisms, that is to say sets of similar mechanisms which work (i.e., 
explain) in different empirical settings. In this way it is possible to categorise explanations 
and even to find generic mechanisms imderlying different phenomena.
The fact of considering multi-level systems and causal mechanisms often leads to the 
necessity of dealing with a micro level of the explanation that is made of individuals. 
Individuals act in the system and, according to the proposed approach, individual 
rationality is a crucial element of social explanation.
Rationality, here, is intended as the reason for human behaviour'. The individual behavioiu' 
that is considered in an explanatory social mechanism should always be rational in the 
sense that the reasons for such a behaviour should always be a necessary element of the 
explanation.
This issue about the need for finding reasons for human behaviour' seems to be one that has 
been underestimated in previous contributions in favour of an analytical approach to social 
sciences and it deserves more attention.
Focusing on the reasons for human behaviour', besides allowing for a better social 
explanation, means to pay attention to the modelling of agents. Social scientists searching 
for formal explanations involving individuals face the problem of agents which can be 
summarised in the impossibility to refer to a model of individual behaviour that is formal, 
well accepted in the commmiity and with empirical salience.
Economists and even some analytical sociologists have exploited the framework usiially 
called of “rational choice” or of homo oeconomicus, that is based on an agent maximising 
his personal welfare represented by a utility function. But such a choice today is facing 
several criticisms coming from Cognitive Sciences and Experimental Economics where 
soimd proof of the falsity of the framework (in particular of the assiunptions on which it is 
based) has been found.
The rational choice model that is usually associated with Economics cannot thus be 
considered a feasible solution for the problem here considered, and the first reason for that 
is its lack of empirical salience that does not allow for finding the causal mechanism 
working in the multiple levels of a social system.
Cognitive Sciences, in recent years, have proposed several alternative approaches, for 
instance the “satisfycing principle” and “prospect theory”, which can all be identified as 
frameworks which consider forms of bounded rationality and with some empirical salience 
(at least with more empirical salience than the homo oeconomicus).
This work suggests that the choice among the many different approaches to bounded 
rationality can be driven by the research approach adopted. Because we are looking for 
social explanations and thus for reasons for individual actions in a social environment, it is 
preferable not to bound the search inside agents. The maximising of a utility frmction (but 
also the satisfycing principle and other approaches) in fact reduces the reasons for 
individual actions to internal ones (increase personal welfare, reach your level of 
satisfaction, and so forth) while the social group and in general the environment in which
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the individual lives are just considered as determinants of boundaries and of individual 
expectations.
On the contrary, the approach of social rationality and ecological rationality allows for 
considering a wider range of behaviour and of reasons to behave. Following this approach, 
it is possible to investigate and model rational behaviour that is an outcome of personal, 
social and environmental reasons.
The second main argument that has been presented throughout this work is the need for 
some clear methodological choices depending on the aims of the adopted research 
approach.
It has been underlined that there is no need for a special and new research paradigm, but 
only the need for strategies useful for dealing with the relationship between the model and 
the empirical target. Such a relationship is in fact crucial: referring to the empirical data it 
is possible to find causal explanations, to formalise them and to validate them.
From survey design to participatory methods, from model specification to model 
validation, the social scientist following the analytical approach has a large variety of tools 
and techniques at his disposal, but depending upon the research aim and the subject of 
interest some tools can be more effective than others. This work has thus presented the 
tools which appear to be most effective in the several cases defined by different research 
aims.
Moreover, talking about such tools and techniques, the issue of methodological 
interdisciplinarity should be addressed: social scientists often refer to empirical and 
analytic tools that have been developed in other disciplinary fields. In their original field of 
application, such tools are almost always coupled with a strict methodological procedure 
which should not immediately be adopted by the social scientist.
Methodological prescriptions are, in fact, always dependent upon epistemological issues 
and the research aim. The research agenda of the original field of application of the many 
tools the social scientist exploits can be very far from the one of analytical social science.
The introduction of a tool in the social scientist toolbox camiot thus be an immediate 
operation and it requires a process of adaptation of the methodology for using the tool. In 
other words, it is the method with which a tool is used that must be adapted to be 
consistent with the analytical approach, and not vice versa.
Proceeding with the analysis of the main arguments that have been presented in this work, 
the focus of its second part has been on the application of the research approach to a 
particular kind of social dilemma: the volmitary provision of public goods.
The chosen dilemma is studied thiough the analysis of an experimental case, a field work 
and the development of more theoretical knowledge, and it has stressed the relevancy of 
using some uncommon tools for collecting data about human behaviour.
In fact there is a strong need for empirical methods to obseiwe and measure human actions, 
and some tools which are not very common in social sciences, like for instance 
experiments, can be a good solution to accomplish such a task.
The most important argument presented in analysing the social dilemma of interest has 
been the one related to causal explanatory mechanisms: it is the explanation of many 
empirical results by the means of a causal mechanism which strongly relies on the stiTicture 
of the dilemma and on a few different kinds of individual behaviour.
The different kinds of individual behaviour, which are recognised by contemporary 
literatui'e on the subject as a crucial element in explaining the phenomenon, are not only 
observed, but this work helps to demonstiate how they cause the dynamics of interest. To
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say it differently, the novelty of the explanation here presented is not due to the 
presentation of the different kinds of behaviour, but to the explanatory mechanism that 
considers those different kinds of behaviour' as an important element (but not the only one) 
and that relates them to other pai'ts of the system.
Fui'thermore, the discovered explanatory mechanism is applied to an empirical case where 
a sort of evaluation of possible futiu'e scenarios is necessary for ensuring a stable 
development of the system.
Finally this work has proposed a way to generalise explanations: the explanatory 
mechanism has been discovered and validated on some empirical cases and, despite the 
fact that many cases repoi'ted in literatme seem to suggest the widespread use of this kind 
of phenomena and the applicability of the explanation to many of them, it is possible to 
computationally derive a mechanism-based theory of voluntary provision by exploring the 
space of validity of the mechanism.
The explanation, in its formal representation, is based on the configuration of the system 
observed in the cases that have been studied. The generalisation of the explanatory 
mechanism aims at understanding if it explains phenomena happening in systems which 
are not completely identical to the ones from which the explanation has been developed.
In other words, in order to extend the developed laiowledge to other similar systems (i.e., 
systems presenting a dilemma of voluntary provision of public goods) but not identical to 
the ones that have been studied, it is necessary to generalise the explanatory mechanism.
Such a task of generalisation is accomplished by building a mechanism-based theory 
tlii'ough a process in which the space of validity of the explanation is explored by 
investigating the effects of modifications on the formal description of the explanation.
As an example, the explanation of the voluntary provision of public goods can be tested on 
the presence of different network stmctmes on wliich information travels among the people 
involved in the contribution. Without the mechanism-based theory, the explanation found 
in this work could have been applied just to cases where the network structuie is identical 
to the one found in the systems presented here.
With the knowledge developed in the theory it is possible to say if the causal mechanism 
works in different settings and with which effects. The theory, in other words, is useful not 
only for extending the field of application of the developed knowledge by generalising it, 
but it is also useful because it helps in completing the knowledge of the explanatory 
mechanism by explormg its space of validity in different possible configurations.
The theory is thus a product that is computationally derived starting with the first formal 
representation of the mechanism and it contains the laiowledge about the effects that 
different configuiations of the system have on the dynamics of interest and on the 
explanation. The theory can be validated and falsified by comparing its predictions to 
empirical cases.
How to Further Develop This Work
As a final remark, it is worth discussing the need for carrying on the research beyond this 
work.
The first point that can be discussed concerns the possibility to extend the field of 
application of the adopted research approach. It is easy to replicate the analyses presented 
here to other social dilemmas which provide for dynamics of cooperation, but even for 
other kinds of social phenomena, the procedure of application of the approach should not 
be too complicated.
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Besides giving new and useful insights about the phenomena to which the approach will be 
applied, such a replication of this work will even be quite useful in pointing out the 
advantages and disadvantages of the research approach.
Secondly, the social dilemma that has been studied has shown how searching for its causal 
mechanism is a matter of understanding individuals’ actions and their relationship with the 
social dimension.
A development of this work could then be in the direction of deepening and discussing the 
methods to obsei've and understand human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this kind of 
context, in fact, it is often the case that individuals are neither capable of considering social 
effects of their choices nor the reactions of their social neighbours. Besides the normal 
effects and risks on social welfare happening in social dilemmas where individuals are well 
informed, in some of these contexts complexity further increases because of lack of 
awareness and individuals often act “blindly”.
It is evident how new methodologies and tools to obseiwe and measure behaviour in such 
contexts can have a strong impact on social welfare and can shed light upon systemic 
mechanisms of behavioiu selection like the one proposed in this work as a reason for the 
existence of conditional cooperation.
Thirdly, it is possible to develop this work by continuing the investigation of voluntary 
public good provision, particularly in order to address two of the relevant issues that have 
been left open.
The first open issue concerns how reasons for human behaviour have been explained.
In the work it has been claimed that subjects involved in such kinds of social dilemma 
choose to follow three general kinds of behaviour (i.e., selfishness, conditional and 
unconditional cooperation) when it is permitted (it was not the case, for instance, in the 
empirical case of chapter 9 where selfish subjects were not allowed to take part in the 
system) and that they are fast and fi'ugal heuristics which are chosen because they are 
efficient in several contexts.
Thus, the reason for a behaviour' is its ecological rationality, and such a point is particularly 
relevant for conditional cooperation, a kind of behaviour the reason of which is still very 
obscure in the scientific community.
While in the literature it is possible to find examples of some heuristics which have been 
proved to be fast and frugal and to be ecologically rational, the hemistics here considered 
need to be verified and investigated. To do so it could be interesting to experimentally 
verify if conditional co-operators act in the same way in different contexts, if there are 
framing effects switching between dilemmas where conditional cooperation implies 
different disadvantages, and so for*th.
The second point worth developing is about the role and the dynamics of relationships 
between subjects.
As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, in the real world it is often the case that 
individuals participate at the same time in several kinds of social networks where different 
social dilemmas are present. Moreover individuals, with their choices and their behaviour, 
are often responsible for the shaping of the social network. All these issues still need to be 
addressed by investigating if and how behaviour and networks are related, even from an 
evolutionary point of view.
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In literature some models about the evolution of networks of relationships of voluntary 
public good provision have been presented. In fact, the birth of a group of co-operators and 
the attachment to it is plausible because the strength of relationships usually grows with 
repeated satisfactory interactions and because with very small groups communication and 
deals are feasible.
But these models do not clarify how the stable coexistence of selfish and cooperating 
agents is possible and do not discuss the kind of network that emerges.
Some issues like tliresholds of tolerance and the cooperative attitude of social newcomers 
can be key elements in improving oui' knowledge about the dynamics of public good 
provision networks, but the research method proposed by the analytical approach can again 
be an effective means leading to a better comprehension of the social network emerging 
along the phenomenon of the voluntary provision of public goods.
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Appendix
Experimental Subjects’ Inferred Decision Rules
The experiment was conducted under three different treatments, called also conditions. Each 
condition (Regular, RegRank and Rank) is split into two sub-groups of twenty people each. In 
following sections the infeiTed decision rules are presented for each player in each sub-group of 
each condition.
Referring to table 7.4 and paragraph 7.2 where the inference process is detailed, the following rules 
use the variable “EARNINGS” meaning the dynamics of individual’s earnings, “TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION” meaning the dynamics of the sum of public good contribution by group 
members, and “CONTRIBUTION” meaning the dynamics of individual’s investment in the public 
good. Each variable is with a time index: for instance, “EARNINGS (T-1)” says if personal 
earnings increased in the last round.
The comparison between two variables here means to compare two dynamics and thus the logic 
value of truth will be obtained only if both dynamics are increasing, stable or decreasing. The 
variable set by every rule (i.e. the output variable) is the dynamics of contribution at time T: when 
the rule is to “FOLLOW” another variable it means to increase or decrease the level of contribution 
to the public good according to what happened in the other variables in the past.
Regular 1
In the Regular 1 group, some subjects keep their contribution constant over the experiment rounds. 
They are subjects number 3, 4, 16 and 17, who free ride, and subject 2 who always contributes the 
total endowment.
Subject 1 of Regular 1 
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 5 of Regular 1
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
Subject 6 of Regular 1
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUITON (T-1) 
CONSTANT)) OR ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-
1) DECREASED)))
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THEN
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
CONSTANT)) OR ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T- 
2) DECREASED)))
THEN
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DYNAMICS WERE 
DIFFERENT)
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 7 of Regular 1
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT) OR (TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT))
THEN
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUITON CONSTANT 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 8 of Regular 1
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUION (T-2) CONSTANT)) OR 
((EARNINGS (T-2) CONSTANT ) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 9 of Regular 1
IF ((EARNINGS (T-2) INCREASED) OR (EARNINGS (T-2) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION 
(T-2) DIFFERENT))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 10 of Regular 1
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN
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IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT) 
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject II of Regular 1
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
DECREASED))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 12 of Regular* 1
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
CONSTANT))
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 13 of Regular 1
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 14 of Regular 1 
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 15 of Regular 1
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IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE
IF ((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) OR (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)) 
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 18 of Regular 1
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT)) OR 
((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 19 of Regular 1
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 20 of Regular 1
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE
IF ((( TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)) 
OR ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
A.2 Regular 2
In the Regular 2 group only subjects 8 and 13 completely free ride. Subject 15 keeps its 
contribution constant over time.
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Subject 1 of Regular 2
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE
IF (EARNINGS (T-2) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-1) EQUAL)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 2 of Regular 2
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) OR (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT))
THEN
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 3 of Regular 2
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT)) OR 
((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 4 of Regular 2
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
CONSTANT))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) 
OR ((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 5 of Regular 2 
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)
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THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 6 of Regular 2
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
INCREASED)) OR ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION 
(T-2) CONSTANT)))
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
Subject 7 of Regular 2
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 9 of Regular 2
IF ((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) OR (EARNINGS (T-1) DECRESEAD))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 10 of Regular 2 
FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 11 of Regular 2
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT) OR 
(CONTRIBUTION (T-2) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT))
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 12 of Regular 2 
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN
IF ((((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
INCREASED)) OR ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION 
(T-2) CONSTANT))) AND ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
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Subject 14 of Regular 2
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-I) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT) OR (TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT))
THEN
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 16 of Regular 2
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 17 of Regular 2
IF ((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) OR (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED))
THEN
IF (((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (EARNINGS (T-I) CONSTANT)) OR 
((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN
IF (((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-
2) CONSTANT)) OR ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION 
(T-2) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 18 of Regular 2
IF (((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE
IF (((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
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Subject 19 of Regular 2
FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
Subject 20 of Regular 2
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
A 3 RegRank 1
In this sub-group subjects 9, 10 and 12 completely free ride.
Subject 1 of RegRanld
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 2 of RegRank 1
IF ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-1) CONSTANT))
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-I) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 3 of RegRankl
IF (EARNINGS (T-2) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-I)
ELSE
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
DIFFERENT)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 4 of RegRanld
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IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND RANK (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
DECREASED))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 5 of RegRankl 
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN
IF (RANK (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 6 of RegRankl
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
CONSTANT) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
DECREASED))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-I)
ELSE
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND RANK (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF ((EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) OR 
(EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED))
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 7 of RegRanld
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
CONSTANT))
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 8 of RegRankl
IF ((EARNINGS (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-1) EQUAL) OR (RANK (T-2) INCREASED))
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THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 11 ofRegRanld 
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DECREASED)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE
IF (RANK (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 13 ofRegRanld
IF ((RANK (T-2) DECREASED) OR (RANK (T-2) INCREASED))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 14 of RegRankl
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) AND RANK (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
Subject 15 ofRegRanld 
FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subj ect 16 of RegRank 1
IF (RANK (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE mCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 17 ofRegRanld
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DIFFERENT) 
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-1)
ELSE
IF ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-1) DECREASED))
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THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
Subject 18 of RegRankl
IF ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-1) CONSTANT))
THEN
IF (((RANK (T-2) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) 
OR ((RANK (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 19 of RegRankl
IF (RANK (T-2) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 20 ofRegRanld
IF ((RANK (T-1) DECREASED) OR (RANK (T-1) CONSTANT))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-2)
^.4 RegRauk 2
Subjects 4,5, 12 and 19 completely &ee ride.
Subject 1 of RegRanlc2
IF (((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR ((RANK (T- 
1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) 
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
Subject 2 of RegRank2
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
275
ELSE
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND RANK (T-2) DIFFERENT) 
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 3 of RegRanlc2
IF (((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
CONSTANT)) OR ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T- 
1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
ELSE
IF (RANK (T-1) CONSTANT)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 6 of RegRanlc2
IF (RANK (T-2) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE
IF (RANK (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 7 of RegRank2
IF ((RANK (T-1) CONSTANT) OR (RANK (T-1) DECREASED))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 8 of RegRank2 
IF (RANK (T-2) DECREASED)
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-1)
ELSE
IF ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) OR 
(TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT))
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
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Subject 9 of RegRank2
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) OR (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT))
THEN
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
CONSTANT))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 10 of RegRanlc2 
IF (RANK (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 11 of RegRauk2
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND RANK (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE
IF (((RANK (T-2) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT)) 
OR ((RANK (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DECREASED)))
THEN
IF (((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (RANK (T-2) 
CONSTANT)) OR ((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (RANK (T-2) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 13 of RegRank2
IF ((RANK (T-2) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-2) CONSTANT))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 14 of RegRank2
IF (((CONTRIBUITON (T-2) INCREASED) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((CONTRIBUITON (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (EARNINGS (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
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Subject 15 of RegRank2
IF (RANK (T-2) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DIFFERENT) 
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 16 of RegRaiilc2 
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT)
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE
IF ((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) AND ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 17 of RegRanlc2
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND 
RANK (T-2) EQUAL))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 18 of RegRank2
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) AND (RANK (T-2) CONSTANT)) OR (EARNINGS (T-1) 
CONSTANT) AND (RANK (T-2) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE
IF (RANK (T-1) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T- 
1) CONSTANT)) OR (EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 20 of RegRaiik2
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT) AND ((TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
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ELSE
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT) 
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
A.5 Rank 1
In this case the number of free riders is bigger and they aie subjects 2 ,6 ,9 , 11, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 
19.
Subject 1 of Ranld
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND RANK (T-1) DIFFERENT) AND (((TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) AND (RANK (T-2) CONSTANT)) OR ((TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (RANK (T-2) DECREASED))))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 3 of Rank 1
IF (RANK (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-2)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 4 of Ranld
IF ((RANK (T-1) CONSTANT) OR ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
CONSTANT)) OR ((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) 
DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 5 of Rank 1
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) OR (CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DECREASED))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 7 of Ranld
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IF (((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((RANK (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN
IF (((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) 
OR ((RANK (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW RANK (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE
IF ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-1) DECREASED))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 8 of Ranld
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN
IF (((EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED) AND (RANK (T-2) CONSTANT)) OR 
((EARNINGS (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (RANK (T-2) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 10 of Rankl 
IF (RANK (T-2) INCREASED)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE
IF ((((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) INCREASED) AND (RANK (T-2) 
CONSTANT)) OR ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) CONSTANT) AND (RANK (T-2) 
DECREASED))) AND ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) OR (TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 12 of Ranld
IF (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-1) EQUAL)
THEN
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT) OR (TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE DECREASE CONTRIBUTION
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ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
Subject 13 of Rankl
IF (RANK (T-2) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-1) EQUAL)
THEN
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-2)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW RANK (T-1)
Subject 15 of Rankl
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-2) EQUAL)
THEN
IF (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) AND TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) EQUAL)
THEN DECREASE CONTRIBUTION 
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
ELSE
IF ((TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) 
DECREASED))
THEN
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-1) EQUAL)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
Subject 20 of Rankl 
IF (RANK (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE
IF (EARNE4GS (T-1) AND CONTRIBUTION (T-2) DIFFERENT)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
ELSE INCREASE CONTRIBUTION
A.6 Rank 2
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Free riders in this sub-group are subjects 1,2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16.
Subject 5 of Rank2 
IF (EARNINGS (T-1) INCREASED)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
Subject 15 of Rank2
IF ((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-1) CONSTANT))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTON (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT
Subject 17 of Ranl(2
IF (RANK (T-1) AND EARNINGS (T-1) DIFFERENT)
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW CONTRIBUTON (T-1)
Subject 18 of Rankiz
IF ((RANK (T-2) INCREASED) OR (RANK (T-2) DECREASED))
THEN KEEP CONTRIBUTION CONSTANT 
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTON (T-2)
Subject 19 of Ranlc2
IF ((CONTRIBUTION (T-1) INCREASED) OR (CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT))
THEN FOLLOW EARNINGS (T-1)
ELSE KEEP CONTRIBUTON CONSTANT
Subject 20 of Ranlc2
IF (((RANK (T-1) INCREASED) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) CONSTANT)) OR 
((RANK (T-1) CONSTANT) AND (TOTAL CONTRIBUTION (T-1) DECREASED)))
THEN FOLLOW CONTRIBUTION (T-1)
ELSE FOLLOW TOTAL CONTRIBUTON (T-1)
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